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Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviations
Where appropriate, acronyms and abbreviations used here conform to FAA-approved
acronyms as used in the Airman's Information Manual and other regulatory and advisory material.
Acronyms and abbreviations used for cockpit devices by specific manufacturers or in specific
aircraft are indicated.
AAS
AC, A/C
ACARS
ADI
ADS
AERA
AFSS
AI
AI.,PA
ALT*
APU
ARAC
ARINC
ARTCC
ASC
ASD
ASDE
ASRS
ATA
ATC
ATCRBS
Advanced automation system (FAA): the constellation of hardware, software and
procedures to be implemented during the 1990s for air traffic control and management
in United States national airspace.
Abbreviation for "aircraft".
ARINC Communications and Address Reporting System.
Attitude director indicator: a gyroscopic aircraft attitude display, also known as an
artificial horizon. See also EADI.
Automatic Dependent Surveillance: means whereby an airplane's position, altitude and
other data are automatically reported to ground control stations at frequent intervals.
Automated En Route Air Traffic Control, the FAA's advanced ATC system concept.
There is no longer as clear-cut a separation between enroute and terminal automation
and use of this term is declining; see also AAS, FAS.
Automated Flight Service Station: an interactive automated facility which makes flight-
relevant information available to general aviation and other pilots. See also FSS.
Artificial intelligence.
Air Line Pilots Association, a labor organization for air carrier pilots.
(ALT-STAR): Altitude acquisition mode of flight management system, in which the
airplane is commanded to climb to and level off at a pre-selected altitude.
Auxiliary Power Unit, a small turbine that provides electrical power, compressed air
and a source of power for airplane hydraulic systems.
Aviation Regulations Advisory Committee, set up by FAA to secure user input to the
regulatory process.
Aeronautical Radio, Incorporated, provides international and domestic data
transmission, receiving and forwarding services for air carriers and other subscribers.
Air Route Traffic Control Center (USA): provides enroute tactical control of air traffic.
Aircraft Systems Controller: a computer which controls the operation of an aircraft
subsystem (McDonnell-Douglas MD-11).
Aircraft Situation Display, an information element of the U.S. traffic management
system.
Airport Surface Detection Equipment (radar).
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, a voluntary, confidential incident reporting
system operated by NASA for FAA.
Air Transport Association of America, the U.S. air carrier industry organization.
Air Traffic Control system: tactical control of air movements (in USA) by Towers and
Air Route Traffic Control Centers.
Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System: a surface transponder-interrogator system
which obtains information from aircraft.
ATCSCC Air Traffic Control System Command Center (USA): FAA organization whose mission
is to balance air traffic demand with system capacity (strategic traffic management).
Also referred to here as SCC.
ATCU Air Traffic Control Unit: the forerunner of today's air route traffic control centers.
ATM Air traffic management: strategic direction of air movements (in USA, by ATC System
Command Center). Also a planned NASA research and development initiative.
AWST Aviation Week and Space Technology: an aerospace industry technical periodical.
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CAA
CAB
CAIX2
CD-ROM
CDU
CFIT
CFMU
CFR
CFIT
CRM
CRT
CrAS
CVR
CWS
United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority; the UK's equivalent of the FAA.
Civil Aeronautics Board (U.S.), the organization that formerly controlled air transport
in the United States, and also investigated aircraft accidents. Now defunct.
Central air data computer.
A means of storage of documents on laser computer disks with read-only memory.
Control and display unit: the flight management system human-system interface (in
general usage).
Controlled flight into terrain.
Central Flow Management Unit: the European equivalent of the U. S. System
Command Center.
Code of Federal Regulations (U.S.).
Controlled flight toward terrain.
Crew or cockpit Resource Management: a concept to improve the resource management
skills of pilots, cabin crews and others in the aviation system.
Cathode ray tube.
Center-Tracon Automation System: a set of software modules designed to assist
terminal area controllers in the management of air traffic.
Cockpit Voice Recorder, a device that preserves 30 minutes of voice comments and
transmissions to, from and within the cockpit.
Control Wheel Steering: an autopilot mode which permits pilot input to the autoflight
system using the control yoke.
DA Descent Advisor, a component of CTAS which assists controllers to order descending
traffic.
Dead reckoning A means of navigating using time, estimated distance traveled and headings, all
corrected for estimated winds.
DME Distance measuring equipment, an element in the common navigation system.
Doppler Aircraft-based navigation system making use of Doppler radar to sense rate of change
of position.
DOT Department of Transportation, the Cabinet Agency which supervises the FAA.
DRAPHYS Diagnostic Reasoning About Physical Systems: a model-based AI diagnostic
system for aircraft faults.
DUAT Direct User Access Terminal: an automated means whereby pilots can obtain weather
and flight planning information from FAA resources.
E-MACS
F.AD
EM)I
ECAM
EDU
EEC
EGT
EHSI
EICAS
ELS
EM
ES
ETMS
Engine Monitoring and Control System.
Engine and Alert Display (McDonnell-Douglas MD-11).
Electronic attitude director indicator: provides aircraft attitude information on an
electronic display (CRT or other EDU).
Electronic Cenaalized Aircraft Monitoring system (Airbus Industrie term).
Electronic display unit (generic): a screen which displays data or graphics by any
means, including CRTs, light-emitting diodes, liquid crystal or plasma displays, or
other display technology.
Electronic Engine Controller (Boeing 757/767).
Exhaust gas temperature.
Electronic horizontal situation indicator, using a CRT or other EDU.
Engine indication and crew alerting system (Boeing 757/767, 747-400, 777).
Electronic Library System: an automated system for the storage and retrieval of
documents in an airplane.
Electromagnetic.
Expert System: a type of artificial intelligence reasoning and inference system.
Enhanced Traffic Management System: the advanced software system to be utilized by
the FAA's System Command Center.
X
ETOPS
F-PLN
FAA
FADEC
FAS
FAST
FCC
FCU
FDP
FDR
FLIR
FMA
FMC
FMS
FSF
FSS
GA
Glonass
GNSS
GP
GPS
GPWS
GS
HDG/VS
HF
HFES
HSCT
HSI
IATA
ICARUS
Extended Twin-engine Operations: a regulatory scheme for control of overwater flights
by twin-engine transport aircraft.
Abbreviation for "flight plan".
Federal Aviation Administration.
Full authority digital engine controller.
Full Automation System (FAA): the advanced air traffic control system to be
implemented in U.S. airspace, including conflict detection and resolution.
Final Approach Spacing Tool: a component of CTAS for control of aircraft during final
approach to landing.
Flight Control Computer (Airbus A320/330/340 aircraft).
Flight Control Unit (Airbus Industrie): the tactical mode and input data control panel for
the autoflight system; located centrally at the top of the aircraft instrument panel. See
also MCP.
Flight Data Processor: a computer component used in air traffic control facilities.
Flight data recorder: a crash-survivable recorder for aircraft data.
Forward Looking Infra-Red: sensors that detect infra-red emissions ahead of an
airplane.
Flight Mode Annunciation panel or function: in older aircraft, a dedicated panel, usually
above or near the attitude indicator;, in glass cockpit aircraft, a display of flight modes
located at the top of the primary flight display.
Flight management computer.
Flight management system.
Flight Safety Foundation: an international voluntary, user-supported air safety research
and educational organization.
Flight Service Station: a class of facility operated by FAA to provide flight-relevant
information for general aviation pilots.
General Aviation: all civil aviation other than air transport.
Global positioning system, a satellite-based navigation system (Russia).
Global navigation system by satellites, a generic term.
Glide path, derived from any surface or airborne navigation system.
Global positioning system, a satellite-based navigation system (USA).
Ground proximity warning system.
Glide slope, the vertical path generated by a surface transmitter for instrument
approaches; an element of the instrument landing system. (Also G/S).
Heading/Vertical Speed, a flight management system mode in which the airplane's
flight path is determined by these two parameters.
High frequency, a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum used for aeronautical voice
and data communications. Unlike VHF and UHF bands, HF is not limited to line-of-
sight; it is, however, much more susceptible to weather and solar event disruption.
Until the advent of satellite communications systems, HF communications were
virtually the only form of real-time voice communications in transoceanic flying.
Human Factors and Engineering Society: a professional organization.
High Speed Civil Transport: a future supersonic transport airplane (generic).
Horizontal situation indicator, either electromechanical or glass cockpit display. See
also EHSI.
International Air Transport Association, the representative organization of international
air carriers, headquartered in Montreal, Canada.
A Flight Safety Foundation technical committee set up to explore ways to reduce human
factors accidents in aviation.
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ICAO
IFF
IFR
ILS
IMC
INIT
INS
IR
IRS
IVSI
International Civil Aviation Organization, an arm of the United Nations; headquarters in
Montreal, Quebec, Canada.
Identification Friend or Foe: the military aircraft identification system adapted for use
by civil air traffic management organizations.
Instrument Flight Rules: a system of rules for the conduct of air traffic under conditions
of limited visibility. Essentially all transport flying is done under these rules.
Instrument landing system, consisting of localizer and glide slope transmitters on the
ground. Also used to describe an approach conducted using ILS guidance. (Obsolete:
ILAS).
Instrument Meteorological Conditions: visibility below specified minima which require
that aviation operations be conducted under instrument flight rules (IFR).
Initialize: a flight management system mode and function.
Inertial navigation system, an airborne system of gyroscopes and accelerometers that
keeps track of aircraft movement in three spatial axes.
Infra-red portion of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Inertial reference system, provides inertial data for navigation, as does INS, but also
provides other data to pilot and aircraft systems.
Instantaneous vertical speed indicator, an electromechanical instrument using air data
quickened by acceleration data; also the display of such information on a primary flight
display in a glass cockpit aircraft.
KLM The Royal Dutch flag airline.
LAF
LCD
LED
LGS
LNAV
LOC
LORAN
Load Alleviation Function (Airbus Industrie), automation that acts on wing control
surfaces to smooth the effect of gusts in flight.
Liquid crystal display.
Light Emitting Diode: an electronic display technology.
Landing guidance system, a localizer transmitter offset from a runway's geographic
orientation; used to assist aircraft to a position from which a visual landing can be
accomplished. See also LOC.
Lateral navigation; also a navigation mode in flight management systems.
Localizer, a surface transmitter that delineates a horizontal path to an instrument
runway; a component of the ILS. Also, the path so delineated.
Long-Range Navigation system: uses ground-based low-frequency radio aids to
provide triangulation-based position derivation for aircraft, marine and surface vehicles.
The LORAN system in the United States is operated by the U.S. Coast Guard.
Math, M
MCP
MFD
MITRE
MI.,S
MMW
MONITAUR
A scale put forward by Ernst Mach which states speed relative to the speed of sound in
air. M. l=the speed of sound. The speed of sound varies with absolute temperature.
Mode control panel: the tactical control panel for the autoflight system; almost always
located centrally at the top of the aircraft instrument panel. Most airframe and avionics
manufacturers except Airbus use this acronym. (See also FCU.)
Multi Function Display: an electronic display which can be used to show various types
of data or information.
MITRE Corporation, an engineering firm that conducts systems analyses and provides
engineering technical support and guidance to the FAA, Department of Defense and
others.
Microwave landing system, a high-precision landing aid which provides the capability
for curved as well as straight-in approaches to a runway, and conveys certain other
advantages. The system is in advanced development and verification testing by FAA
and is the future standard precision landing system presently endorsed by ICAO.
The millimeter-wave portion of the electromagnetic spectrum.
The monitoring "front end" of the DRAPHYS and related fault diagnosis systems.
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MSAW
NAS
NASA
NATS
NC
NOTAM
NTSB
PERF
PFD
PIC
PIREP
PMS
PVD
QRH
RA
RBES
RDP
RMI
RNAV
RVR
SAE
SAS
SBO
SCC
SID
SOC
SSR
STAR
T/FPA
TA
TATCA
TCA
TCAS
Minimum SafeAltitude Warning:a softwaremodule in air traffic control computers
whichwarnsof aircraftoperatingbelowasafealtitudeabovetheground.
NationalAirspaceSystem.
NationalAeronauticsandSpaceAdministration.
National Air Traffic System(UnitedKingdom): equivalent of the United States Air
Traffic Control system.
Numerical Control: automated machine control system using input data for production
processes.
Notice To Airmen: information concerning potential hazards to flight.
National Transportation Safety Board (U.S.), investigates all aircraft accidents.
Abbreviation for "performance".
Primary flight display, usually electronic. See also ADI, EADI.
Pilot in command.
Pilot Report: a report concerning hazards to flight submitted by pilots to ATC facilities.
Performance Management System: a forerunner of the flight management system.
Plan View Display: the controller's primary display of air traffic.
Quick reference handbook, a booklet containing aircraft operating procedures,
especially abnormal and emergency procedures.
Resolution advisory: an avoidance maneuver provided by TCAS systems when another
aircraft poses a serious threat.
Rule-based expert system; see ES.
Radar Data Processor: ATC computer modules that synthesize, from a number of radar
sources, planview displays for air traffic control.
Radio magnetic indicator, an electromechanical instrument showing magnetic heading
and beating to VOR or low frequency nondirectional radio beacons. Also, this
information presented on an electronic display.
Area Navigation system, a genetic acronym for any device which is capable of aircraft
guidance between pilot-defined waypoints, such as LORAN, Doppler, INS, etc.
Runway Visual Range: a measure of visibility in a runway's landing zone.
Society of Automotive Engineers, a professional organization.
Scandinavian Airlines System.
Specific Behavioral Objectives: a method of constructing training programs oriented
toward specific tasks and activities rather than general system knowledge.
System Command Center (FAA): the strategic air traffic flow management organization
and facility.
Standard instrument departure procedure.
Systems Operations Center (air carriers): flight operations management organization.
Secondary Surveillance Radar: radar which makes use of ATCRBS to obtain data from
aircraft.
Standard Arrival Route: an FAA-approved arrival route and procedure (see also SID).
Track/Flight Path Angle, a flight management system mode in which the airplane's
flight path is guided by these two parameters. See also HDG/VS.
Traffic advisory: an indication that another aircraft poses a potential threat, provided by
TCAS systems.
Terminal Air Traffic Control Automation research and development program (FAA).
Terminal Control Area: the former designation for Class B airspace.
Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System. TCAS-II, now installed in most U.S.
and many foreign air carrier aircraft, provides vertical maneuver guidance for the
..°
Xlll
TM
TMA
TOGA
TRACON
UHF
UK
USAF
VDU
VFR
VHF
VMC
VNAV
VOR
VS
VSI
WSAS
resolution of serious potential conflicts; this system is mandated for U.S. transport
aircraft. TCAS-M, in development, will provide both vertical and horizontal avoidance
maneuvers. TCAS-I, a less expensive system, provides information concerning
potential conflicts but does not provide resolution advisories.
Technical memorandum (NASA)
Traffic Management Advisor, a component of CTAS.
Take Off Go Around: an aircraft automation mode which controls and displays
information about the takeoff or go-around maneuvers.
Terminal Radar Approach Control facility (FAA).
Ultra-high frequency, a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum used for aeronautical
communications and navigation. It is limited to line-of-sight.
United Kingdom.
United States Air Force.
Video Display Unit, a display device.
Visual Flight Rules: the rules which govern aircraft operations under conditions of
good visibility (see also IFR).
Very high frequency, a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum used for line-of-sight
aeronautical communications and navigation.
Visual Meteorological Conditions: visibility conditions that permit VFR flight.
Vertical navigation; ordinarily refers to a navigation mode used for climbs and descents
in flight management systems.
Very high frequency Omnidirectional Range, a surface radio navigation beacon
transmitter which forms the core of the common overland navigation system for
aircraft.
Vertical Speed.
Vertical Speed Indicator (generic).
Wind Shear Advisory System: a system that provides warnings of wind shear to pilots.
The system may be passive (reactive), using airborne inertial sensors which react to
accelerational forces on an airplane, or active, searching the environment for evidence
of shears. If the latter, it may be located either on the ground (e.g., Doppler radar) or
in an airplane (Lidar and radar are both under study).
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Dedication
This book is dedicated to the memory of Hugh Patrick Ruffell Smith, who introduced me to
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research on and application of the principles of cockpit and crew resource management which has
taken place over the past 15 years. Pat received too little credit during his lifetime for his
monumental contributions, but he understood better than most in our profession the importance of
what he was doing.
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Foreword
Origins of this document
Automation technology, used in the control of aircraft and many industrial processes for many
years, has been revolutionized by the development of the digital computer. The invention of the
transistor in 1947 and subsequent miniaturization of computer components enabled widespread
application of digital technology in aircraft. The period since 1970 has seen an explosion in aircraft
automation technology. In 1987, the Air Transport Association of America (ATA) Flight Systems
Integration Committee established an industry-wide task force to consider aviation human factors
issues.
In its "National Plan to Enhance Aviation Safety through Human Factors Improvements", (Air
Transport Association, 1989) the Human Factors Task Force stated that "During the 1970s and
early 1980s...the concept of automating as much as possible was considered appropriate. The
expected benefits were a reduction in pilot workload and increased safety...Although many of
these benefits have been realized, serious questions have arisen and incidents/accidents have
occurred which question the underlying assumption that the maximum available automation is
ALWAYS appropriate or that we understand how to design automated systems so that they are
fully compatible with the capabilities and limitations of the humans in the system". The ATA
report went on, "The fundamental concern is the lack of a scientifically-based philosophy of
automation which describes the circumstances under which tasks are appropriately allocated to the
machine and/or to the pilot. Humans will continue to manage and direct the NAS (National
Aviation System) through the year 2010. Automation should therefore be designed to assist and
augment the capabilities of the human managers...It is vitally important to develop human-centered
automation for the piloted aircraft and controller work station".
During the same year, NASA's Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology approved a new
research initiative, "Aviation Safety/Automation" (National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
1989). Under this initiative, the Ames and Langley Research Centers were to examine human-
machine interactions in aviation and future aircraft automation options. As a response to the need
for a philosophy of aircraft automation expressed by the ATA, I prepared a NASA Technical
Memorandum (Billings, 1991). The TM's focus was deliberately confined to aircraft, rather than
aviation, automation. This constraint was appropriate at that time, but it has become less
appropriate (or even possible) as each passing year has seen increases in the tightness and
complexity of the integration between the airborne and surface elements of the national aviation
system. I have therefore attempted to discuss air traffic control automation in some detail in this
revision, recognizing that both ATC and aircraft are critical elements of a single aviation system.
The original Technical Memorandum has served a number of useful purposes, the primary one
being to stimulate a dialogue among professionals in the aviation community about automation
philosophy. It is my hope that this revised and expanded document will serve to further that
dialogue. I have incorporated lessons learned from the considerable operational experience in
advanced aircraft which has accrued since 1990, a more systematic consideration of air traffic
control and management automation, and discussion of the integration of the airborne and surface
elements of the aviation system.
Rationale
One need only look back over the developments of the last twenty years to realize how much
has already been done to integrate advanced automation into the aviation system. Advanced,
highly automated aircraft are more productive, more reliable and safer than their predecessors when
xvi
managedproperly. Theaviationsystemhasbeenstrainedbeyondits presumedlimits, yetremains
safeandfairly resilient. The systemis carryingmorepeople,in moreairplanes,to moreplaces
thanatanytimein its history.
Why, then,is thisdocumentneeded?If theATA HumanFactorsTaskForcewerebeginning
its work today,would it still placeautomationat the top of its list of concerns? Is thereany
substantive videncethatwhatwehavebuilt to date,andwhatweareplanningto build duringthe
remainderof this decade,will notcontinueto improveupontheprogressof thepasttwo decades?
The TaskForcehascontinuedits activities. Its discussionssuggesthataviationautomation
remainsas importantatopic todayasit wasfive or tenyearsago. Thestressesthat theaviation
systemhasexperiencedhaveexactedapricein termsof decreasedresidualcapacityof thatsystem
to copewith inexorabledemandsfor still greaterthroughput. Muchmoreof thesystem'sdesign
capacityis beingused;all credibleprojectionsindicatemoreseriouscapacityproblemsin theyears
ahead.The hub-and-spokesystemhasalsocreatedmuchgreatertraffic concentrations,andthus
greaterflight crewandcontroller workloads,at hub terminalsat certaintimes. Hub-and-spoke
implementationhasalsomadethesystemlesstolerantof delaysandcancellations.
Automationhasfreedthecrewsof neweraircraftfrom dependenceonpoint-to-pointsystems
of navigation aids,but this freedom from defined route constraintshas increasedair traffic
coordinationrequirementsandhascomplicatedconflict prediction. Economicconstraintshave
increasedthepressureoneveryhumanandmachineelementof thesystem.Eachof thesefactors
hasplayedapartin increasingthedemandfor greatersystemprecisionandreliability, andeachhas
shaped,andcontinuesto shape,thebehaviorof thehumanoperatorsof thesystem.
Technologyimprovementshaveincreasedaircraft andsystemcomplexity andcost. Some,
like GroundProximityWarningSystems,haveconveyedsubstantialbenefits;for someothers,like
electroniclibrary systems,thebenefitsappearthusfar to bemarginalatbest. It canbeconfidently
predictedthatothernewtechnologysolutionswill beproposedin thefutureif theyappearlikely to
improvesafetyor utility. It is certainthattheywill imposeadditionaltasksuponthehumanswho
operatethe system.It is only slightly lesscertainthat someor manyof thesenovel technologies
will notoperatequiteasplanned,andthathumanswill berequiredto adaptto, compensatefor, and
shapethenewartifacts,astheyhavealwayshadto dowhennewtechnologywasprovided.
Readersshouldkeepin mind that the"future" aviationsystem,to a considerableextent,is
with us today. It will rely upon aircraftalreadyin line service(andfuture derivativesof those
aircraft),just asthevastmajorityof today'smodemaircraftarethemselvesderivativesof machines
developedaslong asthreedecadesago. The generaloutlinesof the future systemcanbe seen
todayat anymajor airport. Evensupersonictransportaircraft,whichmaywell representhemost
radical future technologydeparturefrom today's system,are presagedby the Anglo-French
Concorde, which has been safely flying trans-Atlantic routes for 20 years.
This is not to say that the system will necessarily operate as does today's system. Though the
aircraft may appear to be similar, today's aircraft represent vast advances over their progemtors.
Their automation, in many cases, is two generations advanced, and the requirements upon the
humans who operate them are considerably different. The Air Traffic Control system today
operates much as it has for the past two decades, but this is about to change. Over the next decade,
radical changes in hardware, software and procedures will result in much more highly automated
systems for air traffic management. These changes will have profound implications for the pilots
and controllers who manage and operate the national aviation system. Today's system works well,
but significant problems exist, some of which relate directly to the automation that has become an
increasingly important element in its operation.
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This document is not only about technology, nor only about the human users of technology.
Like its predecessor, it is about humans and technology, working together in highly dynamic and
potentially dangerous environments to accomplish social goals, subject to a multitude of social,
political and technical constraints.
Aviation is not yet one century old, yet the system it supports has grown over this time to
become an absolutely essential part of our global economy. Those of us who have been privileged
to work within this dynamic, rapidly-advancing system know that we can make the system do
more, more effectively. The demands that will be placed on the aviation system during the next
two decades make it quite obvious that we must do more; we must develop a still safer, more
efficient and more productive aviation system, and do it quickly. The increasing needs of the users
of the system demand that the system continue to improve. The improvement of the aviation
system through more effective coordination between humans and automation is the goal of this
document.
Charles E. Billings
Columbus, Ohio
March, 1995
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Part 1: Aviation Automation: Past, Present and Future
Part 1 contains the premises of this document and most of the factual bases for the conclusions
drawn in it. It describes the technology that has bccn applied in aviation and considers the
implications of those technologies for the human operators of the aviation system.
In chapter 1, the problem is presented, the purpose of the document is explained, and
definitions and assumptions are discussed. Chapter 2 briefly describes problems associated with
today's aviation automation, and goes on to present a concept of human-centered aviation
automation. Some "first principles" of human-centered automation are discussed. Chapters 3
discusses aircraft automation since its beginnings; the technology and its effects on human
operators are described. In chapter 4, future aircraft automation is presented and its effects
considered. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss air traffic control and management automation to this time
and in the future. Chapter 6 also presents proposals that have been advanced for the architecture of
the future automated air traffic management system.
(Note for readers: Most of the serious incidents and mishaps cited with a place name and year
in the text are summarized in appendix I. Investigation reports are also cited in the References.)
1. Statement of the Problem; Definitions
Introduction
This document describes the development of aviation automation, its likely evolution in the
future, and the effects that these technologies have had on the human operators of the aviation
system. It suggests concepts that may bc able to enhance the human-machine relationship in the
future system. The focus is on the interactions of human operators with the constellation of
machines they command and control. I have not attempted to consider either the humans, or the
automation, in isolation, because it is the interactions among these system elements that result in
the success or failure of the system's mission.
The aviationsystem isa technology-intensive,spatiallydistfibutedsystem in which skilled
human operatorsaccomplish the goalofmoving passengersand cargo from place toplace utilizing
complex, variably-automatedmachines. In no endeavor has technology been brought to bearmore
effectivelythan in the aviationenterprise,and no enterprisehas more effectivelystimulatedthe
advance of technology. In the space of a century,we have moved from wood and fabricglidersto
aircraftcarrying hundreds of people and tons of cargo halfway around the caxth atncax-sonic
speedsin comfort and safety.
In the course of thisdevelopment process,we have learnedhow to automate thisremarkable
machinery nearlycompletely. The newest long-rangeairplanescan operatealmostunassistedfrom
shortlyaftertakeoffin New York untilcoming torestaftera landing inTokyo. The considerable
psychomotor and cognitiveskillsof theirhuman operatorsare hardly calledupon unless some
clement of the automation failsor unanticipatedenvironmental circumstances arise.But when the
cnvironrnentdoes not behave as expected,or when the very reliablemachinery does not function
correctly,wc expect these human operatorsto do whatever isrequired to complete the mission
safely.Isitreasonabletoexpect human operatorsina highlyautomated, dynamic system always to
do "thefightthing"when they arccalledupon? Arc today'saircraftdesigned to facilitateeffective
cooperation between the humans and the machines they manage? Aviation automation has
conveyed greatsocialand technologicalbenefits,but thesebenefitshave not come without cost.In
recentyears,wc have sccn the emergence of new classesof problcms which arc due to failuresin
the human-machine relationship.
In particular, we have seen the appearance of failures to understand automation behavior,
mode errors, lack of mode awareness, and inability to determine what automation was doing.
Common to these occuncnces have been complex, tightly-coupled automated sys_ns which have
become more autonomous and authoritarian, and which provide inadequate system feedback to
human operators. These are not isolated problems, and they will not be fixed by "local" measures.
They are system problems, and they require systematic correction.
h is these accidents and incidents that have motivated riffs inquiry into aviation automation. I
will suggest here that a different approach to automation, which I have called "human-cent,:red
automation", offers potential benefits for system performance by enabling a more cooperative
human-machine relationship in the control and management of aircraft and air traffic. This
approach requires, and encourages, more effective coordination among system elements, so that
there is less likelihood of misunderstanding or misinterpretation of system state, or which element
is performing what functions, and a more cooperative relationship among system elements.
Background
It has long been an article of faith that from 65-80% of air transport accidents are attributable
in whole or part to human error. The figure has been relatively stable throughout the jet era.
Indeed, one of the motives for increasing automation in transport aircraft has been the desire by
manufacuncrs and operators to decrease the frequency of human errors by automating more of the
tasks of the pilot (Wiener, 1989). Similar motives underlie, at least in part, the interest in
automating the Air Traffic Control system. While one can argue with the usefulness or
appropriateness of the retrospective attribution of"human error" in aviation accidents, all of which
have multiple overt and latent cause factors CLauber, 1989; Reason, 1990; Holluagel, 1993), the
aviation community and the public dearly believe that the human is potentially a "weak link" in the
chain of accident causation (Boeing, 1993). What has been our experience with aviation
automation to date? Is there good evidence that the considerable amount of automation already in
place has affected accident or incident rates? The answer to this question, briefly, is, "yes and
no". But the question is also too simplistic, for "automation" is not a single entity.
Examination of aviation incident and accident data from the past two decades reveals two
seemingly contrary trends. On the one hand, there have been sharp declines in certain types of
accidents that appear almost certainly to be due to the introduction of automatic monitoring and
alerting devices such as the ground proximity warning system (GPWS), introduced in 1975. On
the other hand, there is clear evidence that despite the application of automation technology to this
problem, controlled flight into terrain accidents still represent perhaps our most serious safety
problem. Collision avoidance systems (TCAS) and wind shear advisory systems (WSAS) have
more recently been installed in transport aircraft. Like GPWS, these devices can detect
environmental conditions that may not be obvious to the unaided human senses. All make use of
sophisticated sensors and algorithms to detect, evaluate and provide timely warning of critical
threats in order to permit avoidance action by pilots. TCAS has almost certainly prevented
collisions, though it, like GPWS, is plagued by nuisance warnings and it has caused serious
problems for air _raffic controllers. At least 20 fatal wind shear accidents have occurred since the
introductionofjetwansports and WSAS has the potentialto assistinpreventing such catastrophic
microburst encounters,though in atleastone recentcase itfailedtoprovide timelywarning of a
microburstevent which caused adisaster.
There is also a contrary uend in accident data. Several mishaps and a larger number of
incidents have been associated with, and in some cases may have been caused by, aircraft
automation, or more properly by the interaction between automation and the human operators of
aircraft. In some cases, automated configuration warning devices have failed or been rendered
inoperative and flight crew procedures have failed to detect by independent means an unsafe
configurationfor takeoff. In othercases,automation has operated in accordance with itsdesign
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specifications, but in a mode incompatible with safe fright under particular circumstances. In still
others, automation has not warned, or flight crews have not detected, that the automation was
operating at its limits, or was operating uitreliably, or was being used beyond its limits. Finally,
we have seen incidents and a few accidents in which pilots have simply not understood what
automation was doing, or why, or what it was going to do next.
It is clear, as the ATA report stated (see Foreword), that aviation automation has conveyed
important benefits. It is also clear that certain costs have been associated with automation, and that
the presence of automated devices has changed human operator behavior, often for the better but,
in a few cases, for worse. If we observe Wiener's (1993) maxim that automation does not
eliminate human error, but rather changes its nature and possibly increases the severity of its
consequences, it is necessary to understand how these devices influence the humans who work
with them, and how humans use and shape automated devices as tools with which to accomplish
their work.
Purpose of this document
My purpose in writing this document is to describe and exemplify several classes of problems
that are associated with the implementation of advanced automation in the aviation context. These
problems interfere with the effective operation of the aviation system and in some cases degrade the
safety and reliability of the system. I shall attempt to show that these problems arise at the
conjunction of humans and automated devices in this human-machine system, and I shall propose
that a philosophy or construct which I call "human-centered automation" may be of assistance in
resolving these problems in the future system by improving the cooperation between humans and
machines.
Definitions
"Automation", as used here, refers to systems or methods in which many of the processes of
production axe automatically performed or controlled by autonomous machines or electronic
devices. I consider automation to be a tool, or resource--a device, system or method by which a
human operator or manager can accomplish some task that would otherwise be more difficult or
impossible, or a device or system which the human can direct to carry out more or less
independently a task that would otherwise require increased human attention or effort. As used
here, the word "tool" does not foreclose the possibility that the device may have some degree of
intelligencemsome capacity to learn and then to proceed independently to accomplish a task.
Automation is simply one class of resource among many available to the human operator or
manager. "Human-centered automation" means automation designed to work cooperatively with
human operators in the pursuit of stated common objectives.
"Piloting" is the use by a human operator of a vehicle (an aircraft) to accomplish a mission (to
deliver passengers or cargo from one point to another). A mission consists of a number of
functions, each involving from one to many tasks and sub-tasks, which are accomplished using a
variety of human and machine resources. Most attempts to decompose the piloting function have
adopted a functional hierarchical architecture of this sort.
Resources available to pilots include their own perceptual, cognitive, social and psychomotor
skills, the knowledge and skills of other flight and cabin crew members, and the knowledge and
information possessed by other persons with whom the pilot may be able to communicate,
especially airline flight dispatchers, who share with the pilots responsibility for the safe planning
and conduct of their flight. They are aided by a variety of information sources and control devices,
including automated devices, within the aircraft. In aircraft designed for multiple crewmembers,
these resources are controlled and managed by a pilot in command (PIC), who is ultimately
responsible for safe mission accomplishment.
"Controlling" is the fimcfion of directing aircraft, on the ground or in flight, in ways that assist
the aixcra_&to move from point to point in conflict-free trajectories. Control may be tactical,
involving the direction of specific aircraft through a specified part of the airspace; or strategic,
involving the PrOvision of general instructions and constraints for the movement of masses of
aircraft within a much larger volume of airspace. Tactical control is refened to as air traffic control
(ATC); swatef_tc control of air traffic is refen_ to here as air traffic management (ATM).
Air traffic controllers are responsible for the safe direction and separation of air traffic. The
resources available to them include their perceptual and cognitive skills (psycho-motor skills are
less important than in piloting), their knowledge of and ability to recall quickly a large body of
procedures and regulations governing the control and movement of air traffic, the knowledge,
skills and abilities of other controllers who may be assisting or immediately supervising them, and
the support of controllers and team supervisors controlling adjacent airspace. Their material
resources include the airspace itself, airports, surface or airborne navigation aids, and a variety of
surveillance, conununications, and data Processing systems and devices.
"Managing:'" Strategic management and coordination of, and assistance to, tactical air traffic
controllers is designed to maximize airspace usage while preventing overload of individual air
traffic control facilities. This function is Provided within the United States by an air traffic
management organization called the Air Traffic Control System Command Center (ATCSCC),
located near Washington and connected to all control facilities (and to many air carders) by various
means of voice and data communication.
Comment
To summarize: this document is about a human-machine system in which highly-skilled
human operators use tools of varying complexity to perform cognitively difficult and exacting
work in a very demanding, sometimes dangerous and always highly dynamic physical
environment. Their work is tightly constrained by a highly-develuped, well-integrated operational
environment and a complex organizational environment. These environments are also the source
of most of the variability within the system, some of it inherently unpredictable and uncontrollable
by the humans who control and manage the system. A great deal of automation has been
introduced in aviation to assist and support human operators and managers in the performance of
their duties (though many of the older aircraft in the system today are not heavily automated and the
air traffic control system is still largely unautomated, pending an extensive rework now
underway). It is highly likely that the airborne and surface components of the aviation system will
become much more tightly coupled in the near future. Whether the tighter coupling, as well as the
continuing integration, of the various system elements will be accomplished in ways that permit
human operators to remain in effective command of the system is not yet clear, and this is one of
the major issues raised in this document.
Most knowledgeable observers agree that future social and political demands on the aviation
system cannot be satisfied without more automation, but the form of that new automation, how it
will interface with the humans who remain responsible for system safety, and whetherit will
materially assist those humans to improve overall system performance, are open questions. I will
attempt to bound these questions more precisely and to answer those for which principled answers
ate possible.
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2. A concept of human-centered aviation automation
Introduction
There are disquieting signs in recently-issued accident investigation reports that in some
respects, our applications of automation technology may have gone too far too quickly, without
full understanding of their likely effects on human operators. In this document, I will discuss
some of the shortcomings of today's automation, trying not to lose sight of the benefits conveyed
by these remarkable technologies. The automation itself, however, in some cases, and procedures
governing its use in other cases, has impinged on the authority of its operators. As always with
new tools, automation has shaped the behavior of those operators, somettmes in ways not foreseen
by its designers.
The progress of automation technology will accelerate during this decade, and more rather
than less automation will be needed (both in aircraft and in air waffle management) as we confront
new capacity demands. Does this new automation (and further development of the automation
now in use) have to be as complex, opaque, brittle and clumsy as the present generation? I think
not, for we have learned a great deal about these problems from observation of today's automation.
Can we solve the human-machine interface problems without compromising the utility of these
remarkable tools? I believe we can, by carefully examining what we have learned and applying, it
to the design and operation of new systems. This will not be easy or cheap, but it will be easaer
and a great deal less expensive than continuing to tolerate aircraft accidents caused by inadequate
human-system interfaces.
Problems associated with the evolution of automation
Most of this document describes problems associated with aviation automation. In chapter I,
I listed some automation attributes that have been found in a number of aviation mishaps (figure 2-
1). These and other attributes are discussed in later chapters, but among the most important are:
Loss of state awareness, associated with:
• complexity
• coupling
• autonomy
• inadequate feedback
MISHAP COMMON FACTORS
DC-10 landing in CWS mode
B-747 upset over Pacific
DC-10 overrun at New York
B-747 tmcommanded roll
A320 accident at Mulhouse-Habsheim
A320 accident at Strasbourg
A300 accident at Nagoya
A330 accident at Toulouse
A320 accident at Bangalore
A320 landing at Hong Kong
B-737 wet runway overruns
A320 overrun at Warsaw
B-757 climbout at Manchester
A310 approach at Orly
Complexity; mode feedback
Lack of mode awareness
Trust in autothrust system
Trust in automation behavior
System coupling and autonomy
Inadequate feedback
Complexity and autonomy
Feedback; system complexity
System complexity & autonomy
System coupling
System coupling
System coupling
System coupling
System autonomy and coupling
Fig. 2-1: Common factors in some aircraft incidents and accidents
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Whatarethe eff_ts of these characteristics on human opcaators?
_...¢2/_R/£,I/_ makes the details of automation more difficult for the human operator to
understand, model, and remember when that understanding is needed to explain automation
behavior. This is especially true when a complex automation function is utilized or invoked only
rarely. (See Woods, 1994b, on "Apparent simplicity, real complexity" of aviation automation.)
Couvlin_ refers to internal relationships or interdependencies between or among automation
functions.Tlaeseinterdcpcndenciesare rarelyobvious;many are not discussedinmanuals orother
documents accessibleto users of the automation. As a result,operators may be surprisedby
automation behavior,particularlyffitisdriven by conditionalfactorsand thus does not appear
uniformly. (Pcrrow, 1984, discussescoupling and itspotentialfor surprises.)
Autonomy isa characteristicof advanced automation;the term describesrealor apparent self-
initiatedmachine behavior. Today's flightmanagement systems, once programmed to conduct a
flightand activated,can accomplish autonomously allor nearlyallof the tasksrequiredthcrea_Cter.
When autonomous behavior isunexpected by a human monitor, itisoftenperceivedas "animate";
the automation appears to have "a mind of itsown". The human must decide,some_rnes rather
quickly, whether the observed behavior is appropriateor inappropriate. This decision can be
difficult,inpartbecause of the coupling mentioned above and inpartbecause the automation may
not provide adequate feedback about itsactivities.(See Billings(1991) and chapter8.)
Inadequate feedback describes a situation in which automation does not communicate, or
communicates poorly or ambiguously, either what it is doing, or why it is doing it, or, in some
cases, why it is about to change or has just changed what it is doing. Without this feedback, the
human operator must understand, from memory or a mental model of the automation, the reason
for the observed behavior. As a pilot has remarked, "If you can't see what you've gotta know,
you gotta know what you gotta know" (Demosthenes, personal communication, 1994).
I AIRCRAFT ]
AUTOPILOT
CONTROLSYSTEMS I
I A'"O"A I
CONTROLS I
AUTOPiLOT ] I:MS
Fig. 2-2: Increasing complexity of aircraft automation decreases direct pilot control
The interposition of more and more automation between the pilot and the vehicle tends to
distance pilots from many details of the operation (fig. 2-2). Over time, if the automation is
reliable, pilots may become less concerned with the details of their tasks. Though this may have
the desirable effect of lessening flight crew workload, it has an undesired effect as well, in that
pilots may be, and may feel, less involved in the mission. The newest technologies nearing
application: digital data link, automatic dependent surveillance and direct digital data transfers
between flight management system (FMS) and air traffic control (ATC) computers, have the
potential to accentuate this tendency toward pcripheralization of the flight crew. The effects of less
verbal interaction with ATC as data link comes into wider service may, I believe, also tend to
distance the flight crew, and the air traffic controller as well, from a sense of immediate
involvement in the team venture (as well as depriving pilots of the ability to hear what other pilots
are saying, and thus the ability to inter what they are doing).
Recent accidents, among them those listed above, have demonstrated how easily pilots can
lose track of what is going on in advanced aircraft Though some new aircraft types have had
better experience than others, these types differ more in degree than in kind. The mishaps that
have occurred must serve as a warning of what may lie ahead unless we learn the fundamental
conceptual lessons these accidents can teach us. One of the most important lessons is that we must
design flight crew, and controller, workstations and tasking so that the human operator is, and
cannot perceive himself as other than, at the locus of control of the vehicle or system, regardless of
the automation or other tools being used to assist in or accomplish that control.
No regulator, aircraft manufacturer or operator talks aloud about totally replacing the human
operator with automation in the aviation domain, and I think that few people in the industry believe
it can be done, if only for sociological and political reasons. To the extent that pilots and
controllers are distanced from their operations by automation, it is an unintended side-effect of the
way their systems have evolved. I do not believe that a sense of diminished involvement is
prevalent--yet--but it may well be if we continue along our present course of automating
everything that can be automated, moving the human more and more toward a "back-up" or
ancillary role. The AERA and "free flight" concepts of air traffic management now under
consideration exemplify this trend (see chapters 6 and 7 for discussion of these concepts.).
It is these threats to the loci of control of the system as we know it that lead me to suggest that
we need to reevaluate the human-machine interactions in this system at a fairly fundamental level.
The concept of "human-centered" automation outlined below is an attempt to do just that. Its thesis
is that by beginning with the human and designing tools and artifacts specifically to complement
his capabilities (Jordan, 1963), we can build more effective and robust systems that will avoid or
ameliorate many of the "automation problems" that now confront us. Most of these problems, of
course, are neither "automation problems" nor "human error" problems. They are human-machine
system problems, and they must be attacked as such.
A concept of human-centered automation
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to an explanation and defense of some of the
principles I believe constitute the essence of human-centered automation in aviation. The term is
not mine, and I have been unable to find out who first conceived it. Sheridan, Norman,
Rouse, Cooley, and many others have written for many years about "human-centered" or "user-
centered" technology.
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_t PrinciDleS of Human-Centered Aviation Automation
PREMISES:
The pilot bears the responsibility for sa/ety of flight.
The controller bears the rssponslblllty for traffic
separstlon and safe traffic flow.
AXIOMS:
Pilots must remain In command of their flights.
Controllers must rsmaln In command of air traffic.
COROLLARIES:
The pilot and controller must be actively Involved.
Both human operators must be adequately Informed.
The operators must be able to monitor the automation
assisting them.
The automated systems must therefore be predictable.
The automated systems must also monitor the
numan operators.
Every Intelligent system element must understand
the Intent of other Intelligent system elements.
Fig. 2-3: First principles of human-centered aviation automation
Some people have
criticized this term because it
appearsto emphasize the
human rather than the human-
machine system, but in the
aviation domain, in which
humans are fully responsible
for the outcome, the human
must be the primary focus of
our attention. The tools are
there to assist the human
operators in canting out the
mission.
Figure 2-3 is a brief
summary of some "first
principles" that I believe are
central to this concept. In
later chapters, I will apply
these general principles to
specific automation problems
and functions that I think will
be implemented in future
aircraft and the future air
traffic system.
These "first principles", of course, axe stated as absolutes. In reality, they arc matters of
choice to which system designers may or may not wish to adhere. An aviation system in which
pilots and/or controllers were not at the loci of control is possible, but it would represent a radical
departure from today's system. It might convey new benefits, but they would be accompanied by
new costs and problems. Nonetheless, radical departures from today's system design have been
actively considered, and they must be considered here in terms of the role and authority of the
operators. This is discussed further in chapter 7. Here, I shall briefly discuss each of these
"principles".
Responsibility and command authority
In their determinations of the probable causes of several recent aircraft accidents, the members
and staff of the NTSB have made a commendable effort to recognize explicitly that there is much
more to aviation system problems than "the sharp end": that pilot or controller errors are usually
enabled by management, design and other latent defects in the system (Cove Neck, NY, 1990; Los
Angeles, 1991; Sydney, 1991). There is a growing, though sometimes fragile, consensus that
factors throughout the system must be considered before assigning causation for a mishap. By
law, however, the human operators: pilots and controllers, are still responsible for the safety of
each flight and for the safety of air traffic movements. The same precept applies in other
transportation modes; it is reinforced by an enormous body of statute and case law. The law also
provides the responsible operator with very broad discretion in the execution of this heavy
responsibility. While the authority of a pilot or controller operating under normal conditions is
circumscribed by a great variety of regulatory and procedural constraints, the operator's authority
to use his or her best judgment in an emergency is not usually questioned, even after the fact, if the
outcome is successful.
Automation is able to limit the operator's authority, and in some cases it is not obvious to the
operator that this has occurred. In chapter 3, I will discuss envelope protection or limitation as an
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example of circumscribing control authority, but homelier examples are found in older aircraft as
well. All complex aircraft have "squat" switches on their landing gear struts that sense wheels on
ground; the switch, alone or in combination with a wheel spin-up sensor, enables (or disables) a
number of important control functions including (in various aircraft) thrust reverser deployment,
ground spoiler actuation, and autobraking. It is very important that these functions not occur in
flight; the only fatal B-767 accident occurred after a thrust reverser deployed during climb at high
altitude. (Thailand, 1991) On the other hand, there have been several incidents in which pilots
landed gently on a water-contaminated runway and were unable to use deceleration devices for
some time because of delayed wheel spin-up due to hydroplaning (Marthinson & Hagy, 1993a, b;
Warsaw, 1993). In the Warsaw case, there was an 8-second delay during which the airplane
traveled almost 2000 ft.
Newer autothrust systems, usually activated early in the takeoff roll, limit engine power to
maximum rated thrust or a lower value depending on aircraft weight, runway length, temperature
and other variables. The purpose of this is to minimize engine wear and fuel consumpuon. The
desired takeoff thrust is selected through the thrust management system. Occasionally, an aircraft
on takeoff encounters a situation in which all available power reserves are needed to climb over a
runway obstacle or to maintain acceleration on a contaminated runway. In older aircraft, pilots
simply "ftrewalled" their throttles to obtain maximum thrust. Engine overheating usually resulted,
but the technique was often successful in avoiding a far more critical threat. (Unfortunately, there
are also incidents in which pilots did not utilize all available power when it was needed, perhaps
because they feared overheating their engines.) In some of today's aircraft, it is not possible for
pilots to obtain more than rated thrust from the engines. "Full throttle" instructs engine computers
to provide rated thrust; no reserve is available. Should a pilot be permitted to "burn up" an engine,
or overstress an airplane? It is the pilot, after all, who is responsible for a successful outcome. On
the other hand, it is predictable that some pilot will unnecessarily overheat some very expensive
engines if given the means with which to do so.
In the air traffic control domain, concepts for advanced enroute ATC systems will be able,
either through automation design or procedures, to limit the scope of controller authority
appreciably, though the responsibility for a safe operation will remain with the human. If the
human operator cannot effectively oversee and retain management authority over his tools, he has
lost authority over the entire operation. Will this be a tenable situation?
I believe it comes down to a matter of trust. Will we provide pilots with full authority, train
them carefully, and mast them to do "the right thing", whatever it is in particular circumstances? Or
will we circumscribe pilot authority by making it impossible to damage the airplane, and in the
process perhaps make it impossible to use its ultimate capabilities if they really need them, or
circumscribe controller authority to do whatever is necessary in contingencies? My bias, based on
a number of cases in which pilots have been able to recover from extreme emergencies, and other
cases in which they did not recover but could have had they used all available resources (e.g.,
Washington, 1982), is that command authority should be limited only for the most compelling
reasons, and only after extensive consultation with both test and line pilots or controllers at "the
sharp end" of the system.
Operators must be involved
No one questions the necessity for operator involvement in flight and air traffic operations at
some level; the questions relate to the degree of involvement. The tenets of situation awareness, a
concept with which the aviation community is much preoccupied, correctly state that it is easy for
pilots to become preoccupied with detail at the expense of maintaining "the big picture" of their
operations (Gilson, Garland, Koonce, 1994). This concept underlies the design philosophy
characterized as, "If it is technically and economically feasible to automate a function, automate it"
(Douglas, 1990).
My questions regarding involvement are rather whether pilots of newer aircraft are indeed
sufficiently "drawn in" (the definition of involvement) to their operations by having an active and
necessary role apart from simply monitoring the course of the operation. That role may involve
active control, or decision-making, or allocation of resources, or evaluation of alternatives, but it
should not be passive, as it too often is today. The Flight Safety Foundation ICARUS Committee
has also emphasized the need for more "disciplined" training to ensure that both technical and
human factors needs are met (Flight Safety Foundation, 1994). I believe that pilots must be given
meaningful and relevant tasks throughout the conduct of a flight, and that these tasks must be
designed into the aircraft automation. This will not be easy, for we have spent the last decade
making the automation self-sufficient. The change from passive monitor to active problem-solver
can be abrupt and difficult. If humans are to remain involved (and without such involvement they
will not always remain in command), they must be an essential part of the normal operational flow,
not only the resolvers of anomalies.
One operator has seriously considered asking its pilots to engage in a continuing process of
flight replanning to take advantage of changing wind and weather conditions by revising their flight
plans while they are being executed. This approach has rnerit--but technology is now under
development to accomplish this automatically on the ground, using automatic dependent
surveillance to provide the real-time data! One is reminded of Wiener and Curry's (1980)
statement: "Any task can be automated. The question is whether it should be..."
This question has not yet come up with respect to controllers, because automation of air traffic
control processes is not yet available to them. It will be, however, in the near future. It is hoped
that the lessons taught in aircraft by assuming "that the maximum available automation is always
appropriate" (ATA, 1989) will not be lost on ATC system architects, but there is little reason thus
far for optimism.
Operators must be informed
For many decades, neither pilots nor controllers ever had as much information as they needed
to conduct operations optimally under changing and often unpredicted circumstances. During the
last two decades, however, there have been quantum increases in the amount of data available in
the cockpit and in ATC facilities. Glass cockpit technology has made it possible to provide much
more of this data in aircraft; information management technology has all but erased the problem of
insufficient data in the system. Data, however, is not information. It becomes information only
when it is appropriately transformed and presented in a way wtu'ch is meaningful to a person who
needs it in a given context.
The secret to compressing and transforming data into information lies in a designer's
understanding of the operator's needs, cognitive models and operating styles under a wide variety
of circumstances. It is absolutely crucial that the designer be able to assume the line pilot's or the
controller's role and way of thinking when designing information displays or representations.
Further, the designer must understand information needs not only through the minds of the highly
experienced test and certification pilots or managers with whom he or she ordinarily interacts, but
must also understand the broad range of cultures and capabilities in the population of operators
who will fly the airplane in line service, and the broad range of environmental circumstances under
which it will be flown. The most capable pilots are able to "make do" with displays that are far
from optimal; it is one measure of their capabilities. But the same displays in service must support
fatigued pilots of below-average ability operating under difficult conditions: what Charles Schultz's
Snoopy calls the "dark and stormy night" in his never-f'mished novel about world war I flying.
Similarly, ATC systems cannot be designed only for the "aces"; they must assist the inexperienced
trainee as well.
Without adequate information (and what is adequate depends to a great extent on the context
and the human operator), neither pilots nor controllers can make uniformly wise decisions.
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Without correct andtimely information, displayedin a way that minimizes operator cognitive
effort, even the best pilots and controllers cannot remain constructively involved in an operation,
and thus cannot maintain command of the situation. The designer must ask how he or she is
affec_g the processes that it takes to extract meaning from the data or ixfformation provided.
Humans must be able to monitor the automation
In automated aircraft, one essential information element is information concerning the status
and activities of the automation itself. Just as the pilot must be alert for pea-formance decrements or
anomalous behavior in the human crew members (self included), he or she must be equally alert
for such decrements in the automated systems that are assisting in the conduct of the operation.
The first principles state that "The humans must be able to monitor the automation." This sounds
obvious, but it has been observed that advanced automation is often "'strong and silent" (Sarter &
Woods, 1994) about its work, leaving humans to wonder about what it is doing, and sometimes
why.
In part, this situation reflects the commendable desire of aircraft manufacturers to avoid
burdening the pilot with information unless something is wrong. The "quiet, dark cockpit"
concept reflects this philosophy by giving a positive indication only when some system is not
operating properly. The equally important issue today is how to inform the pilot (or controller) that
the automation is performing each of the functions it has been commanded to perform.
When automation performed only tactical chores in response to direct commands from pilots,
it was reasoned that the pilots could monitor the automation by simply observing the correcmess of
the airplane's responses to autopilot inputs. Today's automation, however, is far more capable
and ubiquitous; it accomplishes more functions over a longer period of time, often with only
strategic guidance from pilot inputs to the FMS. The number and seriousness of mode errors
(Boston, 1973; Los Angeles, 1979; Strasbourg, 1992; Paris, 1994) that occur despite information
on the flight mode annunciator panel at the top of the primary flight display suggest strongly that
pilots of modem aircraft must be given more salient affirmative evidence that their automation is
indeed doing what they told it to do, perhaps many hours earlier (Sarter & Woods, 1992b; 1994).
Automation must therefore be predictable
In many redundant aircraft systems, the human operator is informed only if there is a
discrepancy between or among the units sufficient to disrupt or disable the performance of their
functions. In those cases, the operator is usually instructed to take over control of that function.
To be able to assume control without delay, it is essential that the pilot be aware on a continuing
basis both of the function (or dysfunction) of each critical automated system and of the results of
its labors to that point, as well as what it was going to do next and when. This, of course, requires
that the pilot have an accurate mental model of how the automation is expected to behave.
The formation of such internal models occurs, or should occur, during training, when the pilot
learns what "the book" says about particular automation functions and then uses those functions in
a simulator or part-task training device. The models are reinforced when the pilot successfully
invokes the functions in line operations. They may be modified if the functions are found to be
"buggy" or to work in ways not expected, and such behavior, which is fortunately rare, can cause
severe disruption to the pilot's mental image of the system. An example in the 757/767 was an
occasional turn to an outbound instead of inbound heading when converging on a localizer course,
or more simply, the lack of a display of the inbound heading in the pilot's field of view in the same
aircraft.
The pilot's model may be an accurate representation of a function, or it may be a drastically
simplified construct of a complex function. If accurate and reasonably complete, the model may
help the pilot to detect and diagnose aberrant automation behavior if it occurs. If the model is a
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grossly simplified or metaphorical representation,the pilot is more likely to be surprisedby
anomalousbehavior of the real system, since its detailed behavior may not be a part of his or her
mental model.
Because of the logical complexity of modern digital systems, they may fail in ways that are
quite different from "physical" systems, This increases the probability that the pilot's mental
model will not fully account for its actual performance. Only ff the automation's normal behavior
is predictable, given a certain input or circumstance, will pilots be able to detect subtle signs of
failure. It is for this reason that automation must be predictable, so that pilots will be able to
observe and respond to unpredicted behavior of these systems. This fact also emphasizes the
importance of helping pilots to build adequate mental models of automated systems during training,
and the importance of simplicity in functional design. It is difficult for pilots to remember the
"normal behavior" of functions that are used only infi'equently. (See chapter 7, Training.)
Automation must monitor the human
Just as machines are prone to failure, so are the human components of the human-machine
system. Human error is thought to contribute to roughly 80 percent of aviation accidents (Lauber,
1989). Though we now recognize that a great many of these human failures are enabled by other
system factors, there is clearly a need to monitor human behavior at the "sharp end" of the system.
Indeed, much of our elaborate safety surveillance apparatus is designed specifically for this
purpose.
One of the major reasons air transport is so safe is the ongoing monitoring of the flying pilot
by a non-flying pilot in the cockpit. This duty is spelled out in the operating procedures of every
air carrier and nearly all other organizations that conduct multiple-pilot operations. Flight
dispatchers monitor pilot decisions, and pilots monitor dispatcher planning. Pilots monitor the
actions of air traffic controllers, and those controllers monitor the behavior of the aircraft they
control. ATC automation monitors both pilot and controller actions. Error detection, diagnosis
and correction are integral parts of the aviation system, and a great deal of effort has gone into
making all parts of the system redundant.
Despite everyone's best efforts, however, human errors continue to occur, are missed, and
occasionally propagate into a catastrophic system failure. There are many reasons for this; one is
that humans are not very good monitors of infrequent events (Mackworth, 1950; Broadbent, 1971)
and may fail to detect them when they occur. This is an area in which automation technology can
be extremely useful, for computers do not become fatigued or relax their vigilance when a long
period elapses between events of interest, and they fail much less frequently than do human
operators.
Automated devices already perform a variety of monitoring tasks in aircraft, as indicated
throughout this document. Incident reports confmn their effectiveness in preventing mishaps (and
also confirm, unfortunately, the failure of pilots to detect configuration problems when the
automated monitors fail, as in takeoffs without flaps in the face of an undetected configuration
warning system failure (Detroit, 1987; Dallas-Ft. Worth, 1988)). Designing warning systems to
detect failures of warning systems can be an endless task, but it is necessary that we recognize the
human tendency to rely upon reliable assistants and consider how much redundancy is therefore
required in essential warning systems. The tradeoff, of course, is increased automation complexity
and decreased reliability.
Data now resident in flight management and other aircraft systems can be used to provide
more comprehensive and effective monitoring of both pilots and controllers, if specific attention is
given to potential failure points that have been well-documented in aviation operations.
Automation, in the air and on the ground, can and should be thought of as a primary monitor of
human behavior in exactly the same way that humans are the primary monitors of machine
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behavior. In the more tightly-integrated system of the future, such cross-monitoring will be the
key to improved system safety. The use of aircraft automation, especially the FMS, for flight crew
monitoring has not been given the attention it'deserves; air traffic control automation has done a
better job in this area.
Communication of intent
Cross-monitoring (of machines by humans, of humans by machines, and ultimately of
human-machine systems by other such systems) can only be effective if the monitoring agent,
whether a person or a machine, knows what the monitored agent is trying to accomplish, and in
some cases, why. The intentions of the automated systems and the human operators must be
explicit, and they must be communicated to the other intelligent agents in the system.
A great deal of this goes on already. Pilots (or airline Systems Operations Centers, SOCs)
communicate their intent to Air Traffic Control by filing a flight plan. Pilots communicate their
intent to the FMS by inserting the flight plan into the computer or calling it up from the navigation
data base. Controllers, in turn, communicate their intent to pilots by granting a clearance to
proceed; in the near future, data link will transmit this information to the FMC as well. During
flight, clearance changes are communicated to pilots by ATC; they acknowledge their
understanding of ATC's intentions by reading back the revised clearance as they heard it (though
on busy communication channels, this procedure is far from faultless (Monan, 1986)).
It is when circumstances become abnormal, due either to problems in the physical or operating
environment or to in-flight anomalies, that communication of intent among the various human and
machine agents becomes less certain. An Avianca B707 accident (Cove Neck, NY, 1990) was a
classic example of failure to communicate need and intent between pilots and air traffic controllers,
but there have been many others, some as serious. Further, the communication of intent makes it
possible for all system participants to work cooperatively to solve the problem. Many traffic
control problems occur simply because pilots do not understand what the controller is trying to
accomplish, and the converse is also true, as in the Avianca case. Finally, automation cannot
monitor pilot performance effectively unless it "understands" the pilot's intent, and this is most
important when the operation departs from normality. This problem has the potential to become
more pressing as new ATC automation is introduced, for there will be linked human and machine
systems both in flight and on the ground, all of which will have to work harmoniously to resolve
tactical problems as they arise.
Comment
Though humans are far from perfect sensors, decision-makers and controllers, they possess
three invaluable attributes. They are excellent detectors of signals in the midst of noise, they can
reason effectively in the face of uncertainty, and they are capable of abstraction and conceptual
organization. Humans thus provide to the aviation system a degree of flexibility that cannot now,
and may never, be attained by computers. Human experts can cope with failures not envisioned by
aircraft and aviation system designers. They are intelligent: they possess the ability to learn from
experience and thus the ability to respond adaptively to new situations. Computers cannot do this
except in narrowly-defined, completely-understood domains and situations.
The ability of humans to recognize and bound the expected, to cope with the unexpected, to
innovate and to reason by analogy when previous experience does not cover a new problem are
what has made the aviation system robust, for there are still many circumstances, especially in the
weather domain, that are neither controllable nor fully predictable. Each of these uniquely human
attributes is a compelling reason to retain human operators in a central position in aircraft and in the
aviation system. Those humans can function effectively, however, only if the system is designed
and structured to assist them to accomplish the required tasks. I believe that as technology
continues to advance, k will become increasingly urgent that its applications in aviation be designed
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specifically around the human who must command them; in short, that future aviation automation
must be human-cemmred ff it is to be a maximally effective tooL
At the same time, many machines today are capable of tasks that unaided humans simply
cannot accomplish. This is true in both the perceptual and cognitive realms. An example today is
the calculation of optimal orbital trajectories for systems such as the Space Shuttle; another is the
determination of a great circle navigation mute. For these tasks, computers and automated systems
are an absolute requirem_ent. Competitive pressures in aviation being what they are, it is likely that
still more complex automation may be offered in the marketplace, wen in subsonic aircraft, and
there will be a tendency to accept it. If this tendency toward greater complexity is to be countered,
it must be by the customzrs: airlines and other operators must decide whether the potential gains are
worth the certain costs. Some air carriers, among them Southwest Airlines, have decided that
"simpler is better" with regard to cockpit automation. Others, as recommended by the ICARUS
Committee (FSF, 1994), are "minimiz(ing) crew confusion by selecting the automation options
and methods best suited to theft own operations, and training for those options/methods as
'preferred' methods", rather than requiting that the full capabilities of their flight management
systems be used in line operations. Given the problems associated with automation complexity,
this seems a prudent approach.
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3. The evolution of aircraft automation
Introduction
This chapter discusses aircraft automation. It is not possible to discuss the interaction of
humans with the machines they control without some understanding of the machines themselves,
which is why this discussion is oriented around the technology. But the overriding issue, as noted
in chapter 1, is not just the machines, nor the people; it is the processes by which they interact to
get the job done.
The earliest flying machines were extremely unstable and often barely controllable. Aircraft
automation was invented to complement and assist human operators in carrying out tasks which
were difficult or even impossible without machine assistance. Later, it became obvious that
automation could appreciably offload pilots, who had increasing numbers of tasks to perform as
aircraft utility and aviation system complexity increased.
Until the late 1960s, automation was largely devoted to maintaining aircraft control, leaving
navigation, communications and management functions to the flight crew. The 1970s saw the
onset of a technological revolution as the expanding utility of digital computers stimulated the
development of miniaturized "microprocessors" with new solid-state circuitry based on the
transistor. In aviation, the changes enabled by the new technology were as revolutionary as had
been those during the previous 15 years when faster, larger, higher-flying jets began to replace
propeller-driven transport aircraft. Microprocessors have had profound effects on the ways
are flown, on the ways the aviation system is managed, and on the human pilots and air traffic
controllers who operate the system.
Aircraft functions
The range of functions that an airplane can perform is really quite limited. Properly
controlled, an airplane can move about on a prepared surface. It can take off from that surface and
once above the earth's surface, it is free to move in all spatial axes. It can be directed from one
location to another, where it can land and again move about on a prepared surface, coming to rest
at a predetermined spot.
Several categories of tasks must be performed by pilots in pursuit of their objectives. They
must control the airplane in three translational and three angular axes. The autopilots discussed
immediately above were designed to assist with this task, which requires nearly continuous
adjustment of the airplane's control surfaces unless the air is perfectly smooth and air speed
remains constant. They must remain cognizant of their airplane's position relative to their
objectives, and must direct, or navigate, the airplane from one location to another. These functions
may be performed by reference to external objects on the ground, celestial bodies, by dead
reckoning, by use of data from radio-frequency navigation aids, or by making use of geographic
reference information from onboard aircraft sensors or satellites. In today's operational
environment, they must also communicate with air traffic control, airline operations control and
other facilities to receive and acknowledge instructions, consult regarding changes, and receive
advice concerning malfunctions or changes in the external environment.
These three invariant requirements are often referred to conoquiany in flight safety literature as
"aviate, navigate, communicate". Their successful accomplishment under all circumstances is the
hallmark of the capable pilot. To these three functions must be added another, that of aircraft,
flight and subsystems management. This became a major task as reciprocating-engine transport
aircraft became larger and more complex and their engines became more powerful and
temperamental during the 1930s, requiring the full-time attention of flight engineers who became
an essential part of the cockpit crew. For overwater flights, navigators and radio operators were
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also carried, though newer technology developments have made all fright crew except pilots
superfluous.
The beginnings of aircraft automation
In 1908, Sir I-Kram Maxim published a book discussing his experiments in aeronautics. He
described a gyroscopic stability augmentation device connected to the fore and aft elevators of a
large, highly unstable airplane built and tested while tethered during the 1890s (fig. 3-1). This
device, believed to be the first example of aircraft automation, was patented in England in 1891.
Fig. 3-1: Maxim gyroscopic stability augmentation system (Maxim, 1908)
In their flight experiments, Orville and Wilbur Wright also recognized the extreme instability
of their aircraft; they independently developed stability augmentation devices for their machines,
for which they received the Collier trophy in 1913.
Lawrence Sperry developed a more advanced gyroscopic stability augmentation system which
was demonstrated in flight (while a "mechanician" walked back and forth on the lower wing of a
seaplane and the pilot stood with both hands over his head, fig. 3-2) at the Concours rUnionpour
la Securit_ en Aeroplane in France in the summer of 1914. The "Automatic Pilot" was awarded
First Prize at the event.
/
Fig. 3-2: Flight demonstration of Sperry Automatic Pilot in France, 1914 (Sperry Company).
The Sperry name was associated with aircraft automation for the next 60 years. Sperry
automatic pilots (called "autopilots") became available during the 1920s. In 1918, H. J. Taplin
patented a non-gyroscopic two-axis stabilization device that relied on differential aerodynamic
pressures. His device was successfully flown in the United States in 1926 (Taplin, 1969). With
this exception, as far as is known, all successful autopilots during this period are believed to have
utilized the gyroscopic principle.
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A capable three-axis autopilot actuated solely by hydraulic and pneumatic power was an
essential part of the equipment installed in Wiley Post's Lockheed Vega, Winnie Mae, for his solo
round-the-world flight in 1933 (fig. 3-3; Mohler & Johnson, 1971). The flight's successful
conclusion was marked by the New York Times with the observation that "By winning a victory
with the use of gyrostats, a variable-pitch propeller and a radio compass, Post definitely ushers in a
new stage of long-distance aviation...Commercial flying in the future will be automatic" (July 24,
1933).
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Fig. 3-3: Diagram of autopilot used in Winnie Mae (Mohler & Johnson, 1971, from Sperry data)
In 1938, Howard Hughes established a new round-the-world speed record in conjunction
with the opening of the New York World's Fair. His Lockheed model 14 was also equipped with
a Sperry autopilot. Long-range civil aircraft during the late 1930s, and military transport and
bomber aircraft throughout World War II, were similarly equipped. By that time, aerodynamic
understanding and engineering practice had improved; most of these aircraft were relatively stable
platforms under normal conditions. The automatic devices were installed to relieve pilots of the
manual labor of hand-flying on long flights. They provided inner-loop control of the aircraft in
response to direct pilot instructions (see below) but left the pilot to perform all navigation and other
essential piloting tasks. Virtually all reciprocating-engine transport aircraft introduced after world
war II were equipped with autopilots of this sort.
The jet era
The introduction of jet aircraft into civil aviation marked the beginning of a technological
revolution (fig. 3-4). The DeHavilland Comet, introduced in 1954, provided air passengers with
transportation at much higher altitudes and greater speeds than had been available previously. It
was followed in 1958 by the Boeing 707, an outgrowth of the military C-135 transport and tanker
designed for the U.S. Strategic Air Command. Douglas was not far behind with its DC-8,
introduced in 1960. During the early 60s, both American manufacturers introduced smaller jets,
the DC-9, B720 and the second-generation B-727.
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Generations of Civil Jet Transport Aircraft
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Fig. 3-4: Evolution of civil jet transports (Fadden)
In 1967, the second generation Boeing
737 entered line service. Its systems were
generally similar to those of the larger 727
introduced three years earlier, but to keep
cockpit workload within reasonable limits
for a crew of two rather than three persons,
Boeing automated the operation of a number
of airplane systems to a limited degree and
simplified other systems. During the 1970s,
the reliability of microprocessors improved
to the point that Douglas, Boeing and the
new Airbus Industrie consortium all felt
themselves ready to take advantage of digital
technology in the design of new airplanes.
Douglas enlarged upon its DC-9 series with
the 135-passenger DC-9-80, introduced in
1978. Though the airplane made use of
conventional electromechanical cockpit
instruments, the manufacturer introduced
considerably more automation of aircraft
systems than in previous models.
Boeing introduced its 767 wide-body twin in 1982. The findings of a Presidential Task Force
on Crew Complement (1981) allowed the airplane to be certified for two-person operation and this
crewing was adopted as the standard for all new types. Boeing also put into production its 757
series, a narrow-body airplane with a virtually identical cockpit and systems; a common type rating
covered both. The latter type caught on more slowly but is now in wide use throughout the world,
as axe various models of the larger 767. These aircraft and the Airbus A310, introduced slightly
earlier, were the first "glass cockpit" aircraft in civil service. They made extensive use of
microprocessors (the 767 and 757 had over 100 in their cockpit avionics suites), though all three
types retained some electromechanical instruments along with the cathode-ray tubes that provided
primary flight, navigation and systems information and motivated the "glass cockpit" descriptor.
During the 1980s, considerable operational experience was gained with these third-generation
aircraft. As manufacturers gained confidence in the new automation technology, it was
incorporated and its uses extended in new designs. This decade saw the development and
introduction of the Airbus A320 (1989), the first of the "all-glass" cockpit airplanes, the Boeing
747-400, a greatly advanced two-person crew version of the venerable 747 in service since 1970,
the development of the McDonnell-Douglas MD-11 which entered service in 1991, and the Fokker
F- 100, an enlarged and highly automated outgrowth of the earlier F-28 regional jet. These aircraft,
and several corporate jets developed during the same time period, represent the state of the art in
cockpit technology at this time.
Fadden (1990) described two categories of aircraft automation; he called them "control
automation" (automation whose functions are the control and direction of an airplane) and
"information automation" (automation devoted to the management and presentation of relevant
information to Right crew members; this category includes communications automation). To these
categories, I have added a third, "management automation" (automation designed to permit
strategic, rather than tactical, control of an operation). When management automation is available,
the pilot has the option of acting as a "supervisory controller" (Sheridan, 1987). In aircraft,
automation is directed by the pilot to accomplish the tactical control functions necessary to
accomplish the objective. This most useful taxonomy is used throughout this document. Under
each category, I will describe the technologies, discuss benefits and problems associated with
them, and try to characterize their effects on human operators.
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Control Automation
Throughout most of the
history of aviation, automation
has fulfilled primarily inner-
loop control functions (fig. 3-
5). Control automation assists
or supplants a human pilot in
guiding an airplane through the
maneuvers necessary for
mission accomplishment. In
this document, the term also
includes devices devoted to the
opcration of aircraft
subsystems, which arc complex
in modem aircraft.
Pilot I
DLsplays I
I
._ Flight H Control surfaces kControls Powerldants
Aircraft
F-HAircraft Aircraft iSystems subsysmaut
Controls
i I
Fig. 3-5: Flight and systems inner control loops
Aircraft attitude control
Maxim's 1891 device maintained pitch attitude, but other early automated controllers
maintained attitude in the roll axis (fig. 3-2). Later generations of such single-axis stability
augmentation devices have been called "wing levelers" and they continue to be available for general
aviation aircraft today. Later, autopilots added other axes of control; the device used in the world
flight of the Winnie Mac maintained the aircraft attitude in pitch, roll and yaw by controlling the
positions of the elevators, the ailerons and the rudder (figure 3-3).
Flight path control
In early generations of autopilots, the gyroscope which controlled roll was also used as a
heading, or directional, gyro in the cockpit Some autopilots of this period also incorporated a
barometric altitude sensor which could be used to hold altitude as well, once the proper altitude
was attained and set into the sensor. In these developments, we see the beginnings of intermediate
loop control, in which the pilot could specify a goal: a heading and altitude to be maintained, rather
than roll and pitch attitude.
As aircraft performance increased, air mass data became necessary for precise control of
aircraft speed and height. Central air data computers were provided when jet-powered transport
aircraft entered service in the 1950s; these devices provided integrated precision sensing of static
and dynamic air pressures. The analog computers likewise incorporated rate sensors which
enabled precise climbs and descents.
Swept-wing jet aircraft are susceptible to Dutch roll, a lightly-damped roll-yaw interaction that
can be suppressed only by well-coordinated pilot or machine inputs. Early jet transport control
required very precise coordination to counter this tendency. When the 707 was introduced, yaw
dampers were provided to counter the problem. Though nominally under control of the pilot (they
can be turned off), yaw dampers in fact operate autonomously in all swept-wing jet aircraft. The
same can be said of pitch trim compensators, used to counter the tendency of jet aircraft to pitch
down at high Mach numbers. These devices likewise operate essentially autonomously.
Spoilers or wing "fences" were installed on jet aircraft to increase control authority and reduce
adverse yaw, to assist in slowing these aerodynamically clean aircraft, to permit steeper descents
and to decrease aerodynamic lift during and after landings. Early jets had manuaUy-controlled
spoilers; later aircraft had spoilers that were activated either manually, in flight, or automatically
19
after main wheel spin-up during landings. The Lockheed LI011 introduced direct lift control by
means of automatic modulated spoiler deflection during precision approaches.
Jet transports also required more precise control to compensate for decreased stability and
higher speeds, parncularly at high altitudes and during approaches to landing. Flight by reference
to precision navigational dam was made easier by the development of flight director displays which
provided pilots with computed pitch and roll commands, displayed as shown in figure 3-6. The
directors were much easier to fly than unmodified instrument landing system (ILS) localizer and
glide slope deviation data, which were presented on the periphery of the instruments used for the
director displays. Such displays rapidly became a mainstay of transport aviation. They made it
possible for pilots of average ability to fly with high precision, though concern was expressed
about "losing sight of the 'raw' data" while relying upon the directors for guidance. A Delta DC-9
impacted a seawall short of a runway at Boston; its crew is believed to have followed the flight
director, which was mis-set in "attitude" rather than "approach" mode, without adequate cross-
checking of localizer and glide slope data (Boston, 1973).
DATA
Fig. 3-6: Single-cue (left) and dual-cue (fight) Flight Director displays. Deviation data is at fight
and bottom of presentations.Aircraftisleftof localizercentcrlineand slightlylow on
glideslope;the directorsarccommanding a rightturnand climb to regainILS ccntcrlinc.
Navigation systems
The advent of precisionradio navigation systems capable of providing both azimuthal and
distanceinformation occurred during the late1940s and early 1950s. Very high frequency (VHF)
navigationalradios were developed during world war H. When introduced in civilaviation
beginning in 1946, they eliminated problems duc to low frequency interference from
thunderstorms,but they were limitedto line-of-sightcoverage.
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Fig. 3-7: Enroute and approach navigation aids
VHF omnidirectional range (VOR)
transmitters became the foundation of
overland aerial radio navigation in the
United States; ICAO soon adopted a
similar standard. Distance measuring
equipment (DME), consisting of
airborne interrogators and ground
transponders, was co-located with
VORs and provided range data.
For approach guidance, VHF
directional "localizer" transmitters and
ultra-high frequency glide slope
transmitters were located on airport
runways; together they formed the
basis for the instrument landing
systems (ILS) which are still the
standard of the current system (figure
3-7). Later, DME units were co-
located with ILS to improve precision.
These devices provided aircraft with positional information of high precision. Their signals
provided azimuthal and distance information which could be used either by pilots or by autopilots
to provide intermediate loop control of aircraft paths. ILS signals, which provided glide slope
guidance as well, were used to permit both manual and automatic ("coupled") precision approaches
to runways. They enabled the design and implementation of autopilots with a wide range of
capabilities including control of pitch, roll and yaw, maintenance of a track to or from a surface
navigational aid, and the capture of localizer and glide slope centerlines followed by the conduct of
automatic approaches.
To improve schedule reliability, carriers began to study automatic landings Cautoland"). After
automatic landing demonstrations in 1965, the British Aircraft Corporation Trident Ill (a three-
engine medium-range transport) was the fh'st production-series transport to be approved for
automatic landings in category 1TI weather (figure 3-8). The airplane u_ three autopilots with
flare capability and roll-out guidance, and a
voting system to ensure concordance in the
control outputs from the three analog
autopilot computers. This equipment enabled
the Tridents, operated by British European
Airways from 1965 to the mid-1980s, to
continue flying their routes when nearly all
other aircraft were grounded.
Many newer transport aircraft have
autoland capability, though pilots as well as
aircraft and navigation facilities must be
certified for such bad-weather approaches.
In recent years, some carriers have utilized
head-up display equipment to provide pilots
with a better means to transition to a visual
landing during extremely low visibility.
Precision Approach (ILLS) Categories
Deei.dea Visibility
C,ateZm'y Heizbt or RVR*
! 700 I_. 2400 ft. (112 mile)
II 100 ft. 1200 ft..¢
Ilia 50 ft. 700 ft.._
IIIb t 150 ft..
me t tt
Runway vi_al rauge (RVR).No d_cision height il_cifiexl. Visibility is the only limiting factor.
• No fx_:tioas of miles authorized when _g visibility. The
nmway _etl by the ILS must have operable RVR equipment.
No ceiling or visibility specified. Aimmh must be equipped with
autalaud.
Fig. 3-8: Weather limits for ILS approaches
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Integrated flight control systems
Aircraft control automation was wall-advanced by 1970. Analog computers of considerable
sophistication were the basis for autopilots which performed all inner-loop and many intermediate-
loop functions (see figure 3-12), though pilots were still responsible for providing the devices with
tactical instructions and monitoring the performance of the automation. Since the outputs of the
autopflot and autothrottIes were reflected both in control movements and airplane behavior, the
pilots' monitoring task required oRly the displays also used by them for manual Right. A few new
instruments provided surveillance of autopilot functions and indications of autopilot modes when
automatic navigation was in use.
Two wide-body airplanes introduced during the 1960s and early 70s, the Douglas DC-10 and
Lockheed L-1011, introduced more complex autopilots with comprehensive mode annunciation
and a broader range of options for both lateral and vertical aircraft control Mode control panels
(figure 3-9), located in the center of the instrument panel glareshield, commanded autoflight and
autothrorde functions and the flight directors whose computers provided flight path commands to
the integrated antoflight systems. The L-lOll, which entered service in 1973, was the first
commercial type to incorporate direct lift control, which controlled lift automatically during landing
approaches by means of partial spoiler deployment and thus improved landing precision (Gorham,
1973). This feature, the forerunner of gust alleviation and lift modulation seen in some of the most
modem transports,was an integralpartof a Category IT[fail-operationalautoland system designed
and incorporatedwhen theairplanewas iniliallycertificd---afirstin transportaviation.
AUTO- FLT DIIREGTOII AND ALTTTI_E
THRUST VERTIOJU. MODES _ NAVI_tllONAUTOIqLOT OONTIIOLS 88.1_L_T &
Fig. 3-9: Lockheed 1011 Avionic Flight Control System Mode Control Panel (Gotham, 1973)
The 1011 Right controlsystem was more
highlyintegratedthan any otherin serviceat
the time and provided a number of autoflight
modes (fig.3-I0), which were generally
similarto those incorporatedin the DC-10's
automation suite. These systernsprovided
pilotswith more sophisticatedtoolsthan had
previously been available (at the cost of
considerably more complexity). Training
officersnoted that some pilotsand flight
engineers had difficultyin learning the new
systems, as their forebears had when first-
generation jet transports entered service
during the late1950s.
Advanced flight control systems
PITCH AXIS
• Control wheel steering
• Altitude hold
• Vertical speed hold
• IAS hold
•Mach hold
• Altitude capture
ROLL AXIS
i
[• Control wheel steering
• Heading select
• VOR hold
• R-nav coupling
• l._ga]lzer hold
DUAL AXIS
• Approach
Approach/land
"Go-around
• Take-off
• Turbulence
Fig. 3-10: Lockheed 1011 Avionic Flight Control
System functions (adapted from Gotham, 1973)
Until 1988, controlof largeaircraft,whether manual or automatic,was carriedout through
hydraulic actuators. Thc conventional large,centraUy-locatedcontrol columns ("yokes") and
rudder pedals controlledthe hydraulic actuators;they moved when actuated by the autoflight
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systems or the pilotsand thus provided visual and tactilefeedback of flightcontrol inputs.
Throttles(actuallythrustlevers:they were now connected to electronicontrolsystems ratherthan
fuel valves) wcrc electricallydriven;they likewise moved when actuated by the pilotsor the
autothmst system.
The 1988 Airbus A320, whose flightcontrolsareunconventional ("fly-by-wire"),represented
a depam]rc from previous civildesigns. Attitude controlin the A320 is by hand controllers
("sidcsticks")locatedoutboard of each pilot.The two sidesticksarcnot coupled to each other,nor
do they move toprovide tactile(much) feedback during autopilotcontrolinputsor when the other
pilotismaking manual inputs.Likewise, the "throttles"in thecenterconsole do not move during
autothrustinputs,though they can be moved by the pilotsto provide instructionsto the full-
authoritydigitalengine controllers(FADECs) which controlthe power systems (figure3-11).
Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM) visual displays indicate both power commanded
and power delivered, but ancillary tactile or visible feedback is not provided by the levers
themselves.
Auto Thrust System Modes:
Max Takeoff (TO) Go around (GA) .. N1 limit TO/GA I
I Max conUnuous _MCT) Flex TO _ _ FI.x TO/max cent
I I  l Max climb(CL) I
Joversn L jl_ m - I I
c,lmb I I-- qliIW I I I\ I
aet,,nt I I _ Idle .. I I _,=I \ I •
I k m I.l. l \ I A.
I_ I_ / l Maxmverse I-_l_l L I /l_
//'k\ I l l li
\_1 h'/ power is mtunotion of
th_ lever position ilia
Thrust lever poeAtion does not necessmdly represent aulothmsl mooe esmng
thrust delivered in eulomutic modes (detents)
Fig. 3-11: Diagram of dual-function thrust levers on A320/330/340 aircraft showing detents
for autothrust modes. Thrust levers may also be moved to intermediate positions
for manual power control.
The introduction of fly-by-wire systems in the A320/330/340 and B-777 has provided control
system engineers with more flexibility to tailor aircraft control responses to match desired
characteristics through software in the flight control computers. An inherently unstable airplane
can be made to feel, to the pilot, like an extremely stable platform. Indeed, some modem aircraft
(such as the MD-11) incorporate reduced longitudinal stability to reduce control surface weight,
which is compensated for by a stability augmentation system. Even manually-controlled flight in
such aircraft is actually accomplished by one or more computers interposed between the pilot and
the machine. This control architecture offers other opportunities to the designer, who may now
limit the flight envelope by making it impossible for the pilot to exceed certain boundaries, or
provide precisely tempered degradation of flying qualities as safe operating limits are approached.
This is called "envelope protection"; it is discussed in detail in chapter 8.
Effects of control automation on human operators
Figure 3-12, an expansion of 3-5, suggests some of the effects of adding control automation
to the pilot's resources. It indicates that the pilot has an additional means of controlling his aircraft
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attitude and flight path. In this sense, it relieves the pilot of inner loop control tasks, which require
a relatively high level of activity and considerable attention on a more or less continuous basis.
Providing an alternative means of accomplishing the control functions gives the pilot considerably
more time to devote to other functions and tasks essential to safe flight.
" " I
Con,.ols ..,,-sy.,omsI [ [
,..o. I "1
_..._1 Flight I .._ [ Control surfaces I _ I I
C°ntr°'s F'°w"r"ar"I--'II
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Fig. 3-12: Hight and systems control loops with autopilot.
On the other hand, note that the pilot must now give at least intermittent attention to additional
equipment and displays. The pilot must understand the functioning of an additional aircraft
subsystem, remember how to operate it, and decide when to use it and which of its capabilities to
utilize in a given set of circumstances. When it is in use, its operation must be monitored to
ensure that it is functioning properly, If it begins to malfunction, the pilot must be aware of what it
is supposed to be doing so he or she can take over its functions. Finally, the pilot must consider
whether the failure impacts in any way the accomplishment of the mission and whether replanning
is necessary; ff so, the replanning must be done either alone or in communication with company
resources.
Issues raised by integrated flight control systems
While the considerable psychomotor workload of the pilot is reduced by an autopilot, the
cognitive workload is increased by the introduction of automated devices, and the pilot' tasks are
always changed by the provision of such devices. The addition of an autopilot provides the pilot
with additional resources which can offload high-bandwidth, flight-critical tasks, but the addition
is not without cost in terms of the attentional, knowledge and information processing requirements
placed on the flight crew. Note also that the pilots' management tasks increase.
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The decrease in pilot workload when an autopilot is in use can be dramatic, but even this
benefit is a two-edged sword. As an example, there have been several instances in which early
series Boeing 707 and 747 autopilots have malfunctioned subtly by disconnecting or introducing a
gradual uncommanded roll input to the airplane controls. In at least some of these, pilots have first
noticed the uncommanded maneuver only when the airplane was in asteep bank and dive from
which level flight was regained eventually only after severe maneuvers (Atlantic Ocean, 1959;
Nakina, 1991). It has long been known that humans are not very good monitors of uncommon
events, especially when they are tired, bored, or distracted by other tasks (Mack'worth, 1950;
Broadbent, 1971). Autopilot functioning is annunciated in the cockpit, but a subtle system
interaction such as this, with or without a failure, may produce little in the way of obvious visual
signals aside from the gradual attitude change, and the human vestibular system is unable to
perceive a very gradual roU acceleration.
These systems are more complex and tightly coupled than their predecessors. They require
that pilots know more about system behavior under both normal and abnormal circumstances.
Since the systems are very reliable, many system anomalies will occur only rarely, presenting the
pilots with behavior that may not be understood when it occurs. It is difficult for pilots to keep all
knowledge about uncommon system states and failures available in memory, and equally difficult
for them to access such information when it is needed. This is sometimes called "inert"
knowledge.
Moreover, even if the systems exceed the limits of their design envelopes, there may be little
information provided aside from an alerting message, if the pilot is expected to take action. If the
fault is one for which corrective action is not thought necessary by the designer, the system may
provide no explanation of its behavior. While this approach serves to keep pilots from improvising
solutions to problems that may not require them, it does little to increase their confidence in the
automated systems.
Issues raised by advanced flight control systems
The major differences from previous aircraft control systems in recent Airbus aircraft have
evoked fairly widespread concern in the operational and human factors communities, though it
should be said that the concern does not appear to be serious in airlines operating this aircraft type.
After a survey of pilots operating these aircraft, British Airways concluded "that the A320 (thrust
lever) design provides advantages in respect to engagement and selection of power settings, (but)
that (thrust lever) movement provides better disengagement and information on system
function...from a Hight Operations perspective a future system should consider providing
movement between the idle and climb power positions, retaining the A320 thrust setting and
engagement 'detents' technique" (Last & Alder, 1991).
The lack of tactile feedback to the sidestick controllers either from autopilot inputs or between
the two pilots' controls in the A320/330/340 has been a matter of concern to human factors
engineers because these airplanes differ from all other civil aircraft in this respect. Reports indicate
that there have been a few situations in which opposing inputs from the two pilots have summed to
produce no change in airplane flight path (e.g., incident at Sydney, 1991), though a button on each
sidestick permits either pilot to remove the other from the control loop. This control arrangement
would be likely to present problems only if a non-flying pilot were to initiate a go-around or an
evasive maneuver because of an emergency before being able to tell the flying pilot that he or she
was assuming control. Simultaneous inputs from both control sticks are not annunciated in the
cockpit except on the ground. To cover such a case, it is possible that procedures and training
should be modified to include using the lockout when the non-flying pilot assumes control, to
insure that only one pilot is flying the airplane.
Based on operating experience to date, it appears that pilots are usually able to obtain all
needed information concerning flight and power control either with, or without, tactile feedback of
25
controlmovements initiatedby the automatic systems. This may be a case in which thereisnot
"one best way", based on empiricalor analyticalknowledge, to automate a system, and in which,
therefore,any of severalmethods of providing feedback may be equallyeffectiveprovided that
pilots are given sufficient information to permit them to monitor the systems effectively.
Unfortunately, information concerning the rare cases in which a particular innovation is not
effective in providing adequate feedback may not come to light until a mishap occurs. How much
feedback is enough? It depends on the context, as will be discussed in future chapters.
Power control
Reciprocating engine aircraft had only limited inner-loop automation of power control
systems. Automatic mixture controls which utilized barometric altitude data to adjust fuel-air ratios
were installed in the DC-3 and later transports. Automated control of propeller pitch (by means of
governors) was also introduced during the 1930s, not long after controilable-pitch propellors.
Later multi-engine aircraft required precise synchronization of propeller speeds to minimize
vibration and annoying beat hcquency noise; propeller autosynchronizers were developed to match
the propeller speeds of all engines. Some superchargers, installed in high-altitude aircraft, had
automatic sensing devices which controlled the amount of air pressure or "boost" provided to the
engine air inlet. Throttles, propeller and mixture controls were not integrated, however.
Following world war H, surplus military aircraft were purchased in considerable numbers by
civil opea-ators. Some of these aircraft were exu_mely demanding to fly after an engine failure at
low speed during or shortly following takeoff. To lessen the asymmcu-ic drag caused by a
windmilling propeller and assist pilots in maintaining control during the critical moments after
takeoff, automatic propeller feathering systems were introduced in some aircraft. These devices
sensed a loss of thrust in a malfunctioning engine and rapidly aligned its propeller blades with the
airstream to reduce drag.
Autofeatheringdevicesprovided criticalassistancewhen they functionedproperly,but several
accidents occurred afterfunctionalengines were shut down autonomously. Autofeathering
systems, once armed by pilotsjustbeforetakeoff,are independent ofpilotcontroland they do not
notifythe pilotbefore takingaction.To thatextent,they remove a portionof the pilot'sauthority
while leaving him with the responsibilityfor the outcome, a topicon which more willbe saidin
chapter 9.
Control of aircraft subsystems
In early generations of jet aircraft, the many aircraft subsystems were operated in the
conventional way, with switches in the cockpit controlling most aspects of system operation. The
flight engineer's primary task was the operation and surveillance of power, electrical, fuel,
hydraulic, and pneumatic systems. Discrete controls for every system were located on the flight
engineer's panel.
In aircraft designed for a crew of two pilots, attempts were made to simplify system
operations somewhat to decrease flight crew workload. Passenger alerting signs were activated
automatically; automatic load shedding was introduced to simplify electrical system reconfiguration
following a generator failure; air conditioning pack deactivation was automatic following an engine
failure on takeoff, etc. These and other measures represented a piecemeal approach to the problem,
however, subsystems were still considered in isolation by designers, and until recently, manual
systems operation during failures was still complex.
Automated flight path control systems usually provide immediate feedback to pilots
concerning their continued functioning. Feedback concerning aircraft subsystem status may be
much less obvious. Older three-person aircraft incorporated a multiplicity of lights and gages to
provide the flight engineer or pilots with such information; cockpit automation and simplification
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efforts have attempted (with considerable success) to minimize the amount of system information
which the crew must monitor. The provision of simpler interfaces, however, has not always been
due to the design of simpler aircraft subsystems. On the contrary, system complexity in some
cases has increased greatly.
Cockpit simplification has included drastic reductions in the number of subsystem controls
and also standardization of those controls, nearly all of which are now lighted pushbuttons with
legends. Critical buttons may be guarded. The switches are usually located in subsystem
diagrams. The use of pushbuttons of identical shape and size in place of a variety of toggle
switches has cleaned up the overhead panel, but it has made more difficult the location by feel of a
given switch. Manufacturers state that their "dark cockpit" concept, in which buttons are lighted
only if they require attention, indicates those that must be used, and that buttons should be actuated
only after visual confirmation of which button to press. Douglas Aircraft Co. has automated large
segments of the subsystems management task in its MD-11.
Information Automation
Though control automation followed a generally evolutionary path until the introduction of the
A320, information automation is largely a product of the digital revolution. The period from 1970
to the present has been marked by major changes in the appearance of the flight deck clue to the
introduction of electronic display units (EDUs) in the 767/757, the Airbus A310 and following
types.
For those unfamiliar with
glass cockpit terminology, figure
3-13 is a generic instrument panel
layout, showing the panels that
are discussed here. Six electronic
display units, together with
backup flight instruments (liquid
crystal displays or
electromechanical instruments)
and a few critical systems
indicators, are found on the main
instrument panel. Aircraft systems
controls are located on the
overhead systems panel. A mode
control panel (also called flight
control unit) is located centrally
on the glare shield below the
windscreens. Other flight
management system control units
and communications control units
are located on the pedestal
between the pilots, together with
power and configuration controls.
These displays, together with
paper documents, verbal
communications, aural signals,
and the pilots' own knowledge,
provide all real-time information
to the pilots.
Windscreens
Center I=MS
Pedestal CDU
controls: 1 & 2
-R) Spoilers
rust Levers
Raps/Slats
Communications
& Audio control
units
Trim conm)is
MODE CONTROL PANEL:
Tactical aircraft control
VISUAL DISPLAY UNITS:
PFD: primary flight
displays
NAV: navigation displays
MFD: multifunction
displays
FUGHT MGT. SYSTEM
CONTROL.DISPLAY
UNITS:
Strategic aircraft mgL
Fig. 3-13: Generic "glass cockpit" layout
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The flexibility of
"glass cockpit" displays
has made it possible to
provide any sort of
information in new and
different formats, and to
modify that information in
any way desired by
designers to fit any need.
Attitude and flight
path displays
Electronic primary
flight displays (PFDs) have
generally shown aircraft
attitude and state
information in much the
same ways it was earlier
presented on
electromechanical displays
(fig. 3-14), though in the
latest generation of aircraft
all of the formerly available
information is shown on a
single large display directly
in front of the pilots (fig.
3-15). This representation
adds additional infor-
mation, in particular trend
information, but few
attempts have been made to
alter radically the format of
the data aside from the use
of linear "tape"
presentations of altitude,
airspeed and vertical speed
in place of the former
round dial displays (as was
done on electromechanical
instruments in the USAF
C-141 and C-5 transports).
The British Aircraft
Corporation (now British
Aerospace) earlier
implemented a simulator
cockpit based on CRT
displays in which these
data were presented in a
conventional circular
display format. There is
still some argument about
whether linear or circular
displays are preferable,
though linear tapes are now
the rule.
Fig. 3-14: Primary flight display on electmmechanicai instruments;,
standard "T" arrangement is boxed and shaded. In upper row:
airspeed indicator, attitude indicator,, altimeten in lower row: turn and
slip indicator, heading indicator, vertical speed indicator.
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Autopllot mode annunciation panel
Spd Hdg Nt
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_ ii_
_DIRECTIO'_N_ j!ii......._....................!i!..........
Courso Heading
Fig. 3-15: Electronic primary flight display, generic. Note that in
general, the "T" arrangement of most essential information has been
preserved in this electronic display.
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Overthe years,humanfactorsresearchersanddesign engineers have brought forth a variety
of concepts for the simplification and integration of the information presented on the primary flight
displays. Most of these have involved some sort of "pathway (or tunnel) through the sky" concept
(figure 3-16). Such displays, based on concepts developed in Germany during the 1950s, have
been tested in simulation and flight, and are still under development (Grunwald, Robertson, &
Hatfield, 1980). Other displays with the same intent are under development by Langley Research
Center, the Air Force Armstrong Laboratory and various airframe manufacmmm. In all cases, the
intent is to provide integrated information concerning attitude and flight path, similar to the
integrated navigation displays which have been so successful in glass cockpits.
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Fig. 3-16: "Tunnel in the sky" flight path display, genetic. Hight director guidance is
generally incorporated in these displays, with alphanumeric speed and altitude data.
Air Force human factors experts have conducted an intensive search for simpler, more
intuitive means by which to convey primary flight information, navigation information and threat
alerting (Stein, 1986). Airframe manufacturers have shown interest in such concepts but have
been inhibited in bringing them to service use, in part by financial constraints and in part by the
mix of aircraft in nearly all fleets. Pilots fly a variety of aircraft during their careers, some with
advanced cock-pits, some with conventional electromechanical instruments. There has been
considerable concern among operators that transitioning back and forth between the older displays
and advanced, more integrated, primary flight displays could increase training requirements and
perhaps compromise safety. At least two U.S. air carriers, each operating various B-737 models,
have gone so far as to install electromechanical instruments rather than EDUs in their -300 and
-400 models to insure uniformity of displays across their fleets.
Navigation displays
Nowhere has information automation been used more effectively than in aircraft navigation
displays. Glass cockpit navigation displays are a radical departure from their electromechanical
forebears. All aircraft manufacturers have integrated the information formerly presented on
electromechanical instruments into a single planview map display to which has been added other
features derived from the flight management system database. Terrain detail, explicit location of
ground navigation aids and pilot-constructed waypoints, airports locations and other data can also
be portrayed on a large EDU, together with the programmed route, alternative routes if they are
under consideration, and other data. Figure 3-17 shows how such information was formerly
presented to pilots, while fig. 3-18 shows a contemporary map display.
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Fig. 3-17: Electromechanical navigation displays: radio magnetic indicator (RMI) at left,
horizontal situation display (HSI) at right. The 180 ° radial of the #2 VOR is 4° to the right; that
VOR is 10.2 miles away. Aircraft is flying parallel to that radial. The HSI also shows ILS glide
slope deviations, to-from indications and DME range from the two VOR stations.
Map displays are the feature most
Liked by pilots transitioning to the
glass cockpit (Wiener, 1985; 1989),
and with good reason. No single
feature has mitigated flight crew
cognitive workload as much as these
new displays, and it is probable that
no technological advance has done as
much to make the modern airplane
more error-resistant than its
predecessors. In several advanced
aircraft, these displays permit the
pilots to preview the flight plans they
have entered in the flight management
system on a large scale map display,
to assist in detecting errors in FMS
waypoint insertion.
Fig. 3-18: Navigation display (Boeing 747-400)
Current navigation displays integrate a considerable variety of complex data into a clear,
precise and intuitive representation of aircraft position with reference to a pre-planned course. As
such, they are an information management tool of considerable power. In the Map mode, they also
assist in flight path management by displaying the results of FMS entries. They are extremely
compelling, though they hide a great deal of data. Unfortunately, they are not always correct,
though this is not obvious to pilots unless they invoke special functions designed to show the raw
data from which the integrated display was constructed (see figure 4-4 for an example). An
example of a potentially serious problem that can be created by the non-observability of source data
30
occurredfor a period of time a few years ago at Kai Tak Airport in Hong Kong, an exceptionally
difficult airport because of very close high terrain and man-made obstacles. The problem was
caused by a navigation transmitter in nearby mainland China which caused spurious location data
to be input to aircraft flight management systems and thus map shifts on navigation displays.
Issues raised by advanced flight path displays
The principal issue raised by flight display innovations is that of feedback of automation
actions and intent to pilots. Complex data become informative only when they are transformed in
an effective representation, and the representation is effective only if it tells the operator what is
required to be known at a certain point in an operation. Navigation displays are an excellent
representation of what the pilot needs to know. They are not perfect, because the data used in their
generation are not infallible. The complexity of the process which produces the map display is not
observable unless the pilot becomes suspicious and utilizes the functions that also show raw data
(see figure 4-5).
Given the effectiveness of the map displays and their reliability under all usual circumstances,
however, the tendency of pilots to rely upon usually reliable information may weigh against the
likelihood of checking the raw data when they are busy preparing for an approach to landing.
There may be no entirely satisfactory answer to this automation conundrum, but pilots must be
taught to be suspicious of all of the very capable automation under their control. This is not an
easy "sell" in today's aircraft and environment, and it will only become harder in the future.
Power displays
System performance displays generally have two objectives: to inform the pilots of the state or
status of the system on an ongoing basis, and to aid the pilots to detect anomalous system
performance. The first objective links system performance to some value or state having external
significance. The second objective links performance to some value or state having internal
significance (Fadden, personal communication, 1995).
In older aircraft, power displays, by their arrangement, permitted pilots to compare the
performance of one engine to the other(s). It was easy for pilots to compare needle positions on
the electromechartical analog instruments to determine whether all engines were behaving the same,
though an implicit weakness in this approach is that it may fail to show the effects of a problem that
affects both or all engines equally. In an Air Florida takeoff from Washington National Airport
(1982) with engine inlet icing which affected the engine pressure probes, both engines were
developing only a fraction of takeoff power, but (incorrect) exhaust pressure ratio indications were
the same from both engines and the pilot flying failed to detect the problem during the takeoff roll
(NTSB, 1982). One way of circumventing this problem is to compare measured performance with
a model of expected performance; an example is shown in figure 3-20.
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The Boeing 757/767 and A310
introduced electronic engine status
displays.They depictedinformationthat
had previously been available on
electromechanical insmnnents, together
with adaptive EGT limits, data on
commanded vs. actual thrust for
autothrust operation, etc. The later
Airbus A320 provided a similar set of
electronicdisplays and alphanumeric
information. The Boeing 747-400
power displays were the first to utilize a
simplified tape format on a primary and
secondary display (figure 3-19). The
format eases the task of comparing
engineparameters, The MD- 11 primary
and secondary power displaysare again
CRT representations of the earlier
electronechanicaldisplays.
Figure3-19:Primary EICAS displayof power, aircraft
configurationand alerts,Boeing 747-400.
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T. Abbott and coworkers have
proposed and evaluated a concept for a
simplified set of power displays using
bar graphs which show relative data vs.
expected values for engine parameters
(Abbott, T., 1989; 1990). This display
is similar to that shown in 3-19, but it
compares engine power with a model of
expected power.
E-MACS represents an attempt to
reduce cognitive workload by providing
a simplified, more integrated
representation of power being delivered,
using simple dynamic bar charts. The
processed information is based on a
simplified functional model of the
monitored engines, derived from the
engine parameters shown in figure 3-19,
among others. A glance at the graphics
(figure 3-20) is sufficient to inform a
pilot about engine condition and whether
the requested thrust is being supplied.
The concept has been tested in
simulation and yielded a decrease in
operator errors (all faults were detected
vs. 43% of faults on a conventional
EICAS display).
Fig. 3-20: Engine Monitoring and Control Display
(from Abbott, T., 1990, p. 27)
The E-MACS concept performs the several cognitive steps necessary to translate raw data into
a concept of engine condition and thrust available, and presents summary results to the pilot. It
should be noted, however, that its usefulness depends on the adequacy of the system's internal
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enginemodel. If actual engine behavior were to differ from the model's predictions, the result
could be more confusing than that from a display having a simpler design concept.
The E-MACS display, like the navigation display, is an example of a general u'end toward
more integrated, pattern-oriented representations to help human operators deal with increasing
volumes of data. The concern about overloading operators with information is also the motivating
factor for attempts to provide more integrated representations of flight attitude, as noted above with
respect to the primary flight display (though a practical display that incorporates all necessary
information for this application has not yet been implemented). Similar concerns exist with regard
to aircraft subsystem displays, the topic of the next section.
Aircraft subsystem displays
Though there is still a philosophical controversy about the necessity or desirability of
providing synoptic (summarized diagrammatic) subsystem information in the cockpit, many pilots
and operators clearly fred it desirable to have such displays and they are provided in many glass
cockpit aircraft. Some designers believe that synoptics of simple systems may increase the risk of
misinterpretation. Part of the controversy relates to certification issues; manufacturers wish to
incorporate as few essential systems as possible to avoid grounding airplanes when they fail, and
the overhead panels on these aircraft permit full manual operation of all subsystems without the aid
of the synoptics. On the other hand, pilots are not normally required to operate in this manner and
do not practice it; flight crew workload could increase considerably during the time required to
reconfigure the affected systems. The Boeing 757/767 cockpit does not provide subsystem
synoptics, though the EICAS messages provide information on aircraft system status. Subsequent
Boeing aircraft (B-747-400, B-777) do incorporate synoptics, but their designers, and FAA in its
certification of the -400, did not consider them essential and the aircraft can be dispatched without
them.
As noted above, Douglas Aircraft has
taken a different approach to subsystem
management in that it has automated most
normal and abnormal actions in the lVlD-11
subsystems. The synoptics in the MD-11
are simplified diagrams of each
subsystem. When an abnormal condition
is detected, the appropriate system
controller takes action autonomously; an
alerting message is displayed on the eng.ine
and alert display. The appropriate
subsystem pushbutton on the systems
control panel is also lighted. When
actuated, this pushbutton brings up the
synoptic, which will show the system
diagram with altered icons indicating the
fault, what action has been taken, and a list
of the consequences for the conduct of the
remainder of the flight.
Figure 3-21: Hydraulic system synoptic page, MD-11.
Figure 3-21 shows an example of a level 2 alert (number I hydraulic system fluid loss) which
has been resolved automatically by inactivation of the two system 1 hydraulic pumps (the system
at the left of the synoptic diagram) after low system 1 hydraulic quantity was detected. The
depleted system 1 reservoir is also shown.
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Issues raised by automated subsystem displays
Subsystem synoptic displays (see figures3-20, 3-21, 3-22) can be very complex, though
most manufacturers have U'iedto make them as simple aspossible.Multiple faults,however, still
requirecarefulpilotattentionto severalscreenstounderstand fullythenatureof theproblems (the
"keyhole" problem isdiscussedin chapter 5):more informationisavailable,but more navigating
through the menus and representationsisnecessary to access it).Herein liesanother facetof the
controversy over what thepilot "needs to know". Modem airplanesare designed to require
specificactions(usuallyas few as possible)inresponse toany faultor combination of them. The
required actionsare spelledout in checklistswhich are designed to be followed precisely.These
ai_rcraf-taxealsodesigned torequireno more thanchecklistadherence forsafeflightcompletion.
There is continuing concern among designers that providin, g too detailed information on
subsystem configuration may lead some pilots to adopt more innovative approaches to solve
complex problems, and thereby negate the care the manufacturer has taken to simplify fault
rectification. Such behavior has caused serious incidents in the past. among them the destruction
of a engine in flight, and will probably continue to do so in the future despite the best efforts of
designers to achieve simplicity and clarity in their designs and procedures. Pilots argue, however,
with justification based on experience, that faults not contemplated by the manufacturer may well
occur in line operations. They point, as one instance, to a L-1011 that landed safely at Los
Angeles (1977) after its crew was faced with a compound set of faults for which no book solution
existed (McMahon, 1978). They do not wish to be deprived of any information that could assist
them in understanding and coping with such problems. The problem for the system designer is to
strike the right balance between too little information and too much, recognizing that the pilot's
actual needs may not be clear in advance.
Proponents of each approach argue vigorously for their positions reg_ding display of
synoptic information, but since not all information can be presented, the quesuon that must be
answered is at what point an appropriate compromise can be found. Better models both of system
behavior and of cognitive responses to malfunction information are needed to answer this question.
In these and other areas, an important issue is the increasing complexity and coupling of automated
systems and the potential for surprises (for both the designer and the pilots) due to the opacity of
such systems (Perrow, 1984; see also chapter 7).
Practiceswith respect to the provision of
information regarding subsystems have varied,
from tightly-coupled linking of systems,
procedures and displaysin the Boeing 767/757,
to the provision of synoptics simply for pilot
information in the 747-400 (figure 3-22) to
synoptics that arc the primarymeans of
subsystem feedback in the MD-11 and A-
310/320 types. The A320 and MD-11 also
presenta limitednumber of normal checklistson
theirECAM screens;a broader implementation
of electronicchecklistswith automatic sensing
of skipped actionsisimplemented inthe Boeing
777, and will likely be seen in other future
transportaircraft.Such automation willpermit
the flightcrew to alternate among several
checklistswhen necessaryto resolvecompound
faults. Automated prioritizationschemes for
such faultsare under consideration by NASA
and otherhuman factorsresearchers. Fig.3-22:Synoptic displayof AC electrical
system (Boeing 747-400).
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In the MD-80 and B767/'757, airplane subsystem control was considerably simplified
wherever possible to reduce flight crew workload, though the systems remained conventional.
The only alerts that were permitted to appear were those that required pilot decisions or actions,
which were carried out largely by actuating lighted push-button switches on the overhead panel.
Legends on the buttons showed switch position and, where necessary, related system state.
Failure to differentiate switch position from system state has led to problems for operators; this
ambiguity was a contributory factor in the nuclear power station accident at Three Mile Island
(Woods, personal communication, 1994). In recent aircraft designs, serious efforts have been
made to keep the number of corrective or compensatory actions required to a minimum.
Douglas has taken a different approach to subsystem management in the MD- 11. Many of its
subsystems are automatically reconfigured by an Automated System Controller (ASC) if a fault
occurs. The Douglas design philosophy, motivated by a desire to decrease flight crew workload,
was stated by its Chief of MD-11 operations: "One of our fundamental strategies has been, if you
know what you want the pilot to do, don't tell him, do it" (Hopkins, 1990). Many normal
subsystem functions formerly performed by the flight crew have also been automated. Douglas
has made no attempt to automate any function which can irreversibly degrade aircraft capability.
The failure to display the basic causes of the faults in the MD-11 implementation of this
philosophy presents the potential for pilot confusion or surprises, particularly in the case of a very
complex system. Douglas has found it necessary to provide ASC "task lists" in its
abnormal/emergency checklists to enable pilots to determine possible malfunctions and the actions
the ASC takes when such malfunctions are detected, to clarify possibly ambiguous system states
following ASC rectification of faults.
Alerting and warning systems
Configuration displays
Landing gear and other configuration warning systems have been used since it was first
discovered by a hapless pilot that retractable gear aircraft could be landed with the gear retracted.
Even with these systems, gear-up landings continue to occur occasionally and incidents involving
gear up near-landings occur more commonly, usually due to distractions or interruption of routine
cockpit task flow. Early warning systems simply provided an aural alert if throttles were pulled
back to idle. The use of idle power routinely during descents in jet aircraft required that the landing
gear warning system be modified to take account of barometric altitude or other factors that could
indicate that landing was not contemplated at the time. Aircraft without such modifications
provided large numbers of nuisance warnings to pilots and therefore tended to desensitize them to
the importance of the warnings.
Configuration warning systems probably represented the first information automation of any
consequence. They date from the early 1930s. In later aircraft, additional surveillance was
performed by these systems. In all jet aircraft, a configuration warning system operates prior to
takeoff (inferred by landing gear on ground and throttles set at high power) if the airplane wing's
leading edge slats or trailing edge flaps are not in appropriate positions for takeoff, or the elevator
trim is not positioned within limits determined in flight test to be appropriate for the takeoff
maneuver. Before landing (as inferred from throttle and flaps positions), configuration warning
systems operate if either gear is up or slats and flaps are in positions other than those permitted for
landing.
Nearly all current-generation aircraft have configuration displays that provide aircraft status
information in graphic form, though Airbus Industrie has gone farther than other manufacturers in
showing graphically the configuration of components of these systems as well as the systems as a
whole.
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Figure 3-23: Flap-slat position in A320.
• Figure 3-23 shows an elegant graphic
representation used in the A320 to indicate
flap and slat position. The diagram appears
on the engine display screen together with
engine data, status and alerting messages.
The number "3" refers to a flap selector
position. The flap and slat indices move as
each new device position is seleaed.
Fig. 3-24: Control configuration display, A340.
The complexity ofconfigurationdisplays
can be high because of the number of items
that are pertinent, and the ease with which
complex graphics can be generated. Though
colorcan help to directa pilot'sattentionto
parameters thatare abnormal, a good deal of
informationmust stillbe scanned (fig.3-24).
Cockpit designershave done an excellentjob
of eliminating large numbers of discrete
"lights,bells and whistles", within limits
imposed by certificationregulations,but they
have substitutedlarge amounts of discrete
data integrated into a smaller number of
displays. Operational constraints often
requirepilotsto review, by whatever means,
a greatdeal of important statusinformation
priorto talceoffand duringapproach, periods
thatare already busy. (The letters"G", "B",
"Y" referto the threehydraulicsystems that
power thevariouscontrolsurfaces.)
Altitude alerting systems
In the early 1970s, it was noted by regulatory authorities that the high rates of climb and
descent of jet aircraft were causing substantial numbers of altitude deviations (commonly referred
to as "altitude busts"), in which aircraft either exceeded the altitude to which they were cleared or
failed to reach it. A backup altitude alerting system was mandated for transport aircraft. The
altitude alert system consisted of a window on the panel in which the altitude cleared to could be
set, and sensors to detect actual altitude. When in a climb or descent, visual and momentary aural
signals were actuated approximately 900 feet before reaching the set altitude; the visual signal
remained illuminated until 200-300 feet before reaching the new altitude, then extinguished. If
the airplane thereafter strayed from the assigned altitude by more than 200-300 feet, the aural and
visual signals again appeared.
Malfunction alerting systems
The central multi-function displays in glass cockpk aircraft accommodate alerting and warning
information (as shown in an amber boxed legend "HYD SYS 1 FAIL" in fig. 3-21). Older
transports had wanting and alerting message lights in so many locations that centrally located
master warning (red) and master caution (amber) lights were placed on the glare shield in the
pilots' direct field of view. Later, dedicated alerting and warning panels with lighted segments
containing alphanumeric legends were incorporated wherever there was room for them. As aircraft
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becamemore complex, the number of discrete warning signals became progressively greater,
reaching several hundred in the early B-747s (Randle, Lateen, & Williams, 1980). In the analysis
following a fatal Tridem takeoff accident at Hcathrow Airport (London, 1972), the investigators
cited "a plethora of warnings" that overwhelmed the remaining flightcrew after the Captain's
incapacitation and a serious configuration error occurred almost simultaneously (Ruffell Smith,
1974). Newer aircraft have eliminated nearly all of these discrete warning, indicators, though the
master warning and master caution lights have remained. Alerting infonnauon is now presented on
the central cockpit screens, usually in the form of alphanumeric messages in a dedicated location
(fig. 3-21 shows an example).
While the number of discrete alerting devices has decreased markedly, the number of discrete
alerting messages that may be displayed and may require action is still large, though the number of
level 3 (emergency) warnings has been kept as small as possible. Non-essential warnings and
alerts are routinely inhibited during takeoff and final approach. Nonetheless, fault management
may still be complex, and newer aircraft are operated by a crew of two instead of the former three
persons, so there may be more for each crew member to do during busy periods. It is largely for
this reason that Douglas has automated many MD-11 sub-systems management tasks.
Other displays
Aircraft equipped with flight management systems but electromechanical instruments utilize a
small monochromatic display in the flight management system for the presentation of alphanumeric
information (see fig.3-27, 3-28). Control-display unit (CDU-) screens may also be used in the
future for ATC messages received by data link units in such aircraft.
TCAS incorporates a planform display of traffic in the vicinity of one's own aircraft. In some
installations a dedicated EDU is used. In others, TCAS information may be shown on a color
radar screen, while in still others, a new color LCD display combines a presentation of the
instantaneous vertical speed indicator (IVSI) with a small plan.form display of traffic. This
instrument replaces the conventional IVSI. In nearly all future glass cockpit aircraft, it is expected
that traffic information will be shown on integrated primary flight and navigation displays.
Wind shear advisories in older aircraft are aural and visual, as are GPWS alerts. In new
aircraft, wind shear advisories may be displayed on the primary flight display, as are TCAS alerts;
in these aircraft, the permitted maneuvering range is shown on the IVSI tape.
Issues raised by automated alerting and warning systems
Configuration alerting systems: Ways of summarizing configuration and subsystem data that
can alert pilots to a potential problem are highly desirable. Indeed, in many newer aircraft, pilots
have no alternative means of accessing this information. As an example, pre-flight exterior
inspection will not show abnormal control surface positions if the hydraulic systems are not
powered, because unpowered surfaces drift. There have been cases in which extended wing
spoilers on one wing, not indicated on the control surfaces position indicator in the cockpit, were
detected before takeoff only by an alert pilot in a following airplane. In at least one case, reported
to ASRS, an airplane took off with two spoilers extended and locked on one wing. Fortunately,
the airplane was light in weight and the pilot managed to maintain control while returning for an
emergency landing.
Alerting messages and aural signals are still used in newer aircraft for critical items prior to
takeoff and approaching landing, as noted above. These takeoff and landing configuration
warning systems have prevented many accidents, but their occasional failure, and their ability to
generate spurious or nuisance warnings, raise a problem of a more general nature. Devices that are
extremely reliable will come, over time, to be relied upon by pilots. In the rare cases when they
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fail,or are disabled,pilotsmay not be sufficientlyalerttodetectthe conditionfor which the device
was originallyprovided.
Altitude alerting systems: Reports to the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)
indicated that many pilots, after they once became accustomed to the automatic altitude alerter,
tended to relax their previously required altitude awareness and to rely on the alerter to warn them
that they were approaching a new altitude assignment. If the ordinarily reliable system
malfunctioned, or ff the pilots were distracted by other tasks and failed to attend to its signals, they
"busted" the new altitude. These reports were dramatic evidence that devices installed as a
secondary or backup alerting system had become instead the primary means by which pilots
derived information. Wiener and Curry (1980) have called this "primary-backup inversion".
Pilots also complained about aural alerts that did not represent an anomalous condition (the
signal approaching altitude) They considered these alerts as "nuisance warnings", like the frequent
inappropriate configuration warnings referred to above. In response to these complaints, FAA
modified the regulations to require only a visual signal before reaching the assigned altitude. From
those airlines that thereafter modified the systems to remove the alert approaching altitude, it was
noted that reports began to be received indicating that some pilots, accustomed to the unmodified
systems, began to report altitude "busts" because of the absence of the aural alert approaching
altitude! These reports further reinforced the hypothesis that at least some pilots had come to rely
on the alermr as a substitute for altitude awareness.
A similar phenomenon has been observed with respect to configuration warning devices.
Though they were intended as backup systems, at least some pilots came to depend on them. This
was demonstrated in two mishaps in which takeoff configuration warning devices malfunctioned
or had been disabled; in both cases, flight crews failed to detect that flaps and slats had not been
deployed prior to takeoff. Both aircraft crashed immediately after leaving the ground, with
substantial loss of life (Detroit, 1987; Dallas-Ft. Worth, 1988).
Hazard and malfunction alerting systems: Devices that produce too many "false alarms" will
be mistrusted by flight crews. In the extreme case, they will simply be ignored after pilots have
become accustomed to them. The earliest models of the ground proximity warning system
(GPWS) were prone to nuisance warnings; at least two accidents have occurred because
crewmembers ignored, disabled or were slow to respond to warnings that were appropriate
(Kaysville, 1977; Pensacola, 1978). Later GPWS models incorporated more complex algorithms
and the number of nuisance warnings dropped dramatically, although the false alarm problem is
still very real at certain locations.
We are now seeing similar problems with large-scale implementation of TCAS-II. This
collision avoidance system, mandated by Congress after many years of development by FAA, has
unquestionably prevented a number of collisions, but it is an extremely complex device whose
control algorithm, now well over 60,000 lines of source code, is not flexible enough to have been
able to cope with new ATC procedures to speed the flow of traffic in high-density terminal areas,
nor with the large number of aircraft in certain airport areas. As a result, pilots have been
burdened with large numbers of "nuisance" warnings in the vicinity of certain airports such as
Orange County, California, and during departures from certain terminals, among them D la]las-Fort
Worth, Texas. The result has been erosion of confidence in the system, and concern that in certain
cases, TCAS may actually worsen the situation (Mellone, 1993). These new mandated functions
have been "add-ons"; they are not always integrated with the remainder of the warning systems,
and may require quite different responses.
TCAS was mandated by the Congress, as were GPWS and WSAS. They were designed as
self-sufficient, add-on systems; in older aircraft, they are not integrated with other cockpit systems,
nor with each other. We are already seeing the emergence of new traffic surveillance requirements
for TCAS, particularly in over-water navigation where radar surveillance is not available. The
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TCAS displayswerenot designed for these purposes and they may or may not provide information
in a form that assists flight crews to perform the additional funcuons implicit in the new
requirements. This is likely to become a more serious problem if p.ilots are required to take over
more functions now carried out by air traffic controllers (see discussion of"free flight", chapter 6).
It is also clear that the use of TCAS in line operations has caused considerable concern among
air traffic controllers, who are faced with sudden pilot deviations from cleared altitudes without
advance warning under circumstances they cannot control. Their ability to maintain effective
command of air traffic rests upon the assumption that pilots will do what they are told to do, and
the interjection of this source of uncontrollable variance has caused them great discomfort.
There are fundamental tensions between systems capabilities and limitations and human
characteristics. False warnings always diminish human trust of warning systems, yet the danger
of a missed potentially catastrophic situation requires that conservative warning limits be embodied
in such systems. Such situations can arise suddenly and can require immediate action, yet
controllers, without an understanding of the immediate problem, cannot function effectively
without a knowledge of pilot intent (nor, for that matter, can pilots function effectively without
knowledge of controller intent). Communication of intent in advance of action by both humans
and machines is an important issue in any real-time dynamic system if all players, or agents, are to
remain informed of system status and progress.
Management Automation
During the 1960s, area navigation ("RNAV") systems independent of surface radio aids began
to be introduced into aviation. The earliest such system made use of Doppler radar to determine
relative movement over the earth's surface. The system was more accurate over water than over
irregular terrain, but it provided considerable assistance during the long overwater portions of
intercontinental flights and did not require of its operators the highly-developed skills required for
celestial navigation. During this period also, inertial navigation systems (INS), first developed for
long-range missiles, began to be adapted to air navigation. Like Doppler, all required equipment
was carried onboard the aircraft.
INS systems used highly accurate gyroscopes and accelerometers to determine the movement
of the system (and the airplane which carried it) after being given a very accurate statement of its
initial position prior to flight. INS, like Doppler, was totally reliant on this initialization. If an
inaccurate initial position was input, it could not be corrected after the aircraft took off. Several
trans-oceanic flights had to be aborted after it was determined that the initial position entry was
incorrect.
Both of these early area navigation ("RNAV") systems permitted pilots to enter a series of
latitude and longitude waypoint specifications, after which the systems would provide navigation
data to the autoflight systems. To this extent, these systems represented the beginnings of flight,
or at least navigation, management automation. The systems provided pilots with much greater
flexibility, but at the expense of greater complexity. They also enabled new types of human error
associated with manual entry of waypoint data into navigation computers, a cumbersome and error-
intolerant process.
The most revolutionary changes brought about by the introduction of digital computers into
aircraft automation have been in the area of flight management. Hight management systems (FMS)
in the contemporary sense have been in service for little more than a decade, but they have
transformed the pilot's tasks during that time. This section contains a brief description of the
modem flight management system, the functions it performs, and its interfaces with the flight
crew.
/
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Flight management systems
The introduction of the MD-80 and the Boeing 767/757 marked a fundamental sb_ift in aircraft
automation, as noted above. In these machines, the first systematic attempts were made to
integrate a variety of automated devices into a seamless automation capability designed for routine
use in line operations. Though pilots had been able to program overwater flight paths using inertial
navigation systems in older aircraft, the new flight management systems were designed to be the
primary means of navigation under all conditions.
Figure 3-25 again shows the controlloops diagrammed above, but with the addition of an
outerloop which representsmanagement functions.Once again,automation has relievedthepilot
of certaintasks,but has added other tasksinvolving additionalcognitiveworkload. These tasks
are the product of the complexity and self-sufficiencyof the new functionality,flexibilityand
complexity of flightmanagernent systems. They impose additionalknowledge requirements,even
while they relievethe pilot of tacticalmanagement chores. Most important, there is more
informationtobc gatheredand processedto _ the stateofthe aircraftand itsautomation.
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Fig. 3-25: Outer control loops involved in strategic management and information processing.
Flight management system functions
Contemporary flight management systems are complex computational devices linked to and
communicating with a great many other aircraft systems as well as with the pilots. Figure 3-26
shows this diagrammatically for the MD-I I FMS (Honeywell, 1990) and the following discussion
describes this system, though others have similar capabilities.
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FMS software, resident in a flight management computer (FMC), includes an operational
program (containing, in this case, over 1400 software modules), a navigation data base, and a
performance data base for the aircraft in which it is installed.
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Figure 3-26: Interaction of flight management computer with other aircraft avionics (Honeywell).
The FMC navigation data base includes most of the data the pilot would normally access by
referring to navigation charts. This information can be displayed on the CDU or CRT map. The
geographic area covered includes all areas where the airplane is normally flown. The data base,
tailored to specific airline customers, contains 32,500 navigation points and airway route structure
data. The stored data includes the location of VHF navigation aids, airports, runways,
geographical reference points, and other airline-selected information such as standard instrument
departures, standard arrival routes, approaches and company routes. Up to 40 additional
way'points can be entered into the data base by the pilots. The FMS software executes these
functions:
Navigation
Performance
Guidance
Electronic instrument system
Control-display unit
Input/output
Determination of position, velocity and wind;
management of navigation data sources.
Trajectory determination, definition of
guidance and control targets, flight path
predictions. T'tme and fuel at destination.
Error determination, steering and control
command generation.
Computation of map and situation data for
display.
Processing of keystrokes, flight plan
construction, presentation of performance
and flight plan data.
Processing of received and transmitted data.
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Built-in test
Operating system
System monitoring, self testing and record
keeping.
Executive Control of the operational program,
memory management, and stored routines.
The FMC performance data base reduces the need for the pilot to refer to performance manuals
during flight; it provides speed targets and altitude guidance with which the flight control computer
develops pitch and thrust commands. The performance data base is also used by the FMC to
provide detailed predictions along the entire aircraft trajectory. The data stored in the data base
includes accurate airplane drag and engine model data, maximum altitudes, and maximum and
minimum speeds. Functions performed by the FMS include navigation using inertial data from
inertial reference units aboard the airplane, updated by a combination of surface and/or satellite
navigation aids when available. It provides lateral guidance based on a stored or manually entered
flight plan, and vertical guidance and navigation during climb and descent based on gross weight,
cost index, predicted winds at cruise altitudes, and specific ATC constraints.
Flight management system controls
Interaction with all flight
management systems is through a
control and display unit (CDU) which
combines a monochromatic or color
CRT or LCD screen with a keyboard.
An example of a CDU is shown in
figure 3-27. The unit contains a CRT
display screen, line select keys on
each side of the CRT, 15 mode select
keys, a numeric keypad, and an
alphabetic keypad. The mode select
keys provide access to FMS function
pages and data; the alphanumeric
keypads permit entry of data into the
computer.
Newer FlVISs provide modes and
functions to minimize pilot workload.
Among them are the "ENG OUT"
function, which provides automatic or
manual access to the flight plan (F-
PLN) or performance (PERF-') pages
to assist in evaluating and handling an
engine failure condition. Entry of
data is accomplished by using the
keypads. The entered data are shown
on a scratchpad line (see below);
when a line select key is pushed, the
data are transferred to the indicated
line ff they are in a format acceptable
to the computer.
Figure 3-27: Honeywell FMS control and display unit.
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Flight management system displays
The CDU display consists of a large number of "pages", each containing up to 14 lines of
alphanumeric information as shown in figure 3-28.
The CDU screen shown here
appears when the "INIT" (irtitialize)
mode select key is actuated. The title
line shows that this is the first of three
flight plan screens; others may be
accessed with the PAGE key. The
scratch pad line is at the bottom of the
display. Vertical arrows indicate that
the arrow keys may be used to
increment values. The small font
displays are predicted, default or
FMC-calculated values, and labels.
The 50 CDU pages are arranged in a
"tree" architecture. A portion of this
logical, but complex, architecture is
shown below in figure 3-29.
Figure 3-28: Control and display unit screen, MD-I1.
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Figure 3-29: FMS mode screens, MD-11.
These diagrams show the tree
structure for two modes of this FMS.
There are 12 such structures, but in a
study of another FMS of the same
generation, it was found that the
number of sequences was several
times the number planned for by the
manufacturer (Corker & Reinhardt,
1990). These data structures, as well
as the displays, vary greatly among
aircraft types and avionics
manufacturers. This large number of
potential trees involves a considerable
attentional demand upon the pilot
even if he or she is fitlly proficient in
the use of the FMS. Since flight plan
changes are most commonly required
during departure and arrival, re-
programming the FMS can divert a
significant amount of attention that
may be needed for outside scan and
for cross-cockpit monitoring.
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Flight management system operation
The two CDUs are redundant. In the MD-11, both pilots may interact with the FMS
simultaneously; however, the system will accept flight plan modifications only one at a time.
There are two FMCs, each of which may accept data from either CDU; one FMC is designated as
master, and both must confh'm data entry before new data will be accepted. The two computers
communicate with each other through a private data bus.
Effects of management automation
Programming of INS and Doppler units is an exacting task, requiring precise and accurate
entry of many alphanumeric characters. Slips (Norman, 1981) were not uncommon and once
made, sometimes went undetected. Air carders instituted a variety of procedural requirements to
detect such errors both during data entry and thereafter during overwater flight, utilizing various
crewmcrnbers to read, enter and confirm data and special progress charts to be filled out enroute, in
the hope of trapping undetected errors before they affected traffic separation over water where no
othermeans ofpositionevaluationwas available.
A few serious errors still crept through the procedural barriers, however, and some led to
near-coUisions many hours after the initial programming was accomplished, as in an incident
between a Delta Airlines L-1011 and a Continental 747 over the North Atlantic Ocean (1987)
(Preble, 1987). Also, autopilots had to be properly coupled to the navigation systems; ff this was
not done, the aircraft could fly a long distance in heading mode rather than in the intended
navigation mode. Based on data made available by Russia in recent years, it is now thought that
this may have been the error that led to the destruction by Soviet fighters of a Korean Air Lines B-
747 after it flew many miles over Soviet territory (Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin islands)
enroute to Seoul from Anchorage, Alaska (Sakhalin Island, 1983). It was also the cause of a more
recent ncar-coUision between an El A1 747 and a British Airways 747 south of Iceland (Atlantic
Ocean, 1990; Pan American, 1990).
Fundamental issues posed by management automation are discussed more fully in chapter 8,
but it should be noted that even the early attempts at management automation sometimes distanced
pilots from the tactical details of theit operations. This, of course, depended on whether the human
operators maintained a high degree of alertness concerning the progress of their missions. The
safety record indicates clearly that most did, regardless of whether automation was in use. What
the increasingly capable automation provided, however, was the opportunity to become somewhat
less involved, an opportunity which could easily permit tired, fatigued or preoccupied pilots to lose
track of their situation if they were not on guard against it. We shall see in chapter 4 the degree to
which more modern automation has increased this danger.
Issues raised by flight management automation
In all FMSs, the complexity of the mode and display architecm_ poses substantial operational
issues. Much has been done to simplify routine data entry, but recovery from errors in
programming (an acceptable but incorrect entry, for example) can be difficult. Entry of certain
types of data remains cumbersome and diverts attention from other flying tasks, as discussed
below. If an unacceptable entry is attempted, it is rejected, but without explanation of the error that
led to the rejection, as one instance.
Interaction with the FMS is through one of two or three identical CDUs mounted on the center
console. Even with color to assist, operation of the FMS requires close visual attention to the
screen, and precision in entering data on the keypads. Alphanumeric data entry is known to be
subject to human errors: numbers may be recalled incorrectly from short-term memory, they may
be input.incorrectly, or they may be misread when the entries axe verified in the scratchpad before
entry into the computer. Some data must be entered in a specific sequence which imposes
additional memory load on the operator; screen prompts are not always clear, when they are
available.
Avionics and aircraft manufacturers have made many efforts to make interaction with the FMS
more error-resistant. Standard or frequently-used routes are stored in the navigation data base and
may be recalled by number. SIDs and STARs are also in the data base; if a change is required by
ATC, only the name of the procedure need be entered. Changing the arrival runway automaticauy
changes the route of flight. Appropriate navigation radio frequencies are auto-tuned as required.
Perhaps most important, newer FMSs interact directly with navigation displays; pilots are shown
the effect of a change of flight plan in graphic form. They can thus verify that an alternative flight
plan is reasonable (though not necessarily what was requested by ATC) before putting it into
effect.
In most newer aircraft, entry of tactical flight plan modifications (speed, altitude, heading,
vertical speed) can be done through the mode control panel (MCP) (see figure 3-30) rather than the
CDU. These entries may either supersede FMS data temporarily, or may be entered into the FMS
directly from the panel.
It is likely that these improvements may
resolve some problems with tactical data entry,
though pilots must keep track of more potential
mode interactions. Mode control panels now
contain numerous multi-function control knobs
(turn to set; pull to activate, push to transfer data
to FMC), which has posed problems of a different
sort when pilots have inadvertently activated a
mode other than that intended.
MCP Knob Operation
• Push- Hold
activates
current value
• Rotate- Preselect
set new datum
• Pull- Select; activates
preselected datum
Fig. 3-30: MCP operation (Fokker 100)
Vertical navigation profiles generated by the FMS take account of standard ATC altitude
constraints as well as airplane performance constraints, though the air traffic control system is not,
at this time, able to take full advantage of the capabilities of management automation which
calculates profiles based on actual rather than average aircraft weight. Optimal descent profiles will
therefore differ enough to cause sequencing problems for ATC.
In some newer aircraft, manual tuning of navigation radios is possible only by interacting with
the CDU. Many pilots have complained that alphanumeric entry of frequency data is more time-
consuming and requires more prolonged attention inside the cockpit than setting the rotary selector
knobs in older aircraft.
Though flight management systems truly permit pilots to manage, rather than control, their
aircraft, the dynamic nature and increasing complexity of today's operational environment has
strained the capabilities of the human-machine interface (see below). Despite this, the systems are
extremely effective and have enabled many improvements in operational efficiency and economy.
The greatest improvement in FMS display capability has been its integration with aircraft
navigation displays, improving visualization and freeing the systems from some of the constraints
imposed by small alphanumeric CRTs. The addition of colors, matched with those used on the
navigation displays, to the CDU display may help (early displays were invariably monochromatic),
though the resolution of the color displays is somewhat less and the usefulness of color in this
application has not received much systematic study. The design of pages, however, still represents
a compromise between the amount of alphanumeric data per page and the number of pages
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necessaryto enable a particularfunction.Pilotsmust look ata very largeamount of datathrough a
relativelysmall "keyhole" ('Woods, 1994a).
Initial FMS designswere based on thenotionof FMS use athigh altitudein cruiseflight.The
success of the concept resultedin extension of the "cruise"concept into use throughout flight,
without redesign of the interfaces,a common problem with successful automation (Fadden,
personal communication, 1995). The attentionrequiredfor reprogramming has led to undesirable
ad hoc procedures in the cockpit; appreciable numbers of pilotsprefernot to interactwith the
systems below 10,000 feetduring descent,in order not to compromise aircraftmanagement and
scan for othertraffic(OnTy, 1985; Wiener, 1989). This approach pen_its human resourcestobe
devoted to more important tasks,but atthe costof losingsome of the benefitsof the FMS during
flightin the terminalarea(such as itsknowledge of altituderestrictions).As noted by Fadden, this
isa problem of human-system interfacedesign,ratherthan a problem in the functionalityof the
systems thernselves.Research and development effortsare underway to improve these interfaces
and specificallyto make them lesstotallydependent on cumbersome alphanumeric data entry,but
considerableattentionto the CDU displaysisalso warranted. There remain important questions
about the integrationof thesesystems intothe overallcockpitand automation design,and itisthese
integrationissuesthatmost need to be resolved.
Comment
Aircraftautomation's major benefits,among them improved fuel economy and operating
efficicncies,have been accompanied by certaincosts,includingan increasedcognitiveburden on
pilots,new informationrequirements which have requiredadditionaltraining,and more complex,
tightly-coupled,lessobservable systems. To some extent,both benefitsand costsare inherentin
these highlyautomated systems. Other costshave accrued because today's automated systems are
not optimally designed to work cooperatively with theirhuman operators. Finally,some costs
have accrued because the automation was designed to operatein an ATC system thatisconstantly
evolving,forcinghuman operatorstoadapt and tailortheiruses of and responses tothe automation
and the changed requirements.
Plus fa change, plus la m_me chose---qhe system changes (as usual); the pilots and controllers
adapt (as usual). This is not new, but as elements of the system become more complex and less
transparent, the task of adapting becomes more complex and more difficult. The further changes
likely to be seen in future aircraft, and their likely effects on operators, are the subject of the next
chapter.
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4. Aircraft automation in the future
Introduction
This chapter considers aircraft automation proposed or already developed for use in the near-
term future system. Airframe and avionics manufacturers and operators alike are constantly on the
watch for emerging technology that can widen their scope of operations. Satellite navigation, as an
instance, offers the promise of freeing aircraft from constraints imposed by ground navigation
facilities, especially ff those same satellites can enable landing at any suitable airport, whether or
not it is served by precision approach systems. On the other hand, new technology is expensive,
and air carriers are only beginning to emerge from a period in which they have suffered the greatest
losses in the history of commercial aviation.
Given this economic climate, new aircraft will have to be more efficient, more reliable, and
less expensive to maintain than those presently on the market It will not be easy for airframe and
powerplant manufacturers to meet these goals. If new automation functionality can improve
efficiency or productivity, it will be embraced. If not, it is not likely to find its way onto future
aircraft, at least in the near term. Let us look for a moment at some of the enhancements that have
been proposed for near-term (1995-2015) implementation (figure 4-1).
Enhancements proposed for future transport aircraft
• Control Automation
Low-visibility taxiing assistance or guidance
High-precision in-trail operations in terminal areas
Automated collision avoidance maneuvers
Automated wind shear avoidance maneuvers
• Information Automation
Electronic library system-"paperless cockpit"
Satellite navigation and flight following
Digital data link-high bandwidth communications
Satellite communications worM-wide
Automatic dependent surveillance
"Big picture" integrated cockpit displays
Enhanced head-up displays
Enhanced or synthetic vision systems
• Management Automation
Easier. more intuitive FMS interfaces
- Cursor modification of flight plans
- Improved error-checking
Direct FMC-ATC computer communication
Improved error tolerance
- Enhanced error monitoring and trapping
Improved electronic checklists
Improved mental activities models for design
Fig. 4-1: Proposals for future aircraft automation
Control automation is already
highly sophisticated; its future
applications will probably extend its
capabilities rather than making new
functions available. An exception to
this generalization is the possible
requirement for automatic flight during
approaches to closely-spaced parallel
runways.
Information automation is an area
in which many new functions have
been proposed; some are now in test or
demonstration. Navigation functions
will be revolutionized during the next
decade by the implementation of
satellite navigation for guidance and
ADS for flight following.
In the area of management
automation, efforts will be directed
toward the improvement of the human-
machine interfaces and (hopefully)
toward new functions or modification
of existing functions to improve the
error tolerance of the human-machine
system.
In Trends in Advanced Avionics, Curran (1992) provides a review of avionics evolution
throughout the history of aviation and discusses present and future trends in avionics. In one
chapter, Perspectives on the Future, Curran states (p. 160) that "Past avionics advances have
permitted the elimination of the radio operator, flight navigator, and the flight engineer positions in
the cockpit. Future improvements should result in better avionics functional capability, integrity,
and availability for the remaining crewmembers." He concludes (p. 172), "Avionics designers
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must find ways of keeping flightcrews more involved as the need for automation increases.
Avionics designers must become more aware thatthere is a kind of automation thatimproves
situationawareness and thereisa kind thatdiminishesthisawareness. The challengesforavlonics
designersare many...These improvements must be accomplished without creatingunacceptable
workload and informationoverload."
Curran is quite correct that automation can either enhance, or diminish, situation awareness,
and that there is a real need for designers to understand the difference between them. As Woods
(1993a) has pointed out, representations arc never neutral. Unfommatcly, neither Curran nor most
other authors have stated how this understanding comes about, or even what the critical differences
are. This is a question of some gravity, for without such understanding we cannot improve the
design of future automation or the performance of the human-machine systems in which it will be
embedded.
Aircraft automation today
If we wish to examine future aircraft automation, the Boeing 777 and Airbus A330 are
convenient benchmarks. Both are flying today; together they represent the state of the art in
transport aircraft and to a considerable extent, the future of aircraft automation. The A330's
cockpit, however, is as nearly identical as possible to that of the A320 and the four-engine A340 to
minimize problems in transitioning among these aircraft, another factor driven by economic
pressures (see chapter 14 for discussion). The 777 is a new aircraft type and its cockpit is not a
derivative, though it has much in common with the slightly older 747-400. Since I have discussed
the A320 in chapter 3, I shall spend some time here in an examination of the 777, using various
Boeing materials as primary sources.
The Boeing 777
The Boeing 777 is the world's largest twin-engine transport airplane. It was designed for
exuemely long-haul routes CB" version), though a shorter-range "A" market variant was the first
to enter production. The A330 is slightly smaller than the 777; the Airbus consortium's A340 is its
longer-legged companion. The B777 will cover and exceed the range spectrum of the 747-400,
though with a smaller capacity.
A330-300 and B777-200 Specifications and Performance
B777-200 B777.200
A340-30e A330-300 A.Market B .Market
Size
Wingspan 198 ft 198 ft 200 ft 200 ft
Length 209 ft 209 fl 209 ft 209 ft
Tail height 55 ft 55 ft 61 ft 61 ft
Cabin width 17'4" 1T4" 19'3" 19'3"
Max. TO weight 558,900 lb 458,600 lb 515,000 lb (1) 632,500 lb (2)
Performance &
capacity
Range 6,750 n.m. 4,550 n.m. 4,240 n.m. 7,380 n.m.
Maximum speed M 0.86 M 0.86 M 0.87 M 0.87
Fuel capacity 35,660 gal 24,700 gal
Passengercapacity 295 335 375 305
C_rgo volume 5751 cu fl 5,751ca ft 5,656ca fl 5,656cuft
(I):A 535,000Ibvariantwith• raageof4,820n.m.carsying305 passcagerswillalsobe offes_l.
(2):Dam shownarefortheIm'gestofllm:cvariams_
Dam fromAirbus_, 111990,andAviationWeek& Sp_:eTechnololry,4/11/94,p. 48.
Fig. 4-2: Comparative specifications of modem transport aircraft
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Pilot'sRole and Responsib_
• The pilot is _ac final anth_W fur the oper_oa of the airplane.
• Both cxc_ at_ ultimate].yze_esiblc for the safe conduct of the flight.
• _on making on the flight deck is based on a goal hierarchy.
Pilot's Li_ns
• Expecu_ pilot performance must x-,xognizefunda:w_tal humanperformance It_ta_om.
• Individualdi,ffezv,nces in pilot perfm-mancccapahifitiesmust be acctmunodaled.
_F_htd_ d_. m._ _ty ,_r _='_ _ ..oid_ _._q_ _o_b_._ ._
Flightdecksshouldbede._gnmzcxcrewOlm-_zoesaz_ uammg t_ea on pastptaca
andinn_dveopeza6ons.
• Workload shou3dbebalancedatTpropmwdyto avoidovezloadand undedoad.
Pilot's needs
• When used, automanon should aid the piloL
• Fright deck automation should be managedto suplx_ the pilots' goal hierazchy.
• Comforeablcworking environment.
Fig. 4-3: Boeing 777 cockpit design philosophy (Kelly et al., 1992)
The overall
philosophy espoused by
the 777 cockpit design
team was "crew-centered
design and automation"
(Kelly, Graeber, &
Fadden, 1992, p. 1).
This philosophy had been
under development for
some time before the
program was launched
(Braune and Fadden,
1987). It is based on the
principles set forth in
figure 4-3.
Kelly et al. point out the similarity of these principles to those presented in chapter 2 of this
document. They are a distillation of experience---what has worked well and what has notmin
earlier aircraft. They have pointed out, however, the difficulties inherent in translating these
principles into the specifics of a particular flight deck design, in part because of their lack of
specificity and because economic and market issues heavily impact the operational features which
will actually appear on a new flight deck. "Recently, for example, head-up displays, electronic
library systems, and some improvements to flight management functions have been difficult to
justify because they did not appear to provide new capabilities which would result in return on
invesmaent".
The 777 is Boeing's ftrst commercial fly-by-wire airplane. Large control columns have been
retained; the two columns are cross-linked and are back-driven by the autopilots to retain tactile
feedback to pilots of control inputs either by the other pilot or the automation. Similarly, the thrust
levers are back-driven by the autothrust management system. Control laws provide speed stability;
manual trimming is required when speed or pitch is changed. This approach also provides more
feedback to pilots, though at the expense of somewhat greater workload during "manual" flight
(actually "assisted": all flight control is through the electronic systems).
Perhaps the most obvious innovation in the 777 cock-pit is a cursor control used to respond to
electronic checklist items, to navigate through menus, and to interact with data link functions when
these are implemented, fit does not interact with the FMS or the navigation display at this time.)
There are several other innovations, however, including flat panel display technology rather than
CRTs; LED lighting for switches and light plates, a master brightness control, and improved LCD
displays.
An electronic checklist function has been implemented. The system senses manychecklist
items and indicates their completion during checklist execution; other functions are marked through
the cursor control when completed. The checklist system also keeps track of checklist items not
completed and indicates these on command. Both normal and abnormal/emergency checklists are
incorporated in the system, to minimize the number of "memory items" required to be performed
by the pilots.
Other significant innovations have been provided for but can be implemented only when
industry standards are developed. There is a data link interface, for instance, but its final form will
depend on the standards set by the FAA in the future for its Automated Telecommunications
Network. Similarly, the airplane is equipped for satellite navigation using GPS, but primary
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reliance on GPS depends on development and implementation of a navigation satellite integrity
monitoring and alerting system, as well as the installation of differential GPS stations at or
covering airports to be served by GPS precision approaches.
The flight management system on the 777 is not new, though certain" aspects of its operation
have been simplified to ease programming (and particularly re-programming) workload, a design
effort that has been in progress for several years. The FMC automatically detects certain anomalies
such as an engine failure and recalculates aircraft capabilities. R also constructs a flight path back
to a departure airport ff an engine fails during the initial climbouL When instmcte_ by a single
keystroke, the FMC builds a transition from a selected runway approach course to another at the
same airport and retunes the navigation radios automatically to those appropriate for the new
runway, relieving pilots of significant distraction when ATC re,quires a runway change.
The 777 control-display unit is the first airline unit to use a color screen; colors correspond to
those used to highlight specific data on the navigation dispLay, which is generated from the FMC
when routes are programmed. This is an excellent use of color and another effective step in the
integration of cockpit interfaces. Though the primary dispLays in the cockpit do not differ greatly
from those in the 747-400, many small design innovations have been introduced.
Both the 777 design philosophy and its implementation arc more conservative than in some
other new aircraft. Though Boeing has always been a conservative company, this may in part be
due to an unprecedented effort by the firm to involve customers (as well as human factors experts)
in the design process from the outset. United Air Lines, British Airways and All-Nippon Airways
had operations and maintenance staff on the Boeing premises throughout the design and
development of the airplane. A full-lime human factors group was a part of the flight deck design
team, and Boeing also utilized human factors consultants from government and industry at
intervals during the design phase.
Perhaps most important, and unique in civil transport development programs, engineering
simulators were available from early in the process. The first simulator, though not then complete,
became available at the beginning of 1991; it was fully functional before the flight deck functional
definition was complete and was heavily utilized for familiarization by consultants as well as by the
design team. A second simulator was operational before the end of 1993. These devices made it
possible to evaluate not only individual devices and functions, but how they were integrated,
before the first cockpit was actually built.
Beyond the 777
What lies beyond this point in transport aircraft automation? As noted above, many features
thought desirable for tomorrow's flight decks have not been implemented in the 777 because of
economic factors: they have not been able to "buy their way" onto the airplane. Nevertheless,
several innovations are under active development at this time, either by airframe or avionics
manufacturers or in a few cases by air carders. Some nearly made their way into the 777 design,
such as an Electronic Library System. Others were prepared for in that design, to save the expense
of Later retrofit: data link modules are an example. Still others are being tested in aircraft now
flying the line; satellite navigation, communication and automatic del_ndent surveillance faU in this
category.
Other innovations now under development include synthetic vision systems designed to
provide pilots with an adequate view of the runway and airport environment during conditions of
extremely poor visibility. Finally, there is a set of innovations under consideration or early
development whose future use is uncertain. Among them are very large-screen integrated displays
incorporating synthetic or "enhanced" views of the aircraft surround and also information
concerning aircraft state and status. These devices are sometimes referred to as "big picture"
displays; originally considered for military aircraft, they are also under serious consideration for
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future civil aircraft in which outsidevisibility will be limited, notablya future high-speed (Mach
2+) civil transport without a forward view fIom the cockpit (this is discussed below).
Future aircraft automation
Much of this chapter is devoted to technology trends, but the reader must not lose sight of the
real issue: the relationship of humans and machines in a complex human-machine system. Each
new technology element discussed here, if introduced, will shape human operator behavior. Will
the technology and the humans who operate it significantly improve the safety, reliability or
economy of the overall operation? New devices must have that potential, or they would not be
introduced, but it is sometimes a far cry from what should happen to what will happen. This
thought pattern must be at the forefront of our minds as we consider new technology for the future
system.
I shall continue to categorize technology as control, information, and management automation,
though the separation among these categories becomes blurred by. the increasing integration of
various functional elements. It is a comparatively short step, as an instance, from the provision of
a wind shear advisory system (information automation) to the provision of an autoflight module
that responds autonomously to such an alert with a predetermined avoidance maneuver (control
automation).
Control automation in the future
Because control automation is already so advanced in the newest aircraft, one would expect
less further innovation in this area of aircraft automation. Rather, I would anticipate that near-term
efforts may be directed toward making existing functionality yet more self-sufficient and
autonomous, a trend which would further bound pilot authority with the intention of avoiding
execution errors under difficult circumstances. Such a trend, of course, would also increase
automation complexity and would probably increase the opportunity for surprises.
Minimizing separation requirements in
CIouty spaced
parallel runways
""AAsurveillance
Fig. 4-4: Closely-spaced parallel approaches
terminal areas
The need for increased capacity and throughput
has already stimulated the FAA, with NASA, to
begin an intensive examination of how technology
may be used to increase airport acceptance rates by
enabling parallel independent approaches to
converging or closely-spaced parallel runways (fig.
4-4). At present, independent approaches to parallel
runways at the same airport are not permitted under
instrument meteorological conditions unless the
runway centerlines are 4300 ft apart. Parallel
runways at many major airports are spaced more
closely than this because of land restrictions; at San
Francisco, as an example, runways 28 left and 28
right, the major landing runways, are only 750 ft
apart. The overall acceptance rate for this airportis
roughly halved when instrument conditions exist, as
they often do because of fog or low cloud. While it
is not likely that independent operations will be
permitted to runways this close together, FAA and
NASA have conducted simulation experiments to
determine whether the 4300 ft limitation can be
reduced by the use of surveillance radar with a one-
second rather than the present 3-second scan rate.
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These studiesindicatedthatwith improved ATC and radarsurveillance,pilotscan consistently
conduct approaches to two or even threeparallelrunways whose centerlinesare separatedby less
than 3500 feet,though tightcontrolisrequired and the problem of blunders or slow turnsto the
finalapproach course becomes more seriousas separationdecreases. The most difficultaspectof
such operations,even under VMC, isthe "belly-to-belly"cockpitvisualrestrictionwhen aircraft
bank for the ttwn to the final approach course from opposite sides of the extended centerlines.
Issues raised by reduced traffic separation concepts
If these types of operations are approved for general use at equipped airports, they will be
combined with minimum safe longitudinal spacing to make maximum use of the capacity of each
runway, possibly using TCAS displays or radar for station-keeping. The Air Force has used
station-keeping radar very effectively for in-trail formations. The dual tasks of very precise
station-keeping and lateral control will be demanding, and control automation may be introduced
and even required to obtain maximum flight path precision under these circumstances. I would
also expect that automated alarm systems will be developed to augment controller surveillance of
such operations.
Whether manually or automatically flown, tightly-spaced final approaches under IMC will
impose considerable cognitive workload both on pilots and on controllers, especially when
unforeseen circumstances force departures from nominal flow. If a leading aircraft is slow to clear
the runway, following aircraft will have to execute missed approaches, possibly toward aircraft
taking off on crossing runways. Design of procedures must insure that one or several aircraft have
clear escape paths from any point on the approach. (These contingencies have not always received
sufficient attention in the past.) With closely spaced aircm_ under IMC, this may not be easy.
The temptation to use such innovative technology to the fullest will be difficult to resist;
indeed, increased throughput is the motivation for this technology and these procedures. Human
operators must not be placed, however, in a situation from which they cannot safely and reliably
extricate themselves and their aircraft if some element of the automation fails, which may mean that
the full benefits of the technology cannot be realized without eroding safety margins. This
dilemma will become commonplace as we attempt to squeeze every possible increase in capacity
from our finite airspace; methods to insure that it is done without decreasing safety must be
developed where they do not now exist.
Protection against environmental threats
Three types of automated environmental alerting and warning functions are now implemented
in transport and some corporate aircraft. They are ground proximity wanting systems, traffic alert
and collision avoidance systems and wind shear advisory systems. Each is designed to detect
threats that may not be obvious to pilots, especially under instrument meteorological conditions.
At this time, each is an information system; pilots must respond manually to the warnings. Each
requires a pitch mode response; for TCAS-II warnings, the pilot may be required to descend or
climb, while GPWS and WSAS advisories require a maximum rate climb to a safe altitude.
Each of the older systems (GPWS, TCAS) has appreciably enhanced safety. GPWS, though
not universally effective, has a documented safety record (e.g., Porter & Loomis, 1981). Even at
its present state of development, TCAS-H is perceived by pilots and the FAA to have prevented at
least several midair collisions--just how many is impossible to tell WSAS is too new to have
accumulated such a record, and newer devices (active sensors in aircraft to improve detection
capability, as compared with passive inertial sensors, and Doppler radar at airports, the first of
which was commissioned at Houston in July, 1994) are under development, but there is good
reason to believe that some form of WSAS will be helpful to pilots, especially during takeoff and
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approachin thevicinity of convectiveturbulence.During tests of the Doppler system at Denver in
1993, a considerable number of airplanes were able to avoid severe wind shears.
Issues raised by environmental protection systems automation
Both GPWS and TCAS have produced variable numbers of false and nuisance alarms,
particularly early in their periods of line service. Though Ground Proximity Warning Systems
have been greatly improved since they were mandated in 1976, they still give rise to nuisance
warnings---in the case of one large carrier, 247 of 339 GPWS warnings during a recent 12-month
period were false or nuisance alarms (73%). Like all new technology, TCAS has also caused new
problems, most importantly for air traffic conlrollers (see below). Inadequacies in the TCAS
software have also burdened pilots with nuisance alerts in considerable numbers, and with a few
resolution advisories that if followed would have put the aircraft in danger.
The problem of false/nuisance warnings is not trivial. If a substantial fraction of the warnings
received are evaluated by pilots in hindsight as false or unnecessary, they will not trust these
systems, even if some of the warnings are correct and could save the aircraft. Pilots' (or
controllers') perceptions (whether correct or not) about the inaccuracy of warning systems will
shape their behavior toward trying to verify whether the warnings are correct-yet delays in
responding to appropriate or true warnings may negate their effectiveness. Airlines have mandated
full responses to GPWS warnings, but have had to backtrack on these procedures in the face of
numerous nuisance warnings at certain specific locations. Procedures may be required in the short
run, but they are not the best answer.
To my knowledge, no aircraft now flying in line service responds automatically to these
warnings, though autonomous responses could be implemented and would have some theoretical
advantages. Manually-flown TCAS responses, in particular, often exceed the vertical plane
separation boundaries established by ATC, and this has been a source of intense discomfort to
controllers who are faced with sudden altitude excursions without advance warning. The initial
operational simulation evaluation (Chappell et al., 1988) indicated the likelihood that such
excursions would be observed, and operational evaluations have confirmed it. It is likely that
automated resolution advisory responses could minimize such excursions.
The great danger of an inadequate response to a true GPWS warning has motivated nearly all
air carriers to require a full procedural response unless it is visually obvious to the crew that no
danger of controlled flight into terrain exists (see, for example, Kaysville, UT, 1977). Cases
continue to crop up, however, in which an inadequate crew response failed to avert the condition
that motivated the warning, and this has been an accident cause in equipped aircraft. Like TCAS
avoidance maneuvers, GPWS responses could easily be automated, and it has been suggested that
this be done. On the other hand, false or nuisance GPWS alerts occur under a variety of
circumstances, among them in holding patterns when an aircraft passes directly over another below
in the same pattern. A GPWS response under these conditions could cause the maneuvering
airplane to climb into the path of yet another aircraft holding 1000 ft above. (It is worth noting that
ATC, which has only a planform view of traffic, cannot detect such an excursion in a holding
pattern, so an important element of redundancy is not available. TCAS should warn of a potential
conflict, but it is not infallible either.)
Severe wind shears, often caused by microbursts, have been responsible for many aircraft
accidents over the years (Caracena, HoUe & Doswell, 1989; Boeing, 1994). The most recent
occurred only a few months ago, at Charlotte, NC (1994). They are particularly dangerous to
aircraft flying slowly in a relatively high-drag configuration; such configurations occur routinely
during approach to landing. Wind shear advisories, like GPWS alerts, require an immediate
maximum-performance climb, trading kinetic energy (airspeed) for potential energy (altitude) if
appropriate. There is little doubt that this escape maneuver could be more precisely performed by
automation than by the human operator, simply because not all of the inertial and air data
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information necessary for the performance of the maneuver is available in the cockpit and a very
rapid response is required. This would seem, therefore, to be an ideal candidate for control
automation. Although wind shear avoidance systems have been under development for several
years, there is not yet, to my knowledge, sufficient information to indicate how fTequently false or
nuisance alarms may be generated by such systems.
In each of these cases, however, the false alarm problem, together with the many other
variables not known to or accounted for by the logic in these systems, suggests a considerable
measure of caution with respect to automating escape maneuvers. Leaving aside issues of
passenger comfort, a secondary consideration when safety is threatened, the record to date
suggests that very substantial numbers of unnecessary and sometimes dangerous escape
maneuvers would occur if pilots were not in the loop, and given the time-criticality of these threats,
it is likely that pilots would not be able to moderate or inhibit automated response maneuvers.
Further, the initiation of an unannounced escape maneuver by the autopilot when a pilot was
flying manually would almost certainly be countered (at least initially) by the pilot, who would
consider the maneuver initiation to be a turbulence or other input which required correcti,e action.
At least one recent accident has involved pilots attempting unsuccessfully to counter ."..._mation
inputs (Nagoya, 1994; see also Paris, 1994). If escape maneuvers were to be automate, a, highly
salient displays to inform the pilot of the intervention would be required, and pilots, as well as
ATC, would have to have special procedures available to cover conflicts that might be introduced
by the performance of the maneuver.
Automated warning systems have saved lives and aircraft, but they axe good example of the
dictum stated earlier: that what shou/d happen and what will happen when new technologies are
introduced arc often at variance. If new systems arc introduced without considering the full range
of behaviors they may evoke and the new problems they may create, they arc liable to do more
harm than good.
Ground maneuvering assistance
A third area in which control automation (together with information automation) may be
introduced is on the ground at airports, to assist pilots in guiding their aircraft between parking
gates and active runways under conditions of poor visibility. Today's aircraft can land
automatically, or even manually, under visibility conditions that are inadequate to permit them to
taxi safely from the runway to a gate. This fact and the serious problem of incursions of aircraft
into airport movement areas without clearance (Billings & O'Hara, 1978; Detroit, 1990) has
stimulated a serious search into how aircraft may be assisted in surface navigation on airports when
unaided visibility is inadequate. Some proposals have included either manual or automatic steering
with reference to taxiway centerline guidance devices, usually cables buried just beneath taxiway
surfaces. Steering guidance during takeoffs has also been considered. (The incursion issue is
more serious than just getting lost; avoidance of conflicts between aircraft and other aircraft or
surface vehicles is another vexing facet of the problem.) Most such proposals have assumed that
pilot vision will also be aided by devices that can produce enhanced or synthetic views of their
immediate surround (see below), though some simulator experiments have been conducted using
airport maps and enhanced GPS navigation aids.
Advanced navigation systems
Satellite-based position determination systems are rapidly reaching a level of maturity that can
permit them to serve as the primary basis for aircraft navigation. One can dispute whether these
systems should be considered as control or information automation; in fact, they can serve either
purpose depending on the way in which a pilot chooses to couple them to onboard control
automation. Such systems are in wide use, though they are not yet approved as a sole or primary
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meansof navigation because adequate monitoring systems (for satellite signal integrity) are not yet
available.
As described by Paulson (1994), two sateUite navigation systems are now in place. The U.S.
Department of Defense Global Positioning System (GPS) is now essentially complete, with 28
Navstar satellites in 55 ° orbits. The system transmits two codes, a coarse acqmsmon (C/A) code
and an encrypted precision (P) code which thus far has not been made available for other than
military use.
The Russian Glonass orbital plan will encompass 24 satellites in 65 ° orbits; 15 satellites were
functional in early 1994 and more have been launched since. The Glonass system, like GPS, is
under the control of military authorities, and this fact has caused considerable apprehension among
civil operators who are concerned about reliability and guaranteed access. ICAO's Future Air
Navigation Committee (FANS) has espoused a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) for
civil aviation worldwide, augmented either by signals from geostationary satellites or by
transmitting position corrections from precisely located ground transmitters (diffc_rential GNSS) to
provide the accuracy required for all-weather approaches and landings.
Both the United States and Russia have declared their system's availability for civil use. The
Inmarsat organization, recognizing the need for a "health warning system" for satellite signals,
agreed to include navigation transponders on its four third-generation geostationary
communications satellites; signals from these transponders would provide both wide-area
differential capability and an integrity monitoring service, broadcasting warnings to aircraft and
ATC in the event of a satellite failure or malfunction. These satellites (or another means of
accomplishing this function) will be deployed in 1995-96.
From a technical viewpoint, either or both systems could be made available for precise enroute
navigation. Northwest Airlines has conducted long-range navigation tests over China using
receivers that utilized both. GPS antennas and decoders are widely available at reasonable cost and
several newer aircraft have made provisions for GPS navigation in their flight management
systems. ICAO final standards are not yet in place, but FAA has given its permission for use of
GPS provided it is not the sole means of navigation, and Europe's Joint Airworthiness Authority
has certified the A330 and A340 avionics suites for satellite navigation.
The use of GPS, augmented by inertial data, for precision approaches is under test at this
time. Though it is not yet clear whether such a system, enhanced either by differential signals or
by other means, can routinely meet the standards for category II or Ill approaches, there is general
agreement that it can provide at least category I accuracy (see fig. 3-8). Whether ILS will be
retained for lower-visibility approaches is uncertain. The FAA spent many years developing
microwave landing systems (MLS), though it has recently cancelled its MLS production contracts;
ICAO has adopted the U.S. MLS standard, and Europe is committed to MLS as its future landing
system. The wide availability of the GPS technology, however, has led to much uncertainty about
the landing systems of the future. Economic variables will be important; MLS is an expensive
system, but some means of conducting category IIl approaches will be an absolute necessity.
Issues raised by advanced navigation systems
As fax as pilots are concerned, the source of their guidance signals is of less importance than
the accuracy and reliability of those signals. They will continue to require a way of monitoring
signal integrity, but they will accept whatever guidance brings them dependably to a position from
which a landing can be assured. It is believed that GPS, like MLS, can be used for more complex
approaches than the long straight-in approach paths required with ILS. The FAA has experimented
with very complex curved-path approaches for use in noise-sensitive and confined areas (Scott et
al., 1987), but it is not clear whether such approaches will be widely used except in very difficult
locations such as the New York (LaGuardia/Kennedy/Newark) area.
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I mentioned earlier that while pilots of advanced aircraft are able to evaluate the sources of the
information on their map displays, it is not obvious what raw data are being used to synthesize the
integrated information. When GPSalone is used, it is impossible for the pilot to determine either
the source or the accuracy of the data because of the complexity of the calcuLations used to derive
instantaneous position from 4-6 satellites. About all the pilot can do is to compare the satellite-
derived position with the inertial position, once VOR-DME data become unavailable. It must also
be said, however, that GPS will free pilots from the constraints of surface navigation aids, which
are not always reliable. If both GPS and Glonass are integrated into the future navigation system,
the positions derived from each independent satellite system can serve as a new source of
redundancy; each will have about equal precision. If the ability to compare them is made available,
this redundancy win be available almost anywhere over the earth's surface.
Information automation in the future
This is an aspect of automation in which many innovations will be offered in the near furore.
Some are already in test; others await technology advances such as Large fiat panel displays. All
will be able to make still more information available in the cocl_t at a time when there may aheady
be more than many pilots can attend to in the time available. But the new technology, ff properly
implemented, can simplify rather than complicate the pilot's task. I will review some of the new
functionality that has been proposed and then examine the likely effects on flight crews.
Digital data link
Digital data link, combined with sateRite communication, has been under evaluation in civil
aviation for several years. At present, ACARS transceivers are used; in the future, mode S
transponders may become the preferred medium for exchange of ATC data. At this time, the
usefulness of automatic dependent surveillance (ADS) on overwater routes seems assured. Several
carriers have participated in tests over the Pacific ocean. Russian authorities are also considering
ADS for primary use over large portions of its land mass, where radar air traffic surveillance is not
available.
ADS involves the frequent reporting, without crew intervention, of position, altitude, and
often wind speed and direction. In recent tests, reports have been issued every five minutes.
These data are received by ARINC or a similar communication service and retransmitted to air
traffic control facilities, where they are automatically plotted and can be used by controllers to
survey traffic under their control At present, voice communication with aircraft in oceanic
airspace still depends on largely HF radio equipment, but all parties hope that satellite
communications, already available for passenger telephonic communications on a few air carriers,
will soon become available for the pilots of those aircraft as well. As one pilot remarked, "I hate to
be using a lousy HF channel when the passenger behind me is talking to his wife on the phone!".
Datalinkprovidesthecapabilityfor high-bandwidthdatacommunication;theissuesrelatenot
to the technology but to its uses. The FAA is working on standards for integrated data and voice
communicationsservicesforthefuture,theAeronauticalTelecommunicationsNetwork,which will
tie the entireaviationcommunications system together. A host of issues concerning
communicationsarchitecture,protocols,vocabularies,tandards,policiesand proceduresremains
tobe enunciated,however,and equipmentmanufacturerscannotprovideequipmentwithoutthese
details.Thisisa majorreasonwhy ATC datalinkisnotyetimplerncntedinthe777 and othernew
aircraft,and why aviationcommunicationstechnologyisstilla patchwork.
Datalinkmay eventuallyenablenearlyallroutinecommunicationbetweenATC and aircraftto
bc carriedoutwithoutrecoursetovoicecontact,leavingvoiceforurgentmessagesand non-routine
transactionsbetween pilotand controller.Weather em'outeand terminalairportinformationare
among thetypesof datathatwillbe sentin thisway. Through ACARS, two-way datalinkis
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already used for much company communication, and the ACARS system has been used
experimentally for pre-flight clearance delivery (Air Canada, American, Delta) and other non-time
critical data transfers. Many new aircraft have printers in the cockpit, so that ATC messages can be
saved as hard copy when desired. It is likely that such devices will be needed to spare crews the
need to page forward and backward through many stored messages when a particular datum is
needed, and give them the ability to refer to such information quickly. The flexibility of the disl?lay
systems should permit pilots with differing cognitive styles to adapt information-handling to meir
own preferences.
Thus far, I have not discussed new functions that may be enabled by data link. I will discuss
error tolerance and error resistance below, but it should be said here that the high-bandwidth
capability of digital data link permits it, at least in theory, to be used to downlink a considerable
amount of aircraft data not now made available to ground facilities. This offers the potential for
error-checking by ATC computers of clearances that have been uplinked, accepted and executed by
pilots, as well as the exchange of more aircraft data with the ground, as was done in the UK CAA
trials in 1991 (see page 111).
Among the functions that are routinely performed by ACARS data link are the transmission of
"out-off-on-in" data (times of departure from gate, takeoff, landing, and gate arrival), diversion or
delay information, engine performance data, arrival gate data and airplane malfunction information
to assist ground maintenance personnel in planning for repairs or parts replacement without
causing delays. Passenger needs upon arrival are also communicated. Other data could also be
transmitted, including performance data and non-routine events, though the transmission in real
time of such data is of concern to pilots. Transmission of sensitive data over broadcast channels
also brings up questions of data security, especially if the data concerns identifiable flights or
persons.
Issues raised by data link
The lack of standard procedures for pre-departure clearance delivery has posed some
problems; ASRS reports indicate that aircraft have occasionally taken off without flight clearances
when hard copies of the initial clearances have not been delivered to the cockpit before push-back,
and different procedures at different locations have caused some problems as well. Nonetheless,
these are growing pains, and the potential benefits of this technology are very considerable once
the "bugs" are worked out.
The routine use of data link for controller-pilot communications will change in fundamental
ways the interaction processes between these two classes of human operators. Where they now
work together in direct person-to-person conversational contact, these contacts will be by
alphanumeric messages that must pass through two computers. Further, unlike voice messages
today, which are primarily broadcast on a "party line", data link messages to aircraft will be
selectively addressed; others in the air will not have access to them. The implementation schemes
for data link all envision the availability of a voice communications channel for urgent messages,
but the potential for decreased team (pilot-controller) involvement in problem-solving is
worrisome.
Electronic library systems
An electronic library system (ELS) was planned for the 777, but most airplane customers did
not feel it to be financially viable at this time. At least one airline and an avionics manufacturer
have actively explored this concept, however. With today's computer technology, it would be
possible to store virtually all of the information required by pilots (and now carried in their
capacious flight bags) on CD ROM disks or other electronic medium, and to make it "instantly"
available on a dedicated screen in the cockpit. Approach plates and enroute navigation charts as
well as the flight and airplane operating manuals could be encoded in such a database.
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I use quotes around "instantly" because instantly available and instandy accessible are not
quite synonymous. Admittedly, pilots must now thumb through hard-copy manuals to fred a
desiredbitof information.(Quick-referencehandbooks assistinemergency and anomaly checldist
retrieval.)With an electroniclibrarysystem; they would have to navigate through numerous
menus tofindthe same bitof information. With the elecu'onicsystem; however, they would also
have to learn the data architecture,preserve itin memory, associate the structurewith the
abbreviatedidentifierson the screen,learneconomical ways of accessing what they needed, and
then perform the on-screen manipulation necessary to bring the desired data to hand.
Issues raised by electronic library systems
If pilots find it necessary to print material stored in an ELS (such as an approach chart) in
order to scrutinize it more carefully or to move it to where they want it, little purpose will have
served by the provision of yet more expensive technology in the cockpit. Most of the material
m the flight bag is alphanumeric, and simply transferring it to an electronic medium seems a
clumsy way to use this technology. Since the ELS will be a single system, it is unlikely that
certification authorities will permit it to be interconnected with flight-critical systems such as the
FMS, and without such connectivity, more of its potential usefulness will be compromised. With
connectivity, the automation becomes yet more complex and susceptible to unwanled surprises.
A capable expe_ system might be helpful to assist in navigatingthrough ELS infommfion, and
some researchhas been done toward thatend. Lacking such a system, one must considerwhether
a "paperless"cockpit representsa substantialimpmvument on what we now have. Things have
improved sinceRuffellSmith (1979) pointedout the20 m 2"blizzardofpaper" requiredfora trans-
Adantic flight.
Much of the flightpath navigationaldata thatpilotsneed isnow availablein the largeFIefS
database;few pilotsusing FMS finditnecessarytorefermore than occasionallytotheirnavigation
chartsthough allpilotsstilluse approach plates,even forfamiliarairports,as memory aids.Charts
_ce anoth.crareain which the printedpage isa substantialimprovement over electronicdata. The
stresotutionavailableon monochrome CRTs (about 300 dpi)issubstantiallylessthan can be
achieved on printed charts (I000 dpi); simple reproduction of such chartswould not provide
adequate spatialresolutionof the data now provided,and navigation and approach chartswould
have to be reconstructedfor effective electronicpresentation.
Nevertheless, it is likely that at some time in the future, electronic libraries will become
available in transport aircraft, especially ff the computer equipment used to enable them is also
found to have a commercially profitable purpose such as providing services for which passengers
will pay.
Enhanced vision systems for pilots
Though air transportation is now highly reliable, visibility restrictions due to fog can still shut
down airports completely for an indefinite period. If this occurs at a major airport such as
Chicago's O'Hare, air traffic over a large part of the United States will be affected within a few
hours. Though category 3 autoland can enable safe landings at suitably equipped airports in very
bad visibility, taxiing may be impossible. To provide independent monitoring capability in the
cockpitduring such operations,the government, avionicsfirms and some aircarriershave studied
how pilotvisionmight be improved by sensorsoperatingin portionsof the electromagnetic(EM)
spectrum less al_enuated by these weather phenomena than the visible spectrum.
Two portions of the EM spectrum have been explored in depth. One is the infrared (IR) band,
portions of which are relatively transparent to moisture in the air. The other is in the minimeter-
wave (MMW) band of the microwave spectrum. In all cases, the studies have aimed at providing
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pilots with a synthetic visual image, either projected on a head-up display or on a head-down
screen on the instrument panel, that would assure them of the location and orientation of a runway
with respect to their airplane. Other studies have been carried out to determine whether images
derived from more than one portion of the EM spectrum could be fused to provide such imagery
(see Cooper, 1994b).
A computer technology that has been proposed for aviation applications is the architecture
known as "neural networks". These networks of artificial neurons operate in analog fashion on
inputs, usually in the form of perceptual fields, to yield an output in the form of a recognized
object. Object recognition (particularly alphanumeric character recognition) has received a great
deal of attention over two decades. A umque characteristic of such networks is that they have a
limited capacity to "'learn" and adapt their behavior over successive presentations of variations on a
particular stimulus.
Neural nets have been proposed as an integrating element for multi-spectral imaging of objects
in the environment. Coupled with an appropriate display medium, such networks might be able to
accept and fuse microwave, infrared and visual imagery of a runway into a coherent representation
which pilots could use for quasi-visual landings under conditions of limited visibility.
These programs have been variously called "synthetic vision", "enhanced vision" or "image
fusion". Such technology could permit pilots to land without assistance from the ground on any
appropriate surface anywhere if they were guided to the proximity of that surface by appropriate
on-board navigation equipment. Thus one major benefit of such devices could be a decrease in the
number, and therefore cost, of ground navigation aids, a major factor in less developed nations.
The technical difficulties lying in the way of such technology are formidable. Infrared images
are substantially different from visible images in that they reflect temperature differences among
objects in the environment rather than brightness or chromatic differences; while outlines may be
clearly detected, they may not be the outlines expected. Also, while IR imagery can detect obj.ects
either colder or warmer than their surround, there are times of day when objects are at essentially
the same temperature as their sun'ound as they are being either heated by solar radiation or cooled
in its absence. Runways or other paved surfaces that are clearly detectable under most conditions
may be "invisible" when they have the same temperature as the surrounding earth. If a paved
surface is covered by even a light coating of water_ snow or ice, its apparent temperature will be
that of the overlying contamination. Finally, nearly all infrared radiation is attenuated by airborne
moisture, dust or smoke between the sensor and the objects of interest; for this reason, IR sensors
may be useful only at fairly short ranges.
Millimeter wave radar relies on EM impulses generated in and propagated from the airplane
toward the earth ahead. A fraction of this radiation is reflected from solid objects in the path of the
radar beam, and a small fzaction of the reflected radiation returns to the transmitting and receiving
antenna. Since microwave frequencies are appreciably lower than the visible specmma, resolution
of objects is less than in visible light, though the temperature of such objects is not a factor. Metal
objects are highly reflective, paved surfaces less reflective, and earth absorbs most microwave
radiation impinging upon it. The reflectance of objects can be enhanced (or degraded) by surface
treatment with various coatings, by variations in shape, surface roughness, and orientation. Metal
passive corner reflectors can provide very bright returns. Large objects such as a nmway can be
visualized, though at the shallow angle from which an airplane approaches the runway, little of the
transmitted radiation is reflected back to the transceiver antenna. Much smaller objects made of
metal, such as surface vehicles, are easily detected: such obstructions on a runway can be detected
easily. (Since vehicles have engines which emit heat, IR sensors also can usually detect such
objects.)
Biological obstructions (animals, humans) do not reflect microwave radiation well; they will
usually be invisible. Since they produce heat, they may be detected, though often not at a useful
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range, by IR sensors. Other obstructions (piles of dirt on a runway under construction, sawhorses
or other markers) may or may not be differentiated from their surroundings. Despite these
problems, MMW equipment has been demonstrated in aircraft and has been shown to provide
sufficient information to permit an approach to be completed under at least test circumstances.
Forward-looking (passive) infrared equipment (FLIR) is in wide use for target detection by the
armed forces, often in combination with other sensors such as low-light level TV or synthetic
aperture radar.
F'mally, it has been proposed that enhanced texram maps stored in aircraft and correlated with
precisegeographic position information from GNSS could be used to generate entirely synthetic
imagery for pilots landing at airports. This technology could in theory free pilots entirely from
environmental constraints to vision (but it would not be able to show runway obstacles unless it
were augmented by forward-looking sensors of some type, operating in real time).
Issues raised by enhanced vision systems
The human factors issues associated with the use of this technology are likewise formidable.
Since the images are qualitatively different from visual images, questions arise as to whether
synthetic imagery should be transformed, and if so how, in order to make it more obvious what the
pilot is seeing, or whether pilots should be taught the differences and required to use the processed
imagery to decrease the likelihood that they will form a false or misleading impression of what the
sensor "sees". Though much research has been done over many years (e.g., Kraft & Elworth,
1969; Stout & Stephens, 1975; Roscoe, 1979) to elucidate what visual cues pilots require for
landing in impoverished visual environments, none of R has been able to specify an exact minimum
set of required cues, and given the number of human variables, there may not be such a set.
If synthetic or enhanced imagery is projected on a wide-angle head-up display in the cockpit,
questions arise as to whether pilots will be able to attend both to the display and to the external
environment behind it. Most synthetic runway representations on head-up displays have been
outline forms to make it less difficult for pilots to wansition to outside visual cues during the
landing maneuver,. The problem may be that the head-up display symbology which is used during
the approach is more salient than the external scene, especially when viewed through fog by an
inexperienced pilot (Lauber et al., 1982). It may be necessary to "declutter" the display during the
final phases of the approach to avoid this problem, though this runs the risk of removing
symbology that may be essential if the pilot has to execute a missed approach very near the
runway.
Another problem is the relatively slow scan rate of radar. It is not possible to update radar
imagery rapidly enough (roughly 30 Hz) so that a continuously changing picture is provided.
Passive IR does not suffer from this handicap, though processing requires time if the images are
transformed. Most jet aircraft are traveling over 200 ft/sec when they enter the landing flare; the
environment is changing very rapidly and rapid updating of visual cues is necessary. We do not
know exactly what image update rate is required for fully effective inner-loop control, though
studies of this are underway.
Several air carriers have installed head-up displays to provide category H and HI landing
capability without the expense of triplex autopilots and other equipment. Many operate routinely in
areas where the likelihood of fog and other restrictions to visibility is high, such as Alaska.
Present head-up display equipment, however, interposes a device between the pilot and the
windscreen, usually a large block of partially reflective plastic onto one of whose surfaces a flight
guidance display is projected. These devices invariably attenuate the transmitted image of the
outside environment by some amount; they also represent a hazard to the pilot's head in the event
of a sudden deceleration of the airplane.
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From a perceptual and cognitive viewpoint, the dangers of such devices are that pilots will be
misled by what they think they see, or that they will not see correctly (through a head-up device)
what they need to see to complete a safe landing. Some have proposed that synthetic or enhanced
imagery should be provided on the instrument panel to obviate the latter problem, but this approach
poses a new problem: the time required to transition fa'om head-down to head-up visual orientation,
a process that requires at least a few seconds and may take longer if external cues are minimal.
This has been handled in the past by a procedure called the monitored approach (Lauber et al.,
1976), in which the pilot flying the approach remains oriented to the inslrurnents (head-down) until
reaching decision height, then executes a missed approach unless the other pilot, who is
monitoring the external environment, announces that visual cues are sufficient to permit a landing
to be made. In this case, the monitoring pilot, who is already oriented to the external view, takes
over control and completes the landing. This procedure, pioneered by Aeropostale in France and
adopted by British European Airways after the war, was highly successful, and variants are now
used by many carriers.
The decision to land is one of relatively few in aviation ,,vhich must be made very quickly
(within very few seconds) under poor visibility conditions. It should also be kept in mind that if
GNSS and enhanced vision technology are used to permit landings at airports without surface
precision navigation aids (and this is an avowed objective), pilots will not have the assurance of
their location which is provided by identifying such aids and "following" them to the airport. They
may be more hesitant to make the decision to land under such circumstances, and this could negate
some of the potential benefits of the technology. At such airports, pilots must be provided with
unequivocal information as to their precise location and the suitability of the runway ahead before
they can commit to landing, and throughout the landing process, including roUout and taxi.
Advanced integrated displays
Recognizing the extreme perceptual and cognitive demands placed upon rnilitary pilots during
combat operations, the armed forces for many years have been investigating large flat-panel display
technology in the hope of being able to provide pilots with highly integrated intuitive situation
displays. These "big picture" displays, coupled with adaptive automation, would provide pictorial
and analogical representations of terrain, threats, targets, predetermined course, and aircraft and
weapons status. The technology is not yet available to provide displays of the size desired, let
alone displays sufficiently robust to endure the combat environment, but in laboratory simulations,
the representations appear to integrate much of the information required by pilots under such
circumstances.
The U.S. Army has taken another approach in its Crew-Systems Research and Development
Facility at its Aeroflight Dynamics Laboratory at Ames Research Center. This facility is a full-
mission virtual helicopter simulator whose visual system presents a binocular helmet-mounted
virtual environment display using synthetic but now quite realistic scene generation. This is
another approach which can provide both terrain and target imagery, augmented by synthetic
representation of relevant threats.
"Big picture" displays have been proposed for use in civil aircraft as well, though the costs
have been perceived thus far to outweigh possible benefits. This situation may change, however,
if a new high-speed (supersonic) transport reaches the development stage. NASA, in the United
States, and government-backed consortia in Japan and Europe, are conducting generic high-speed
research intended to enable such a development program by the end of this decade. One desired
feature of such a transport is the ability to provide pilots with sufficient forward visibility without
the considerable structural weight penalty associated with a movable visor and nose assembly
which covers the windscreens during high-speed flight. Such a visor apparatus is used on the
Concorde to permit a view over the nose of the aircraft during takeoff and approach when pitch
angle is high compared with that of conventional aircraft.
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A supersonictransportwithout a visorassembly would have cockpit sidewindows but none
orienteddirectlyforward,for aerodynamic reasons. Some sortof forward visualdisplaywould be
necessary both formaneuvering atlow altitudeand fortaxiing.Itwould probably be drivenby a
combination of televisionand other sensors,though some have proposed an entirelysynthetic
("virtual")computer-generated displayforthispurpose.
An additionalproblem for ground maneuvering in a supersonic transportwould be the
position of the pilots,far forward of the steerablenose gear as well as the main landing gear
position much furtheraft. Even ffthey had forward vision,additionalviews, perhaps from the
nose gear position,might be necessary to enable them to remain within the confines of narrow
taxiways and to negotiate turns with variable radiion airports. These technologies would
qualitativelychange the ways in which pilotsmaintain contactwith theirexternalenvironment.
They pose both perceptual and cognitive questions related to reliability,trust,automation
complexity and transparency(literally!)which willrequiremuch furtherresearch,not only on the
technologiesthemselves but on the human's abilitytoremain in command in therange of situations
in which he or she would be dependent upon them.
Issues related to information management
Itisimportanttokeep in mind the need forindependent sourcesof data ina real-tirne,highly
dynamic system. Though a pilot may have access to several apparently differenttypes of
information concerning a singletopic in a highly automated airplane,he or she must always
consider whether theredundant informationwas collectedby independent systems, or whether itis
merely two ways of representingdata from the same source. Ifthe former, itcan be used for
cross-checking;ffthelatter,a singlesensorcould corruptboth representations.In tightly-coupled
systems, the differencemay not always be obvious. To what extentdoes the pilotneed toknow
the sourcesof theprocessedinformationthatreacheshim?
We have reached a point at which multiplesources of similardata are usually availableto
pilotsand avionicswith which to accomplish theirfunctions.As noted immediately above, in the
near futurepilotsmay have access torepresentationsof the airplaneenvironment derived from thc
visual,infra-redand microwave portionsofthe electromagneticspectrum.
In the enhanced or synthetic vision case, the answer is fairly obvious: these three
electromagneticbands, visual,IR and MMW do not provide the same data. Unless a way can be
found to synthesizecongruent imagery from each source, or to fuse disparate imagery intoa
consistentrepresentation,itwillbe important thatthe pilotunderstand what data source isbeing
used, and the limitationsof the data. The ta'ainingburden imposed by such technology willnot bc
trivialunless these questions are eitheranswered by image fusion and synthesistechniques,or
unless pilotsare given the opportunity through simulation and flightexperience to become
thoroughly familiarwith what can be trustedand what cannot be under specificcircumstances.
Another case in which disparatedata sources arc used isdatafrom surface navigation aids
and inertial sensors within the aircraft. In the past, the data derived from various sources has been
presented in a common manner, or the data has been reconciledwithin the flightmanagement
computer priortoitspresentationon the navigationdisplay. Pilotscan gain access to the sources
of thisdataon theirnavigationdisplays(seefigure4-5 foran example).
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Fig. 4-5: Visualization of raw and processed navigation data on Navigation
Display (Boeing 747-4430)
Management automation in the future
KeUy et al. (1992, p. 2) indicated that "some improvements to flight management systems
have been difficult to justify because they did not appear to provide new capabilities which would
result in return on invesmaent." It is probably fair to say that many pilots now flying FMS-
equipped aircraft would welcome a simpler, more intuitive system with which they could interact
more easily than is possible with today's CDUs. It is also likely that most designers and human
factors specialists, given the knowledge of hindsight, would welcome the opportunity to redesign
this interface, and that members of the avionics community have the knowledge necessary to do it
better.
The fact remains, however, that today's flight management systems work. A very
considerable investment in training has already been made, and the vast majority of pilots have
found it possible to adapt successfully to present FMS idiosyncrasies. Many steps have been taken
in newer systems to simplify reprogramming with the intent of reducing the inherent clumsiness of
the system, to speed FMC response times (which were very slow in early devices), and to improve
the legibility of the CDU screen. Any future attempt to revise the F'MS interface radically will
require extensive retraining of operators at considerable expense. Unless carefully done, a
redesign may impose training transfer problems for pilots moving from the older to the new
devices. These factors, leaving aside the return on investment issue, make it likely that flight
management systems and their interfaces will continue to look and operate much as they now do
for a considerable time to come.
Having said this, however, are no improvements possible without starting over with a clean
sheet of paper? The answer to this question, if there is one, lies in looking carefully at problems
known to be associated with FMS use in line service. Several investigators, prominent among
them Sarter and Woods, have conducted such inquiries. Their data, gathered in flight observation
and simulation experiments, indicate two principal sources of FMS interaction problems. The first
class of problems involves mode errors or lack of mode awareness. As Sarter has pointed out
(Sarter & Woods, 1994), today's flight management systems are "mode-rich" and it is often
difficult for pilots to keep track of them (see figure 7-1). The second problem, which is related to
the ftrst, involves lack of understanding by pilots of the system's internal architecture and logic,
and therefore a lack of understanding of what the machine is doing, and why, and of what it is
going to do next.
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Simply saying that improvement of the flight management system is not economically
justifiable rationalizes away the many lessons learned from operational experience with these
systems. If"the box" itself cannot be _xtesigned, it is possible and likely that redesign of some of
the displays associated with it (the CDU format, the map display and particularly the mode
annunciation panel) might accomplish some of the same purposes. There is, for instance, no true
vertical navigation display at present, yet it is during climb and descent phases of operation that a
majority of the problems in the interaction between operators and the automation arises.
Reworking of mode annunciation panels to make mode data, and particularly mode changes, more
salient could improve pilot understanding of what the automation is doing (Hutchins, cited in
AWST, 1995b).
While modifying procedures is a poor substitute for fixing the basic problems that motivated
the modifications, them are at least three possible approaches to these problems in addition to the
display improvements mentioned immediately above, each of which has both advantages and
drawbacks. Each, however, seems worthy of considm'ation by designers and operators.
Without modifying the hardware, system software revisions could be made to simplify
complex FMS functions with the intent of making them more understandable and/or
transparent to operators (see previous paragraph).
Procedures for the use of the FMS could be modified to simplify the use of the systems.
Such modifications would involve the use of only a subset of FMS functions. Excluded
functions could either be disabled or simply not used.
Pilot training should be examined and revised with the intent of providing the operators
with a better understanding of system logic and behavior under the range of conditions
likely to be encountered in line operations.
Each of these alternatives will be examined briefly here.
System software revisions could be made to simplify complex FMS
functions with the intent of making them more understandable and/or
transparent to operators.
In newer aircraft, Hight Management Systems arc flight-essential equip.ment. This means that
any changes in the systems or in how they function axe subject to ngorous configuration
management and certification criteria. Software changes, however small, are extremely expensive.
Further, given the tight coupling among software modules, changes in one module may have
cascading effects on other software elements. Any proposal for software modifications is subject
to even greater cost constraints than are hardware modifications. Further, "cosmetic" software
changes are unlikely to have appreciable effects on system complexity, the real issue underlying
present problems with the FMS. A wholesale redesign of the system would probably be required
to simplify it in a useful way.
Despite these negative comments, however, research should be undertaken to learn which of a
large number of approaches to FMS architecture would convey the greatest benefits in temas of real
system simplicity and transparency. I am unwilling to accept the thesis that advanced flight
planning, management and guidance systems cannot be made easier for human operators to
understand and to operate. Several research groups arc now working on various aspects of this
problem, though none, to my knowledge, has looked at the overarching question of FMS
architecture and functionality.
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Procedural modifications for the use of the _"M$ could simplify the use of
the systems. Such modifications would involve the use of only a subset of
FMS functions. Excluded functions could either be disabled or simply not
used.
Procedures have always been used to make up for deficiencies in equipment and technology,
but it is also true that uses of technology are often sub-optimal because proper procedures for its
utilization have not been developed and applied. We have FMS technology in being; it is unlikely
to be fundamentally modified, and we know that human operators are having some difficulties in
using it effectively. Here, I am not suggesting ways to get around specific problems; rather, I
suggest that a systematic look should be taken at those FMS functions that are widely used,
necessary for safe and effective mission accomplishment, and least likely to be misunderstood or
misused. Functions that do not meet these criteria should be considered for abandonment. Is it
really necessary to have four distinct descent modes, or would two suffice?
Is it really necessary that pilots be able to demonstrate their ability to use all FMS functions to
be type-rated on a given piece of equipment, or is it necessary only that they be able to use a limited
subset of the available modes to accomplishtheir mission under all foreseeable circumstances?
Any reduction in FMS complexity would pay dividends during training, would decrease the
cognitive burden imposed on pilots by the equipment, and would simplify flight procedures.
Automation complexity is the fundamental problem in this domain; reducing that complexity offers
the greatest hope of a successful resolution of that problem, even if system redesign is not
possible.
Simplifying procedures for the use of the FMS would also permit us to avoid those corners of
the FMS functional envelope that have posed the most serious problems in the past. The "open
descent" issue in current Airbus airplanes is one example; climbs using vertical rate rather than
speed modes is another. A third is operations that may cause pilots inadvertently to disable an
airplane's "altitude capture" function. A fourth is restrictions on flight paths necessary to permit
glide slope and localizer capture during approaches. The recent A300 accident at Nagoya (1994)
suggests that mode interactions which permit simultaneous manual and automated control should
be avoided. (This is not a new problem; it has been a source of incidents and accidents in general
aviation for many years.) United Airlines is focusing its FMS training on "preferred modes" of
operation of the FMS to simplify the pilot's tasks in managing the airplane.
These are only examples designed to provoke thinking about whether we can make the use of
this very complex tool simpler by avoiding some of its less important capabilities. Pilots could
point to several other possibilities, perhaps more important than some mentioned here, ff they were
asked to. Though a number of pilot opinion surveys has been conducted, to my knowledge none
of them has asked, "What functions do you never use, and why?"
Pilot training should be examined and revised with the intent of providing
operators with a better understanding of system logic and behavior under
the full range of conditions likely to be encountered in line operations.
To paraphrase Sarter and Woods (1994), "What is needed is better understanding of how the
machine operates, not just of how to operate the machine." A more homely expression of this is,
"If you can't see what you need to know, then you've got to know what you need to know" (to
which Demosthenes (personal communication, 1994) added, "and if you don't know, you've got
to be told!"). Given the flexibility and complexity of the current FMS, some of the mistakes pilots
make in its operation suggest that they simply do not understand how it operates, and why it does
things that way. There are good reasons in most cases, and they are known to the designers of the
equipment (although the designers may not always have taken full account of the needs of the line
pilot). Some are imposed by certification requirements, others by the system architecture and still
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othersby the range of FMS interactions with the airplane and with other automation. But the
problem of inadequate user understanding persists.
Explanations of these interacting requirements during training.would be costly in terms of
training time, without question. They would certainly be less expensxve, however, than the loss of
an aircraft and its passengers because of the lack of such knowledge. Accidents to date and
growing experimental evidence (Saner, 1994) do indicate inadequate understanding of FMS
behavior and operating constraints, and pilots responding to surveys indicate that they have not
been satisfied with the thoroughness of their computer-based training or with their ability to get
answers to questions when they have asked them CUchtdorf & Heldz, 1989).
An adequate internal model of an automated system is vital to a pilot's ability to predict how
that system will function under novel circumstances. I believe that research in progress will point
toward a better understanding of what pilots require to build correct and adequate models of the
systems they operate. Hopefully, air carriers can find ways to assist them in forming such models
during their training.
Management of human error
The alternatives presented above are not mutually exclusive. Experience with advanced
automated systems indicates the need for simplicity, transparency and comprehensibility in the
systems we use, as well as predictability in the behavior of those systems. Even though today's
fright management systems fall short of human-centered principles in certain respects, it will be
difficult, in today's economic climate, to generate much interest in radical re-work of any systems
that are functional, let alone systems as capable as our present FMSs. Yet we must fred ways to
improve the error resistance and error tolerance of both our current systems and those of the future.
Iend thischapterwith a shortdiscussionof theseall-hnportant concepts.
The aviation system has been plagued by the problem of "human error" since it began. One of
many reasons for this has been that our investigations of accidents has tended to focus rather
narrowly on the specifics of individual cases, wherein a specific set of often unlikely
circumstances, including erroneous actions by humans, has led to an undesired outcome. Points
of commonality among accidents have been discerned and often corrected, but on the whole, our
remedial measures have been specific and narrowly focused on the "sharp end" of the system.
In recent years, several investigators have looked farther in an attempt to discover more
generic factors involved in accidents, among them Perrow (1984), Reason (1990), Lauber (1993),
and Woods et al. (1994). Reason's "latent failure" model has been influential; in over-simplified
form, it suggests that a variety of latent factors, or "pathogens", are present in most organizations
and endeavors. Under certain usually uncommon circumstances, they may affect the course of an
operation or production process in such a way that an untoward outcome ensues: an accident.
Woods et al. have carried this conswact further and have explored the variety of circumstances that
can potentiate the effects on the operators at the "sharp end" of such enterprises. Lauber has
stimulated systematic searches for such factors in the background of transportation accidents and
has argued for theirinclusion as probable or contributory cause factors in NTSB accident
investigationreports.
The Dryden, Ontario (1989) accidentbrieflysummarized inthe Appendix isa classicexample
of such factors(Moshansky, 1992),but they have been major contributorstomany mishaps. A
fulldiscussion is beyond the scope of thisdocument, but itmust be accepted thatwithout full
informationconcerning the contextand environment(s) in which accidentsoccur,itisnot possible
to understand theirgenesisand how to take rationalstepstoprevent futureaccidents.Accidents
are not only human failures;they are also failuresof design, operation,management and often
oversight.In short,they aresystem failures.They must be looked atas such ifthey are to be fully
understood.
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Error resistance
Ideally, aircraft automation should prevent the occurrence of all errors, both its own and those
of its human operators. This is unrealistic, but it is necessary to design systems to be relatively
error-resistant, both with respect to their own errors and those of the operator. Resistance is "an
opposing or reta.nling force", a definition that recognizes the relative nature of the phenomenon.
Resistance to error in automation itself involves internal testing to determine that the system is
operating within its design and software guidelines. Resistance to human error is more subtle; it
may involve comparison of human actions with a template of permitted actions ("reasonability"
checks), a software proscription against certain forbidden actions under specified conditions
(envelope limitation or protection is an example), or simply clear, intuitive displays and simple,
uncomplicated procedures to minimir¢ the likelihood of inadvertent human errors.
Automation of unavoidably complex procedures (such as fuel sequencing and transfer among
a large number of widely-separated tanks to maintain an optimal center of gravity) is necessary and
entirely appropriate provided the human is "kept in the loop" so he or she understands what is
going on. The system must be able to be operated by the human ff the automation fails; it must fail
"safe" (in this case, it must be designed so a failure will not leave the airplane outside its operating
limits) and it must provide unambiguous indication that it is (or is not) functioning properly.
Guidance in performing complex tasks (and fuel balancing in some aircraft may be such a task) is
helpful, whether it is in a quick reference handbook or in the form of an electronic checklist.
Prompting has not been used as effectively as it could be in aircraft human-system interfaces,
though the newest electronic checklists attempt to assist in this task.
Questioning of critical procedures or instructions to the automation (those that irreversibly alter
aircraft capabilities), or requiring that critical orders be confirmed by pilots before they are
executed, can be additional safeguards against errors. These queries can also be automate& either
by themselves or as part of a procedures monitoring module which compares human actions with a
model of predicted actions under various circumstances. Such models have been developed in
research settings (Palmer, Mitchell & Govindaraj, 1990); some are now in use.
The human operator is known to commit apparently random, unpredictable errors with some
frequency (Wiener, 1987; Norman, 1988); it is extremely unlikely that designers will ever be able
to devise automation that will trap all of them. This being the case, it is essential to provide
alternate means by which pilots can detect the fact that a human or an automation error has
occurred. Such warnings must be prodded in enough time to permit pilots to isolate the error, and
a means must be provided by which to correct the error once it is detected. Where this is not
possible, the consequences of an action should be queried before the action itself is allowed to
proceed.
It must be noted here that automation also makes apparently random, unpredictable errors, and
it is equally unlikely that designers will be able to devise the means to trap all of them. The human
operator is the last (and best) line of defense against these failure, but that operator must be given
the means to deal with such failures. Figure 4-6 shows some of these apparently random failures.
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"As the nosewheel was about to touch down, the rudder moved, uncommanded,
16-17 degrees to the righL The airplane left the runway at about 130 knots..."
"As the aircraft banked, it encountered a wind shear...this buffeting triggered its
automatic flap locking mechanism...the flaps locked at a fuI1 setting...the pilot
aborted the landing. On the fourth try, he landed on runway 31...two pas-
sengers were slightly injured after the aircraft ran off the runway..."
"A V2500 engine 'shut itself down' during a descent...because of a fault in the
automatic fuel flow logic which is being urgently investigated..."
"About half a mile from the runway threshold, the stick pusher activated while the
airplane was slowing through 130 knots...the pilots estimated the pull required to
overcome the forward yoke pressure at more than 250 pounds..."
"At the time, the airplane was operating at 31,000 ft, at night, with the autopilot
engaged. The crew did not notice the initiation of the roll and first noted a
problem when the INS warning lights illuminated. They then noted...a roll to the
right with a bank angle in excess of 90 degrees."
"After touching down...the pilots selected spoilers and reverse thrust, but there
was a delay of 9 seconds before they deployed..."
Fig. 4-6: Automation failures during aircraft operations.
Error tolerance
Since error resistance is relative rather than absolute, there needs to be a "layered defense"
against human errors. Beside building systems to resist errors as much as possible, it is necessary
and highly desirable to make systems tolerant of error. Tolerance means "'the act of allowing
something"; in this case, it covers the entire panoply of means that can be used to insure that when
an error is committed, it is not allowed to jeopardize safety.
Nagel (1988) has pointed out that "it is explicitly accepted that errors will occur;, automation is
used to monitor the human crew and to detect errors as they are made." The aviation system is
already highly tolerant of errors, largely by virtue of monitoring by other crew members and by air
traffic control. But certain errors possible with automated equipment become obvious only long
after they are committed" such as data entry errors during preflight FMS programming (or even
errors in the construction of the FMS database, a factor in the Mr. Erebus DC-IO accident). New
monitoring software, displays and devices may be required to trap these more covert errors.
As was suggested above, checks of actions against reasonableness criteria may be appropriate;
for an aircraft in the eastern hemisphere, a west longitude waypoint between two east longitude
entries is probably not appropriate. An attempted manual depressurization of an aircraft cabin
could be an appropriate maneuver to rid the cabin of smoke, but it is more probably an error and
should be conf'Lrmed before execution. Closing fuel valves on both engines of a twin-engine
transport, an action that has occurred at least twice, is almost certainly an error if airborne (San
Francisco, 1986; Los Angeles, 1987).
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Given that it is impossible either to prevent or to trap all possible human errors, aircraft
accident and especially incident data can be extremely useful in pointing out the kinds of errors that
occur with some frequency. Formal system hazard analyses are appropriate to elucidate the most
serious possible errors, those that could pose an imminent threat to safety. The latter should be
guarded against regardless of their reported frequency (Hollnagel, 1993; see also Rouse, 1991).
Error management
An epidemiological model of, and approach to, the problem of human error in aviation was
suggested over two decades ago (Barnhart et al., 1975; Cheaney & Billings, 1981). In a recent
comprehensive review, Wiener (1993) has discussed intervention strategies for the management of
human error. Wiener states that "The aim of intervention is to strengthen the lines of defense at
any barrier, or any combination of barriers, and to insert additional lines of defense where
possible" (p. 13). He also proposes, however, that "Each proposed method of
intervention...should be examined with respect to its feasibility, applicability, costs, and possible
shortcomings (e.g., creating a problem elsewhere in the system)". He offers guidelines for the
design of error management strategies. This thoughtful study, and the others cited above, deserve
careful scrutiny by operators and managers, as well as designers, of complex equipment.
Comment
In this chapter, I have presented a variety of automation innovations that I believe will be seen
in, or at least proposed for application in, future aircraft. It is worth remembering again the criteria
given by Kelly, Graeber and Fadden (1992): does a new system or function offer a reasonable
likelihood of a return on investment? The return may be actual or potential, but it must be
demonstrable in advance if the new system is to find its way onto a future airplane. It must be
needed, not merely desired, in today's (and very probably tomorrow's) economic and competitive
climate.
Nonetheless, while accidents prevented cannot be counted, it is clear that prevention is a great
deal less expensive than accident costs. Two 737 accidents in recent years remain entirely
unexplained at this time (Colorado Springs, 1992; Pittsburgh, 1994). Both had older digital flight
data recorders which did not record control surface positions; that information might very well
have led to an unambiguous finding of probable cause. A large part of the older fleet could
probably have been equipped with advanced recorders for the cost of these two occurrences, and
we would not continue to wonder whether there may be a latent defect waiting to cause another
accident. In sharp contrast, the Aerospatiale ATR-72 which crashed after extended flight in icing
conditions ('Roselawn, IN, 1994), was equipped with a modem digital flight data recorder whose
data enabled investigators to discover, literally within days of the accident, that icing had disturbed
airflow over the ailerons beyond the pilots' ability to maintain control.
Some of the innovations discussed here are clearly needed if the industry is to continue to
expand its horizons; some form of enhanced or synthetic vision is an example. Improved error
tolerance is imperative. Capacity must be increased, by whatever means. Global satellite
navigation and satellite data and voice communication are certainties. The need for some of the
other innovations discussed here is less certain, though the technology for them exists. Many
could have been implemented in the Boeing 777 had there been sufficient demand for them-but
there was not.
Other innovations not yet thought of will be proposed for aircraft still in the future, though
most will be introduced in civil aviation only if they can meet the test proposed by Kelly and his
coworkers. Even an entirely new supersonic transport, if one is built, will be subject to the
demands of the marketplace, and our manufacturers cannot afford to take chances, especially now.
They will build even a radically new airplane with the caution they have displayed throughout
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history--and that airplane is more likely to be both safe and economically viable because of that
caution.
It is the task of the human factors community m make that aircraft and any other new models
easier to manage, more error tolerant, and thus safer, than those that have come before, despite the
economic factors that militate against change ff what we have is "good enough". Accidents, even
the few we have, are sufficient evidence that "good enough" isn't--that as long as preventable
accidents occur, our job is not fi_rdshed.
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5. Air traffic control and management automation
Introduction
Aircraft automation has a very long history (chapters 3-4). In contrast, air traffic control
(ATC) automation is of relatively recent vintage, dating from the 1960s, when the potential
advantages of computer management of flight plan data were fast recognized by the FAA, which
manages essentially all air traffic control in the United States. This discussion is focused on the
United States system because it is a single integrated system free of the national boundary and
political constraints that have hampered progress in air traffic control elsewhere, and because its
operations have been a model for many other nations. This chapter discusses the evolution of air
traffic control and management automation. The tasking of our complex ATC sy.stem is simple on
its face: to provide safe separation among controlled aircraft and to expedite men" passage to men"
destinations. Fulfilling the requirements of that tasking is less simple.
Background
The U.S. National Airspace System (NAS) utilizes computers for a great part of its data
management and information transfer, but air traffic control itself is still an almost entirely human
operation conducted by highly skilled air traffic controllers whose information is derived from
radar data, voice communication with pilots and printed flight data strips. There are many sound
reasons for this apparently primitive state of affairs, not the least being the necessity of a careful,
evolutionary approach to modifications of the ATC system, a highly integrated complex of
equipment ranging from elderly vacuum tube systems to modem digital devices.
Though ATC system automation is primitive compared to the advanced technology in the
aircraft which it controls, the system is a truly remarkable, highly functional human-machine
system which has accommodated itself to enormous demands upon it. In recent years, the system
has been called upon to handle traffic volume well beyond what a few years ago was thought to be
its capacity. It has done so because of the creativity and flexibility of its operators and managers,
who have revamped the airspace and designed procedures to deal with constantly increasing
demand due to increased competitive pressures on air carriers and other segments of the
commercial aviation community.
During this same period, the air transport system itself been beset by constant change, totally
unlike anything known during its 70-year history. In their former regulated (and stable)
environment, air carriers were able to set operating standards at a level weU above the minimums
required by regulations. The same could be said of air traffic control. Safety and conservatism
were the overriding factors in its design and implementation. This state of affairs changed
dramatically during the 1980s for a number of reasons, including the air traffic controUers' strike in
1981 and an enormous increase in discretionary travel brought about by airline deregulation and the
emergence of unfettered competition.
The aviation system worked well despite these perturbations, but carriers found it necessary to
adopt radically different ways of doing business. A major change was the introduction of "hub-
and-spoke" flying, in which carriers selected "hub" airports, flew long segments between them,
then shunted passengers onto shorter "spoke" flights to get them to their destinations. This
produced enormous concentrations of traffic that had formerly been more reasonably spaced, with
consequent workload increases for controllers.
The air traffic control system found itself handling considerable increases in traffic with
outdated equipment, chronic understaffing and less experienced controllers in many facilities.
Since the early 1980s, the FAA has been working on plans for a radical upgrading of the ATC
infrastructure involving major increases in automation to improve controller p.roductivity, eliminate
airspace bottlenecks and increase traffic throughput. The first of the new eqmpment was scheduled
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to be installed in the Seattle Air Route Traffic Conu'ol Center (ARTCC) in late 1994, but the
implementation schedule has slipped considerably, and the costs have escalated by nearly three
billion dollars.
Evolution of the Air Traffic Control System
Airport air traffic control
Air traffic control began at airports during the late 1920s. The first controllers used flags and
stood outside; later, control towers were built and controllers used light guns to provide one-way
communication with airplanes. Radios began to be used during the middle 1930s, though most
smaller aircraft did not carry them until after world war II and light guns continued to be used well
into the 1950s.
As all-weather transportflyingincreased and radar became availableafterthe war, tower
visualcontrolof localairtrafficwas augmented by radarcontrolof trafficin busierterminalareas.
Terminal areacontrollers,attachedto towers,were given separateradarfacilitieswhich permitted
them to provide departing air traffic with a transition to the enroute environment and arrivals from
that environment to a final approach to landing. Terminal radar approach control (TRACON)
facilities were equipped with broadband radar, later augmented by dam processing equipment and
automated data communication with enroute Centers. Full performance level controllers functioned
both as tower and TRACON controUers.
Fig. 5-1" U. S. Aimpace Categories (FAA)
Continuing increases in air traffic motivated the FAA to establish new categories of terminal
airspace, in part to separate fast jet traffic from slower, smaller (and harder to see) general aviation
aircraft.Terminal ControlAreas (TCAs) came intobeing;,withintheseareas,generallyshaped like
an "inverted wedding cake", alltraffic,whether flyingunder visual(VFR) or instrument (IFR)
flightrules,was required to submit to positivecontrol by terminal area controllers. Beacon
transponders and radiotransceiverswere required inorder eithertoland atthe primary airportor
simply to transitthe area. Other airspace reservationswith lessstringentrequirements but also
involvingincreasedsurveillanceand controlwere put ineffectaround lessbusy airports.Figure 5-
1 shows the present (1994) categoriesof civilairspace over the United States. The increasing
requirements in thesecategoriesof airspaceimposed a heavierworkload on airtrafficontrollers.
In theory,they lessened surveillanceworkload forpilots,though high levelsof vigilancewcrc still
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required, particularly at the vertical and horizontal margins of terminal airspace where many light
aircraft flying just outside the controlled areas could still be encountered.
Effects of increasing terminal airspace complexity
While these terminal areas unquestionably assisted in air traffic segregation, they imposed an
increased procedural and information processing burden on pilots and controllers alike even with
carefully-adjusted procedural separation requirements. When it became necessary to relax
procedural separation standards and increase the use of visual separation procedures on approaches
to accommodate continually increasing air traffic, the vigilance and information processing
requirements, especially on pilots, increased further. The total dependence of the system on low
bandwidth single-channel voice radio communications for real-time information transfer has
increased workload still more. These problems will continue to require better solutions in the
foreseeable future. They are made more pressing by the continuing demand upon air traffic control
for still further increases in terminal area capacity, which has required innovative, complex
procedures to stay ahead of (or even with) demand.
Enroute air traffic control
Enroute air traffic control began to be utilized in 1935 along airways marked by aeronautical
beacon lights. Enroute Air Traffic Control Units (ATCU), (the first of which was established by
TWA, United,Eastern and American AirlinesatNewark because thegovernment had no funds for
it),communicated with aircarder dispatcherswho forwarded the information by radio to aircraft.
Hight plans were made mandatory in 1936; ATCUs were taken over by the CAA in 1937-38. In
1940, the CAA was reorganized to take account of itsincreasingresponsibilitiesfor airtraffic
control;thereafter,itacquired control over trafficat allmunicipal airportsand established23
Airway TrafficControl Centers. During world war ll,approach control facilitiesbegan to bc
establishedatsome of the busiestairports (secNolan, 1994, for an excellentbriefhistoryof air
trafficontrol).
Prior to the introduction of radar, enroute control facilities visualized traffic using flight
progress strips (figure 5-2). All information input was by voice radio; controllers kept a mental
three-dimensional picture of traffic under their control and annotated the strips to correspond with
reported positions. Low-frequency radio navigation aids marked the various airway segments.
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Fig. 5-2: Hight progress strip, annotated.
In 1956, radar became available and controllers began to be provided with a visual
representation of traffic within their sectors of control. Primary radar provided only a display of
aircraft locations; altitucles were still reported by voice and procedural control was still required to
insure vertical separation. When the radar failed, controllers had to revert quickly to "shrimp
boats" (small annotated markers representing aircraft) and full procedural control based on flight
strips and their mental picture of traffic, a function that required considerable skill.
Communication was improved by the introduction of improved two-way VHF transceivers.
Controllers still kept track of their traffic by using flight strips which they annotated as insmactions
were given to each airplane.
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The introduction of interrogation devices, the Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System
(ATCRBS) at radar sites and transponders in aircraft which responded to queries from the
interrogators, made possible secondary surveillance radar (SSR) systems (also referred to as
"narrow-band" radar, as contrasted with primary or "broad-band" radar). The transponders
provided coded identification of specific ah-vraf_ eliminated ambiguity as to location, and improved
returns from the responding aircraft. By the early 1960s, most em'oute Centers were operating
with SSR, to which was added over the next several years altitude reporting in the transponder
replies. This information, along with aircraft identification codes, provided controllers with
positive _ee-dimensional location information for aircraft being controlled.
A disadvantage of the beacon system was that primary radar targets were poorly visualized,
and not all aircraft operating within the system had transponders. The controller had to provide
separation to these aircraft as well ff they were operating under instnnnent flight rules, and this task
became much more demanding as enroute system controllers began to depend increasingly on
direct representations of traffic. This is still a problem in many areas; although nearly all aircraft
now carry transponders, some general aviation aircraft still do not have altitude-encoding ("mode
C"), and radar images of these airplanes consequently may be ambiguous as to altitude. (This is
also a problem for TCAS, which cannot provide conflict resolution advisories without altitude
data.)
Air traffic management
The development of the Federal airtrafficontrolsystem has often fallenseriouslybehind
trafficdemand. Even when Congress has recognized the problem and provided additional
funding, usuallyfollowing a major accidentsuch as the midair collisionof a TWA Constellation
and a United AirlinesDC-7 over the Grand Canyon (1956),ithas been difficulto "get ahead" of
the need for services.One resultof thishas been thatcontrollermorale has often been at a low
ebb. This was evidentfollowing world war If,again during the Viet Nam war, and more recently,
during the late1970s.
Manifest and latent labor-management problems got out of control in 1981, culminating in a
disastrous walkout of union controllers in August. The President of the United States acted
decisively to end the strike and 10,000 controllers who did not return to work within a few days
were summarily discharged. The nationalairspacesystem was placed under draconian capacity
controlsbut continued tofunction ata fractionof itsformer capacity,manned by supervisorsand
the relativelyfew controllerswho l_adnot participatedin the strikeor who had returned to work
withinthe permittedwindow for such action.
Itwas atthistime thatstrategicairtrafficmanagement, thefoundationsforwhich had emerged
during the Arab fuel embargo of 197S, assumed criticalimportance in airspace management.
Working with aircarriersand other airspaceusers,Flow Control allocatedan'spacecapacity to
operatorsin accordance with system resources,establishedthroughput targetsattolerablelevels,
and literallymanaged the entiresystem. The facilities,taffand equipment availableforthistask
were grossly inadequate, but the flow control system worked and provided ATC Centers and
terminalarea controlfacilitieswith the buffertheyrequired tocontinue toprovide trafficservices
with whatever personnel were available.Pilotsand operatorscooperated in every way possible,
and the system never broke down completely.
The activitiesof Flow Control during thisperiod made startlinglyobvious the need for a
continuing strategicmanagement function, supported by a communications and information
management infrastructurethatwould provide itwith a "big picture'of U.S. airtraffic.As the
effectsof the strikeon tacticalcontrolwere graduallyameliorated by time, new procedures and
new traineecontrollers,the FAA accelerateditseffortstoprovide itsstrategictrafficmanagement
functionwith thetoolsitneeded.
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After some years, the ATC System Command Center (SCC), located in Washington, finally
received an automated system visualization device, the Aircraft Situation Display (ASD), which
displays current aircraft positions and directions on a national scale, with superimposed maps of
geographic and facility boundaries. The system incorporates selective digital filtering to permit
controllers to visualize special categories of aircraft or situations of interest; system software also
enables controllers to project and visualize the effects of intended strategies for management of air
tra_c in response to weather or other contingencies. It is thus a strategic planning tool as weU as a
representation of the cmrent traffic situation. Weather displays are also available, and in the near
future will be integrated with the ASD.
The Center's primary mission is to ensure that traffic demand does not exceed ATC system
capacity. SCC personnel act mainly as coordinators between users of the airspace (largely air
carrier dispatchers, with whom the Center has direct contact) and controllers in the various ATC
facilities. During 1993, ASD displays also became available to air carrier System Operations
Centers (SOCs), whose ability to manage their own traffic flow has been greatly enhanced by
access to the larger picture of air traffic activity. The SCC performs an extremely important
integrating function for aviation, though it does not direct individual aircraft. This integration is a
key to the efficient utilization of finite airspace whose capacity is strained by the demands upon it.
Air traffic control automation
Radar itself may be considered a form of automation, in that it integrates and provides a visual
representation of a geographic or spatial phenomenon, and thus constitutes "a system in which a
production process is automatically performed by a self-operating electronic device" (chapter 1).
Air traffic control radar facilities incorporate a great variety of electronic aids to reduce ground
clutter, eliminate noise, overlay video maps on radar scopes, etc. In the early 1970s, the FAA
began to install radar data processors (RDP) in enroute Centers, all of which make use of several
remote radar sites to obtain full coverage of their airspace. Before radar data processing, sector
controllers would utilize imagery from whatever individual radar provided acceptable coverage of
their sector. RDP correlated the data from many radars to produce a composite synthetic image of
all traffic using the best information available from its sensors. The result was a vastly improved
visual representation of the best available data with less ambiguity and greater consistency, and
thus decreased controller interpretive workload.
During the same time period, FAA installed flight data processors fFDP) that stored flight plan
data, recognized the sectors through which flights would pass, and printed flight strips appropriate
to each facihty's responsibilities for flights. The FDPs were interconnected so that data on flights
leaving a Center's area would be passed automatically to the next Center or terminal facility in line.
FDPs also generated data for aircraft "tags" on controller plan view displays (PVD). Sector
controllers continued to store the flight strips, annotate and move them to remind them of their
flights' progress and requirements. Hopldn (1994b) has discussed the assistance that manual
handling and marking of flight strips provides to controllers. He points out the information that
adjacent sector controllers obtain simply by glancing at another sector's strip bay, the ability to re-
sort the strips to take account of changes in traffic flow, etc. Controllers have shaped this tool, as
humans always do, to serve their needs. Some authors believe that there is no longer a need for
such tools (Vortac & Manning, 1994); others are less certain (Hughes, 1992; Hopkin, 1994a).
During the past decade, despite severe limitations on data processing capacity within aging
ATC computers, several automated monitoring and alerting functions have been added to the ATC
system. Conflict alert, designed to warn of a failure of separation minima, provides an audible
alarm in the ATC facility if standards are transgressed. Unfortunately, violation of these separation
minima subjects controllers to adverse action if they are found at fault. In response to controlled
flight toward terrain incidents (and a small number of controlled flight into terrain accidents despite
GPWS in aircraft), a minimum safe altitude warning (MSAW) module was developed. Later, an
automated altitude monitoring function was added, which alerted controllers if pilots transgressed
75
an altitude clearance limit (pilots violating their altitude clearan_s also fac_ enforcement action by
FAA).
Effects of air traffic control automation
As radar and ATC automation became more reliablein the 1970s, NASA Aviation Safety
Reporting System reportsbegan to contain comments from older controllers,trainedand highly
expert in the use of procedural control,worrying that theiryounger colleagues had become
dependent on radar representationsof trafficand thus were lessskilledin constructinga three-
dimensional mental image of the trafficunder theircontrol. Though some ASRS reports did
indicatethatsudden radar failuresproduced short-termdisruption of trafficcontrol,reports of
serious incidentswere uncommon. A few reallydangerous lossesof controldid occur (e.g.,
Atlanta, 1981); these were usually ascribed to trainingor proficiency problems, though the
investigationsusually did not delve deeply into latentfactors (Reason, 1990). Air traffic
controllers(and ATC system managers) cultivatedthe image of great mental strength and
individuality;thisimage did not willinglyadmit of personal or system weaknesses thatcould
compromise the performance of theircriticaltasks(Rose, Jenkins, & Hurst, 1978; FlightSafety
Foundation, 1982).
Nonetheless, the ATC system was under strain when its met its greatest challenge in 1981, the
sudden departure of the great majority of its experienced operators. That it survived this challenge,
even under severeconstraints,reflectsthe capabilityand dedicationof thehumans who remained to
operate itafterthe strike.The men and women who continued to controltrafficwere severely
tested,but the basic sm_cture of the system survived and remains in place today, awaiting
advanced equipment which hopcfuUy willenablethe system tomeet stillgreaterchallengesahead.
The plans for the new AAS were drawn to provide greaterflexibility,productivityand capacity.
Whether the system can meet itsnew demands will depend upon whether itsdesign provides
controllerswith the flexibilityto meet thechallengesof an environment which isstillnot entirely
under thecontrolof thehuman operatorsinthe system.
Comment
One of the continuing problems in the aviation system has been thatits two principal
components, the aircraftand the airtrafficontrolinfrastructure,have usuallybeen considered in
isolation.Aircraftdesignershave usuallygiven only passing considerationtothe system inwhich
•theirmachines must operate;ATC system designers have usuallyconsidered aircraftsimply as
pointobjectsto be moved from place toplace (afunctionoftendescribed as "moving tin").Most
controllersaxe not pilots,and virtuallyno pilotsarc,or have been, controllers.Designers ineach
sphererarelyhave adequate knowledge of the otherdomain.
While this has not created insuperable handicaps in the past, evolving automation in aircraft,
unaccompanied by similar development of the ATC system, has led to increasing disparities
between aircraftand ATC capabilities.These, and increasingdemands on the entiresystem, arc
now manifest as delays,which are expensive both to operatorsand to airlinepassengers. Though
future ATC automation, the subject of the next chapter, may help resolve some of these
discrepancies,itiscriticalthatthefuturesystem's architecturerecognize thatthe aviationsystem is
a singlesystem. Only with thisrecognitionwillthe system be sufficientlyfunctionaltomcct the
demands upon it.
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6. Future air traffic management automation
Introduction
The FAA is in the midst of the largest air traffic management system upgrade in its history. Its
intended product is the Advanced Automation System (AAS). Europe is beginning the
harmonization and integration of its multiple national air traffic control systems, and many
members of the European Community are also undertaking massive equipment modernization
programs. There is every reason to believe, therefore, that future air traffic control systems will
look very different fi'om the systems of today.
Two years ago (1992) the shape of the U.S. Advanced Automation System looked fairly
clear, while that of Europe was very difficult to discern. Now, the outlines of the European
system are beginning to reveal themselves while the shape of the future U.S. system is much less
clear. "The cost of the (AAS) program, originally estimated at $4.3 billion, is now projected by
the FAA at $7 billion...The system was to become operational in stages, beginning last year, but
current estimates now project the earliest starting date as 1997" (Tolchin, 1994) 1. Meanwhile, air
traffic continues to increase.
Though discussion of future air waffle management systems is made much more difficult by
the current unsettled state of affairs in the United States, it is plain what the future system is
expected to accomplish. Further, we know in broad outline how the FAA wants to reach those
objectives. From these facts, it is possible to suggest in some detail what the future system may
look like and how it will function. What cannot be stated with any clarity at this time is what
human and machine roles will be in that system, because its designers have not approached the
question except in general terms. Joseph Del Balzo's (1992) forecast of"an era where air travel is
unhampered by...the limitations of human decision-making..." suggests the depth of the concern
about human reliability among senior system managers. If this concern is permitted to dominate
the debate about the shape of the future aviation system, that system will not be a human-centered
air traffic management system, and if ATC system automation is not human-centered, automation
in the remainder of the system will not be either.
It is for these reasons that this document attempts to make the case for a human-centered
automation system for air traffic control as well as for aircraft. There are not two systems (air and
ground); there is one National Aviation System. Its elements must be designed and operated from
a common philosophical base if the system is to be maximally effective. Forecasts of capacity
demands indicate that even if the system operates optimally, its capacity will still be strained by
early in the next century. We must, therefore, make the most of what we will have during that
period.
Future air traffic control system characteristics
Assumptions
I shall assume that by the year 2000, most of the hardware and major software elements of a
hypothetical advanced automated air traffic control system are in place. ATC computational
resources will be adequate to process any system software that is likely to be devised. Interfaces
between the human and machine components of the new system are in place. Most or all
communication between ground and airborne components of the system is carried out by digital
data link; voice is a secondary means of communication between ATC and aircraft under normal
1 It has since been decided to eliminate certain parts of the advanced automation system and to
delay its implementation in facilities having less traffic, in order to lessen the overall cost. Cuts
will also be made in the Initial Sector Suite development program.
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circumstances. Finally, control of air traffic is still the responsibility of the ground ATC system
(this assumption is being questioned; see discussion of "free flight" below).
The question, then, is what software will activate this system and how its components will
work together to accomplish the mission. A range of hypothetical scenarios can be constructed.
For reader convenience, I have named each using a scheme which wilt be discussed in detail in
chapter 8 (see figure 8-2).
Scenario 1: Management by delegation
Scenario 1, the least radical, involves a system in which the controller manages by delegation,
as do pilots of present-day aircraft. It is an outgrowth of today's system in many respects: the
controller is given an enhanced multicolor plan view of traffic in a sector of airspace, a data display
which presents flight strip analogues, rules governing the handling of that traffic, and a variety of
automation tools which can be used to accomplish the task. Controllers have several such tools
today; among them arc predictors which show where traffic will be at a certain time in the futu_,
history traces which show the immediate past trajectory of each aircraft, range scnings with which
they can set the area of coverage, variable polarization, declutter options, transponder code
filtering, and others.
A larger area of coverage would be available, including other sector airspace. Short-term
conflict prediction algorithms would suggest potential conflicts. A timeline might be available
which would show traffic loading in the future. "What-if' gaming capability would assist the
controller in examining decision options. Conflict alerting modules would warn the controller in
advance of potential conflicts and would assist in evaluating the lilmlihood of conflicts given certain
changes in trajectory. The computer would also monitor controller actions to insure that they
comported with rules and procedures, and that limited-use airspace restrictions were observed.
Weather information would be shown; in low-altitude sectors, terrain and other obstacles
would also be made visible as desLred. The controUer, within certain limits, would be able to select
the strategy he wishes to utilize, and the computer would accept that strategy in its conflict
predictions. More important, the controller could specify the level of assistance he wished the
computer to provide; the automation could thus be adapted to a variety of cognitive styles and
experience levels. Finally, memory aids would be provided which would enable a departing
controUer to brief a relieving controller quickly and comprehensively.
This scenario is roughly analogous to the environment of the pilot of a moderately automated
future airplane; a variety of aids, developed in consultation with controllers of widely differing
experience and expertise, would be available for use as needed. If a controller wished to control
traffic without such assistance, the machine would let him do so while monitoring his actions for
discrepancies (potential conflicts, actions not permitted by current procedures, potential incursions
into special operations airspace, etc.). Most important, the computer would alert the controller to
such anomafies before they resulted in transgression of permitted boundaries, to permit him to take
corrective action early. In that sense, the computer would improve the error tolerance of the
human-machine system.
Scenario 2: Management by consent
This scenario assumes a higher degree of machine intelligence somewhat like that projected for
the Advanced Automation System's AERA 2 modules. In this scenario, the ATC computer accepts
requests for flight plans or flight plan modifications. It examines the effects of these requested
trajectories over a 20-30 minute period (and perhaps a longer period for initial requests), approves
them ff no conflict is detected, or suggests modifications to avoid a future conflict. (This may be
done in automatic "negotiation" with the affected airplane's flight management computer.) The
computer's output, when accepted by the controller, is an approved flight plan, either without or
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with modificationsof theplan requested. This plan is shown (hopefully graphically, as on current
aircraft navigation displays) to the controller. As in AERA 2, the controller may request another
alternative or may input an alternative for evaluation. When a plan is acceptable to the controller,
he or she gives consent, after which it is transmitted as data to the affected aircraft. Upon
acceptance by the pilots, it is executed in the FMS.
Computer decision aids would be available to the controller to aid in visualizing the planned
course of action (and changes from the present plan ff one existed). Computer monitoring of
controller actions would be performed throughout; as in the previous scenario, feedback to the
controller would occur in time to develop a revised plan free of conflicts or transgression of rules
and procedures.
This scenario differs from the previous one in that the machine takes initial and primary
responsibility for development of plans, subject to consent by the controller. The level of
automation is fixed, but the human can bypass machine decisions by making an alternative plan
acceptable to the error monitor. As in today's aircraft, scenarios 1 and 2 are not mutually
exclusive; it would be possible to embody both architectures in a single machine, giving the
controller the ability to select which automation option he or she wished to utilize. This scenario
would require somewhat more feedback from the computer to the human to permit the latter to
monitor machine integrity on an ongoing basis, for the appropriateness of the computer's actions
would be less obvious than in scenario 1, in which the human operator is more tightly coupled to
system behavior.
Scenario 3: Management by exception
This scenario involves a somewhat higher degree of automation than has thus far been
suggested by air traffic management for near-term implementation, either in the United States or
Europe. In view of increasing demands on the ATC system, however, I think it likely that a more
autonomous solution may be proposed as a "growth" version of the next-generation air traffic
control system. During the last decade, there have been serious suggestions that high-altitude
enroute traffic, given satellite navigation systems and automatic dependent surveillance, and backed
by airborne collision avoidance systems, could function essentially autonomously without much, if
any, ATC intervention (see discussion of"free flight", below). This scenario does not go that far;,
a measure of control remains with the ground infrastructure, but there are alternative ways of
realizing a system in which management is by exception, and pilot-assisted ATC is one of them.
In this scenario, computers would perform all of the functions listed under scenario 2, but
they would select and exercise decision options autonomously. The human air traffic monitor (he
or she would no longer actually control traffic) would be informed by some means of the present
and future (intended) traffic situation and would manage by exception. Compliance with machine-
generated clearances would likewise be monitored by the computer, which would alert the human
monitor to any undesired behavior of aircraft. The human could intervene by reverting to a lower
level of automation, or could instruct the computer to resolve potential conflicts or problems. The
human would also monitor machine function and would be aided in doing so by the machine's
portrayal of the traffic situation and other data.
Here, the computer, and pilots in flight, are controlling air traffic. The controller's role is to
insure that the machine is behaving in accordance with predetermined roles and that its actions are
in conformance with directives and procedures. Though such a system initially would require
controllers who could intervene as required, it might not require such backup after it had proved
itself sufficiently expert and reliable. Instead, human monitors would be trained to evaluate and
detect departures from permitted machine behavior and given means with which to hmit machine
authority as needed to maintain a safe operating environment.
79
Where would the responsibility lie in such a system? I believe h would have to vest in the
operating organization and the system's designers. It could not remain with the system's
operators; they would be too far removed from the details of system behavior to accept full
responsibility for outcomes. This is a potentially u'oublesome problem, but a much more difficult
problem would be to endow such an automated system with enough flexibility to encompass the
range of environmental and other variables that can affect air traffic.
Having saidthis,however, Irecognize the exponentiallyincreasingcapabilityof computers
and I willreadilyadmit thatsuch a capable system isatleastthinkable. Itwould be extremely
expensive, but itcould convey enormous returnon investment ffitworked, and itsthroughput
under normal circumstances might be as good or better than that of other, less automated systems.
It is important to remember that the newest aircraft flight control and guidance systems are
essentially capable of being managed by exception; once programmed and off the ground, they will
conduct a flight autonomously unless the pilots intervene. It is at least conceivable that at some
point in the future, air traffic control automation will also be a highly inteUigent machine agent,
though it is far in the future.
Developments in progress
Flow control: strategic traffic management
Each of thesethreescenariosassumes theexistenceofa strategicmanagement function.In the
United States, the FAA's Enhanced Traffic Management System (ETMS) will improve the ability
of the ATC System Command Center to manage traffic in cooperation with Traffic Management
Units at each ARTCC and System Operations Centers at airlines. As mentioned earlier, SCC
aircraft situation displays are already available to air carrier dispatchers, and this has laid the
foundation for increased cooperation between SCC and its customers. Recall that the basic
purpose of the SCC is to insure that air traffic demand does not exceed ATC facilities' ability to
handle it. If a runway, or an airport, becomes unusable, the SCC commands and coordinates a
reduction on traffic flow until the facility problem is resolved.
The ETMS will provide an enhanced aircraftsituationdisplay, a monitor-alertfunction,
automated demand resolution,a strategy evaluation and recommendation module and other
decision aids,and a directivedistributionfunction,among other automated tools. Elements of
these functions are already in use; the finalproduct should provide personnel at the System
Command Center with even more formidable strategicmanagement capability.
A Central Flow Management Unit (CT'MU) for western Europe came into operation in 1993.
Located in Brussels, it is planned that there will be an equivalent facility in Moscow for eastern
Europe. As in the United States, the CFMU will coordinate with Flow Management Positions at
each Area Control Center.
Terminal area traffic management
These scenariosalsoassume the existenceof softwaremodules thatwillextend some type of
automated airtrafficontrol from takeoffto landing. Oddly enough, terminal controlelements,
which are substantiallymore difficultthan enroute control,are also fartheralong,in large pan
because of a research and development effortcalledthe Center-TRACON Automation System
(CTAS). CTAS, undertaken by NASA's Ames Research Center in the mid-1980s, has developed
as a decision aiding system; itdoes not operate autonomously. Rather, itprovides displays and
toolsto help controllerssecure maximum utilizationof terminal airspace by flow planning and
preciseexecution of descent and approach maneuvers (Erzbergerand Ncdell, 1989; Harwood and
Sanford, 1993). Itsfunctionalityisgenerallysimilarto thatproposed in scenario2,above.
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CTAS is a time-based system (Tobias & Scoggins, 1986) which when fully implemented
contains three modules: a traffic management advisor (TMA), a descent advisor (DA) and a final
approach spacing tool (FAST). The TMA has been developed for use by Traffic Management
Units, which monitor the demand of arrival traffic and coordinate with ATC facilities to make
decisions about balancing traffic flow so demand does not exceed capacity in Center and Terminal
Areas (Sanford et al., 1993).
CTAS has undergone a great deal of simulation testing at NASA Ames, in cooperation with
the FAA's Terminal Air Traffic Control Automation (TATCA) program. During the past year,
elements of the system have been implemented at Denver for eventual testing with live traffic
(Harwood & Sanford, 1993); tests at Dallas-Ft. Worth are also planned. The system offers
considerable promise with regard to maximizing terminal area traffic throughpug it is an important
element of NASA's Terminal Area Productivity program.
Enroute air traffic management: the AERA concept
Since the early 1980s, FAA and its contractors, notably the MITRE Corporation, have been
developing an automated enroute air traffic control system (AERA). This proposed system has
undergone many changes since it was initially proposed, but its outlines have remained. In brief,
the AERA concept envisions automation similar to that described in scenario 2. Automation would
maintain surveillance of air traffic movements, detect potential conflicts over a 20-30 minute
window, and provide revised clearances to mitigate detected conflicts. Controllers could accept
these machine decisions or could propose alternatives to deal with the detected problems. Data link
would communicate clearances to aircraft (Items, 1994); voice communications would be available
for emergencies.
The "Free Flight" concept
Prompted by the relative inflexibility of the present system of enroute control of air traffic and
growing understanding of economic benefits if more flexible routes can be approved, airline
managements and their representative organizations, ATA and IATA, have begun to consider
seriously more radical innovations in air traffic management. They have recently proposed a"free
flight" concept, in which operators would have the freedom to determine airplane paths and speeds
in real time 0ATA, 1994). Air traffic restrictions would only be imposed to ensure separation, to
preclude exceedance of airport capacity, and to prevent unauthorized flight through special-use
airspace. Such restrictions would be limited in extent and duration to correct identified problems.
The radical nature of this proposal amounts, in essence, to a fourth scenario for future air traffic
management. Relevant parts of the IATA document are therefore extracted here.
Scenario 4: Free flight
The "vision" of this concept (IATA, 1994) is "a global air traffic management system that
allows airspace users maximum freedom of movement subject to the needs of safety, overall
system efficiency, and the environment". "The following principles shall guide the development
and operations of the future ATM system:
• "Safety must be maintained at its current level and enhanced where feasible.
• "The future system shall provide adequate capacity to meet demand at peak times and
locations without imposing significant restrictions on traffic flow.
• "Aircraft operators shall have the flexibility to dynamically adjust flight trajectories and
departure and arrival times to satisfy business operations.
• "ATM services will be provided in a cost-effective manner. Charges must be equitable,
traceable, transparent and cost-related.
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• "ATM services and procedures shall adhere to uniform principles world-wide.
Requirements for airborne equipment capabilities must be internationally standardized.
• "The ATM system must be based on human-centered automation enabling high levels of
performance.
• "ATM shall contribute to the protection of the environment by allowing flights to operate
on optimum trajectories."
The IATA document states that its "vision can only be realized through the application of dynamic
user-determined flight trajectories. The desired result is to operate in the airspace with the safety
associated with instrument flight rules while simultaneously providing flexibility and capacity
normally associated with visual operations" (p. 5). "Air traffic restrictions axe only imposed to
ensure separation, to preclude exceeding airport capacity and ensure safety of flight." (p. 5). "The
air traffic manager intervenes on a 'by exception' basis to resolve any detected conflicts...In
normal situations, aircraft maneuvering is unrestricted. Separation assurance may be enhanced by
on-board systems."
(p. 6) "Over time, the (air traffic control) process has become increasingly more rigid and
inefficient in order to cope with constantly increasing demand. Under the concept of free flight,
the flight plan contract will not be needed to provide the air traffic manager with knowledge of
intent for the separation of traffic. It is possible and necessary to shift from a process of clearance
based separation to one of near-term position and velocity based separation. In the future system,
each aircraft will be separated by two aircraft centred zones. The smallest zone...must remain
sterile to assure separation...The outer zone...is used to indicate a condition where intervention
may be necessary...An aircraft separated from other aircraft, so that its alert zone is clear, is free to
change course, altitude or speed at will. Subsequent to any change, a revised plan will be data-
linked to the ground system for planning purposes..." (emphasis supplied)
"Advanced automation is an essential element of the new air traffic management system. The
purpose of this automation is to assist humans and not to replace human reasoning. Aircraft in
potential conflict must be identified and appropriate advisories or resolution instructions will be
suggested by automated systems. With timely and proper notification to controllers and pilots,
near-term separation, within minutes of the point of closest approach, becomes feasible...
(p. 7) "The combination of GNSS, ATN and ADS will permit aircraft separation minima to be
reduced significantly. The air traffic service provider will intervene only when there is a high
probability of conflict. Intervention of (with?) an aircraft should be delayed until a conflict can be
predicted accurately, but not so long as to require an unacceptable avoidance manoeuvre. The
process of conflict detection and resolution must be automated, and after controller approval,
resolution instructions can go directly to involved aircraft. Conflict resolution will involve a
minimum disruption to the flight path of each aircraft, and following a resolution, aircraft will be
released quickly to resume free flight."
While the AERA concept envisions a system that would be able to accommodate operator
route preferences to a much greater extent than is presently possible, the "free flight" concept goes
a step beyond this by limiting air traffic control authority to the resolution of short-term conflicts.
Issues raised by future air traffic management concepts
Both the AERA 2 and free flight concepts raise substantial issues with respect to human-
machine cooperation in the aviation system. Both concepts envision radical changes in the
architecture of airspace control, though the free flight concept is more revolutionary than the A.ERA
concept.
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Each concept implies major shifts in human and machine responsibilities, and each would
involve major shifts in the locus of control of the aviation system. Some of the more important
human-machine issues are discussed below.
Human and machine roles in the future system: AERA.2
As implied above, air traffic control automation can go in several directions: either toward a
more autonomous machine system, or toward a system in which the human operator remains in
command. Each direction presents different potential advantages and different potential problems.
There is substantial sentiment within FAA and Eurocontrol for a more automated system that
reduces the probability of human error by reducing human control. Several studies of operational
errors (defined as loss of prescribed separation between aircraft) have found a trend toward more
errors under light or moderate, as opposed to heavy, workload (Kinney, Spahn, & Amato, 1977;
Schroeder, 1982; Schroeder and Nye, 1993), though it has been hypothesized that more serious
errors occur under heavy workload conditions (Rodgers and Nye, 1993). Deficient situation
awareness has been implicated as a factor associated with the severity of operational errors. Not
surprisingly, human operators are almost always found to be at fault (but see discussion of human
error in chapter 4, page 66).
Though our understanding of latent factors in the causation of human errors has progressed
considerably, there is no doubt that many in the air traffic control community look to automation as
the principal way to improve ATC reliability. This being the case, it will be necessary to make a
compelling case for keeping the human controller in effective command of the system once
advanced ATC automation is available. I have said "effective command" because there seems little
question about the controller's continuing responsibility for traffic separation regardless of the level
of automation interposed between the controller and his or her traffic. It is encoded in high-level
operating guidelines for the A.ERA 2 system when it becomes operational (Celio, 1990).
"Responsibility for safe operation of aircraft remains with the pilot in command.
"Responsibility for separation between controlled aircraft remains with the controller."
I argue in this document (see chapter 8) that if the human remains responsible for safety, that
human must retain the authority with which to exercise that responsibility, by whatever means---
automation must be a tool over which the human must have full authority. The operating
guidelines offered by Cello do not give cause for comfort:
"Since detecting conflicts for aircraft on random routes is more difficult than if the traffic
were structured on airways, the controller will have to rely on the (automated) system to
detect problems and to provide resolutions that solve the problem.
"Alerts may be given in situations where later information reveals that separation standards
would not be violated...This is due to uncertainty in trajectory estimation...Therefore,
alerts must be given when there is the possibility that separation may be violated, and the
controller must consider all alerts as valid.'"
In its Executive Summary, the report states,
"Machine-generated resolutions offered to a controller that are free of automation-identified
objections are assumed feasible and implcmentable as presented."
"The controller will use automation to the maximum extent possible." (Emphasis supplied)
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Note that if a controller accepts a computer decision and it turns out to be faulty, the controller
is responsible. If the controller rejects a computer decision and substitutes one which !,s faulty, the
controller is also responsible. This sort of dilemma represents a classic "double bind (Woods et
al., 1994). Note also that in this sort of system, de-sldlling (Cooley, 1987) is very likely to occur
over time. F'mally, since the hAS computer will resolve conflicts over a relatively long time
window (20 minutes or so), the controller who issues a machine-recommended clearance may not
be able to assess retrospectively whether his choice was correct, for the outcome of that clearance
will often occur in a sector not under his control and not visible to him. The alternative, of course,
is to revert to short-term controller-initiated conflict avoidance, as occurs routinely in the present
system.
Pilot, controller and machine roles in a "free flight" system
While the "free flighf' proposal is new and has not yet undergone the intensive scrutiny it will
certainly receive in the near future, it clearly represents a carefully studied proposal which
expresses the frustration of operators with what is perceived as an increasingly outdated,
cumbersome and inflexible gronnd-centered concept of aviation operational control. The first stage
of a system precursor was implemented in January, 1995, however, for altitudes of 39,000 ft and
above; lower altitudes will be included over the next year. Building on its previous experience
with the aviation safety/automation program, CTAS and other control strategies, NASA is planning
a new aeronautics initiative variously called "Air Traffic Management" or "Advanced Air
Transportation Technology" and has established interdisciplinary teams to explore this concept and
the technology needed to bring it to fxuition.
The AERA concept poses major questions concerning the roles of the air traffic controller and
the automation which would bring it to fruition. I believe that the free flight concept, as set forth
above, poses more fundamental questions concerning human (both pilot and controller) and
machine roles in the future air traffic management process. More important, it calls into question
many of the fundamental assumptions on which the largely successful ATC system has been built.
The architecture of a fully-developed air traffic management system designed around this concept
would have to be radically different from that presently proposed for the AAS because of its
emphasis on short-term tactical, rather than strategic, management and its implication that
management should be almost entirely autonomous or by exception.
The design implications of a free Right system are beyond the scope of this document, but it is
clear that such a system would involve a qualitative change in the roles of the humans and
machines that operated it. Some of the issues raised by the concept are set forth below.
The freeRightconceptenvisionsthatflightpathswould be selectedby pilots,or more likely
dispatchersworking in aircarrierSystem OperationsCenters,and implemented by thepilots
withoutpriornotificationtotheairtrafficmai_agementsystem.Thisconceptenvisionstheentryof
a third,more-or-lessco-equal,authorityintothecontrolprocess:theSOC, and itthusraisesmany
questionsaboutfurtherdistributionf authorityand responsibilityforairtrafficmovements (see
chapter 8).
The air traffic management subsystem would be relegated to an oversight role unless a conflict
were detected. It appears that the ATM system would function in somewhat the way that collision
avoidance systems now function: by using aircraft data and extrapolated trajectories to develop
separation zones around aircraft which would be used to determine a need for alerting or conflict
resolution in real time. The concept implies the existence within the ATM system of computers that
can accomplish the functions planned for the AERA-2 system, but with additional uncertainty
posed by random variations in flight trajectories.
These uncertainties would pose problems for controllers (and for the ATM system) similar to
but more acute than those they now face when TCAS issues a resolution advisory to pilots, who
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respond prior to notifying ATC that they are doing so. Yet "controllers" are expected to intervene,
or supervise the computer that will intervene, "on a 'by exception' basis", "only when there is a
high probability of conflict". The likelihood that controllers will be able to detect and diagnose
probable conflicts under a high level of uncertainty is low, and the .proposal recognizes this by
stating that computers will accomplish this task and suggest appropnate resolution tactics. The
computer, of course, will also have periods of uncertainty during aircraft maneuvers, before it is
able to reestablish a stable trajectory projection and project it forward in time to evaluate whether
the maneuver has created a potential conflict. Yet the proposal also states that the purpose of
automation is to assist humans and not to replace human reasoning. The compressed times within
which the humans would have to apply such reasoning and take action, given only retrospective
notification of aircraft maneuvers, appear to have received somewhat less attention than they
deserve in the development of the concept.
The IATA document dearly envisions TCAS, perhaps with lateral as well as vertical maneuver
capability (the capability proposed for TCAS-3), as an additional means of conflict detection and
resolution ("Separation assurance may be enhanced by appropriate on-board systems"). Yet TCAS
resolution maneuvers are a prominent source of problems for controllers and the ATC system
today and would almost surely present more difficult problems for them and for ATC computers in
a less constrained free flight system.
The proposal does not explicitly mention significant additional requirements on pilots.
Nonetheless, the lack of "assured separation" provided by the present, admittedly cumbersome
system would actually require higher vigilance throughout flight operations, since maneuvers could
be instituted without advance knowledge of the locations of other aircraft whose own trajectories
might be affected by such maneuvers.
The requirement for knowledge of other aircraft positions and altitudes would require a
cockpit display of traffic information. TCAS in its present form provides only an approximation of
the information required for this task. As noted earlier, its representations of traffic are not entirely
adequate even for its present tasks (and its software thus far has not been able to handle all of the
situations in which it must provide traffic or resolution advisories). It appears that free flight
would impose substantially greater requirements on airborne coUision avoidance equipment, as
well as considerably greater separation assurance requirements ("see and avoid (by whatever
means)") and therefore workload on pilots. Pilots are not presently required, or trained, to think in
terms of the four-dimensional resolution of traffic conflicts, yet this new task is what would be
required of them during climbs and descents. This proposal would certainly increase the
involvement of pilots in enroute operations, (see chapter 2), but it does not address how pilots
would be kept adequately informed of the positions and paths of other aircraft which may become a
problem for them.
It should also be noted that collision avoidance is a flight-critical function. TCAS at this time
is a "single-thread" system; that is, only a single TCAS unit is installed in each airplane. A traffic
management system that relied upon airborne collision avoidance systems to a greater extent would
certainly require consideration of whether dual TCAS systems should be installed. Further, TCAS
in all aircraft to date has been installed as a "stand-alone" system; its displays are integrated only
partially with the remainder of the information management capability in the cockpit. Finally,
TCAS was designed as a back-up system, like altitude alerters. It would surely become a "front-
line" system if this proposal is implemented.
Perhaps the most worrisome aspect of the free flight proposal in its present form is its central
assumption that automation can increase flight path flexibility without imposing greater order on
the system it would control, and without providing human operators in the air and on the ground
with the information they would require to maintain command over the system. Separation
standards would no longer be constrained to provide time for prospective action to resolve potential
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conflicts; such conflicts would be resolved in real time as they occurred. Intent would no longer be
required to be communicated.
It appears that little thought has been given to whether humans can operate and manage such a
system. Rather, new technology will operate the system and humans will supervise its operation,
but not necessarily with advance knowledge of how it is going to behave. As proposed, the
airborne systems will not inform the ATM system of their intent in timely fashion; the ATM system
and its supervisory controllers will not predictably be involved in air traffic movements, and will
not have advance knowledge of any individual airplane's future trajectory.. For these reasons
among others, the likelihood that pilots and controllers will be able to remain m command of such a
system is very low, for the system will not be predictable. The likelihood that those humans will
not be held accountable for the results, however, is negligible.
Wiener (1993, p. 4) has pointed out (with respect to aircraft automation) that "Many in the
aviation industry have assumed that automation would remove human error, replacing the fallible
human with unerring devices. The research of Wiener and Curry...suggests that this may be
overly optimistic, and that automation merely changes the nature of error, and possibly increases
the severity of its consequences." In an earlier paper (1987, p 179), he had said, "The experience
fi'om commercial aviation shows that it is unwise to dream of automanng human fallibility out of a
system. Automation essentially relocates and changes the nann'e and consequences of human
error, rather than removing it, and, on balance, the human operator provides an irreplaceable check
on the system. The search should be directed towanl the management of human caprice, not the
elimination of its source." Human error is a symptom of a system problem.
There isno reasontobelievethatautomationinairtrafficcontroland management willbe a
panacea,any more thanithasbeen inthecockpit.As Woods hascommented, any tool,including
automation,shapeshuman behavior.The human errorsexpectedin a highlyautomatedsystem
would be expectedtobe different,and indeedtheyaredifferent.But automationdoesnot,and can
not, eliminatehuman error(though if properly designed,itcan sometimes mitigatethe
consequencesofhuman error).
Automation, of course,is not infallibleeither.The literatureabounds with failuresof
automation to perform as expected; a few examples in aircraft are shown in figure 4-6. These
failures are among the reasons why humans must be an integral part of the system----they are there
to compensate for the imperfections of the automation. They are also there, as noted above, to
accept responsibility for system safety. If they are to remain in command, they must be involved
in system operation---not only when the automation fails, but during normal operations as well, in
order to be in the loop when the inevitable failures occur. The human operator is the final line of
defense in automated systems, and the new systems proposed for air traffic management axe no
exception.
Implications of future system design proposals
The complexity of any automated system for air traffic control will be far greater than the
complexity of a flight management system, and pilots' problems in understanding that system's
behavior have been discussed in chapters 3 and 4. It can be confidently predicted that similar
problems will be encountered in the air traffic management domain if controllers are unable to form
adequate mental models of the system's processes. Those processes must be comprehensible and
predictable, both so the controller can predict them and so that failures of the automation can be
detected. Consciously reducing the predictability of a highly integrated, cooperative human-
machine system seems a strange way to achieve greater system safety.
A summary of comments regarding the human's role in air traffic management made during a
recent conference on European ATM is instructive but unsettling:
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"'The present system of air traffic control has been in existence with few fundamental
changes for 40 years. Even with technological improvements, the present system is likely
to reach capacity limits by 2005,' says Peter Whicher of Logica. The provision of
automatic aids to assist the controller is only marginally likely to defer the problem, and the
deadline (Whicher) sets for getting a new concept installed and running successfully, with a
potential capacity of at least five times 1992 traffic, is 2010.
"The basicrequirement isto minimise human controlinvolvementinroutineeventsand
concentrateskillson system and safetymanagement., and on theresolutionof exceptional
situations.
"'To permit unrestricted ATC growth we should first determine how to eliminate one-
to-one coupling between a proactive sector controller and every aircraft in flight--and so
avoid him becoming reminiscent of the man with a red flag in front of early motor vehicles.
With improved area navigation and flight management systems, pilots can and are willing
to take direct responsibility for routine enroute track-keeping functions,' Peter Whicher
explains, 'frying controllers to concentrat_ on the key areas where human skills have most
to offer traffic management, system safety assurance, and dealing with the exceptional
occtm'cnce.'
"Mr. Whicher foresees two possible concepts of control for the next century: one isfulI
aircraft autonomy, the other is its opposite----fu/l ground control automation." (Cooper,
1994a, emphasis supplied)
The role of the future controller proposed here is that of a monitor, not a manager, except
when exceptional situations are detected. If an automated ATC system works well, such situations
should arise relatively rarely---and the human controller is back to the situation Mackworth (1950)
investigated so effectively, searching over long periods of time for rare events that may not be
particularly obvious when they arise. As with pilots of long-haul aircraft, some form of active
involvement is required if controllers are to remain in command of the traffic situation. Further,
active involvement in air traffic control is necessary to prevent skill degradation (Cooley, 1987;
Rauner, Rasmussen, & Corbett, 1988).
If the controller is to remain in command, and if automation is responsible for conflict
detection and resolution, it must inform the controller of what it is doing and how. We know from
previous studies in aircraft, nuclear power plants and elsewhere that complex automation tends to
be opaque to its observers. Controllers must be informed, not only of the traffic situation, but of
the processes that are being invoked to modify that situation, if they are to remain controllers rather
than simply machine monitors. If the controller is not to remain in command, then system
architects must state more clearly who is to replace him, and how. Responsibility for an adverse
outcome will be placed at some human's door (see chapter 14, liability issues).
Whicher's concept of the future ATC system might be economical, but field observations and
empirical research suggest that it is unlikely to be effective. Are there alternatives that will still
accomplish the objective of increased throughput? I believe that management by consent, as
exemplified in scenario 2 above, offers at least a greater likelihood of preserving controller
involvement in the tactical management of air traffic. There is a problem with such an approach; it
may be difficult to prevent situations in which consent is perfunctory rather than thoughtful, if a
controller is tired or distracted. Nonetheless, it is preferable to management by exception
(scenarios 3 or 4), in which the "controller" is not intimately involved in the control process.
Given that a majority of controller operational errors occurs during periods of light rather than
heavy traffic, I would prefer from a human factors viewpoint to see a work environment in which
the controller could adjust his or her workload as required by invoking automation to offload some
•of the routine tasks while preserving authority over the more complex and challenging tasks such
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as planning and management of exceptional situations. This approach to ATC automation
resemblesthatavailabletodayinadvancedaircraft,where the pilotisabletopreservecontrolskills
by exercisingthem,butisalsoabletolightenroutineworkloadwhen desired.
Cooperative human-machine air traffic management systems
As Benjamin Franklin observed at the signing of the Declaration of Independence, "We must
all hang together or we shall assuredly hang separately." Much the same can be said of human
operators and automation in complex systems. What is required is a cooperative relationship
between humans and machines, in which each intelligent agent augments the strengths and
compensates for the deficiencies of the others. Can the basis for such a relationship be established
in future automated ATC systems7 I believe it can be, but that it must be a part of thefundamenta/
architecture of such a system, which means the basis must be established very early in the design
process.
Ongoing attempts to make air traffic management more effective can, and should, point the
way to the shape of the future ta_cal air traffic control system. But we must not lose sight of the
strengths of the current system, and of why it works as well as it does. Before new technology is
designed for a future system, ATM concepts should be brought under intensive scrutiny to
determine the ingredients of success in a complex, distributed human-machine system whose
performance can be evaluated and measured quantitatively. The cognitive factors that make for
success or failure in this team enterprise are beginning to be understood and can serve as a model
for the design of the futm'e tactical ATM system. Without this model to drive the architectme of the
system, the technology will fail.
Comment
The fundamental question raised by present proposals for the architecture of the future air
traffic management system is simply whether future ATC automation should be designed to assist
human controllers or to supplant them. As I have said above, a fully automatic ATC system may
be thinkable, and might have important economic benefits. I do not believe its productivity would
be appreciably higher than a cooperative human-machine system; it would be less flexible than a
cooperative system by virtue of being unable to call upon human creativity in dealing with
unplanned contingencies, and there will always be such contingencies. Further, the difficulties that
have already arisen in connection with the development of system software for AAS will be
magnified many times by the enormous cost of developing a more fully autonomous system even if
it is possible in theory.
While the "free flight" concept envisions very important economic benefits for air carriers, and
perhaps increased ATM system productivity (if fewer controllers were needed), it would require
that a full ATM infrastructure remain in place to deal with "exceptions". Much new ATM
automation would be required to deal with conflict prediction in a less orderly system involving
random, unpredictable flight paths. This factor would also dec'rease the amount of time available to
human managers who would be expected to exercise flexibility in the resolution of conflicts. The
new automation will bring with it more of the problems to be discussed in chapters 7 and 8.
Dr. Hugh Patrick Ruffell Smith, a very wise human factors expert, observed in 1949 that,
"Man is not as good as a black box for certain specific things; however, he is more flexible and
reliable. He is easily maintained and can be manufactured by relatively unskilled labour." We
should think carefully about this observation as we contemplate the shape of the future ATC
system.
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Part 2: The Roles of Human Operators in the Aviation System
In part 1, I have discussed the developmental history of automation in aviation. In part 2, I
will try to encapsulate some of the benefits, and some of the costs, of aviation automation in terms
of the human operator's ability to work cooperatively with highly automated systems. Not all of
these costs, by any means, are inherent in the automation; many have resulted from humans'
deficient mental models of that automation. Other problems result from cumbersome interfaces
between the humans and their automated tools. Whatever the reasons for these problems, they
tend to make the human-machine system less effective, less reliable or less safe. As noted in the
foreword, this document is not a study only of humans who use automation, nor of the automation
itself, but of the system in which both attempt to work cooperatively to accomplish social
objectives.
In chapter 7, I summarize and generalize some of the problems introduced in part 1 to remind
the reader of what they are, where they are seen, and why they occur. Chapter 8 discusses in more
detail a central question in human-machine system design and operation: the respective roles of the
human and machine, and how responsibility and authority are apportioned in such systems.
Chapter 9 discusses an important issue with regard to aviation system design: whether the future
aviation system should be more tightly coupled, or whether it should remain integrated but
uncoupled, as at present. The points made in these chapters are the basis for the human-centered
automation concepts previously presented in chapter 2, and for the guidelines presented in part 3.
7. Benefits and costs of aviation automation
Introduction
The NASA Aviation Safety/Automation program (NASA, 1990), the work of Wiener and
Curry which preceded it (Wiener and Curry, 1980; Curry, 1985; Wiener, 1985; 1989; 1993;
studies by Rouse and colleagues (1980; 1983; 1987; 1988), research by Sarter and Woods (1991;
1992; 1994), and contributions by Rasmussen (1988), Reason (1990) and many others, are the
theoretical and empirical foundations for these comments on humans and automation. There is
now a great deal of data concerning human cognitive function in complex, dynamic environments.
This chapter will hopefully demonstrate to designers and operators working in the aviation domain
that there is a considerable body of knowledge that can help them to do their respective jobs more
effectively.
I do not apologize for dwelling upon the unwanted behavior both of automation and people,
because it is only through such study that we can minimize the costs while increasing the already
considerable benefits of this technology. It is important that we not lose sight of the benefits (see
immediately below), for aviation cannot advance without automation if we are to meet future
challenges which will tax our ingenuity to the utmost. We must not "throw the baby out with the
bath water".
But it is equally important that we not ignore the potential costs of yet more sophisticated
automation, for if it is not designed and used properly it can make the future aviation system less
flexible, less effective and less able to meet those challenges. In recent years, it has become
evident that our operators do not always understand or properly manage the automation they now
have at their disposal. It is essential that we make every effort to understand why this is true, if we
are to design future automation so that it will be more effective and error tolerant than what we now
have.
89
Benefits of aviation automation
I have referred in several places to the benefits derived from aviation automation to date. Let
me summarize explicitly what these benefits are, to keep this discussion of problems in context.
Wiener and Curry (1980) discussed system goals. Paraphrased, they are:
• Safety
• Reliability
• Economy
• Comfort
I will briefly cite demonstrated benefits with respect to each of these system goals. This list is not
inclusive, but it will provide some insights into the extent to which we rely upon automation to
accomplish our objectives.
Safety has always been proclaimed by the aviation industry as its primary objective. An
examination of air carrier accidents by Lautmann and colleagues (1987) suggests that more highly
automated aircraft have had substantially less accidents than earlier aircraft. Ten years after their
introduction, the Boeing 757/767 types have been involved in only one fatal mishap (Thailand,
1991), a remarkable record. Other new types have been involved in more mishaps, but the record
is still generally good. (For a balanced discussion of this question, see AWST 1995a, b)
Reliability has been improved; autoland-capable automation and other innovations have
increased the number of flights able to operate at destinations obscured by very low visibility.
Newer systems (GNSS, enhanced vision) have the potential to improve approach and landing
safety worldwide. Improvements in Air Traffic Control also have the potential to increase
reliability in the future system.
Economy has been improved by flight management systems that can take costs into account
in constructing flight plans, though the benefits possible from such computations have been diluted
by the inability of the present ATC system to permit aircraft to operate routinely on most cost-
efficient profiles. Despite this limitation, significant economies are being achieved in the United
States by more extensive coordination of non-preferred and direct routes between air carrier
Systems Operations Centers and the FAA's System Command Center.
Comfort has been improved by gust alleviation algorithms in the newest aircraft, as well as
by the ability of newer aircraft to fly at higher altitudes, above most weather. Greater flexibility
enabled by ATC automation will permit pilots to utilize a wider range of options to achieve more
comfortable flight paths.
In what respects are we still deficient with respect to these system goals? Most of our
accidents can be traced to the human operators of the system, and increasing numbers can be waced
to the interactions of humans with automated systems. More can be done to make aircraft
automation more human-centered, but perhaps even more important, advanced automation can be
used to make the system as a whole more resistant to and tolerant of human errors, be they in the
implementation or the operation of these systems.
Costs of aviation automation
The 1989 ATA Human Factors Task Force report stated that "During the 1970s and early
1980s, the concept of automating as much as possible was considered appropriate. The expected
benefits were a reduction in pilot workload and increased safety...Although many of these benefits
have been realized, serious questions have arisen and incidents/accidents have occurred which
question the underlying assumption that the maximum available automation is always appropriate,
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or thatwe understand how to designautomated systems so thatthey arc fullycompatible with the
capabilitiesand limitationsof the humans inthe system,'(pp.4-5). Let us examine thisstatement,
which was largelyresponsiblefor the inquirydescribedinthisbook and itspredecessor (Billings,
1991).
At the time theATA reportwas prepared,theoutlinesofthe A320 and B-747-400 automation
suiteswere justbecoming visibleto the knowledgeable observerson the Task Force. The ME)- 11
was atan curlystageof development and itscockpitdesign was not yet fn'm. Itisclearthatin the
A320 and MD-11, the "concept of automating as much as possible",with the intentof reducing
flight crew workload and minimizing human errors, was in fact considered appropriate, though the
two design teams took different approaches. The 747-400 was much more conservative in its
automation philosophy and more evolutionary than revolutionary in its application.
Itisclear,with the hindsightafforded by fiveyears of operationalexperience,thatat least
some pilotshave found certainof the automation fcatm'_sinthisnew generationof aircraftdifficult
to understand and to manage. The difficultiesthathave been experienced appear to mc to have
bccn duc in largeparttofivefactors.Four am design factors:complexity, brittleness,opacity and
literalism.A fifthrelatedfactoris training,which in turn isrelatedto understanding. Each is
considered inmore detailhere. A discussionof otherrelevantfactorsfollows.
Complexity
As indicated in chapters 3 and 4, today's aircraft automation suites arc very capable,
increasingly flexible and very complex. Tactical control automation (enabled through a mode
control panel, as in figure 3-9) is tightly coupled to strategic flight management (the FMS, with its
CDU interface) in ways that are not always obvious. The FMS itself is capable of autonomous
operation through several phases of flight. Both parts of the system arc "mode-rich", (Sarter and
Woods, 1994); default and reversion options vary among modes.
When these interactionscause unwanted behavior (from the pilot'sviewpoint),thc pilothas
no mental model thatallowshim orher tocorrectthesituationshortof revertingtoa lower levelof
managcmcnt (seechapter8) or turningthe automation off,which isnot always desirablcand may
not bc possiblein some circumstances. "'Turningitoff"(Curry, 1985),for instance,may disable
certainprotectivefeaturessuch as FMS knowledge of altituderestrictionsduring a descent intoa
terminal area, or the automation's intent to level the' aircraft at a given altitude during a climb.
Pilots of recent, very powerful aircraft have become concerned about the rate at which thc airplane
was approaching a level-off altitude and have reverted to autopilot vertical speed mode to slow the
climb as they approached the new altitude, unaware that this reversion also cancelled the altitude
capture mode. The result has often been a deviation above assigned altitude.
Another aspect of automation complexity is the great flexibility found in the modem flight
management and autoflight system. Modem systems have many modes for each of several control
elements (figure 7-1). These modes interact in ways not always obvious to pilots. Operators must
learn about, remember and be able to access information concerning each mode in order to use it
effectively; this imposes a considerable cognitive burden, makes it less likely that the operator will
have an appropriate mental model of the automation, and increases the likelihood that modes may
be used improperly. In addition, the capability of the modern FMS means that the system may
direct the airplane through several modes of operation autonomously, in ways which may leave the
pilots uncertain of exactly why the automation is behaving in a certain manner at a particular point
m time.
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Aircraft Flight Modes
Autothrust Vertical Lateral
Modes Modes Modes
TOGA
FLX 42
MCT
CLB
IDLE
THR
SPD/MACH
ALPHA
FLOOR
TOGA LK
SRS
CLB
DES
OPEN CLB
OPEN DES
EXPEDITE
ALT
V/S-FPA
G/S-FINAL
FLARE
RWY
NAV
HDG/TRK
LDC*
LOC/APP NAV
LAND
ROLLOUT
Sarter and Woods (1994)
and Saner (1994) have
discussed mode errors and
mode awareness. Figure 7-1
is adapted from their paper. It
illustrates the mode flexibility
(and complexity) in a modern
transport aircraft. Compare
this with the relatively small
number of flight modes in the
Lockheed L-1011 automation
shown in figure 3-10.
Fig. 7-1: FIVIS and autoflight modes in the Airbus A320 (after
Saner and Woods, 1994)
Each of the modes listed represents a different set of operating instructions for the automation.
The mode in use (or armed, ready for use) is displayed in an alphanumeric legend on a flight mode
annunciator panel at the top of the primary flight display. In their conclusions, the authors of this
very useful paper state that, "As technology allows for the proliferation of more automated modes
of opemtion...human supervisory control faces new challenges. The flexibility achieved through
these mode-rich systems has a price: it increases the need for mode awareness--human
supervisory controllers tracking what their machine counterparts are doing, what they will do next,
and why they are doing it...While we understand a great deal about mode problems, the research to
examine specific classes of countermeasures in more detail and to determine what is required to use
them effectively, singly or in combination, is just beginning."
Hollnagel (1993) suggests that increasing system complexity leads to increasing task
complexity. This leads to an increasing oPl_Ommity for malfunctions, which leads to an increasing
number of unwanted consequences, which m turn leads to solutions that ultimately increase system
complexity still further. He notes that this is sometimes humorously referred to as the "law of
unintended consequences". The "law" states that the effort to iru¢ things sometimes worsens the
damage. While we are perhaps not there yet in this domain, the quantum increase in complexity of
_t automation has unquestionably created new opportunities for human errors, both those that
are inadvertent and those that result from deficient or "buggy" knowledge of the system being
utilized.
I believe that automation complexity has been at least part of the problem in several incidents
and accidents involving tiffs new generation of aircraft (see Mulhouse-Habsheim, 1988; Bangalore,
1990; Strasbourg, 1992; Manchester, 1994; Paris, 1994; Toulouse, 1994). This is not to say that
the automation has not functioned as it was intended to function; it has usually done exactly what
its designers and programmers told it to do. The problem has been rather that the human operators
have not understood its intended functioning and consequently have used it either beyond its
capabilities or without regard to its constraints or rules. In another recent example of this problem,
an A300-600 crashed at Nagoya, Japan, (1994) after the pilot flying inadvertently engaged an
autopilot mode (TOGA), then provided opposing inputs to the airplane's autoflight systems which
were counteracted by the autopilot when it was engaged to stabilize the flight path (Mecham,
1994).
92
The likelihood that all of the subtleties of such complex systems will be fully comprehended
by pilots, even after considerable line experience with the systems, is not high (Wiener, 1989;
Sarter and Woods, 1992); the likelihood that they will be understood after a few weeks of training
is very small indeed. Uchtdorf and Heldt (1989), studying pilot understanding of the A310,
indicated that a year or so of line experience may be required before pilots fccl fully comfortable
with the automation features--and this does not guarantee that they understand the entire system,
only that they feel comfortable with enough of its modes to operate it effectively.
Brittleness
As software becomes more and more complex, it becomes more and more difficult to verify
that it will always function as desired throughout the full opcralflug range of the aircraft in which it
willbc placed. The reason for thisisthatthereisan almost infinitevarietyof circumstances that
can affectitsoperation,only a subsetof which can be evaluatedpriorto certificationeven ifthey
areknown to the evaluators.Even then,thcr_willbe conditions,not thought of by the designers,
which willinevitablyariseatsome pointinthe course of the airplane'soperation.Brittlenessisan
attributeof a system which works well under normal or usual conditions,but which does not have
desiredbehavior ator closetosome margin of its operatingenvelope.
An example might be a pitch control system that was selected, reverted or defaulted to "vertical
speed" mode while an airplane was climbing. The autoflight system would attempt to maintain
constant vertical speed by gradually increasing pitch angle at the expense of airspeed, which would
gradually decay to unsafe levels. One of several examples was an Aeromcxico DC-10
(Luxembourg, 1979) whose autoflight system maintained a climb at constant vertical speed until
the airplane stalled; the pilots were thought to have improperly programmed the autopilot for
constant vertical speed instead of constant airspeed and subsequently failed to notice the decaying
airspeed until too late to maintain control (Luxembourg, 1979). Another example would be a
dcsccnt mode that involved idle power without safeguards to insure that such a descent could not
continue all the way to the ground (scc Bangalorc, 1990), or an autothn_st system that pcrmittcd
powcr to remain at idle after descending onto the glide slope followed by a decrease in descent rate
and a consequent decrease in airspeed to unsafe levels.
An example of brittleautomation was present in the TCAS software when itwas first
implemented in civiltransports. Under certaincircumstances, the TCAS logic was able to
recognize a hazard but was unable toadvise a safemaneuver to resolvethe conflict.When this
occurred,the system simply "threw up itshands" and indicatedtothe pilotthattherewas a conflict
but thc system could not resolve it.FAA certificationpilotsraisedseriousobjectionsto such a
mode and the software was modified to exclude this problem, though at the expense of
commanding much more drasticavoidance actionsunder such circumstances,which has caused
greateraltitudeexcursions. This problem has stillnot bccn fullyresolved,though the TCAS
system isno longerableto"walk away" from a conflictthatrexluircsa resolutionadvisory.
Yet another example of brittlenesswas seen, I believe,in the crash of a third-generation
aircraftatMulhousc-Habsheim afteran experiencedA320 pilotmade a low pass over the airfieldat
minimum airspeedduring an airshow (1988). During his low pass,he descended below 100 feet
above ground leveland was unable toobtainenough power quickly enough to avoid treesatthe far
end of the runway. The automation prevented the airplane from stalling,but when the pilot
descended below 100 feet,theautomation disabledthe angle ofattackprotectionalsobuiltintothe
airplane'sflightcontrolsystem. This feature,which under any othercircumstances would have
appliedfullpower and rotatedthe airplaneintoa climb,must be disabledtopermit the machine to
land.
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Opacity
Three questions with which Wiener (1989) paraphrased the frequent responses of pilots to
automation surprises, "What is it doing?", "Why's it doing that?", and "What's it going to do
next?",may be indicativeof eitheror both of two problems. One isa deficientmental model of the
automation---alack of understanding of how and why itfunctionsas itdoes. This can be duc to
automation complexity, or to inadequate training, or both.
Another problem, however, isnot thatthe operatorsdo not understand the behavior being
observed,but ratherthatthe automation does not help them to understand by tellingthem what it's
doing (and ff necessary, why). Sarter & Woods (1994, p. 24) have observed that "The
interpretationof dataon the automation as processisapparentlya cognirlvelydemanding one rather
thana mentally economical one given the 'strongand silent'characterof themachine agent."
This problem representsa failureincommunication or coordinationbetween the machine and
human elements of the system. Itmay occur because of inadequate displays,or because of
deficient mental models, or because one or more human and/or machine comtmnents of the system
do not understand the intent of another component at a particular point in time (See chapter 2).
Regardless of the cause, the net effect is diminished awareness of the situation, a serious problem
in a dynamic environment.
In earliertimes,automation with lesscapabilitysimply controlledthe airplane'sattitudeand
path;pilotscould usually understand exactly what itwas doing and how by observing the same
instrumentsthey used when they were controllingtheairplanemanually. Today's automation may
use any combination of severalmodes to accomplish the objectivesithas been ordered to reach.
The information about what itisdoing is almost always availablesomewhere in some form,
though not necessarilyin terms thatthe pilotcan easilydecipher. Why itis behaving in that
manner isoften not availableexcept in the source code which controlsit.What itisgoing to do
next isoften,though not always, unavailableon the instrumentpanel.
In short, as automation complexity increases, it becomes more difficult for the designer to
provide obvious, unambiguous information about its processes to the monitoring pilot (even ff the
designer believes that the pilot needs this information and therefore tries to provide it). I call this
"opacity". Others have referred to it as a lack of transparency; the two terms are synonymous in
this context. Still others have used the term "lack of feedback" to refer to automation's failure to
communicate effectively with the human operator (Norman (1989) has argued that the problem is
not automation complexity, but lack of feedback to its operators).
As noted earlier, automation opacity may be deliberate: one sure way to keep the operator from
intervening in a process is to deny him or her the information necessary to permit intervention in
that process. Much more commonly, I think, it is the desire, and need, to avoid overburdening the
operator with information that is not essential to the performance of his or her necessary functions
(as those functions are understood by the designer). The capabilities of the computer and its
screens have made it possible for designers to overwhelm pilots with information and data.
Opacity at some level is required to avoid overwhelming the pilot with data. We know that the
ability of pilots to assimilate information is context-dependent, and that when we provide more data
without adequate consideration of context we simply make it less certain that they will attend to that
which they really need to know. (Woods, 1993c).
The mode awareness problems cited by Sarter and Woods (1992) are in part due to opacity,
though modes are always announced on mode annunciator panels, in part, the problem is one of
salience: alphanumeric symbols must not only be attended to, but must be read, to convey
information. Hutchins (1993) has attempted to ease this problem by using iconic representations,
with some experimental success (see AWST, 1995b, for an illustration of this approach). Woods
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(1994) speaks of"apparent simplicity, real complexity" as one of our more serious problems with
advanced automation.
There have been some notable examples of the effects of opacity on advanced flight decks,
though it must be noted that in most of the cases, the information could have been found had there
been time to look for it. This tends to reinforce the notion that drowning the operator in
information isn't a wise way to design a system. Perhaps the most notable recent example is an
accident that occurred during an approach to Strasbourg (1992), when the flight crew inadvertently
commanded the autopilot to descend at a 3300 ft/min vertical speed rather than at a 3.3 ° flight path
angle (figure 7-2). The FCU display read "-33" instead of "-3.3", though smaller letters on the
LCD display also read "HDG/VS" instead of "T/FPA" and the symbology on the primary flight
display was also different in the two modes.
The fact remains that the pilots, already heavily loaded because of late ATC instructions and
inexperience in the airplane, missed these discrepancies and descended into the ground several
miles from their destination (Strasbourg, 1992). Changes have been made in later cockpits of this
type to show "-3300" vs. "-3.3" in the hope of eliminating this possible source of confusion.
Another example is the "TOGA" (takeoff/go-around) indication in the A300 at Nagoya (1994),
which was initially missed by the pilot flying. It is worth noting that in both these cases, the flight
crew provided the autoflight system with an incorrect indication of their intent (see chapter 2). The
automation was performing in accordance with an acceptable, but inappropriate, instruction.
Literalism
A fourth attribute of automation (and of computers in general) could be described as its
literalism or "narrow-mindedness" (Dekker, personal communication, 1994). Automation is able
only to do exactly what it is programmed to do, as it did in the two cases cited immediately above.
Human problem solvers are creative in their reasoning and their search for solutions to a problem.
They can and will draw knowledge or evidence from any available source (either in memory or
external to themselves: reference books, manuals, contact with others by radio, etc.), as long as
that knowledge is relevant to the problem to be solved. Automation, on the other hand, is
constrained by its instructions and as such is insensitive to unanticipated changes in goals and
world states that may fall well within its usual operating range but were unanticipated by the
designers of its software. It is in this sense that computer literality contrasts with brittleness; the
latter term refers to undesired automation behavior at the margins of the operating envelope.
As an example of this, some flight management systems with vertical navigation capability
will calculate an optimal descent point, based on cost factors, that is closer to a destination airport
than pilots may wish for a smooth, gradual descent. The pilots may be unaware of the logic that
drives this decision and action, but they learn through experience that they can "trick" the
automation by programming a higher tailwind than is actually present. This false information
causes the automation to begin the airplane's descent at an earlier point in time, thus achieving the
pilots' desired ends. Human operators have always shaped the tools at hand to assist in
accomplishing their objectives, but this shaping also increases task demand and cognitive
workload.
Training
I indicated above that a fifth relevant factor is training. Let me preface this discussion by
saying that if we cannot show the pilot what he or she needs to know in a given situation, then the
pilot needs to know what (s)he needs to know. The only way this knowledge can be acquired is
through education and training.
In the early 1960s, Trans World Airlines ordered its first DC-9 aircraft, also its fin'st jets with a
two-person crew complement. For a number of reasons, the airline decided to undertake a major
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revision of its training philosophy for the new airplane; its new, and highly successful, training
program emphasized the specific behavioral objectives (SBOs) required of pilots, rather than the
older (and until then universal) approach of "teaching the pilot how to build the airplane".
Previous training programs had emphasized detailed knowledge of how airplane systems were
constructed, how the various parts contributed to the whole, and based on this knowledge, how to
operate them. The new approach provided significant economies in training time, which is
expensive, and appeared to be fully as successful in teaching pilots how to operate the new
airplanes without burdening them with more systems knowledge than they "needed to know".
United Airlines later adopted a similar training philosophy, with similar success, and a training
revolution was underway.
There has been continual pressure to minimize training time for the last 30 years. Pilots are
paid virtually the same amount for training as for line flying, and when they arc in training they arc
not flying trips that produce revenue for their company. There is no question that the SBO concept
has been effective and efficient. Until recently, there has been no reason to question the concept.
The complexity of advanced automation, however, gives rise to questions about this approach
to training. As indicated above, pilots must have an adequam mental model of the behavior of the
equipment they are flying. I believe that our experience to date with advanced automated aircraft
suggests that the training we now provide does not always give them a sufF_ent basis for forming
such models. One example of this, in the MD-11, was that takeoff speeds could be incorrectly
calculated by the FMS if engine anti-ice significantly warmed certain sensors. An error message
was generated, but this message was inhibited by flap extension. If flaps were lowered at the
beginning of taxi, before airflow over the sensors had time to cool them, the erroneous speeds
were "locked in" and takeoff speeds were incorrectly displayed on the speed tape of the PFD.
There is no question about the growing complexity, and opacity, of automated systems in
these aircraft. I believe that questions must be raised about whether _g in how to operate
these more complex and less transparent systems, as opposed to how they operate, is sufficient to
provide pilots with the information they need when the systems reach their limits or behave
unpredictably. One of the few disadvantages of digital computers as compared with their analog
forebears is that analog devices usually degrade gradually and in a predictable manner, while digital
computers usually fail abruptly and in an unpredictable way. If a pilot does not have an adequate
internal model about how the computer works when it is functioning properly, it will be far more
difficult for him or her to detect a subtle failure. We cannot always predict failure modes in these
more complex digital systems, so we must provide pilots with adequate understanding of how and
why aircraft automation functions as it does.
Comments about automation (Rudisill, 1994) make it plain that many pilots do not understand
the reasons why aircraft and avionics manufacturers have built their automation as they have---and
there are usually very good reasons, though they may not be known to the users of the automation.
This, again, is a failure of training to explain how the system operates and why, rather than simply
how to operate the system.
Other observed problems with aviation automation
Reliance on automation
Several examples have shown that pilots given highly reliable automated devices (and most
are) will come, over time, to rely upon the assistance they provide. They rely upon the correct
function of configuration warning systems, altitude alerters and other information automation to
which they have become accustomed. When GPWS was first introduced, the nuisance warnings
to which it was prone caused pilots to distrust it; conformance with its warnings had to be
mandated by company standard operating procedures. Later models have proved themselves more
trustworthy, and they are relied upon. Pilots have long been served reliably by autopilots and are
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sometimesless alert in monitoring their behavior than they should be, as evidenced by the failure to
detect uncommanded roll inputs in a few early 747s (e.g., Nakina, 1991). Controllers likewise
rely upon the data presented to them on their CRTs, even though much automation is required to
present the synthetic images with which they worL They are surprised by occasional tag swaps
and other misrepresentations of the data when they occur.
It does little good to remind human operators that automation is not always reliable or
trustworthy when their own experience tells them it can be trusted to perform correctly over long
periods of time. Many pilots have never seen these automation elements fail, just as many of them
have never had to shut down a malfunctioning engine except in a simulator, and in any case,
humans are not good monitors of infrequent events. The solutions to the "human failings" of trust,
and of inattentiveness, must be found elsewhere. If we are to continue to provide operators with
automation aids, we must make the system in which they are embedded more error tolerant so that
such "failings" will not compromise safety of flight. In this area, there is much more we can do,
even though much has been accomplished in the past.
Clumsy automation
Wiener (1989) coined this descriptor to denote automation that lightens crew workload when it
is already low, but requires more attention and manipulation at times when workload is already
high. He and others have cited today's flight management systems as having this characteristic, as
I have noted in chapter 3. In the aviation context (though clumsy automation is by no means
limited to aviation), it is in locations where traffic density is highest that ATC will most often have
to change clearances to adjust to unexpected problems. It is also in these areas that aircraft are
climbing or descending and preparing to land, maneuvers that also impose a higher task demand
than does cruising flight at high altitude.
These are the phases of flight that involve the highest likelihood of conflicts with other aircraft
and that therefore demand that as much attention as possible be devoted to scanning for such
traffic. Programming a flight management computer requires that the non-flying pilot's attention
be inside the cockpit and focused on the CDU for some period of time, an attentional requirement
that directly competes with outside scanning and monitoring the activities of the flying pilot. It is
for this reason that some captains do not permit reprogramming of the FMS when they are below
10,000 feet. They simply disengage the automation if necessary. This, however, removes many
useful functions that the FMS can provide in this flight regime, and also makes unavailable
machine knowledge regarding routes and altitude restrictions.
Though efforts have been made in the newest FMSs to lighten this burden, the FMS CDU is
still a complex interface requiring both visual and cognitive attention; reprogramming, often
required to meet ATC requirements during flight into terminal areas, can still be cumbersome.
Flights into Los Angeles are often cited by pilots as perhaps the most taxing example. ATC often
finds it necessary to reassign aircraft to a runway different from that originally intended, and a
second reassignment is not uncommon later in the descent. Since these runways differ in position
and are served by different navigation fixes and ILS transmitters, it is necessary to re-tune radios in
older aircraft, and to reinstruct the FMS in newer machines. These tasks require appreciable
"head-down" time, which prevents the non-flying pilot from maintaining a traffic watch and
monitoring the flying pilot's actions while descending into what may well be the world's most
heavily-traveled terminal airspace.
Digital vs. analog control
I have mentioned earlier the criticism by pilots of automation that makes it necessary for them
to enter new navigation radio frequencies through alphanumeric keystrokes on the CDU rather than
by turning rotary selectors as they did on older radio control units. Whether digital frequency entry
actually takes longer has not been studied, to my knowledge, but I must confess that I share the
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bias of these pilots. At this time, new communications f_xluencies arc still accessed through the
older types of control heads, most of which also show and make available both the old and new
fi_uencies. This is a help to pilots if they are unable to establish radio contact on a new channel,
but communication froquencles also may be accessed in fuv.m_ through the FMS.
In the autoflight control wheel steering (CWS) mode, pilots manipulate their control columns
to instruct the automation what rates of change are desired for a maneuver. Once placed in a certain
attitude, the autopilot will hold that ardtude until other control instructions are received. This "rate
command" function is all accomplished digitally in newer aircra_ but the pilot perceives a graded
input which produces a continuous response. In contrast, the "command mode" of the autopilot is
controlledby providing itwith digitalnumeric targetsrepresentingairspeed,desiredaltitudeand
heading, and sometimes desiredverticalrate.In today'saircraft,thesedigitalvaluescan eitherbc
specifiedthrough rotary switches on the mode control panel in a manner quite similarto the
selectionof new radio frequenciesin olderaircraft,or by digitalnumeric inputto theFM.
The control wheel steeringmode can be a trap,as was evidenced in a DC-10 incident in
which, aftera close-inturnto finalapproach,the flyingpilot,who was heavily loaded,forgotthat
he was in that mode and incurred a taftstrikeduring the subsequent landing (NASA ASRS,
1976a). Some carriersdisablethe controlwheel steeringmode, and some alffamncmanufactm_rs
believe it to be an unnecessary function in most of their aircraft. It is the normal mode of autopilot
control in Boeing 737-200 series aircraft, however;, it pennits quick tactical changes to flight path,
and itthereforerepresents a potentiallyuseful intermediate between fully manual and fully
automatic flight.Itisshown as "assistedcontrol"inmy controland management continuum (see
chapter 8). In atleastone new airplane,theMD-11, alllongitudinalcontroliscarriedout through
the CWS function of the autoflightsystem, and full-timeCWS for lamral (roll)controlisalso
availableas a customer-specifiedoption.
Fully autonomous automation
Some automation elements have bean essentiallyautonomous for a long time. No pilotwould
thinkof hand-flyinga jetthroughout cruise,as one instance.Many airlinesrequirethe use of the
autobraking function for alllandings,and autospoilcrsarc also used routinely. Several other
automatic functionsthatarc used at alltimes have been mentioned in chapters 3 and 4. Despite
this,concern has been expressed in variousquaxtersabout more complex functionsthatare now
csscntiailyautonomous, severalof which can be "turned off"only with difficultyor not atall.
Among thesefunctionsarc the full-time"envelope protection"system in the A320, which in
effectprevents pilotsfrom exceeding certainflightparameters under any circumstances. This
could more accuratelybe calledan "envelope limiting"system. Severalcurrentand planned aircraft
have systems thatfulfillsimilarfunctions,though in a somewhat differentmanner. The MD-11's
automatic systems control computers, as noted above, will reconfigure aircraftsubsystems
autonomously ifthey sense specificmalfunctions in those systems. Systems such as these give
riseto questionsconcerning pilotauthorityand responsibility.These questions arc discussedin
more detail in chapter 8.
Skill degradation
One potentiallyseriousproblem inhuman-machine systems with highlycapable automation is
a loss of certainskillsby the human when the automation routinelyperforms tasks thatrcquixc
such skills.This effecthas been observed innumerous contexts.Itmay be due largelyto lackof
practiceof theparticularskillby the human operator,though in certaincontexts,otherfactorsmay
play a part.
Psychomotor skill decrements were observed by pilots transitioning from copilot positions in
the DC-10, a fairly automated airplane, to command positions in less automated aircraft such as the
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727. After some failures to complete this transition, air carder training personnel suggested to
pilots approaching transition that they should forego the use of the automation for a couple of
months prior to transition, in order to obtain more practice in manu_ control. The pilots to?k this
advice and were able thereafter to complete transition training without difficulty, rqote, m this
example, that the pilots coming to transition all had extensive flying experience in older, relatively
anautomated, aircraft. Their problem was to reacqui_ skills which they had already possessed in
adequate measure before their transition to the more automated DC-10.
The advent of the new generation of highly automated aircraft, and the replacement of the
older machines by such airplanes, implies that at some point in the future, some pilots may be.gin
their airline careers flying as first officers on advanced aircraft that incorporate envelope protecuon
and a variety of other control automation. Such automation may include limits on rate of roll, bank
angle, pitch rate as a function of speed, gust alleviation and other functions.
Will pilots who have never had to acquire the finely-tuned manual skills which older pilots
take for granted be able to demonstrate such skills at an acceptable level if they must transition to
another aircraft that lacks these advanced features? Similarly, will they have learned the cognitive
skills necessary for unassisted navigation if the flight management software fails? Finally, and
perhaps most important given the high reliability of today's aircraft, will they. acquire the
judgmental skills and experience that alone can enable them to make wise decisions m the face of
uncertainty or serious mechanical or environmental problems? At this point, no one knows the
answers to such questions, but we do know that it is these skills, collectively called "airmanship",
that provide the last line of defense against catastrophes in aviation operations.
Similar questions can be asked about some air carriers which effectively require their pilots of
advanced aircraft to utilize the automation on a full-time basis. Flight International, in its Letters
columns, carried a brisk debate on this topic early in 1993; "Excessive reliance on equipment to
help pilots fly 'smarter and safer' has become institutionalized to the point of becoming
dangerous." (Hopkins, 1993, p. 40) "... I remember being admonished by the chief pilot for
daring to hand-fly a raw-data standard instrument depama_, and, worse still, for practising enroute
VOR tracking by hand flying for 10 rain in the cruise." (Laming, 1993, p. 140).
Some operators suggest to their pilots that they should exercise as many options as possible,
and that they should fly at each level of automation on a periodic basis, to remain familiar with the
systems and to maintain proficiency. Delta Airlines has stated these goals formally in its statement
of automation philosophy: "Pilots must be proficient in operating their airplanes at all levels of
automation. They must be knowledgeable in the selection of the appropriate degree of automation
and must have the skills needed to move from one level of automation to another" (Byrnes and
Black, 1993). Many airline pilots make it a point to fly at least part of each flight segment
manually to maintain their sldlls, regardless of the policies and preferences of their carriers.
Recall that similar questions were raised with respect to the ability of air traffic controllers,
trained only in a full radar environment, to transition to procedural control of air traffic in the event
of a massive radar failure. The ability of the FAA System Command Center to offload controllers
during such failures has lessened this concern to some extent, but it is stiU possible for controllers
to be grossly overloaded by system contingencies such as occurred after ATC communications and
data transfer were suddenly shut down by a massive failure of communications facilities in New
York (Lee, 1992).
Crew coordination
Wiener (1993) has discussed crew coordination and resource management in the context of
automated aircraft. In his extensive cockpit observations in advanced aircraft (Wiener, 1989), he
noted several crew coordination issues (pp. 177-178):
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"Comparedto traditional models, it is physically difficult for one pilot to see what the other
is doing (on the CDU)...Though some carriers have a procedure that requires the captain
(or pilot flying) to approve any changes entered into the CDU before they are executed, this
is seldom done; often he or she is working on the CDU on another page at the same time...
• "It is more difficult for the captain to monitor the work of the first officer and to understand
what he is doing, and vice versa.
"Automation tends to induce a breakdown of the traditional (and stated) roles and duties of
the pilot-flying versus pilot-not-flying and a less clear demarcation of 'who does what' than
in traditional cockpits. In _ in the past, the standardization of allocation of duties and
functions has been one of the foundations of cockpit safety...
"There is a tendency for the crew to 'help'each other with programming duties when
workload increases.This may or may not be a good thing...butitclearlytends todissolve
the cleardemarcation of duties..."
Costley, Johnson and Lawson (1989) found in flight observations in 737 and 757 aircraft that
less communication occurred in more advanced cock'Fits. Wiener interprets these findings in terms
of extremely low workload during cruise in advanced automated aircraft, and expresses concern
"because of the presun_ vulnerabilityof crews toboredom and complacency". He concludes that
"Field studiesof the introductionof the new-technology aircraftlead me to believe thatthe
demands on the pilotin the new aircraftare qualitativelydifferentfrom those in the traditional
models..." His findingsagree with othersreportedhere:thatour traditionalmodels of the behavior
of competent airtransportpilotsmay be insufficientguides to behaviorin newer aircraft,because
the machines themselves are,in certainrespects,qualitativelydifferentfrom older aircraft.New
models thatemphasize the increasedcognitiveloading on pilotsare needed to guide our designs
and implementation inthe future.
We may have been shielded to some extent from problems in thisrealm by the very high
experience levelsof many firstofficers,as well as captains,in today's system. Many former
captainswith extensivecommand experience are now flyingascopilotsafterhaving been laidoff
by defunctor bankrupt carriers.This willlessenduringcoming years,however.
Monitoring requirements
Leaving aside issuesof transparency or opacity,pilots(and in the near future,airtraffic
controllersas well) must monitor flightprogress closely,for others,human and machine, arc
monitoring as well, to an extent unprecedented in the historyof the industry. One problem
inherentinautomation isthatpilotscannot usuallydetectthatitnot going todo what they expected
ittodo untilafterithas failedtodo it.Itisonly afterautomation has "misbehaved" thatoperators
can detectits"misbehavior" and correctit.Unfortunately,when thisoccurs inaviation,the aircraft
may already be in a positionfrom which rapid reactionsmay be necessary toreturnitto nominal
conditions.
During an idlepower descent,an airplanemay descend S0 feetduring each second ittakes the
crew to recognize an anomaly, decide to take action, make a control input and wait for an
appropriate response. Aircraftare separated by only 1000 feetverticallybelow 29,000 feet;
deviationsof 500 or more feetarenot uncommon afteran autopilothas failedtocapturean altitude.
Such a deviationcan be easilyobserved by airtrafficontrolpersonneland, ffthereisa conflict,
by ATC automated conflictalertsoftware. Ifthe deviationisreported,pilotsmay face disciplinary
or enforcement actionfrom FAA.
For these reasons as well as others, pilotsmust closely monitor the behavior of their
automated systems, but ifan anomaly occurs, they must sometimes take very prompt action.
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Present automation (except the ubiquitous altitude alerting system) provides no predictive or
premonitory warning that a failure is likely to occur in the immediate future; such information
would give pilots time to prevent, rather than correct, the problem. Fortunately or unforumately,
flight path automation is reliable enough so that pilots may be tempted to relax their guard on the
(justified) assumption that it will almost always behave correctly. Moray, Lee and Hiskes (1994)
have even suggested that this is the logical and appropriate strategy for pilots to adopt, since it is
rare for such malfunctions to occur;, thus, pilots are better advised to spend more time monitoring
aspects of their flight that involve more uncontrolled variability.
Without question, the most effective monitoring of pilots flying is by a non-flying pilot in the
same cockpit. This redundancy is absolutely critical. The vast majority of errors in the cockpit are
detected, announced and corrected without adverse consequences, often before any sort of
anomaly can occur. When this fails, air traffic controllers often detect and warn of small
anomalies, permitting the pilot to correct them at an early stage. All of this cross-monitoring
assumes that the monitoring agents understand the intent of the monitored agents, as they usually
do (see chapter 2). Newer automation could do more than it has thus far been called upon to do to
strengthen still fm_er the error tolerance of the aviation system (chapter 4).
Automated system "navigation" problems
Though manufacuners of the latest flight management systems have gone to considerable
effort to simplify the operation of these systems, they are still exceedingly complex and all
interaction with them must be through several displays brought up sequentially on a single small
screen containing a large amount of alphanumeric information. As more functions have been
implemented, more and more screens have been designed, each requirin.g serial access by the
operator (see figure 3-29). In today's system, a great deal of informauon must be accessed
through a very small "keyhole". As a consequence, "navigating" among the many screens has
become complicated. This requirement imposes yet another cognitive burden on operators, who
must remember enough of the FMS architecture to recall how to get to specific information when it
is needed.
One method that designers have utilized to lessen the memory burden is to increase the number
of modes in the FMS itself. This simplifies the navigation problem within the FMS but increases
the requirement to remember the various modes and what each is used for. As these remarkable
devices become still more capable, this cognitive burden imposed by the need for mode awareness
can be expected to increase, unless a different approach is taken to their design (Woods et al.,
1994).
Data overload
Automation and the glass cockpit have increased considerably the amount of information
available to pilots. The information is of much higher quality than was available in the past, a true
blessing for it decreases ambiguity and uncertainty, but the quantity imposes much higher
attentional demands than in the past. The flight navigation displays on today's panels integrate a
great deal of data into an integrated, clear and intuitive representation of the aircraft's location,
directional trend and chosen course--but this screen may also contain data regarding severe
weather, wind shears, waypoints, airfields, obstructions and other traffic, almost none of which
was explicit in earlier aircraft. Depending on the circumstances of the flight, any part or all of this
information may be relevant. Much of it, fortunately, can be turned off when it is not needed.
Nonetheless, the pilot must now manage a potential glut of information, where in the past, he
simply had to wonder about it.
Pilots have often demonstrated that they want access to a// information that may be relevant to
their decision processes in flight, and that they are willing to accept a hi .gher workload to deal with
it. Unfortunately, as Fadden has noted, if they have too much informauon, it become less certain
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that they will be ableto prioritize andintegratethedata in time to addresstheproblem which is
most important. Particularly when virtually all information is visual in form, this is a serious
potential problem for designers. Some have suggested adaptive displays which can be
automatically decluttered as the pilot becomes more heavily loaded, but this poses other problems
relating to operator authority (chapters 8 and 13).
Comment
I have tried here to summarize some of the amibutes of contemporary aircraft automation that
appear to have been associated with problems in pilot cognitive behavior. Few of these problems
represent failures of the automation as such; most represent either conceptual failures at the design
or operator level, or problems in the implementation of these concepts. As machines grow more
complex and difficult to understand, opecators are more likely to err in their operation, so the net
effect of these problems is often seen as human error at the sharp end. As Reason (1990) and
Woods et al. (1994) have pointed out so clearly, to say this and stop is simply to insure that the
serious latent factors that lie behind human error will go unnoticed, and that attempts to insulate the
system against such errors in the future will not get at the systemic and conceptual problems which
cause most errors.
It is for this reason that I have tried, in this chapter, to generalize from the particular problems
cited in earlier chapters to the conceptual issues that appear to me to underlie many or most of those
problems. These issues, I believe, are the "latent factors" which we must attack if we are to make
aviation automation more human-.een_
As I said in the foreword, it is necessary that we look not only at the human or at the machine,
but at the system, ff we are to correct system faults or to design and implement more effective
systems in the future. If we do not take this approach, our present systems, as tightly integrated as
they are, will simply acquire more layers of "band-aids" as we attempt to solve specific problems
one by one, without considering the effects of those solutions on the system as a whole, or on the
competing demands upon both pilots and conu'ollers. I am fi'ankly worried that this may be what
we are doing in our present attempts to improve TC.AS, a very tightly coupled system, by adding
more and more software to lessen nuisance warnings while trying to maintain and extend the basic
usefulness of the deviceby placing new requirements on it.
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8. Human and machine roles: responsibility and authority
Introduction
Much industrial automation has been implemented on the implicit assumption that machines
could be substituted for humans in the workplace. The Fitts (1951) list of functions that are best
performed by humans and those best performed by machines exemplifies this concept. Jordan
(1963), among others, has proposed that humans and machines should be considered as
complementary, rather than competitive. The design and operation of the modem transport
airplane exemplifies the concept of complementarity, but in certain respects its automation very
much exemplifies the principle of the interchangability of parts. There are good reasons for this
based on the historical precedents that have come down to us from earlier attempts to assist the
pilot, but we must question whether we should still be designing and operaling machines in that
manner and whether a somewhat different approach could solve some of the problems we now
perceive in aviation systems.
Today's aircraft automation controls an airplane more or less as the pilot does (though most
automation has less control authority in order to provide the pilot with time to overpower or disable
it should that become necessary; this is a certification requirement). It navigates as the pilot does,
or would if pilots could carry out in real time the complex calculations now performed by the
computer. It operates the systems as the pilots do, or would do if theydo not forget or overlook
any of the procedural steps. In the near future, it will communicate with ATC, accept and execute
ATC clearances, and report its location when not under radar coverage, just as pilots do now.
Some have noted that automation usually performs all of these functions correctly, that it does not
become tired or distracted or bored or irritable, that it often "speaks" mor_ clearly and succinctly
than pilots do, that its data stream is easily comprehended by ATC computers in any. nation, and
that it does all these things without complaints. They have concluded that automation is as capable
as the human for these functions, and some air carriers have mandated that it be used whenever
possible. Are these "parts" interchangeable? That is the subject of this chapter.
The pilot as controller and manager
It should be clear from chapters 3 and 4 that pilots may play any of a variety of roles in the
control and management of a highly automated airplane. These roles range from direct manual
control of flight path and aircraft systems to a largely autonomous operation in which the pilot's
active role is minimal. This range of allocation of functions between human and machine can be
expressed as a control-management continuum, as shown in figure 8-1.
None of today's aircraft can be operated entirely at either end of this spectrum of control and
management. Indeed, an airplane operated even by direct manual control may incorporate several
kinds of control automation such as yaw dampers, a Mach trim compensator, automated
configuration warning systems, etc. Conversely, even remotely piloted vehicles are not fully
autonomous; the locus of control of these aircraft has simply been moved to another location.
Most transport flying today is assisted to a greater or lesser extent, by hydraulic amplification
of control inputs and often by computer-implemented flight control laws. Flight directors, stability
augmentation systems, enhanced displays, and in newer aircraft various degrees of envelope
protection, assist the pilot in his or her manual control tasks. To some extent, pilots can specify
the degree of assistance desired, but much of it operates full-time and some of it is not intended to
be by-passed. The pilot remains in the control loop, though it is an intermediate rather than the
inner loop (chapter 3, figure 3-12).
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Fig. 8-1: The control/management continuum for pilots
Whether pilots of limited experience should be rcquitezl by to have and demonstrate direct
manual control ability in today's airplanes, which incorporate highly redundant automated control
assistance, is a reasonable question, but beyond the scope of this document. Airbus has renderexi
this issue moot to some extent by providing shared control as the A320's basic control mode.
Pilots' control inputs are considerably modified and shaped by the flight control computers;
envelope limitations prevent them from exceeding pre-dcterminod parameters. In this airplane,
pilots arc provided with considerable assistance even during control failure modes; true manual
flight capability is limited to rudder control and stabilizer trim and is designed only to maintain
controlled flight while the automated systems arc restored to operation. Under all normal
circumstances, the aircraft automation is responsible for much of the inner loop control, though
control laws arc tailored to respond in ways that seem natural to the pilot. In the MD-11, a
combination of longitudinal stability augmentation and control wheel steering is in operation at all
times; roU control wheel steering is available as an option.
When an autopflot is used to perform the flight path (and/or power) control tasks, the pilot
becomes a manager rather than a controller (this is also true to some extent of the shared control
option). The pilot may elect to have the autopilot perform only the most basic functions: pitch, roll
and yaw control (this basic autoflight level is no longer available in all systems); he or she may
command the automation tomaintain or alterheading,altitudeor spcod,or may directthe autopilot
to capture and follow navigation paths,eitherhorizontal or vertical.This is management by
delegation,though atdifferinglevelsof management, from fairlyimmediate tofairlyremote. In all
cases,however, the aircraftiscarryingout a setof tacticaldirectionssuppliedby the pilot.Itwill
not deviatefi'omthesedirectionsunlessitisincapableof executingthem.
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As always, there are exceptions to the generalizations.The 757/767 will not initiatea
programmed descent from cruisealtitudewithout an enabling actionby the pilot.Other modem
flight management systems require that the pilots provide certain inputs before they will accept
certain conditional instructions. Management by consent describes a mode of operation in which
automation, once provided with goals to be achieved, operates autonomously, but requires consent
from its supervisor before instituting successive phases of flight, or certain critical procedures.
The consent principle has important theoretical advantages, in that it keeps pilots involved and
aware of system intent, and provides them the opportunity to intervene if they believe the intended
action is inappropriate at that point in time.
This management mode may become more important as "smart" decision-aiding or decision-
making systems come into use (see chapter 13). A protracted period of close monitoring of these
systems will be necessary; requiring consent is one way to monitor and moderate the potential
influence of these systems. While management by consent is an attractive option worthy of further
exploration, it must be informed consent. More fundamental human factors research is needed to
identify how to implement it without the consent becoming perfunctory.
Management by exception refers to a management-control situation in which the automation
possesses the capability to perform all actions required for mission completion and performs them
unless the pilot takes exception. Today's very capable flight management systems will conduct an
operation in accordance with pre-programmed instructions unless a change in goals is provided to
the flight management system and is enabled by the pilots. Such revisions occur relatively
frequently when air traffic control requires changes in the previously-cleared flight path, most often
during descent into a terminal area. Some FMS lateral and waypoint management tasks now
operate by exception.
The desire to lightenthe pilot's workload and decrease the required bandwidth of pilot actions
led to much of the control automation now installed in transport aircraft. The more capable control
and management automation now in service has certainly achieved this objective. It also has the
capacity, however, to decrease markedly the pilot's involvement with the flying task and even with
the mission. Today's aircraft can be operated for long periods of time with very little pilot activity.
Flight path control, navigation, and in some aircraft subsystems management are almost entirely
automatic. The capable, alert pilot will remain conversant with flight progress despite the low level
of required activity, but even capable, motivated pilots get tired, lose their concentration and
become diverted, or worry about personal problems unrelated to the flight. A critical task of the
designer is to find ways to maintain and enhance pilot involvement during operation at higher
levels of automation.
This is less simple than it sounds, for pilots will both resent and find ways to bypass tasks
that are imposed merely for the purpose of ascertaining that they are still present in the cockpit.
Tasks to maintain involvement must be flight-relevant or even flight-critical, and equally important,
must be perceived by pilots to be relevant. Designing pilot involvement into highly automated
systems will not be easy but must be accomplished to minimize boredom and complacency,
particularly in very long range aircraft which spend many hours in overwater cruise. The progress
of avionics, satellite navigation and communications, and data link will very likely have an
opposite effect unless this uniquely human factor receives more consideration than it has to date.
Fully autonomous operation denotes operation in accordance with instructions provided by
system designers; no attention or management is required of the pilots. Until recently, relatively
few complex systems operated fully autonomously. With the introduction of the A320 and MI)-
11, however, major systems operate in this way.
A fundamental question is how wide a range of control and management options should be
provided. This may well vary across functions; indeed, pilots often prefer to operate using a mix
105
of levels, for example controlling thrust manually while managing the autopilot and using the flight
director to monitor navigation. Pilot cognitive styles vary; their skill levels aLso vary somewhat as
a function of the amount of recent flying they have done, how tired they are, etc. These factors
lead me to argue that a reasonable range of options must be provided, but widening that range is
expensive in terms of training time and time required to maintain familiarity with a broader
spectrum of automation capabilities as well as in terms of equipment costs.
One possible way to keep pilots involved in the operation of an "ai_.t is to ".li_t theirability
to withdraw from it by invoking very high levels of management. Anomer, perhaps preterame
way is to structure those higher levels of management so that they still require planning, decision-
making and procedural tasks. The use of a management by consent approach, rather than
management by exception, could be structured to insure that pilots must enable each successive
flight phase or aircraft change of status, as an instance. It has been suggested by one air carrier
that long-haul pilots should be given the tools with which to become involved in flight planning for
maximum economy on an ongoing basis; this is another approach to maintaining higher levels of
involvement, but it is presently being implemented as a dispatcher function.
The role of the air traffic controller
When a more highly automated ATC system is implemented, its computers will be able to
search for traffic conflicts and to provide at least decision support in resolving them. This is the
foundation of the FAA's automated en route air traffic control system (formerly referred to as
AERA), and it is a key feature of the "free flight" proposal (chapter 6). Direct ATC computer-to-
flight management computer data transfers, and probably direct "negotiations" between these
computers, will likewise be a part of such a system, which opens the possibility of direct control of
air traffic by ATC automation without involvement of either controllers or pilots.
I have discussed a control/managementcontinuum in termsof pilotrolesin an automated
system.A similarconstructcan be proposedforairtrafficcontrollersand theirautomation(figure
8-2),thoughitshouldbe keptinmind thatairtrafficcontrollersactuallydirectand coordinatethe
movements of aircraft;only pilotscontrolthem. In thisrespect,the controller'stask is
fundamentally different from that of the pilot.
As in the case of pilots, a very broad range of roles is theoretically possible, ranging from
unassisted procedural control without visualization aids such as radar all the way. to autonomous
machine control of air traffic. Indeed, the former option will probably continue m some parts of
the world, even while other areas adopt advanced automation. The important point is that the role
of the controller, and probably the involvement of the controller in the details of the operation, can
vary greatly, from absolute direct authority over the entire operation to a relatively passive
oversight function in which air traffic control tactics are purely the computer's task.
Whether such a broad range of roles is desirable is another matter entirely. The first principles
of human-centered automation indicate that involvement is necessary if the human operator is to
remain in command of the operation. I question the controller's ability to remain actively involved
for very long ff he or she has no active role in the conduct of an almost entirely automated process.
On the other hand, some range of options should be permitted, to account for differences in
cognitive style, variations in workload, and a wide range of controller experience levels.
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Fig. 8-2: A control/management continuum for air traffic controllers
Human and machine roles
Present aircraft automation does not plan flights, though it is able to execute them and to assist
in replanning (e.g., after an engine failure). It cannot configure an airplane for flight or start the
engines. It knows with great precision where runways are, but not how to get to them from a gate,
nor from a runway mmoff to a gate after landing. Flight control automation is locked out during
the takeoff sequence, though thrust is under automatic control from early in the process in some
aircraft. Automation controls neither the landing gear nor the flaps during takeoff and approach.
From shortly after takeoff until the airplane touches down at a destination, however, automation is
fully capable of executing all the required elements of a flight, though it does not, at this time,
accomplish the checklists required during the process.
There is, of course, no reason why automation could not perform taxi maneuvers, though
implementing this function would be extremely costly. There is absolutely no reason why landing
gear and flap actuation could not be automatic. The few aspects of subsystem management that are
still manual in some of the newer aircraft (e.g., the MD-11) could certainly be automated as well.
Why, then, have they not been? The answer does not lie in the inadequacies of technology, but in
the intricate domains of sociology, psychology and politics.
Pilots are perceived to be essential because passengers are not willing to fly in an autonomous,
unmanned airplane--though millions entrust themselves every day to the Bay Area Rapid Transit,
the Washington Metro, and other mass transit systems in which the locus of control has shifted
from the operator station to a central control room. The trains on these systems do carry a human
operator, but under normal circumstances, the operator does not operate the vehicles and is
proscribed from doing so. Airport "people-movers", some of which travel over several miles of
dedicated track or roadway, do not have an on-board operator, the voice announcements are
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recordedor synthetic. Note that these systems are not fully autonomous; humans control them, as
they always did, but the control is supervisory and remote (Sheridan, 1984).
The flight environn_nt, however, is far more complex than that of a _ light-rail system,
and many of the variables are not under the control of system managers. Pilots are essential
because they are trained to compensate for unexpected variability. Automation does fail, and
unlike surface vehicles, airplanes cannot simply come to a stop while the automation is fixed.
Once in flight, they must be guided to a landing. In other words, pilots and air traffic controllers
are essential because they are able to make good decisions in difficult situations. We have not yet
devised a computer that can cope with the variability inherent in the flight and air traffic
environment.
The human role, then, is to do what the automation cannot do: to plan, to oversee, to reflect
and make intelligent decisions in the face of uncertainty, and to make passengers (and air carrier
management, and the FAA) feel comfortable about air transportation.
Responsibility and authority
If a controller fails to maintain separation because of a tag swap or a radar outage, is the
computer "grounded"?. No; the controller remains responsible for traffic separation regardless of
the circumstances. There may be mitigating circumstances, but this responsibility cannot be
delegated.
If an automated airplane gets lost and lands at the wrong airport, or encounters severe
turbulence and incurs structural damage, or runs out of fuel and crash lands, or violates regulations
for whatever reason, is the flight management computer held to account? Not to my knowledge.
The pilot, not the autopilot, is in command of the flight and is responsible for its safe conduct.
Does the pilot have the authority required to fulfill this responsibility? What responsibility,
and what authority, does the pilot have in today's system and today's airplanes? It is a maxim of
military command that authority can be delegated by a commander. Responsibility for the outcome
cannot be delegated to others. It remains with the commander.
These precepts are extremely important in aviation. Though aviation involves a widely
distributed system in which no individual can get the job done by himself, the roles of all the
humans in the system come together in the process of flight. In that process, the pilot and
dispatcher share responsibility for the plan which guides the flight. The pilot is solely responsible
for its safe execution, and the air traffic controller is solely responsible for keeping the flight safely
separated from other air traffic.
Part 91.3 of the Federal Aviation Regulations describes the "responsibility and authority of the
pilot in command". It is brief and succinct:
(a) The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the fmal authority
as to, the operation of that aircraft
(b) In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command may deviate
from any rule of this part to the extent required to meet that emergency.
(c) Each pilot in command who deviates from a rule under paragraph (b) of this section
shall, upon the request of the Administrator, send a written report of that deviation to the
Administrator.
This regulation confers upon the pilot essentially unlimited authority to depart from the
accepted rules for the conduct of flights if that pilot believes that an emergency situation exists.
Under his emergency authority, the pilot is permitted to request whatever assistance is necessary,
to declare for his flight absolute priority for any maneuver, flight path or action, and to take
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whatever steps are necessary, in his view, to protect his passengers. His or her decis.ion.s may be
questioned afterward, but the authority remains and is recognized without question at me ume.
It is a matter of record that pilots have sometimes not used their emergency authority when
hindsight says they should have done so. Some situations, like the fuel emergency that led to the
loss of Avianca flight 107 (Cove Neck, NY, 1990), seem obvious to anyone, though the Board
raised the question of whether the pilot's very limited English competency may have permitted,,him__
to think that he had made such a declaration when the proper enabling words ("Mayday or
"Emergency") had not been used. In other cases, pilots have been inhibited by fear of the
paperwork and questions that inevitably follow such a declaration (though onerous questions after
a safe landing are a great deal easier to walk away flxan than an aircraft accident).
Pilots, then, have as much authority as they need to permit them to fult'fll their responsibility
for flight safety--or do they? Does a pilot whose control authority is limited by software encoded
in the flight control computer have full authority to do whatever is necessary to avoid an imminent
collision, or ground contact? U.S. transport aviation involving jet aircraft was scarcely 4 months
old in 1959 when a Boeing 707 entered a vertical dive over the North Atlantic Ocean. The pilots
recovered from the dive and landed the airplane safely at Gander, Newfoundland. Post-flight
inspections revealed severe structural damage of the wing and horizontal stabilizer, but all the
passengers survived and the airplane flew again after major repairs (NTSB, 1960). Would this
have been possible if flight control software had limited the forces that could be applied to levels
within the normal flight envelope of the airplane?
Limitations on pilot authority
In the A320/330/340 series aircraft, the flight control system incorporates envelope limitation.
Certain parameters (bank angle, pitch or angle of attack) cannot be exceeded by the pilot except by
turning off portions of the flight control computer systems or flying outside their cutoff values, as
was done during the low-altitude flyover prior to the Mulhouse-Habsheim accident (1988).
Predetermined thrust parameters also cannot be exceeded.
Systems designed for autonomous operation pose serious philosophical questions with respect
to pilot authority as well as pilot involvement. These questions arose first in the design of fighter
aircraft and were discussed succinctly in an unsigned editorial in Flight International (1990). The
American F-16 fighter's fly by wire control system incorporates "hard" limits which "preserve the
aircraft's flying qualities right to the limit of its closely defined envelope" but do not permit the
pilot to maneuver beyond those limits. The Flight editorial pointed out that "There is, however,
another approach avaihable: to develop a 'softer' fly-by-wire system which allows the aircraft to go
to higher limits than before but with a progressive degradation of flying qualifies as those higher
limits are approached. It is this latter philosophy which was adopted b.y. the Soviets with fighters
like the MiG-29 and Sukhoi Su-27. It is not, as Mikoyan s chief test pilot...admits, necessarily a
philosophy which an air force will prefer." (He) says, however: "Although this...approach
requires greater efforts...it guarantees a significant increase in the overall quality of the aircraft-
pilot combination. This method also allows a pilot to use his intellect and initiative to their fullest
extent." (Farley, 1990) The "softer" approach has been taken in the MD-11 and Boeing 777,
which permit pilots to override automatic protection mechanisms by application of additional
control forces. The flying qualities are degraded in this mode, but the pilot retains control
authority. (The MD-11 also has "soft" power control limits, while the 777 incorporates "hard"
limits on engine power, for reasons I do not understand.)
Though civil aircraft do not face the threat posed to a fighter under attack whose
maneuverability is limited, their pilots do on occasion have to take violent evasive or corrective
action, and they may on rare occasions need control or power authority up to (or even beyond)
normal structural and engine limits to cope with very serious problems. The issue is whether the
pilot, who is ultimately responsible for safe mission completion, should be permitted to operate to
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or even beyond airplane limits when he or she determines that a dire emergency _qul_s such
operation. The issue will not be simply resolved, and the rarity of such emergencies makes it
difficult to obtain empirical support for one or the other philosophy. Nonetheless, the issue is a
fundamental one.
The MD-11 incorporates angle of attack protection, but its limits can be overridden by the
pilot, as can the limits of the autothrust system. In the MD-II, however, aircraft systems operate
autonomously to a considerable degree. Failure detection and subsystem reconfiguration are also
autonomous ff the aircraft system controllers (ASC) are enabled (the normal condition). Any
system may be operated manually, though the protections provided by the ASC systems are not
available during manual operation.
Comment
The increasing capabilities of advanced automation pose a severe temptation to new aircraft
design teams. They can decide that the safety of the airplane makes it important that they limit the
authority of the pilots, and they can implement that limitation very easily in airplane software. Or
they can match the software limits to the structural parameters of the airplane insofar as possible,
though this is an approach that has not yet been implemented. Whether they have considered all of
the circumstances that may confront a pilot in line operations is a question that may only be
answered when totally unforeseen circumstances arise, perhaps years after the airplane has left the
factory.
Given that pilots bear the ultimate responsibility for the outcome, it would seem that their
authority to do whatever is necessary to insure that the outcome is favorable should be foreclosed
only with extreme reluctance. The concept of "soft limits" on control authority may represent one
useful and constructive approach to this dilemma. What is important is to realize how easily the
pilot's authority can be compromised, given the technologies that are now available. It may take
only a line or two of software and may or may not be known or obvious to the pilot.
The same dilemma will face us in the near future with respect to air traffic controllers, as the
tools they use axe automated in the APTS. This question has not received the attention it deserves,
and the rarity of situations that force the issue makes it very difficult to provide good data in
support of any extreme position. It is necessary that we realize, however, that issues involving
such rare events must sometimes be handled on the basis of the best available a priori reasoning.
The views of pilots and controllers on this issue are clear:, if they have the responsibility, they want
the authority necessary to exercise it.
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9. Integration and coupling in the future aviation system
Introduction
The technical challenge of developing advanced automated aircraft pales in the face of the
challenge posed by the need for a highly integrated air traffic management system. Simply
developing a set of agreed-upon standards for such a system has already taken five years, and the
task is far from finished. FAA, ICAO and other organizations must produce standards and
requirements for data link technologies, the aeronautical telecommunications network, automatic
dependent surveillance, future ATC procedures, satellite surveillance, navigation and
communications, ground communication links, integration of satellite and radar surveillance, the
necessary airborne equipment, and assessment of the problems posed by a mix of airborne
capabilities (Paulson, 1994). Integrating all of the pieces needed for a truly integrated aviation
system will be a staggering task.
The U.IC National Air Traffic Service (NATS) has supported studies to insure that a variety
of technologies can "play together" in a future environment. In October 1991 Eurocontrol and the
U.K. CAA demonstrated the automatic delivery of clearance data, weather interrogation by pilots,
and the transmission of ATC instructions and pilot acknowledgements using a BAC 1-11 airplane
belonging to the Royal Aircraft Establishment. "Downlinked autopilot settings were automatically
checked against the controllers' original instructions, enhancing safety, while the downlinklng of
other avionics data (such as true airspeed, heading and vertical rates) reduced voice traffic and the
controller's workload. The Volmet (weather) messages were printed in the cockpit, reducing the
pilots' workload, and the downlinking of ATC messages and pilot acknowledgements gave the
controllers assurance that the message had reached the correct recipient and was unlikely to be
misinterpreted.
"Studies suggest that aircraft-derived data could provide additional inputs to ground-based
trackers, reducing position uncertainty and enabling improved conflict alert algorithms to reduce
the number of nuisance alerts while giving earlier warning of potential conflicts" (Paulson, 1994).
Earlier in 1991, I proposed that ATC clearances transmitted to aircraft by datalink be downlinked to
ATC computers as they were executed, to provide confirmation of FMS and presumably pilot
intentions and to provide positive cortfi_rmation that the aircraft would proceed in accordance with
ATC intentions (Billings, 1991).
However limited, the U.K. experiments represent an encouraging start on the task of
integrating the ground and airborne components of the aviation system. Since 1991, a number of
other demonstrations have been conducted to examine other elements of an integrated system. In
this chapter, I examine the implications of creating such a system for the humans who must operate
within it. In accordance with Perrow's (1984) cautions, I shall also examine issues related to
coupling and complexity in such systems.
Elements of an integrated aviation system
A very large number of functional capabilities must be in place in a future aviation system if it
is to accomplish the tasks assigned to it. Briefly, these functions are to facilitate the movement and
tracking of large numbers of variably equipped aircraft on or over any part of the earth's surface, to
assist them in landing and taking off from airports, and to provide all assistance necessary during
contingency operations. These tasks must be accomplished in all extremes of weather, across
national boundaries, with limited resources. The aviation system is information-bound, and the
complexity of the system results largely from the complexity of moving all necessary information
in real time to al/system participants who have a need for it.
Avionics data have been downlinked and processed automatically during the UK NATS mode
S trials. Some air carriers have achieved a 96% success rate in delivery of oceanic clearances by
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ACARS, and at certain airports, prcdeparturc clearance delivery is now routinely
accomplished by this route. Two carriers have successfully tested ADS over the Pacific,
transmitting data through satellites to air traffic control facilities on land. Other elements of the
system have also been tested in simulation; some have had flight trials. Large-scaic GPS testing
has been performed, and A330 and A340 aircraft have been ccnJ_ficated for satellite navigation by
the JAA in Era'opt.
TheTe appear to be no technologicalbanders to the implementation of the technologies requi_
for a more highly integrated system. The barriers that remain arc in the areas of standards,
procedures, software, and harmonization across nations. The knotty issue of how ATC will cope
with a broad mix of aircraft capabilities is more difficult in a conswained economic climate.
ICAO's Requix_ Navigation Performance concept may help to some extent, though retrofit of
advanced equipment ina largenumber of regionaland commuter aircraftmay not be economically
possiblein the near term.
The software issueiscritical;the elements of thissystem must be able to communicate, and
the design and verificationof software to make thishappen throughout the system will bc
immensely difficulttasks. Nordwall (1993, p. 30) points out thatwhen air trafficcontrollers
began to work with prototype hAS software,500-700 change orders were generated. The AAS
system willincorporateover two million linesof code; a system for the ground support of frec
flightislikelytobe substantiallymore complex. A long periodof debugging willbe required,and
some verificationwork may not be ableto be performed untilthesystem ison linewith livetraffic,
for the presentsystem may not be fullyintegratedwith the new one. The overallsystem willbc
extremely complex, distributedacross a great many nodes. Integrationof such a system is far
differentfrom integrationof themany controland displaymodules ineven as complicated a system
as a nuclearpower plant.
Coupling and complexity,
In our present aviationsystem, the various automation elements are not necessarilycoupled
except by information. That is to say thatthe various elements operate independently. The
"coupling" among them isprocedural:itisagre_l among thevarioussystem participantsthatupon
receiptof a given instructionor request,a system component willtakecertainactions.The results
of those actions may be visiblein many parts of the system, but they are not predetermined.
Though the various system components may be very complex in and of themselves, they arc not
physicallyor virtuallylinked.
Most officialsin the airtrafficsystem and an increasingnumber in the aircarriertechnical
community envision directcommunications between ATC computers (and perhaps, in the future,
airlineSOC computers as well) and aircraftflightmanagement computers, though itisgenerally
accepted atthistime thatwhen clearancemodifications are uplinkcd to an aircraft,they willbc
subject to consent by the pilots.Direct negotiationof such clearance modifications between
computers isalsoenvisionedby FAA, however, and forms a partof thefreeflightconcept (IATA,
1994). Such a process could confront both controllersand pilotswith a resultarrived at by
processes that were opaque to them. It is also planned to require acceptance of datalinkcd
mcssages withina certainshorttime interval(40 seconds has bccn mentioned), though presumably
executionof an uplinked clearancecould be delayed forsome furtherperiodof time topermitmorc
review by the pilots.Nonetheless,the clearanceexecutionprocesscan be time-criticalunder some
conditions.
These proposals presentpotentiallyseriousproblems for human operators. Itis not always
easy tounderstand a complicated clearance,particularlyifitinvolveswaypoints or instructionsthat
departfrom expectations.The process may require,forinstance,thatthe pilotsconsultnavigation
charts,theirdispatchers,or the FMS map display,even though the FMC may have sufficient
informationto comply with theclearance.A new clearancemay not comport with thepilot'sview
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of theenvironment;it mayre_lUi_theexpenditure of extra fuel or may take the airplane too close to
the limits of an operating envelope. These factors will sometimes require deliberation and
decision-making by the flight crew, all of which will take time.
Executing an uplinked Hight plan issimple, requiringonly a singlekeystroke on the FMS
CDU. Ifprocedures forvoice or ACARS negotiationswith ATC to securea revisionare difficult
or time-consuming, a Right crew already busy with another problem may not have the time and
may acceptan undesirableclearanceratherthan argue about it.The controllermay alsoneed time
to understand a complex recommended clearance revision and may not have the time at that
moment due to the pressureof othertasks.These areproblems thatoccur now; they can be dealt
with by the methods used in the present system, but only if provision is made for them in the
design of the future system.
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A more important issue is
the hypothetical (at this time)
situation that would arise if it
were to be decided that
clearances arrived at by
computer-to-computer negot-
iation need not require pilot or
controller consent (figure 9-
1). The future system will
make this entirely feasible,
and automatic execution of
such clearances might assist
ATC by insuring prompt
responses to ATC commands.
In this case, the ATC and
airborne components of the
system would be coupled as
well as integrated.
Fig. 9-1: Some options for the futuremanagement of air traffic.
The airplane flight path would be managed by exception rather than consent (pilots would
presumably still be able to countermand the actions of the FMS, though they would not necessarily
be given advance notice of its intent). This hypothetical situation begins to resemble the position of
the air traffic manager under the free flight concept.
The Automated Air Traffic Management System concept
As noted in chapter 6, NASA is presently considering the elements of a new research and
development program devoted to advanced air traffic management (now called Advanced Air
Transportation Technology). The objective of the program is to develop advanced "conflict-free,
knowledge-based automated systems for real-time adaptive scheduling and sequencing, for global
flow control of large numbers and varieties of aircraft, and for terminal area and ground operations
that are compatible with 'free flight' enroute operations" (Lebacqz, personal communication,
1994). This system will involve much tighter coupling, not merely integration, of the ground and
airborne elements of the aviation system. These concepts run a very real (and very high) risk of
infringing significantly on the authority of both air traffic controllers and pilots, despite their
proponents' claims that the new automation will be human-centered.
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Issues raised by tightly coupled systems concepts
In a much more tightlycoupled hypotheticalsystem involvingautomaticclearanceexecution,it
would unquestionably be more difficult for pilots to understand how a clearance was arrived at and
why itwas given,since they would not have access tothe ATC computer's reasoning. Similarly,
itwould be much more difficultfor a responsiblecontrollerto understand the rulesby which the
clearance was derived, since he or she would not have access to the FMS dam. This is the
complexity-coupling problem discussed by Perrow (1984). It would certainlyresultin more
surprisesfor the human operators,and would seriouslydiminish theirabilityto develop mental
models of the ATC automation.
Though cruiseflightisa comparative low workload periodforpilotsof advanced aircraft,itis
quitecertainthatthecognitiveburdens, and workload, now placedupon enroutecontrollerswillbe
transferredtopilots,not mitigated,ffsuch a concept comes to fi'uition.This has happened before,
when "profiledescents" were imposed in busy terminal areas. Controllersfound theirworkloads
lightenedby thenew procedures,but pilotsfound theirtaskdemands to be considerablyincreased.
At this time, pilots do not have in their cockpits the information necessary.to permit them to
accomplish "air traffic control" other than short-range conflict avoidance using TCAS, which
provides farlessthan a fullyadequate presentationeven of immediate potentialthreats.Despite
theirlimitations,which are considerable,TCAS displaysare now being used on a testbasisfor in-
nail climb separationover the PacificOcean. Other uses, to include lateralseparationduring
closely-spaced(1700 ft)parallelapproaches tolanding,are being activelyconsidered,and displays
for thisfunction are in development. Note thatnone of thisnew functionalityhas been integratea
intothe cockpittaskflow, nor have the displaysbeen looked atinthe largercontextof cockpitand
flightmanagement, as so often happens when new functionsare considered forretrofitinpresent
flightdecks.
Comment
Removing pilots or controllers from the command loop, even under constrained conditions,
would be a comparatively small stepfrom a technicalviewpoint. Itwould represent,however, an
enormous, qualitativechange in the rules by which the aviation system has been governed
throughout itshistory.Itwould diminish the authorityof the human operatorsappreciably,and it
would change the dominant mode of system management as much as would the freeflightconcept.
Itwould, however, be technologicallyfeasibleand implementable, perhaps atrelativelylow cost,
and itcould resultin decreased workload for eitherpilotsor controllersor possibly both for
which reasons,itwillprobably be seriouslyconsidered at some point in the future. This isthe
reasonIhave chosen toraisethe specterhere.
The differences between integration of independent systems and coupling of interdependent
systems need to be clearly understood. The disadvantage of an uncoupled system is that its
elements may, or may not, always behave predictably when certain instructions are issued. A pilot
may turn too slowly after receiving a controller's request for an immediate maneuver (and this is
probably more likely when a data linked instruction is received than when a controller issues an
urgent voice instruction), as an instance. The most significant advantage of an integrated but
uncoupled system is that the operators are much more likely to understand it, and therefore less
likely to be sm'prised by its behavior.
Given a system as complex as the futureaviationsystem willbe, however, attemptstocouple
itsground and airborne elements willinevitablymake itmore difficultfor operatorsto predictits
behavior,particularlyunder other than nominal conditions.Ibelieve thatthiswould bc likelyto
result in less safe rather than more safe operations.
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Part 3: Requirements and Guidelines for Aviation Automation
In. part 3, suggested requirements and guidelines for the design and application of future
automation in aviation are presented. It is suggested that detailed "how to do it" guidelines can
only be discussed in the context of a specific design philosophy and constraints for a specific
system. For that reason, the guidchnes proposed here are written from a system viewpoint and are
designed to be used as input to the development of requirements for such specific systems.
Chapter 10 is concerned with requirements and generic guidelines for aircraft automation.
Chapter 11 deals with future air traffic management automation, and chapter 12 discusses
guidelines for aircraft certification.
10: Requirements and guidelines for aircraft automation
Introduction
The predecessor to this document (Billings, 1991)was successful in stimulating a dialogue
between knowledgeable people inthe aviationcommunity concerning the rolesand functionsof
human operators in the system. The guidelines it presented were less useful to designers,
however, because of theirgenerality.Since thattime, however, I have become steadilymore
convinced thatspecificdesignguidelinescan only be proposed in thecontextof a particularsystem
being designed with specificgoals and subjectto specificconstraints.That being the case,can a
document such as thisoffer any useful guidance to those who must design future aviation
automation? I am not sure of the answer to thisquestion,but I am indebted to those reviewers
who have triedto guide mc inproposing such guidance. The entiredocument to thispoint isin
reality an attempt to provide that guidanc_ in nan_ve form.
Fadden (personal communication, 1994) has suggested that, "While there are people in
aviation who do not understand some very basic facts about human beings, the design, operations
and regulatory climate have improved to the point where the conflict between principles is the
primary area of interest....Getting (the value of individual guidelines) into the airplane is tied to
resolving the conflicts (between principles) in the most effective way possible. I would suggest
that the majority of automation issues in the second, and certainly the third, generation jets are tied
to the balance between competing (human) objectives, not to ignorance of those objectives."
In accordance with these comments, I have attempted in part 3 to reorder my statements of
requirements to emphasize priorities and conflicts among the problems discussed in chapters 2 and
7. First, however, we should remind ourselves of what this part of the document is all about. The
reader will recall that I have suggested in chapter 2 some "common factors" I believe are found in
automation-associated incidents and mishaps:
* Loss of state awareness, associated with automation:
• Complexity
• Coupling
• Autonomy
• lnadequatefeedback
In chapter 7, I elaborated on these and other automation characteristics that appear to have been
associated with problems in the operation of highly automated systems:
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• Aut)mation characteristics
• Brittleness
. L_alism
• Clumsiness
• Monitoring requirements
• Data overload
To generalize still further, the fundamental problem in this human-machine system seems to
me to be that human operators sometimes do not understand what their automated
tools are doing, and why. For that reason, they have difficulty in using automation
effectively to serve their objectives. There are many reasons for inadequate understanding; some
are related to design deficiencies, some to inadequate training, and some to characteristics of the
humans, including their tendency to rely uncritically on these normally reliable tools.
I have said in chapter 2 that I believe a philosophy of human-centered automation can help to
lessen these aviation system problems..These requirements and guidelines are aimed at the
conceptual issues underlying the (largely cognitive) problems listed here. The guidelines are
necessarily presented sequentially; they are like FMS screens which can only be accessed one at a
time. They are not independent, however, and many or most of them have implications for at least
several others. These guidelines must be considered as a whole, not only as "stand-alone"
statements, and the designer must achieve whatever balance is possible among them, keeping in
mind the problems that have been observed and their implications.
In a landmark paper in 1980, Earl Wiener and Renwick Curry discussed "Flight-Deck
Automation: Promises and Problems" (see Appendix 2). Their contribution has been the stimulus
for a great .deal of research.during _e 15 years since it was published. After presenting candidate
guidelines mr control and information automation, the authors concluded that "the rapid pace of
automation is outstripping one's ability to comprehend all the implications for crew performance.
It is unrealistic to call for a halt to cockpit automation until the manifestations are completely
understood. We do, however, call for those designing, analyzing, and installing automatic
systems in the cockpit to do so carefully; to recognize the behavioral effects of automation; to avail
themselves of present and future guidelines; and to be watchful for symptoms that might appear in
waining and operational settings..." (emphasis supplied) Their statement is true today and their call
is as appropriate as when it was written. The remainder of this section is devoted to expanding on
their guidelines with the benefit of an additional 15 years of experience and hindsight.
Requirements for human-centered aircraft automation
There are innumerable guides for aerospace system designers. All present more or less
specific prescriptive guidance, often context-free, which may or may not meet the particular
requirements of a design engineer working under specific constraints on a specific system. Many
are not indexed in a way that makes the material immediately accessible to those who need it.
Design engineers .f_equenfly complain that most do not provide the guidance required in the design
proce,ss,nor sufficlentlyfirm reasons fortakinga certainpath inpreferenceto othersthatmay be
easer or less expensive in a given project.
Let me reiterate that I do not believe that specific "how to" guidance is appropriate or
particularly useful except in the context of a particular system, within which there may be many
perhaps equally effective ways to implement a particuiar function. In this section, I have tried to
provide guidance with respect to "what to do" rather than "how to do it", for I believe that our
knowledge of cognition and behavior is sufficient to provide some general outlines of what needs
to be presentin a human-centered aviationsystem. Itisprobably more appropriateto callthese
"requirements for human-centered automation", or guidelines for the development of requirements.
116
Principles of human-centered automation--general guidelines
I remm to the first principles of human-centered automation set forth in chapter 2, and repeat
them here as general guidelines, with some further discussion of each of them. These principles
deal at a fundamental level with the relationship between human operators and the machines which
assist them in carrying out their mission. (For information on the mishaps cited here, see the
Appendix.)
1. The human operator must be in command.
Fully autonomous transport aircraft are probably technically feasible, but are not
politically possible at this time, in my view, because social factors would prevent them from
being accepted by those who wished to utilize the services they offered. On the other hand,
we accept and utilize the products made available by unmanned satellites without question, and
their reliability at this time is of a high order. Were fully autonomous vehicles to become the
dominant mode of transportation, this document would not be necessary, though a different
document devoted to the human factors of ground control systems might be useful. I have
assumed, for purposes of argument, that human "commanders" will continue to be
responsible for the safety of air transport, and these guidelines are based on that premise. To
the extent that it is true, I believe that the human operator must be given authority
commensurate with that responsibility.
There are three ways that command authority can be compromised. A pilot in command
can effectively relinquish that role, either to other humans or to the automation, by
indecisiveness when a decision is required. This is fortunately rare, though it has been
observed both in simulation (Ruffen Smith, 1979) and in flight (Portland, OR, 1978) when
the captain delayed making the decision to land until his fuel supply was insufficient to permit
a controlled landing. Operators can provide command and CRM training to reduce the
likelihood of such behavior, but it can still occur, especially if the first officer is a strong-
willed, dominant person and the captain is relatively passive.
A second way in which command authority can be degraded is by overly restrictive
operator policies and procedures which "hamstring" the commander's authority, or by
operator failure to back its commanders when disputes arise with company, government or
other ground support personnel. The Air Ontario F-28 accident (1989)grew out of a situation
in which the captain was required by his company to off-load fuel to permit a full passenger
load in an airplane whose APU was inoperative. This combination placed him in a classic
"double bind" when he landed at Dryden to refuel (Moshansky, 1992).
A third way in which command authority can be degraded is by an airplane's designers.
"Hard" airplane or engine operating/imitations encoded in automation software can preclude a
pilot from making full-capability maneuvers if they are required in an emergency. Inadequate
feedback on cockpit displays can deny a pilot the information he or she needs to recognize,
evaluate and respond to a developing aircraft or automation problem, as may have occurred
prior to the A330 accident at Toulouse, France (1994), when the pilots' mode annunciator
panels "decluttered" after the airplane exceeded 25 ° of pitch during a test flight.
It is a fundamental tenet of this concept of human-centered automation that aircraft and
ATC automation exists to assist pilots and controllers in carrying out their responsibilities as
stated above. The reasoning is simple. Apart from the statutory responsibility of the human
operators of the system, automation is not infallible. Like any other machine, it is subject to
failure. The human's responsibilities include detecting such failures, correcting their
manifestations, and continuing the operation safely to a conclusion or until the automated
systems can resume their normal functions.
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2. To command effectively, the human operator must be involved.
To exercise effective command of a vehicle or operation, the commander must be
involved in the operation. Involved is "to be drawn in"; the commander must have an active
role, whether that role is to control the aircraft (or traffic) directly, or to manage the human
and/or machine resources through which control is being exercised. The pilot's involvement,
however, must be consistent with his or her command responsibilities; the priorities of the
piloting or "aviating" tasks remain inflexible. The pilot flying must not be helped to become
preoccupied by a welter of detaiL
As we have implemented more capable and independent automation, particularly in Ion.g-
haul _t, we have not made it aptneciably harder for an alert, competent pilot to maintain
situation awareness. What we have done, however, is to make it easier for a tired, bored,
complacent or distracted pilot to distance him or herself from the situation. This is not new;
Korean Air Lines fright 007 (Sakhalin Island, 1983) was probably flying in heading rather
than INS mode for some considerable time before the first of its two incursions into Soviet
airspace. What is important is that none of three crewmembers detected the mode error. They
were not adequately involved.
Ways must be found to keep pilots involved in their operations by requiring of them
meaningful (not "make-work") tasks at intervals during a long flight. IdeaUy, these tasks
should have perceptual, cognitive and psychomotor components so that the pilots must
perceive or detect, think about, and respond actively to some stimulus. This may.require that
designers "un-automate" some tasks or functions now performed by the automanon. Such a
step involves the risk that the tasks may be missed or performed wrong, but ff we know
enough about the task to have automated it, we also know enough to implement an error-
detection module which will alert the pilot if the task is not performed or is performed
incorrectly.
Modern aircraft automation is extremely capable; it has made it possible for the aircraft
commander to delegate nearly all tactical control of an operation to the machine. Human-
centered aircraft automation must be designed, and operated, in such a way that it does not
permit the human operator to become too remote from operational details. We know how to
automate, and we know ways of keeping pilots involved. The goal here must be to do both
simultaneously, a less easy task but an essential one.
3. To remain involved, the human operator must be appropriately informed.
Without appropriate information concerning the conduct of an operation, involvement
becomes less immediate and decisions, if they are made, become unpredictable. The level of
• detail provided to the pilot may vary, but certain information elements cannot be absent if the
pilot is to remain involved, and more important, is to remain able to resume direct control of
the aircraft and operation in the event of automation failures.
Both the content of the information made available and the ways in which it is presented
must reinforce the essential priorities of the piloting task; in particular, state and situation
awareness must be supported and reinforced at all times. A quantity of data which could
overwhelm the pilot if presented poorly can be easily assimilated if displayed in a
representation that requires less cognitive effort to understand. The navigation display is a
good example of this.
In highly automated aircraft, one essential information element is information concerning
the activity and capability of the automation. Just as the pilot must be alert for performance
decrements or incapacity in other human crew members, he or she must be alert for such
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decrements in automated systems that are assisting in the conduct of the operation. This leads
to the requirement that:
4. The human operator must be informed about automated systems behavior.
The essence of command of automated systems is the selection and use of appropriate
means to accomplish an objective. Pilots must be able, from information about the aircraft
subsystems, to determine that total system capability is, and will continue to be, appropriate to
the flight situation and their selected strategies for its conduct.
In most aircraft systems to date, the human operator is informed only if there is a
discrepancy between or among the units responsible for a particular function, or a failure of
those units sufficient to disrupt or disable the performance of the function. In those cases, the
operator is usually instructed to take over control of that function. To be able to do so without
delay, it is necessary that the human operator have access to historical information concerning
the operations to date if these are not evident from the behavior of the airplane or system
controlled.
It is therefore necessary that the pilot be aware both of the function (or malfunction) of
the automated system, and of the results of its processes, if the pilot is to understand why
complex automated systems are doing what they are doing. Wiener and Curry.. (1980) argued
for displays of trend information to provide pilots with advance informauon concerning
potential failures. They noted that the provision of such information would also increase
pilots' trust of their automation. Fuel usage greater than nominal (as determined by the FMS
knowledge of flight plan) might be a candidate; engine parameters that might later require
shutdown may be another.
5. Automated systems must be predictable.
To know what automation to use (or not to use), the pilot as manager must be able to
predict how the airplane wiU be affected by that automation, not only at the time of selection
but throughout the flight. It is important that not only the nominal behavior, but also the full
range of allowable behaviors, be understood; all unpredicted system behavior must be treated
as possibly anomalous behavior. This was less difficult when automation only performed
continuous flight control tasks; it becomes far more difficult when automation performs many
discrete tasks. Its inability to perform those tasks may become evident only after it has failed
to do so, and pilots are less likely to detect a failure to perform than aberrant performance.
If pilots are to monitor automation against the likelihood of failures, they must be able to
recognize such failures, either by means of specific warnings or by observation of aberrant
behavior by the automated systems. Both are probably desirable for critical systems, to
improve detection probability. To recognize aberrant behavior, the pilot must know exactly
what to expect of the automation when it is performing correctly. This requires that the
normal behavior of automated systems be predictable and that the pilot be able to observe the
results of their operation. It also argues strongly for simplicity in the design and behavior of
such systems.
6. Automated systems must also monitor the human operators.
Because human operators are prone to make errors, it is necessary that error detection,
diagnosis, management (Wiener, 1993) and correction be integral parts of automated systems.
Much effort has gone into making critical elements of the aviation system redundant. Pilots
monitor the behavior of air traffic controllers, who in turn monitor the performance of pilots,
as an important instance.
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•Automated devices already perform a variety of monitoring tasks in aircraft, as indicated
throughout this document. It is indisputable, however, that failures of an automated warning
system have enabled serious mishaps when the automation did not warn that it was disabled
and pilots, perhaps made complacent by its effective functioning, over a long period, failed to
notice the conditions it was designed to detect. Designing warning systems to detect failures
of warning systems can be an endless task, but it is necessary to recognize the human
tendency torelyupon reliableassistantsand toconsider whether additionalredundancy may
be required in safety-critical alerting systems in today's operating environment.
Data now resident in flight management and other aircraft computers can be used to
monitor pilots more comprehensively and effectively, ff specific attention is gi.'ven to the
monitoring function. I have mentioned the substantial number of non-obvious navigation data
entry errors, some of which have had serious effects long after they were committed.
Research should be conducted using the growing body of accident and incident data to
determine otherareasinwhich errorsaxe common or have particularlyhazardous implications,
and ways should be devised to detectsuch errorsand alertpilotsto theirp.resence. Both
Langley and Ames Research Centers have experimented with procedures momtors; some new
electronichecklistsalertpilotstoitems not performed.
The most difficult task, of course, is to monitor pilot decision making. When a pilot
consciously decides to do nothing, his or her decision cannot he differentiated by any
algorithm from a failure to do something. Further, advanced automation has made the need
for decisions and actions infrequent during cruising flight (too infrequent, perhaps: see
guideline 2). The advent of extremely long haul aircraft has emphasized the problem of
monitoring human alermess and functionality.
There isno way to make the system totallyerrorproof,and each additionalpiece of
hardware or software has a potentialdecremental effecton system reliability,but as Wiener
(1993) put it,multiple "linesof defense" againsterrorsisessentialffwe axe to make the
system as foolproofas possible.
Each agent in an intelligent human-machine system must have knowledge of
the intent of the other agents.
Cross-monitoring (of machine by human, of human by machine and of human by
human) can only be effectiveffthe agentmonitoring understandswhat the monitored agent is
tryingto accomplish, and in some cases,why. The intentionsof both the automated systems
and the human operators must be known and communicated; thisapplies equally to the
monitoring of automated systems by pilots,of aircraftby human controllerson the ground,
and of airtrafficontrolby human pilotsin flighL
Under normal circumstances, pilots communicate their intent to ATC by filing a flight
plan, and to their FMS by inserting it into the computer or calling it up from the navigation
data base. ATC, in turn, communicates its intent to pilots by granting a clearance to proceed;
data link in the near future will make this information directly available to the FMS as well.
It is when circumstances become abnormal that communication of intent among the
various human and machine agents may break down, as occurred in the Avianca accident at
New York. The communication of intent makes it possible for all involved parties to work
cooperatively to solve problems. Cooperation among intelligent agents is the cornerstone of
human-centered automation. Many controller problems occur simply because pilots do not
understand what the controller is trying to accomplish, and the converse is also true. Finally,
neither automation nor ATC can monitor pilot performance effectively unless it understands
the pilot's intent, and this is most important when the operation departs from normality (e.g.,
during an unannounced airplane response to a TCAS resolution advisory).
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In at least two recent accidents at Strasbourg (1992) and Nagoya (1994), the automation
did not warn in unmistakable terms that it was behaving in a manner contrary to pilot
intentions. It could not do so, because the pilots had inadvertently signalled contrary
intentions to the automation. We must ease the task of communicating intent to the machine
component of the system, but we must also find better ways to protect the human-machine
system against m/s-communication of intent, which appears to have occurred in both mishaps.
To the "first principles" set forth above, I will add two others of a general nature which have
emerged from this review of aviation automation.
8. Functions should be automated only if there is a good reason for doing so.
In the past, to quote a Douglas (1990) briefing, the dominant design philosophy has
been, "If it is technically and economically feasible to automate a function, automate it." The
effects of this philosophy were warned against by the ATA Human Factors Task Force report
(1989) and are manifest throughout this document. There are, however, tasks that pilots
cannot accomplish by themselves (usually because of their complexity or because there is not
time to do them), and other tasks that we know they do poorly, such as monotonous repetitive
work or monitoring for rare events. Better criteria are needed to motivate the automation of
functions on a human-centered flight deck. Among criteria that might be applied are the
following:
If the time within which action is required following a signal or stimulus is less than
will normally be required for detection, diagnosis and decision to act (less than perhaps
3-5 see), the task should be considered for automation.
• If a task is very complex, requiring many rote steps, or if the task is very difficult to
perform correctly, the task should be redesigned or considered for automation.
If a complex task, improperly performed, will lead to a high probability of an adverse
outcome, or if an adverse outcome will threaten the safety of the mission, that task
should be redesigned or considered for automation.
• If a task is boring, repetitive or distracting, especially if it must be performed
frequently, that task should be considgred for automation.
To quote from Wiener and Curry (1980), "Any task can be automated. The question is
whether it should be..." Why is this function being automated? Will automating the new
function improve system capabilities or flight crew awareness? Would not doing so improve
the pilot's involvement, information, or ability to remain in command? Each of these
questions should be asked and answered prior to the implementation of any new element of
automation in the cockpit.
9. Automation should be designed to be simple to train, to learn, and to operate.
I believe that aircraft automation to date has not always been designed to be operated
under difficult conditions in an unfavorable environment by tired and distracted pilots of
below-average ability. Yet these are precisely the conditions where its assistance may be most
needed. Simplicity, transparency and intuitiveness should be among the cornerstones of
automation d_sign.
Training must be considered during the design of all cockpit systems and should reflect
that design in practice. Particular care should be given to documenting automated systems in
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such a way that pilots will be able to understand clearly how they operate and how they can
best be exploited, as well as how to operate them.
These "first principles" are not absolutes; they are but one approach, intended to promote a
more cooperative relationship between pilots and automation that allows the humans in command
of the system to utilize automated assistance to its fullest potential. It is vital that humans
understand and be able to communicate with these tools; it is equally vital that the tools understand
what the humans want and communicate with them as they are performing their tasks.
Specific requirements and guidelines
Some more specific guidelines for human-centered automation follow from the principles
above. These are the most important:
10. Automated systems must be comprehensible to pilots.
As automation becomes more complex and coupled, with more potential interactions
among modes, pilots must be helped to understand the implications of those interactions, and
especially to understand interactions which can be potentially hazardous at a critical point in
flight. Automated systems need to be as error resistant as possible in this respect, for the
likelihood that pilots will remember all such potential interactions is low if they are not
encountered fzequently. The memory burden hnposed by complex automation is considerable;
infrequently-used knowledge may not be immediately available when it is needed.
"Prompting" or brief explanations should be considered with regard to such knowledge items.
The ultimate solution to this problem lies in keeping the operation of the airplane, and of
its automation, simple and predictable. If it is simple enough, it may not need to be automated
at all. If it is predictable and reasonably intuitive, it may not need to be particularly simple, for
the pilotwillunderstand and remember it.Complexity isthe enemy of comprehensibility.
11. Automation must insure that the pilot is not removed from the command role.
Increasingautomation of aircraftand of the ATC system, and increasingintegrationand
coupling of the ground and airborneelements of thatsystem have thepotentialto bypass the
humans who operate and manage the system. One way to guard againstthisis to design
futureflightmanagement systems so thatthepilotisshown the consequences of any clearance
before accepting it;another istoinsurethatthe pilotmust activelyconsent to any requested
modification of a flightplan before itisexecuted. A third,more difficultway isto make it
possible for pilotsto negotiateeasilywith ATC on specificelements of a clearance,such as
altitudechanges, ratherthanhaving to acceptor rejectan entireclearanceor modification. All
three,and possiblyother ways as well,may be required to keep pilotsfirmlyincommand of
theiroperationsin a future,more automated system.
These stepswillrequiremore than simply software changes. They willrequiredetailed
negotiationsbetween the operatingcommunity and air trafficmanagement system designers.
In view of the rapiditywith which the enabling technology isbeing pursued, the long-term
goals and objectives of system designers and planners with respect to future human and
machine roles in the system need to be known with precision. I do not believe that they have
been set forth with sufficient clarity thus far, and I believe also that the potential consequences
of fundamental changes in the locus of command of the system are so major as to require
informed consensus before proceeding farther with system redesign.
12. A primary objective of automation is to maintain and enhance situation
awareness. All automation elements and displays must contribute to this
objective.
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The minimum elements of information rrxluir_ by pilots at all times are a knowledge of
the airplane's position, velocity, attitude, error rate, status, threats, the status of the aircraft
control automation and other aids, what must be done next, and when it must occur (figure
10-1). These are the elements of situation awareness. Many other information elements will
be required in some form at specific times, however. The question is not whether these are
needed, but in what form they will best reinforce the pilot's awareness of his or her situation
and state.
Fig. lO-l: Required elements of information for pilots
13. Management automation should make airplanes easier to manage.
A major problem with flight management systems is that they are often cumbersome to
operate. Under some circumstances, it is easier to operate without them than to use them,
with the predictable result that they are apt to be bypassed under these circumstances. This is
a pity, for the error resistance that they bring to flight path management is also bypassed.
One partial solution to this problem is to improve the interfaces between system and pilot
so that they can be manipulated more easily. This will not be a trivial task, for it may require
establishing a different level of interface between the pilot and the system, one which involves
a high-level interaction rather than the present point-by-point description of desired ends. On
the other hand, data link may enable a higher-level interaction and may even require it for
effective interaction with ATC, most of which may be through the FMS.
Within the constraints of present-generation systems, continued efforts to improve the
ease of system programming and operation in high workload segments of flight would be
most helpful to pilots, and would improve system safety. Much progress has been made in
easing the task of modifying approach tasks to accommodate revised ATC instructions. The
problem of manually tuning navigation and communications radio aids rapidly has been
mentioned by pilots; providing alternate interfaces (similar to those available in older aircraft)
through which these and other cumbersome tasks could be accomplished more readily is
worthy of consideration.
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The proliferation of modes in newer flight management systems has imposed an
increasing cognitive burden on pilots. Both the modes themselves, and their inadequate
feedback, have induced erroneous actions in flight crews not entirely familiar with them.
Operators should determine whether all modes are required and should consider simplifying
training and operational workload by eliminating those not entirely necessary, or by making
their use optionaL
14. Designers must assume that human operators will rely on reliable automation,
because they will.
Once pilots have flown an automated airplane long enough to become comfortable with it,
they will come to "know" which control, information and management elements can be
trusted. Thereafter, many (though not all) pilots will become increasingly reliant upon the
continued functionality of those elements and therefore less liable to be suspicious of them ff
they become um'eliable.
If information is derived or processed, the designer must insme that the data from which
it is derived are also either visible or accessible for vexification. If it is not critical information
for a particular flight phase, make it available ordy on request, but insure that it remains
accessible, as has been done with raw navigation data (figure 4-5).
Future automated decision support systems may pose a serious problem in this regard if
pilots come over time to rely on the quality of the machine decisions. A poor machine
decision may be much more difficult to detect than an aberrant subsystem operation. It may
also be much more difficult to determine whether a machine decision is correct, because of the
complexity of the process that motivates it.
It is not enough simply to warn pilots in training that their automation is not infallible.
They will rely on their own experience to assign subjective probabilities of failure. If a
machine has "always worked well" in thek experience, they will assume that it will continue to
work well, and they will usually be correct--but not always, which motivates the need for
error(and failure)tolerantautomation.
Guidelines for aircraft control automation
Several guidelines relate specifically to requirements for control automation. Among them axe
thefollowing:
15. Control automation should be limited in its authority. It must not be
permitted to become "insubordinate".
Control automation should not be able to endanger an aircraft or to make a difficult
situationworse. Itshould not be able to assume a statethatcould cause an overspeed, a stall,
or contactwith the ground without explicitinstructionsfrom the pilot,and possibly not then.
Ifeitherthe pilotor the automation approaches safeoperatinglimits,the automation should
alert the pilot, giving him or her time to recognize the problem and take corrective action.
The pilotshould not be permitted to selecta potentiallyunsafeautomatic operatingmode
without being challenged;automation should eitherforeclosethe use of such modes or should
alertthe pilotthatthey may be hazardous. Many usefulmodes are "open-ended"; in these
cases,continued pilotinvolvement isespeciallyimportant. Alternatively,the designer should
considerwhether thereisreallya need forsuch a mode, or whether another way to accomplish
the same functionwould be a safer,more errorresistantapproach.
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The edgesof theoperatingenvelopearca particular problem. Some accidents involving
automation have occurred at, or outside, the normal range of operating conditions. Since
designers can never guarantee that aircraft will never reach these conditions, automation must
be designed so that it is tolerant of such conditions, or in any event, does not worsen them.
The phenomenon of "brirdeness" is difficult to predict, but very serious when it occurs,
usually during an emergency when there may not be lime to compensate for it.
16. Control automation must never be permitted to perform, or fail, silently.
This is a corollary of principle 3. "Fail-passive" control automation represents a potential
hazard in that its failure may not and usually does not change aircraft performance at the time ff
the airplane is in a stable condition. Such failures must be announced unambiguously to
insure that the pilots immediately resume active control of the machine. Automation must
never encourage a situation in which "no one is in charge", for pilots must always "aviate"
even if they have delegated control to the autopilot. The Everglades accident was a good
example of what can happen ff this tenet is violated (Miami, 1972).
A particularcaseof thisisuncoupled sidcstickcontrollers,both of which can be operated
simultaneously (the inputs are summed) without tactileor other feedback to eitherpilot.
Consideration should be given to indicatingto both pilotsany situationin which commands
arc being inputfrom both controUcrs.
17. Designers should not foreclose pilot authority to override normal aircraft
operating limits when required for safe mission completion without
compelling reasons for doing so.
In a recent review of aircraftautomation, Hughes and Dornheim (AWST, 1995a,b)
reported that "Airbus Industric officials believe that ff the technology exists to automate a
function that would prevent a pilot fi'om inadvermntly exceeding safety limits, this should be
done." This statement does not consider that pilots may fred it necessary to deliberately
exceed safe operating limits, but the same automated protection would apply in such a case.
Limitations on pilot authority may leave the pilot unable to fulfill his or her responsibility
for safety of flight. An ASRS incident report, one of many, underscores the need to preserve
pilot capability to do what is necessary; an abrupt 50 ° banked turn was required for collision
avoidance in a wide-body airplane (NASA ASRS, 1986). There have been several cases in
which pilots have violated aircraft structural limits in an acute emergency; in nearly all of
these, the aircraft have been recovered, though with damage (Atlantic Ocean, 1959;
Luxcmbourg, 1979; Pacific Ocean, 1985). These maneuvers would not have been possible
had hard envelope limits been incorporatcck
I believe that the "soft envelope limits" approach represents one way to avoid limiting
pilot authority while enhancing flight safety. Other automated modules that "lock out" flight-
critical functions should also be capable of being overridden in an emergency. The
implementation of "hard" limiting functions should be undertaken only after extensive
consultation with both test and line pilots.
18. Control automation should provide the human operator with an appropriate
range of control and management options.
The control and management of an airplane must be safely accomplished by pilots whose
abilities and experience vary, under circumstances that vary widely. To provide effective
assistance to whomever is flying, under whatever conditions, a degree of flexibility is required
in aircraft automation. The aircraft control-management continuum has been discussed;
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19.
20.
21.
problemsat the extremesof this continuumhavebeenindicated (very high workload at the
low endof thespectrum,dex-'reasedinvolvement at the high end of the spectrum).
The range of control and management options appropriate to a given airplane must be
wide enough to encompass the full range of pilots who may operate it, under the full range of
operating conditions for which it is certificated. It should not be wider than is needed to
provide an appropriate range of workloads, however, to avoid unnecessary complexity. I
have attempted in chapter 8 to suggest how wide a range of options may be sufficient.
Designers should keep the flight crew involved in the operation by requiring
of them meaningful and relevant tasks, regardless of the level of management
being utilized by them.
As indicated in principle 2, high levels of strategic management have the potential to
decrease pilot involvement beyond desirable limits. Automation should be designed to
minimize this detachment, so that pilots are ready to reenter the loop in the event of its failure.
Keeping pilots meaningfully involved may require less automation rather than more, but it is
critical to their ability to remain in command of an _on.
I have suggested that requiring management by consent rather than management by
exception may be one way to maintain involvement, though it has also been pointed out that
we do not yet know how to keep consent fi'om becoming perfunctory, and this must also be
avoided. One way to assist may be to give more attention to workload management, as is
suggested in guideline 20.
Control automation should be designed to be of most help during times of
highest workload, and somewhat less help during times of lowest workload.
Some field studies of aircraft automation have suggested that it may appreciably lighten
workload at times when it is already low, yet impose additional workload during times when it
is already high, during climbs and particularly descents. While much of the additional burden
relates to problems in interacting with the flight management system itself, the end product of
that interaction is the control and guidance of the airplane as it moves toward its destination.
Avionics manufacturers have made appreciable stridesin easing this workload by
providing listsof departure,arrivaland runway options atparticulardestinations.Air traffic
controlauthoritiespressed toincreasecapacityatbusy terminals,however, may develop and
utilize procedures that differ from those anticipated by the designers. In particular, "sidestep"
maneuvers to alternate parallel or converging runways axe a problem in this regard, especially
if clearances are altered late in a descent. Easing such problems may require a better
understanding by ATC of what is, and is not, reasonable to ask of the pilots of a highly
automated airplane. Given the congestion at our busiest terminals, however, ATC is likely to
continue to seek more, rather than less, flexibility from pilots and any short-term
improvements will have to be in the cockpit (see also management automation guidelines
below).
Control automation should be designed both for maximum error resistance
and maximum error tolerance.
Both automated controlsystems and theirassociateddisplaysshould be designed to be as
errorresistantas isfeasibleby incorporatingthe simplestpossiblearchitecture,clear,intuitive
displaysand unambiguous responses tocommands. Designers should alsoincorporateclear,
unambiguous statements for the design use of each control mode in their software
documentation.
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The designs should incorporatethe highestreasonable degree of errortoleranceas well.
Consideration should be given to embedding monitoring and error-trappingsoftware in the
systems. Accident and incidentdatashould be reviewed on an ongoing basistoidentifylikely
human and machine deficienciesand thesedeficienciesshouldreceivespecialattentionin this
process.
Human errors,some enabled by cqnipment design,bring more aircrafto gricfthan any
other factor. Error resistantsystems can protect against many of these errors,but itis
necessaryto give pilotsauthoritytoactcontrarytonormal operatingpracticeswhen necessary
and thisrequiresthatdesigns alsoincorporateerrortolerance. Automation should be used
wherever possible to monitor pilotactionsand warn of mistakes,slipsand lapses(Norman,
1981).
Guidelines for aircraft information automation
Itwillhave been noted thatsome of theguidelinesabove relatetoinformationprovided to the
pilots as well as to the control of the airplane and its subsystems. It is not always possible to draw
a clear distinction between control and information automation, for all automation involves the
requirement to keep pilots informed. The following are suggested guidelines specifically for
information automation.
22. Emphasize information in accordance with its importance.
The most important information should be most obvious and most centraUy-located.
Information relevant to aircraft control deviations, power loss or impending collisions with
obstaclesisalways more importantthaninformationconcerning otherfacetsof the operation.
Changes in stateor statusarc more important than information concerning staticstates.
Symbolic information should be redundantly coded (shape, size,color,use of two or rnorc
sensory modalities)to insurethatitis detected. Auditory (sounds) or tactileinformation
displayscan be used to reinforce,or in some cases to substitutefor,visualinformation;this
can bc particularlyusefulduringperiodsof high visualworkload.
A strenuousand largelysuccessfulattempthas been made todecreasethe largenumber of
discreteauditory warnings thatwere present in older cockpits. The use of discretevoice
warnings isincreasing,however;,GPWS, TCAS and windshcar alertsallincorporatevoice
signals,and an increasingnumber of aircraftalsoincorporatesyntheticvoice altitudecallouts
on finalapproach. This may be lessof a potentialproblem when data linkreplaces some of
thevoice communications now required,but thereremains thepotentialforinterferenceamong
voice messages, as well as the potentialfor overuse of voice signalsleading to diminished
attentivenesstovoice emergency messages.
23. Alerting and warning systems should be as simple and foolproof as possible.
Warning systems for discrete failures do not present a particular problem as long as they
are annunciated in such a way that the pilot can determine the root cause. This has not always
been the case. Whether rcconfiguration of aircraft systems following such a failm'c should be
autonomous remains an open question awaiting more experience with the MD-11 systems.
The problem of quantitative warning system sensitivity and specificity has been discussed:
false or nuisance warnings must be kept to minimum levels to avoid the unwanted behavioral
effects of excessive alarms.
At the risk of providing pilots with more information than they need to know, I believe
(as did Wiener and Curry) that it is often appropriate to provide pilots with trend information
before a parameter reaches a level requiring immediate action, to improve their awareness of a
potentially serious situation. As they pointed out, this serves the added purpose of increasing
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pilots' trust of the automated monitoring systems. When alerts are provided and response
time is not critical, many pilots will attempt to evaluate the validity of the information. Means
should be provided for them to do so quickly and accurately.
Warnings and alerts must be unambiguous. When common signals are used to denote
more than one condition (e.g., the master caution and master warning signals), there must be a
clear indication of the specific condition which is responsible for the alert. This is not a
problem in most newer aircraft, though large numbe_ of discrete messages may occur during
emergencies (see incident report at beginning of chapter 13).
24. Integration of information does not mean simply adding more elements to a
single display.
Integration in psychology means "the organization of various traits into one harmonious
personality". An integrated display combines disparate information elements into a single
representation that renders unnecessary many cognitive steps the pilot would otherwise have
to perform to develop a concept. It thus relieves the pilot of mental workload. Glass cockpit
navigation displays are very effectively integrated. Electronic primary flight displays are not
integrated; rather, they combine a great deal of information, previously shown on many
instruments, on a single screen. The elements, however, are stiU discrete and the mental
worldoad of inferring aircraft state is still required. The same is true of most power displays
in today's cockpits.
Clutter in displays is undesirable, for pilots may fail to notice the most important
information or may focus on less important data. Pilots are able to add or remove display
elements from navigation displays. Fairly radical (pilot-selectable) decluttering of the PFD
would still provide the pilot flying at cruise on autopilot with all information required to
monitor the autopilot and return to the control loop rapidly if reqtfired.
Many subsystem displays can also be made more simple and intuitive. Again, the
controlling variable should be what the pilot needs to know under normal and abnormal
circumstances. As long as all information necessary to take over manual control of these
s.ystems is available when required, it is not necessary that other data be visible in
CkrCnm_tances in which they are not central to the pilot's tasks.
25. Automation poses additional monitoring requirements; pilots must be able to
monitor both the status of the automation and the status of the functions
controlled by that automation.
Should automation status be announced, as well as the status of the functions being
controlled? One can argue that it should be, by some means (perhaps a selectable synoptic
display). No information can mean either that everything is normal or that a sensor or
annunciator has failed. Particularly in the case of subsystems, where nothing important
happens for long periods of time, pilots need some type of reassurance that the automation is
still monitoring the systems. The "need to know" concept assumes different dimensions in
aircraft that are usually managed rather than directly controlled.
Automation can fail covertly as well as overtly, and in either case, the pilot must become,
or be ready to become, a controller rather than a manager. To do so, he or she must know by
some means that the automation has failed, and the condition of the controlled elements or
functions.
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26. Design system automation to insure that critical functions are monitored as
well as executed.
The safety benefits of independent monitoring are indisputable. ATC radar permits
controllers to monitor flight path control; TCAS permits pilots to monitor controller actions.
Some aircraft functions are not independently monitored at this time; airplane acceleration with
respect to runway remaining during takeoff is one, ILS guidance during instrument
approaches is another. A third is aircraft position on the airport surface, at many facilities.
Monitoring of input to aircraft systems, especially the FMS, remains a problem despite the
partial monitoring capability provided by map displays.
In the first two cases mentioned, new technology will be required. In the latter case,
FMS software should be provided to monitor, as well as assist in, pilot interactions with the
system. Where critical errors could compromise safety, independent monitoring of inputs by
downlinking of FMS data for comparison by ATC computers with uplinked clearance data
should be enabled. It is not clear at this point in time that airplane-to-ATC digital data link will
be used to confirm that clearance data has been received and entered into the FMC correctly.
This link could also confn'm that manually-entered flight path data such as revised altitude
clearances conforms to ATC intentions. Such a monitoring link could add an important
element of redundancy and error-tolerance to operations within the system.
Guidelines for aircraft management automation
Management automation has been a remarkably successful tool in the cockpit; the develop.ment
of air traffic automation will further improve its utility and effectiveness. It has made the avlation
system more error resistant, though it has also enabled new errors in the cockpit, as does any new
equipment that must be operated by humans. It is recognized that there are substantial economic
disincentives to making qualitative changes in flight management systems, given the investments in
hardware, software and training that have already been made. Nonetheless, it is necessary that
research and development efforts, at least, continue with the aim of making future flight
management system interface designs more human-centered and more error tolerant.
The following guidelines axe suggested for future flight management systems and other
management automation.
27. Flight management system interfaces must be as error tolerant as possible.
In view of the known problems in data entry, FMS software should accomplish as much
error trapping as is possible. A few ways of doing this have been suggested above. When
data link is available, the data entry process may be simplified, but that does not necessarily
imply that data entry errors will be eliminated. Many intermediate altitude restrictions will still
have to be entered manually (usually into the MCP). This task is known to be error-prone; the
downlinking of such data when they are executed would trap many such errors, if ATC
software were provided to verify the correctness of the entries.
As noted earlier, CDUs refuse to accept incorrectly-formatted entries, but they do not
provide feedback as to why an entry was rejected. If the computer knows, why doesn't it tell
the pilot? Some data entry errors are obvious, but others may be less obvious and pilots may
be tired or distracted by other problems. In general, the less often a pilot is required to
perform a particular programming task, the more likely it is that the details of accomplishing
that task will be forgotten. Infrequently'performed tasks, therefore, should be the ones on
which pilots receive the most help. Prompting could be very useful under these
circumstances.
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28. Insure that flight operations remain within the capacities of the human
operator.
There are very few flight maneuvers that require such precision that they have been
entrusted only to automation. Pilots generally have not been asked to engage in operations
unless they can demonstrate their ability to perform them without machine aid. The limited
capacity of the airspace system, however, has motivated intensive efforts to increase system
throughput by making better use of presently-available runways and terminal airspace. As
noted earlier, this includes studies of "free flight", closely-spaced parallel approaches, the use
of more complex approach paths, closer spacing in the terminal area, and other initiatives. At
least some of these maneuvers will require extreme precision in flight path control. It is likely
that automation will be called upon to perform them, and possible that it will be required.
This will be a safe approach if, and only if, pilots are provided with the monitoring
capability required to maintain full situation awareness throughout the performance of the
maneuvers, and with ways of escaping from the maneuvers safely and expeditiously in the
event of a contingency either within the airplane or the system. New monitoring automation
and displays may well be necessary in the cockpit if pilots are to remain in command during
such maneuvers, just as higher scan-rate radar and enhanced displays will be necessary for the
controllers who wiI1 monitor such operations.
Guidelines for error management
In his recent document, "Intervention Strategies for the Management of Human Error",
Wiener (1993) has provided an excellent review of the literature and a number of guidelines for the
management of human error, to which modem transport aircraft are still highly vulnerable. He
provides an approach to error management involving intervention su'axegies at all levels. His report
should be read by all designers and operators of these aircraft. Many of the guidelines above
involve error management at one or another level. I will add only one further guideline for
consideration, motivated by my increasing concern about the disparities among new equipment
from various manufacturers.
29. Standardize critical interfaces across fleets and manufacturers wherever
possible to prevent flight crew errors in operation.
During and after world war II, Ruffell Smith in the Royal Air Force and teams of human
factors investigators at the USAF Aeromedical Laboratory attempted to improve the
standardization of controls and displays in military aircraft. Their attempts were not entirely
successful, but over time, a considerable degree of commonality in conventional controls and
displays has become the consensus among designers, certification authorities, operators and
pilots. This commonality, unfortunately, has not yet been extended to flight deck automation.
The differences among these systems should be evaluated in the light of the tasks that
must be performed by pilots using them. Manufacturers have adopted quite different
philosophies for the operation of their airplanes, and it is this fact, more than superficial
differences among the systems, that may cause difficulties for pilots moving from one to
another. Air carriers operating mixed fleets need to insure that a single operating philosophy
and consistent operating policies can be applied in all of their aircraft. In the long. ran, it is
they, the customers, who can do the most to increase standardization in automauon, as in
other aspects of their aircraft. To a considerable extent, manufacturers produce what they axe
told to produce by customers.
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Nomencimmm:
MD-11 FT_ht control :ariel FCP
747400 Mode control I_snel MCP
77T Mode comml psnd MCP
A320 Right con_o! unit FCU
I=-100 Flight mode panel F'MP
AmmgemMt and sparing cd data dbplays on pa_l:
747.400
F-1 O0
(Break)
(Brm_
input _tio.: on panel:
Knob action: PUSH TURN PULL
MI)-I 1 Hold P_ Select
• 747-4(_ Vahous Se4ecl None
777 None(?) _ None
A320 ---->FMGS P_ Select
F.1 O0 Hold Preseiec= Select
Fig. 10-2 shows elements of a
number of mode control panels. It
indicates some of the differences
among these interfaces with respect to
nomenclature, positions of data
elements and input actions. With
mixed fleetsbeing the rule in larger
carriers,these design disparitieshave
caused and will continue to cause
errorsin operationby pilotswho have
transitionedfrom one to another of
theseaircraft.
In addition, some FMS modes
operate differently in different aircraft
types, another source of potential
difficulties in the operational use of
the equipment. Industry efforts
should be instituted to move toward
greater standardization of automation
elements, to prevent reversion errors
which are most likely to occur under
stressful emergency conditions.
Fig. 10-2: Mode control panels in current aircraft
Comment
These guidelineshave implicationsforcontrollers,airspaceplanners and othersin the system
as well asforpilotsand flightdeck designers.They should be read as requirements guidelinesfor
the airborne component of the aviationsystem, not only as guidelinessimply for cockpitdesign,
because changes anywhere in a coupled system can produce changes elsewhere aswell.
Workload removed from one element of the system will often be reflected in additional
workload elsewhere. This was the case when profile descents were implemented, and it has
occurred again with the implementation of pre-departure clearances delivered through airline
system operations centers rather than directly from air traffic control facilities. It may occur yet
again if pilots are given more responsibility for traffic separation during the enroute phase of flight,
a concept that has been seriously considered by FAA in its airspace redesign efforts. During the
past year, as an example, tests have been conducted to evaluate the use of TCAS as a separation aid
for aircraft climbing through an altitude occupied by another aircraft on oceanic routes not under
radar surveillance. The "free flight" concept is under active consideration.
The standardizationissueraisedinthe lastguidelinewillbecome a matter of urgency asmore
aircarriersmove toward mixed fleets. Chapter 14 discusses the increasing tendency among
carriersto standardizetheirfleets;as noted there,some carriershave refused to selectEDUs rather
than clectromcchanical instruments in new aircraft,to maintain commonality across a range of
aircraftof a common type. Whether thisisjustified,as opposed tothe alternativeof maintaining
commonality in EDU displayswithinthecockpit,has not been evaluated.
During the period before the emergence of advanced automation, most large airlines enforced
rigid standards across their fleets in cockpit design, placement of switches and other controls, and
procedures. This was not a problem until aircraft from some of these carriers were sold to others,
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andpilots from failed carriers began to work for otber airlines having disparate standards. Some
smaller fleets today, however, have marked differences within the cockpits of even a single type
and variant. This lack of standardization extends to automation and will cause serious errors. The
solution adopted thus far is to provide "differences training" to insure that pilots are aware of the
differences they will encounter, but this cannot be a fully effective way of dealing with the
problem.
A recurrent theme running through these suggested guidelines (and through thisentire
document) is that "simpler is often better". The overriding human factors problems in today's
aircraft are the complexity of the tools provided to help pilots do their job, and deficient
understanding of how the tools work. More efforts devoted to simplifying the design and
operation of these essential tools will decrease required training and cross-training,, improve the
error resistance and error tolerance of the systems, ameliorate the increasing cognmve burdens
placed on pilots of these aircraft, and ultimately increase system safety.
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11. Guidelines for air traffic control and management automation
Introduction
It is necessary to remember the important distinctions between pilot and air traffic controller
tasks in the aviation system. The pilot receives essentially instantaneous feedback from an airplane
and its displays once he makes a control input. The "controller", on the other hand, directs traffic
by giving voice instructions to an intermediary (the pilot); he or she must then wait an
indeterminate period of time to observe whether the airplane appears to be executing the requested
action. The difference in required lead time may be considerable and it can have major
consequences for controller planning, as can the fact that controllers must often manipulate several
aircraft rather than only one. In these respects, the controller's tasks are conceptually more
difficult than those of the pilot.
Also more difficult for the controller is the fact that he or she must ordinarily work entirely
through representations of the monitored system rather than being able to observe its behavior
directly. (Tower controllers in VMC are an exception.) Unlike controllers, pilots receive not only
visual, but also tactile, proprioceptive and sometimes auditory feedback from their airplane and
environment. Woods and Holloway (in Woods, 1994a) illustrate the problem in this manner
(figure 11-1). The controller is handicapped by having to view the monitored system entirely
through a representation rather than being able to view its behavior directly.
i i
Fig. 11-1: The keyhole property (redrawn from Woods,
1994)
"The viewport size is very small
relative to the large size of the artificial
data space...that could potentially be
examined. This property is often
referred to as the keyhole effect
(Woods, 1984). Given this property,
shifting one's 'gaze' within the virtual
perceptual field is carried out by
selecting another part of the artificial
data space and moving it into the limited
viewport."
The controller sees only a plan
view of the traffic space; the third
dimension must be provided by
alphanumeric data and by symbols on
another screen. To assess traffic not
yet visible, a second screen which
portrays flight data must be examined.
(The "keyhole" problem afflicts pilots as well; their view of the traffic situation is incomplete,
and TCAS as implemented today is not an efficient means of providing them with information
concerning other traffic not yet in conflict. The "party line" is of help, but much of the information
conveyed to other aircraft may be ambiguous.)
Controllers become adept at constructing a mental model of the traffic under their direction
from this imperfect view, but under the stress of heavy traffic, they are in danger of losing their
internal model, a serious problem because "once the picture has been lost, the controller can
seldom recall it in its entirety again but has to rebuild it painstakingly aircraft by aircraft..."
(Hopkin, 1994, p. 173).
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For all these reasons, the controller requires different tools to perform different tasks from
those of the pilot. It is easy to argue that controllers need more help from automation than do
pilots, but this neglects the obvious fact that they arc now performing very well indeed without
many oftheaidsthatpilotstakeforgranted.Any attempttoproduceguidanceforATC automation
must takeaccountofwhat controllersnow do soeffectivelywithoutsuchaiding,and why theyare
abletoperformsuccessfullyina largely"manua/",or unaided,work environment.
Human-centered automation for air traffic control
I hope it is obvious from chapter 2 that I believe in the importance of human-centered
automation for air traffic controllers as well as for pilots. In fact, I believe this approach to
automation may be more important in the ATC domain because of the factors mentioned above.
The opportunities for proper design are very great, because major elements of the automation
system for ATC are not yet in place. The need is equally great, because ATC will be the
instrumentality through which the required gains in traffic capacity will have to be realized. Pilots
can help, but they can only control one airplane at a time. Controllers will bear the brunt of the
additional traffic. They will need effective and highly efficient tools to help them manage the
additional loads.
The first principles of human-centered automation have been discussed at some length in
chapter 2, and again in chapter 10. I will not repeat them here except to say that I am convinced
that human air traffic controllers must remain in firm command of the future ATC system if it is to
meet the challenges that will be imposed upon it. They must retain authority commensurate with
their great responsibilities. If futme ATC automation is not human-centered, the entire system will
lose this focus and the flexibility that goes with it. That flexibility, both on the ground and in the
air, is what has enabled the current system to cope with traffic demands to date. It will be even
more necessary in the more crowded system of the future.
How can flexibilitybe maintainedin thefaceof a need tomove more aircraft, spacedmore
closely,with lessroom for error? I believethiscan be accomplishedby providinghuman
controllerswith decisionand monitoringaidsthatwillenhance theirconsiderablecognitive
capabilitieswhilemaintainingsurveillanceoftraffictoinsurethatitismoving inaccordancewith
theirequirements.Controllersdo not,ingeneral,need tobe toldhow tomove airplanes;thatis
what theydo best. What they do need, ata minimum, isconfirmationthattheirplans arc
appropriateand assistanceinkeepingtrackof whether airplanesaremoving in accordancewith
thoseplans.These aretypesof assistancethatcomputers arequitecapableof providingeven
withoutmajoradvancesincomputationalcapability.
The NASA/FAA CTAS program (Tobias & Scoggins, 1986; Erzberger & Nedell, 1988;
1989) has demonstrated that properly designed decision aids, which take account of aircraft
dynamic capabilities, can help arrival controllers to decrease traffic dispersions considerably,
thereby increasing terminal area throughput. It has also demonstrated that properly designed
management and spacing aids can assist materially in the controller's planning processes, while
leaving the human able to exercise his or her expertise and judgment as the traffic situation unfolds.
As notedpreviously,many systemdesignersbelievethatonlya trulyradicalreshapingof the
trafficmanagement architectureand infrastructurewillbe abletoaccommodate trafficexpansion
beyond perhaps2010 (Whicher,quoted by Cooper, 1994a).I am not convincedthatthefuture
ATC systemmust be radicallyrestrucRnedtomeet thedemands thatwillbe placedupon it.On the
contrary,Ibelievethatthenew systemshouldperhapsrelymore upon controllerexpertisethanis
envisionedinpresentproposalsforitsarchitecture.Iam more optimisticthata human-centered
ATC system, complemented by the proper intelligent tools, can get the job done well beyond that
time. What are the proper tools, and what must they be able to do to help the human operator do
his or her job? That is the question that must be examined.
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Guidelines for human-centered air traffic control automation
Assumptions
The following guidelines are designed to help in the definition of requirements for future air
traffic control system automation. They assume that adequate computing capacity will be available
to accomplish whatever functions and provide whatever tools will best serve the controller in the
future system. They also assume that sensor capacity of some sort (whether radar located on the
ground or GNSS and ADS in aircraft, or both) will be able to provide precise, nearly real-time,
dam concerning aircraft positions, states and environmental conditions. Finally, they assume that
both broadcast voice and selective data communications will be enabled in the new system, and that
most routine ATC message traffic will be by means of digital data link, whether through mode S
transponders, ACARS or some new communications functionality.
As in the previous chapter, I have not attempmd to set forth detailed human factors engineering
guidelines for air traffic control automation. To do so when the shape and content of the future
system is not yet defined would be pointless. These guidelines, like those proposed previously,
provide general guidance which hopefully can contribute to requirements definition for the future
system.
First principles of human-centered air traffic control automation
To recapitulate briefly the first principles, as applied to air traffic control (see chapters 2 and
10 for discussion of these general guidelines or principles):
1. The human operator must remain in command of the air traffic control and
management system.
2. The controller must remain actively involved in the direction of air traffic.
3. The controller must be informed of relevant traffic and of the results of
his her actions with respect to its movement.
4. The controller must be able to monitor the automation assisting him her.
5. That automation must behave predictably.
6. ATC automation must also monitor the controller's decisions and actions.
7. All system elements must understand the controller's intentions, and the
controller must understand their intentions.
The ability to monitor the automation, and thus the need for automation predictability, is
perhaps even more important in the ATC domain than in flight, because the controller has less
comprehensive feedback than the pilot with respect to the behavior of the controlled system. As
Norman has observed, "The problem is that the operations under normal operating conditions are
performed appropriately, but there is inadequate feedback and interaction with the humans who
must control the overall conduct of the task. When the situations exceed the capabilities of the
automatic equipment, then the inadequate feedback leads to difficulties for the human controllers"
(Norman, 1989, p. 1).
The two additional general guidelines proposed in chapter 10 are also appropriate here:
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8. Functions should be automated only if there is a good reason for doing so.
The questions asked with regard to aircraft automation must also be answered by the
designer of air traffic control automation: Why is this function being considered for
automation? Will automating this function improve the controller's capabilities or awaxcness?
Would not doing so improve the controller's involvement, information, or ability to remain in
command?
9. Automation should be designed to be simple to train, to learn, and to operate.
Trainingmust be consideredateach stepinthe designof any automated system and
should reflect that design in practice. This will be particularly important in ATC automation
becausecontrollers,unlikemany pilots,have nothad experiencewithadvanced automation
and willhave tolearntooperatewithin,and developconfidencein,a new and very different
system. The propensityof designerstorelyupon Imyboardentry(withitsattendantvisual
and psychomotorworkload)may be a particularp oblem intheadvanced automationsystem;
controllersrelyto a greatextenton theirvisionforreal-timeinformationtransfer.Their
presentinformationmanagement systemsdo notrequirea greatdealof visualattention;itis
importantthat heirfuturesystemcontrolsalsobe easytooperate.
Guidelines for human-centered air traffic control automation
Based on the foregoing, I offer the following guidelines for air traffic control automation. As
in the previous chapter, the guidelines are loosely ordered in terms of their importance.
10. Future ATC automation must insure that the controller is not removed from
the command role.
Ihave indicatedmy seriousconcernwithregardtothelevelof authoritywhich willbc
reserved to the controller in the advanced automated system. While it may not always be
appropriate for the controller to have to work one-on-one with aircraft under his or her
control, it is vital that the controller remain in command of all air tra_c and able to modify its
behavior as required to perform the mission.
The temptation to build more autonomous automation is pervasive, particularly when an
express purpose of that automation is to "improve human productivity" (which in the past has
usually meant to accomplish the same or greater throughput with less human involvement).
But the losses in system productivity which will result if controllers are unable to remain "in
the picture" are likely to negate any gains achieved by more autonomous machine systems.
The air traffic management system, like the aircraft it directs, is not at this time planned as a
fully autonomous system. If that is true, then the controller must play a central role, not only
when automation fails but when it is functioning normally.
11. ATC control automation should be explicitly limited in its authority, and its
limits must be explicitly understood by human controllers.
The authority of control automation must be explicitly limited so that there is never a
question about its operating boundaries. Human controllers must understand these limits and
their implications, and that they will be responsible for all decisions and actions that lie outside
machine authority. This is analogous to the role of the military commander, whose
subordinates may proceed independently within specific doctrinal and operalJng guidelines but
who may not transgress those guidelines without authorization. While the authority may vary
as a function of the level of management invoked by the human controller, the rules must be
simple enough to be fully understood.
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I2. Future ATC automation should not make air traffic management more difficult
for controllers.
Examples of "clumsy" automation making the pilot's task more difficult have been cited.
The controller will be subjected to the same problem unless care is taken to make new
representations at least as informative as the present ones, new functions as simple to invoke,
and new capabilities as intuitive as possible so that the controller is not required to perform
additional cognitive tasks to understand them. It is recognized that the enroute controller, at
least, may be utilized somewhat differently in the advanced system. Designers must be certain
that new tools and representations support the different tasks controllers will be expected to
perform, while maintaining and ff possible enhancing their situation awareness (see below).
13. The primary objective of information automation is to maintain and enhance
situation awareness. All display modes must contribute to this objective.
The radar controller's video display'units or radar scope are the sole means by which he
or she can maintain cognizance of the system being controlled or monitored. Much progress
has been made over the years in reducing ambiguity, clarifying presentations, providing aiding
features and improving the quality of the input data which is processed for use on this display.
Ordinarily, these representations of system activity are sufficient to keep con=oilers "in the
picture" by providing them with information they use to update their mental models of the
traffic under their control.
Efforts have been made over the years to improve these representations. In particular,
attempts have been made to provide three-dimensional representations of air traffic, thus far
without notable success. A planform display remains the standard in air traffic management,
as it does in most military command and control systems. The fact remains, however, that a
good deal of cognitive activity is required to construct and maintain a three-dimensional mental
model from the available imagery. Not all controllers accepted for training ever develop the
ability, and this is one reason for high attrition rates in controller training.
The advent of advanced display media incorporating color and improved imagery offers
the opportunity to examine again various aspects of ATC displays, with the aim of decreasing
the mental effort involved in their interpretation. Among the features that have been proposed
is more effective highlighting of significant events and new alerting techniques. Care must be
taken, however, to insure that controllers can transition easily from the old to newer displays.
Equally important, attempts should be made to assist the controller unfortunate enough to lose
his mental model of traffic to regain it more easily and quickly, by systematic analyses of the
cognitive processes now used by expert controllers and the provision of visual aids keyed to
flight progress data.
14. ATC automation interfaces should be as simple and intuitive as possible.
Digital cockpit interfaces (the CDU), with which pilots must interact by entering
alphanumeric strings, are a major source of distraction from outside scanning by the non-
flying pilot. The controller often will not have a data person assisting him or her, and will
have to divide his/her attention between the primary display and the electronic flight data
displays. If data entry in the AAS is made as cumbersome as it sometimes is in aircraft,
another major diswaction from the primary task of maintaining traffic surveillance will have
been introduced.
It has been pointed out that invoking display aiding functions may require significantly
more manual effort in prototype advanced sector suites than in the older display units. This
situation is analogous to the clumsiness of certain FMS functions in the cockpit. It will
assuredly lead to less use of these functions during periods of high workload, when they may
137
be most needed (see also guideline 9, above). Every effort must be made to assist controllers
in calling up the functions most used as quickly and easily as possible, with the least diversion
of visual and cognitive attention from traffic. Controllers in the future will be required to
interact more with their computers rather than less; the lessons learned from clumsy avionics
automation should be applied here.
I5. Future ATC automation must insure
capabilities of the human operator
automation fails.
that traffic control remains within the
who must accomplish the task if the
Today's air traffic control system, particularly in crowded terminal areas, is operating, to
tighter tolerances than have ever before been permitted. The trend toward decreasing
tolerances still further will continue, not only around airports but in continental and oceanic
enroute airspace as well. The FAA has specified exuemely high reliability for critical elements
of the future automated system (some hardware elements can be off-line for only four seconds
per year!), but it can be predicted with utter confidence that functional failures will continue to
occur, whether due to software bugs, communications system failures, environmental
contingencies, human errors or acts of God. In those cases, human controllers will be
required to "make do" safely despite degraded machine capabilities, as they have always had
tO.
The problem with this is that new automation may well enable the system, when it is
functioning normally, to operate at higher capacities and to tighter tolerances than are possible
when the human controller is operating without the automated tools. If higher throughput is
possible with new technology, it will become, over time, the normal and expected throughput.
HoUnagel's concept of risk homeostasis (1993) applies here, as elsewhere. Procedures must
be devised to permit the human-machine system to operate safely under all contingencies
which may arise. Among the conditions that will arise is machine failure, and the reversion
procedures must take account of human capabilities and limitations.
The system software will be subjected to exhaustive testing before it is placed on line.
Care must be taken to explore the margins of its operational envelopes, however, to insure
(insofar as is possible) that it is not brittle--that there are not conditions under which it begins
to behave in ways that makes the controller's task more difficult.
16. ATC automation must be comprehensible to controllers.
This guideline is a general caution which is applicable to control, information and
management automation. The increased amount and sophistication of future ATC automation
will inevitably be accompanied by greater complexity and less transparency as more functions
are automated and coupled. Particular care should be taken to constrain the number of new
modes in which the automation can operate. Saner and Woods (1994) have talked of "mode-
rich" automation in aircraft; Woods (personal communication, 1994) has made plain his belief
that ideal automation should be "modeless". Simpler automation will both speed the transition
to the new system and increase its acceptance. More important, it will decrease the likelihood
of human errors in its use, both initially and throughout its lifetime. Controllers must be
helped to understand not only how to operate the new devices, but how the new devices
operate and their limits, ff they are to remain in command of the system.
17. ATC automation should perform tasks in a manner understood by controllers.
It is accepted that future control automation will have a longer predictive threshold, or
"window", than do human controllers, and that this ability to resolve conflicts over a longer
time and a wider space will be important when more aircraft are on random tracks.
Nonetheless, decisions made or offered by the automation will be more likely to be
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understood and accepted by human controllers ff those decisions incorporate conflict
resolution strategies similar to, or at least understood by, those controllers. The automation
must be able to explain its decisions ff requested, preferably by graphic representations that
can be assimilated quickly and easily (see guideline 18).
18. The controller must be able to visualize the consequences of a decision,
whether made by him her or by the automation.
I have mentioned my concern that an automated air traffic control function which can
resolve potential conflicts over a longer time period may place human controllers in the
position of being unable to visualize the likely consequences of their decisions (when the
conflict resolution occurs in a downstream sector), and unable after the fact to determine
whether their decision was in fact appropriate. This undesirable state of affairs puts the
controller in the unpleasant position of being unable to select knowledgeably among machine-
offered decision options, and unable to learn from subsequent experience whether the options
selected were the right ones.
I believe,therefore,thatitisimportant thathuman controllersbe able to visualize,by
viewing predictivedisplays,the likelyconsequences of a conflictresolutiondecision,whether
thatdecisionismade by them or by theautomation. Itisalsoimportantthatcontrollersbc ablc
to visualizea wider fieldof view on requestin order to view the resolved situationlater,to
obtainfeedback concerning theirearlieractions.
19. ATC automation should be designed to assist the human controller to manage
workload.
Several studiesof controlleroperationalerrorshave indicatedthat largernumbers of
errorstend to occur during periods of low or moderate, as opposed to high, controller
workload (usuallymeasured as number of aircmftbeing controlled)(Rodgcrs & Nye, 1993).
Ifthisisthe case,then futureautomation thatrelievesthe human controllerof most routinc
workload may tendto increasethelikelihoodofhuman error,even though the automation may
assume a portionof the tasksinwhich errorsmight be committed.
There is an urgent need for further studies of the relationship between level of automation
and the probability of errors in human tasks. Some laboratory work has been done, but
before automation design is predicated on the results it is necessary that studies in more
naturalistic settings be performed. It is possible that the CTAS evaluations planned at Denver
and Dallas-Fort Worth in the immediate future may yield new insights into the relationships
between workload and error in more automated environments, but it is also quite possible that
CTAS, which maintains a high level of human involvement by design, may not be an
appropriate analog of a future enroute system in which the controller is less actively involved
in routine operations. (See also the following guideline.)
20. The human controller must be kept involved in the operation by being
required to perform meaningful and relevant tasks, regardless of the level of
management automation being utilized.
One of the stated objectives of the A.AS is to improve controller, and therefore system,
productivity. Whither (in Cooper, 1994a) suggested that "To permit unrestricted ATC growth
we should fn'st determine how to eliminate one-to-one coupling between a proactive sector
controller and every aircraft in flightmand so avoid him becoming reminiscent of the man with
a red flag in front of early motor vehicles...Pilots can and are willing to take direct
responsibility for...track-keeping functions, freeing controllers to concentrate on the key areas
where human skills have most to offermtraffic management, system safety assurance and
dealing with the exceptional occurrence" (p. 8).
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I would argue that the degree to which the controller becomes involved with individual
aircraft should, within reasonable bounds, be his or her choice: in other words, that the
controller should have the freedom to select the level of control and management to be
exercised under particular circumstances, just as pilots now may select the level of automation
assistance they wish to invoke. There should certainly be levels which provide considerable
assistance, to permit the controller to focus on specific problems. There should also be levels
which permit the controller to direct traffic, in order to retain the skills necessary for minimally
aided control. But at each level, the controller must have meaningful tasks to perform. As
noted above, each level of management must be a cooperative endeavor between the human
and the machine, requiring active participation by both components of the human-machine
system.
21. Automation must never be permitted to perform, or fail, silently.
22.
Much of the activity of future ATC automation will be Iransparent to human operators. In
particular, its ongoing or periodic monitoring of trajectories and its continuous searching for
potential conflicts will not (and should not) be visible. The operator, however, must be
informed that these activities are ongoing, for the absence of such information can mean either
that the machine has not located any potential events of interest, or that it is not performing
correctly. Ways must be found to keep controllers informed of these processes, and of their
failure if the automation becomes degraded in any respect.
ATC automation should be designed for maximum error resistance and error
tolerance.
The future AAS will be designed with improved error resistance, in that automated
conflict prediction will be an essential element. Controllers will remain responsible for
insuring that conflicts do not occur, but computers will augment their watch over traffic and
will probably provide decision options to assist them in resolving conflicts when they are
detected. These automated functions will thus increase the redundancy of the ATC system.
The automated safety functions in use today: conflict alert, minimum safe altitude warnings,
etc., will still be there performing their vital monitoring functions and acting to improve the
error tolerance of the system Can more than this be done? I believe it can.
As indicated previously, data link architecture should be designed to insure that ATC
computers receive conf'n'mation of flight path changes when they are executed in flight
management computers or through mode control panel entries. These data, indicative of
aircraft intent, should be automatically compared with previously-issued ATC instructions to
insure conformity with planned trajectories. If there is a conflict, a controller should be
notified so that he or she can determine where the difference lies and resolve the problem. In
today's system, detection of an incorrect or undesired flight path can only occur after the
airplane has already strayed appreciably from the desired path. Prospective monitoring of
airplane intent would make it possible, in many instances, to detect and correct these problems
before they happen. This functionality could prevent a substantial fraction of the altitude
deviations that plague today's system. The UK CAA flight demonstration in early 1991
indicated the feasibility of such an approach, using currently available equipment. Note,
however, that proposals for free flight do not make use of a "flight plan contract" that would
facilitate prospective monitoring.
23. Emphasize information in accordance with its importance.
More information displayed on VDUs will increase controller workload. Consideration
should be given to the use of a limited number of auditory signals to denote information of
particular importance. One promising way to dh-ect attention to an event of interest, for
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instance,is to use synthesized directionalauditory signals to indicate the approximate
azimuthal locationof theevent. The technology has been evaluatedin flightsimulationsas a
way of drawing attentionto potentialconflictsdetected by TCAS (Bcgault, 1992); ithas
proved quiteeffectiveinthatapplication.This approach may likewiseofferpotentialbenefits
in air trafficontrol
The use of colorto increasethe salienceof displayedsignalscan bc effectivein attracting
attention,but redundant coding of such signalsshould be implemented wherever possible.
Size,shape and brightnesscues in additionto color willmake itmore likelythatimportant
informationwillbe attendedto.
24. Alerting and warning displays should be as simple and foolproof as possible.
Alertingand warning systems incurrentATC suitesare fairlysimple,inpartbecause the
monochrome displayspermit only the use of blinkingsymbols and auditorywarning tones as
information transferdevices. The use of advanced color displays will permit the use of
colors,new icons and other symbols as alertingdevices. Itwillbe importantto kccp alertsto
a minimum, inorderthattheirmeanings remain simple and universallyunderstood. Wherever
possiblc,the exact natureof the alert,and the aircraftinvolved,should be specifiedin a way
that immextiately makes the namm of the problem obvious to the responsible conn'oller.
Consideration should be given, as noted earlier, to providing alerting trend information to
the appropriate controller before mandated boundaries are encroached upon. There is a danger
that this will lead to an increased number of nuisance alerts under some circumstances; that
danger should be balanced against the problem of not warning until a violation has occurred.
Certainly the prevailing practice of broadcasting audible conflict alerts is undesirable from a
psychological viewpoint; it holds an "offending" controller up to ridicule, and it distracts
others who may be busy solving their own problems.
25. Less information is generally better than more information, if it is the right
information for a particular circumstance.
The increased functionalityof the advanced automation system will provide more
information thatmay be usefulto controllers.Itwillalso bring the temptation to add that
information to controllerdisplays,as the implementation of advanced automation has added
complexity toaircraftdisplays.New displayelements should be considered fordisplayonly
ffconsultationwith activecontrollersrevealsthatitwilladd significantlyto theircapability.If
a consensus isin favor of adding elements,itmust be realizedthatthe additionswilltend to
distractfrom attentionto existingelements;every cffortshould be made to simplify,rather
than rnakc more complex, theinformationextractiontask.The additionof the colormodality
can help directattention,but the temptationto add colorfor color'ssake or to make a more
visually appealing picture must bc resisted. It is quite likcly that a simple, largely
monochrornc rcprcscntation,with colorused only sparinglyfor very specificpurposes, will
be most effective.
26. Integration of information does not mean simply adding more elements to a
single display.
If displays arc to be redesigned in any major way, consideration should bc given to a
higher degree of integration of the existing displays if this can be accomplished without
compromising the integrity of the critical information. Data from on-the-job training with
regard to task elements that are difficult for trainees to assimilate would be helpful to the
designers of these displays. In order to effect maximum transfer of training from the present
to the new controller suites, it is quite possible that essential elements of the old displays
should be retained unchanged or only minimally modified.
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New features should be displayed analogically or by means of icons where appropriate.
Wherever possible, displays should focus attention on changes in the data and on events of
potential interest, leaving static or less interesting data in the background.
Comment
The Wiener (1993) and Woods et al. (1994) discussions of en'_ management should receive
careful attention from ATC system designers as well as the operators of the system (see chapter 10,
guidelines for error management). The future AAS has been widely espoused as a system that will
minimize human errors; it is more likely that it will transform them as automation has done in
aircraft, foreclosing some while enabling others. What is critical is that the future system also be
effective at detecting, trapping and mitigating the effects of those errors that will still occur.
It is worth pointing out once again that enroute and approach/departure controllers, unlike
pilots, cannot "see out the window"--that their only contact with the real world is through the
representations provided by their traffic and other displays. Woods (1994a) has discussed the
heavy obligation this places on the designer, who must create virtual representations that provide
all needed information under all circumstances. Human operators can visualize the processes they
are controlling on/y through such representations--the "keyholes" provided by the computer.
I believe that to keep controllers actively involved in their task, it is necessary as weLl as
desirable to provide them with a moderate degree of management flexibility, by permitting them to
take a more, or less, direct role in controlling traffic. They should be able to be supervisory
controllers when they wish, or to be more active in the process. This alone will maintain their
skills if there are circumstances under which they may have to revert to a direct controlling role.
Given the limited reliability of automation to date, I think it very unlikely that the AAS will be
infallible; no other advanced automated system has ever been, regardless of its specifications.
Further, if controllers are to continue to be considered professionals, it is vital that they be given a
measure of authority over their own working conditions, which includes (as with pilots) a degree
of choice as to the means by which they wish to accomplish the job. With adequate computer
monitoring, this should not lead to increased numbers of critical errors. Rather, it is more likely
that it will permit controllers to make best use of their automation at some level even when its full
capabilities are not available.
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12. Guidelines for certification of aviation automation
Introduction
A criticismof the earlierNASA Technical Memorandum on Human-C_.cntcrcd Automation
(Billings,1991) was thatitmade almost no mention of certificationand included no guidance with
respect to that process. I am indebted to the FAA Air Transport Certification personnel who drew
my attention to this oversight. This chapter is accordingly devoted to a brief consideration of
aircraft certification from the human factors viewpoint, and to some suggested guidelines for
certification personnel. I acknowledge here the help and support provided by the late Berk Greene,
and the guidance so kindly made available by Donald Armstrong and Guy Thiel, all FAA
certification pilots, in the preparation of this chapter.
In the United States, the FAA is solely responsible for certifying new aircraft and avionics
equipment. Recognizing the extreme problems that would result were an uncertifiable aircraft to be
presented for approval at the end of its development cycle, certification people, all of them highly
experienced engineers and pilots, are deeply involved in discussions with aircraft manufacturers
throughout the design process. In this consultative process, which goes on for several years, they
become intimately aware of novel or different features that may be incorporated into a new design.
Their advice is sought on issues that may be problematical or that may raise concerns later in the
certification process. (Unfortunately, this is less likely to be true for new functions when they are
proposed for aircraft already in service. Such modifications would benefit from the input of
certification personnel, but they often are not consulted.)
The certification role is a difficult one. Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 25,
Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category Airplanes, governs the certification process. § 25.1,
Applicability, says only the following:
(a) This part prescribes airworthiness standards for the issue of type certificates, and
changes to those certificates, for transport category airplanes.
(b) Each person who applies under Part 21, for such a certificate or change, must show
compliance with the applicable requirements in this part.
A manufacturer may choose to satisfy the requirements set forth in part 25 in any of a
considerable number of ways. If compliance can be demonstrated, the airplane must be certified,
even if the certifying authorities are less than comfortable with the approach that has been taken.
While common sense usually prevails, certification staff cannot demand more than the regulation
requires. Their decisions are constrained by the Administrative Procedure Act, which forbids
arbitrary or capricious actions by the Administrator, a finding of non-compliance can be grounds
for an appeal under this Act.
The only other regulation bearing directly on the type certification process is Part 21; §21.21
describes the conditions under which an applicant is entitled to a type certificate:
(2) For an aircraft, that no feature or characteristic makes it unsafe for the category in which
certification is requested.
This requirement is powerful but little used, because it switches the burden of proof from the
manufacturer to the certifying authorities to show how a design feature or characteristic is both
unsafe and not otherwise addressed in the basic regulation. More often, new technology is
handled by the development of special conditions: rulemaking for particular novel or unusual
design features that were not envisioned when the appropriate sections of Part 25 were adopted.
Here, the Adminislrative Procedure Act applies; special conditions must be handled like any other
rulemaking, with publication in the Federal Register, the seeking of public comments, and the
addressing of those comments before the special condition can be made effective. This time-
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consumingprocess, unique to the United States, makes establishment of the complete body of
airworthiness requirements for a new or highly-modified aircraft occur much later in the design
process than the manufacnnm" would prefer_ to starting the ball game without knowing where
the goal posts are.
Further, certification is usually the fial step in a new airplane's development process. Given
the schedule slips that invariably occur in the course of a complex airplane's years-long
development and the financial burden on the manufacturer ffinitial deliveries of a new airplane arc
delayed, the FAA certification staff is routinely undex enormous pressure throughout the latter
phases of the certification process, especially ff all does not go as planned or ff some areas require
further study or flight test. The certification process itself is extremely expensive because of the
substantial amount of flying requi_md, and this is another factor that places pressure on FAA
personnel.
Finally, today's airplanes arc software-intensive; the Boeing 777 incorporates some 5 million
lines of source code in its various computers. Software verification is extremely difficult, and
"bugs" arc bound to occur as the airplane goes through its flight testing, including certification.
These can also complicate and delay the certification process.
At present, the handling of software revisions deemed to be hazardous should erroneous
information result requires extensive software verification and validation before approval Because
so many of the "bugs" are discovered late in the certification program, flight crew "workarounds"
are often resorted to in order to obtain certification on schedule. The result is a succession of
program upgrades, typically about a year apart; in the meantime, the burden of remembering to use
the "workarounds" falls upon line pilots. This certification process lacks a method of "beta
testing" because the total product must be fully approved before delivery. The only control device
available to certification authorities is a limitation against use of the deficient modes, or reliance on
workarounds.
Regulatory basis for considering human factors in certification
Some sections of Part 25 cover various aspects of the standards in exquisite detail, with
precise quantification of the required performance. Other parts, however, go into much less detail
and requirehighly subjectivejudgments on the partof the certifyingauthorities.Nowhere isthis
more obvious than in the sectionthatdiscussescrew complement. § 25.1523, Minimum flight
crew, isquoted initsentirety:
The minimum flight crew must be established so that it is sufficient for safe operation,
considering-
(a) The workload on individualcrewmcmbcrs;
Co) The accessibilityand ease of operationof necessary controlsby the appropriate
crewmembcr, and
(c) The kind of operationauthorizedunder § 25.1525.
The criteriaused in making the determinations required by thissection arc set forthin
Appendix D.
Exu'acts fi'om Appendix D are shown here:
Criteria for determining minimum flight crew. The following are considered by the
Agency in determining the minimum flight crew under § 25.1523:
(a) Basic workload functions. The following basic workload functions are considered:
(1) Flight path control.
(2) Collision avoidance.
(3) Navigation.
(4) Communications.
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(5) Operation and monitoring of aircraft engines and systems.
(6) Command decisions.
(b) Worldoadfactors. The following workload factors am considered significant...:
(1) The accessibility, case, and simplicity of operation of all necessary...controls...
(2) The accessibility and conspicuity of all necessary instruments and failure warning
devices...The extent to which such instruments or devices direct the proper action is also
considered.
(3) The number, urgency, and complexity of operating procedures...
(4) The degree and duration of concentrated mental and physical effort involved in
normal operation and in diagnosing and coping with malfunctions and emergencies.
(5) The extent of required monitoring of (aircraft systems) while enroute.
(6) The actions requiring a crewmember to be unavailable at his assigned duty
station...
(7) The degree of automation provided in the aircraft systems to afford (after failures
or malfunctions) automatic crossover or isolation of difficulties to minimize the need for
flight crew action to guard against loss of hydraulic or electric power to flight controls or to
other essential systems.
(8) The communications and navigation workload.
(9) The possibility of increased workload associated with any emergency that may
lead to other emergencies.
(10) Incapacitation of a flight crewmember whenever the applicable operating rule
requires a minimum flight crew of at least two pilots.
This guidance was last amended in 1965, at about the time the first model of the Boeing 737
was in its development process. In 1986, the FAA issued an Advisory Circular, AC 25-1523,
Minimum Flightcrew, in which it provided expanded guidance based on its earlier Engineering
Flight Test Guide for Transport Category Airplanes (FAA Order 8110.8). The regulation itself
takes no account of the radical changes that have occurred on the flight deck since that time, nor of
the revolution caused by digital computational capability, as discussed in chapter 4, but the revised
guidance is considerably more specific and discusses acceptable methods for determination of
flight crew workload.
In all transport aircraft, the minimum flight crew is timed by design at the beginning of
development. The FAA's role is to evaluate the design as operated by the minimum crew using the
manufacturer's proposed procedures. If problems are encountered, they are inevitably resolved by
rebalancing workload and revising procedures, not by increasing the minimum flight crew.
The overarching issues
Certification personnel are not evaluating simply aircraft components. They are given an
airplane, which must operate as an internally-consistent entity. The machine is very complex, yet
all of its functions must operate together harmoniously. As certification pilots examine all of these
many functions, they must always consider how an average pilot operating under difficult
circumstances might misunderstand, misread or misinterpret what he or she sees; how such a pilot
might be led to inappropriate decisions by the information provided by the machine; how he or she
might make errors of omission or commission in executing those decisions; how line pilots might
find it difficult to recover from failures or their own errors, and how tolerant the airplane will be of
such mismanagement when it is in line service. They must do all of this in a comparatively short
time, always under pressure, and they must then accept the responsibility of approving the
airplane. This is not a job for the faint-hearted.
The certification process
Faced with this mandate and these constraints, certification authorities have attempted to
evaluate flight deck workload in comparative terms, measuring the difficulty of the flight crew's
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tasks in each new airplane against workload in earlier, "benchmark" airplanes certified for and
successfully operated by a crew of two persons. As noted in chapter 1, the findings of the
Presidential Task Force on Crew Complement (1981) effectively permitted the FAA to certify
aircraft of any size for a two-person crew, provided that sufficient aids were provided to keep
workload within tolerable limits.
This comparative evaluation is carried out by FAA certification pilots and other highly
experienced air carder inspectors. It necessarily yields subjective estimates of workload, though
attempts have been made in recent years to utilize quantitative measures derived from empmcat
research. Aircraft are evaluated in operational scenarios which simulate air carrier operations as
much as possible. A variety of malfunctions is simulated in the course of the workload
certification flights, including the incapacitation of one crewmember as required by Appendix D.
Among the simulated malfunctions are failures and degraded operation of many elements of the
automation.
It should be noted that aircraft are certified under Part 25 of the FAR. After certification,
however, they are operated under Part 121 of the regulations. Part 25 says little about either the
range of conditions encountered in line flying, or about the capabilities of the range of air carrier
pilots who will operate the new airplane. Though an attempt is made in certification to examine the
widest range of environmental conditions and malfunctions possible, only a very limited subset of
these conditions can be evaluated. Likewise, only a very limited number of Agency pilots, all
highly experienced, can take part in the certification process, which means in effect that until the
f'LrStairplane is delivered, it will have been flown extensively only by company and FAA pilots of
above-average experience and ability.
Transport aircraft are among our nation's most important exports. The United States has led
the world in the design and production of aircraft throughout most of the history of aviation. The
FAA is widely regarded as the model for aircraft certification, and those involved in the process
must continually be aware that they are certifying machines that will be operated throughout the
world. Though certification is carried out solely under U.S. regulations, the difference between
our rules and those of other nations imposes yet another source of implicit pressure on certification
staff. A major effort is underway at this time to reconcile, or "harmonize", our regulations and
those of the European Union Joint Airworthiness Authority, which will regulate the certification
process in Europe. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, airworthiness considerations applied in the
Commonwealth of Independent States have also had to be considered, as U.S. aircraft begin to
penetrate the market in the newly independent states of northern Asia. It should be mentioned also
that the issue of cultural differences, and their impact on flight crew operations, is another aspect of
the problems faced by certification personnel, who know that the aircraft will be used in different
ways by operators worldwide.
I have pointed out previously that operations well within the envelope may not show evidence
of brittle automation (see chapter 7), nor for that matter of organizational latent factors which may
come to light only when a line crew is fatigued or distracted by other operational anomalies. All of
these factors are considered by certification pilots, themselves operating under a different sort of
pressure, but it is not surprising that operational problems with new aircraft sometimes are not
recognized until they are operating in line service.
Other relevant sections of FAR Part 25
Several other sections of Part 25 contain material which, taken together, are relevant to
discussion of human factors requirements for certification. They are abstracted here:
§ 25.143: Controllability and Maneuverability
(a) The airplane must be safely controllable and maneuverable during-
(l) Takeoff;
(2) Climb;
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(3) Levelflight;
(4) Descent;and
(5) Landing.
(b) It must be possible to make a smooth transition from one flight condition to any
other flight condition without exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength, and without
danger of exceeding the airplane limit-load factor under any probable conditions...
§ 25.171: Stability
The airplane must be longitudinally, directionally, and laterally stable...In addition,
suitable stability and control feel (static stability) is required in any condition normally
encountered in service, ff flight tests show it is necessary for safe operation.
§ 25.671: Control Systems
(c) The airplane must be shown...to be capable of continued safe flight and landing
after any of the following failures or jamming in the flight control system and
surfaces...within the normal flight envelope, without requiring exceptional piloting skill or
strength. Probable malfunctions must have only minor effects on control system operation
and must be capable of being readily counteracted by the pilot...
(d) The airplane must be designed so that it is controllable if all engines fail...
§ 25.672: Stability augmentation and automatic and power-operated systems
If the functioning of stability augmentation or other automatic or power-operated
systems is necessary to show compliance with the flight characteristics requirements of this
part, such systems must comply with § 25.671 and the following:
(a) A warning which is clearly distinguishable to the pilot under expected flight
conditions without requiring his attention (sic.) must be provided for any failure in the
stability augmentation system or in any other automatic or power-operated system which
could result in an unsafe condition if the pilot were not aware of the failure. Warning
systems must not activate the control systems.
(b) The design of the stability augmentation system or of any other automatic or
power-operated system must permit initial counteraction of failurcs...without requiring
exceptional pilot skill or strength, by either the deactivation of the system, or a failed
portion thereof, or by overriding the failure by movement of the flight controls in the
normal sense.
(c) It must be shown that after any single failure of the stability augmentation system
or any other automatic or power-operated system---
(1) The airplane is safely controllable when the failure or malfunction occurs at any
speed or altitude within the approved operating limitations...
(3) The trim, stability, and stall characteristics arc not impaired below a level needed
to permit continued safe flight and landing.
§ 25.771: Pilot compartment
(a) Each pilot compartment and its equipment must allow the minimum flight crew...to
perform their duties without unreasonable concentration or fatigue.
(c) If provision is made for a second pilot, the airplane must be controllable with equal
safety from either pilot seat.
§ 25.1309: Equipment, systems, and installations
(c) Warning information must be provided to alert the crew to unsafe system operating
conditions, and to enable them to take appropriate corrective action. Systems, controls,
and associated monitoring and warning means must be designed to minimize crew errors
which could create additional hazards.
§ 25.1329: Automatic pilot system
(a) Each automatic pilot system...must be designed so that the automatic pilot can be
quickly and positively disengaged by the pilots to prevent it from interfering with their
control of the airplane...
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(f)The system must be designedand adjustedso that...itcannotproduce hazardous
loads on the airplane, or create hazardous deviations in the flight.path, under any condition
of flight appropriate to its use, either during normal operation or m event of a malfunction,
assuming that conre_ve action begins within a reasonable period of time.
(11) If the automatic pilot system can be coupled to airborne navigation equipment,
means must be provided to indicate to the flight crew the current mode of operation.
Selector switch position is not acceptable as a means of indication.
§ 25.1335: Flight director systems
If a flight director system is installed, means must be provided to indicate to the flight
crew its current mode of operation. Selector switch position is not acceptable as a means of
indication.
In addition to this regulatory guidance, a number of Advisory Circulars apply to specific facets
of certification where no other guidance is available.
Guidelines for human factors certification
Recognizing that FAA can legally impose only a m/n/mum standard as codified in regulations
that in many respects do not incorporate the lessons learned during a period of exceedingly rapid
technological advances, can any generic guidelines be offered that can help certification authorities?
They, after all, are the experts, and it is presumptuous to assume that this very difficult and
exacting job can be thoroughly understood by.anyone who has not "been there". Nonetheless, a
careful examination of Appendix D and the remainder of Part 25 suggests certain areas in which
requirements can be suggested, if onlyto provoke argument.
I shallincorporatehere thethoughtssetforthinchapter2,A conceptof human-centered
automation,as theoverarchingphilosophywhich shouldbe applied.Ibelievethisisjustifiedby a
carefulreadingoftheregulation,which statesrepeatedlythatflightmust be possibleundera great
varietyofconditionswithoutexceptionalskillorstrength,and thatitmust be possibleforthepilot
toremainincommand of theairplaneunderallbutextremelyimprobablefailures.The pilotmust
be warned ofpotentiallyunsafeconditions;theairplane'sdesignmust minimizecrew errors.The
crew must be abletoperformtheirdutieswithoutunreasonableconcentrationorfatigue.
The regulation discusses workload and discusses factors that may increase it, but does not
consider the possibility of workload being too low, a factor not thought about very much prior to
the inu'oduction of advanced automation. It has become clear in the last decade or so that either
overload or underload can pose hazards; both are considered here.
Principles for certification of human-centered aircraft automation
With regard to the "first principles" of human-centered automation (chapter 2), the following
general guidelines or requirements are suggested. They are also summarized at the end of this
chapter.
1. Automation should not be able to remove the pilots from effective command
of their aircraft.
It has been indicated elsewhere that sophisticated automation can decrease pilot authority
in ways that may not be immediately evident. I believe that pilots must be made aware of any
modes or features that may act in this way, and that provisions should be incorporated to
.permit them to "quickly and positively" override these functions when an emergency requires
It.
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• Automation should not remove the pilots from direct involvement in the
operation.
In 1965, when the present Part 25 was implemented, "underload" was not a serious
problem. The term "automation complacency" had not yet been invented, and such
automation as was availableaccomplished only tacticalfunctionsunder directinstructionfrom
pilots.The regulationdid take note of the ease with which pilotscould mistake and misuse
navigation modes and required thatthese modes bc annunciated (and errorsin selectionof
these modes continue to occur today). New automation should keep pilotsmeaningfully
involved in the operation, by whatever means. I also believe ways should bc found to
increase that involvement to minimize the likelihood that they will accept and tolerate
inappropriatemode selections,especiallyin long-rangeaircraftin which workload islikelyto
be very low.
3. Automation must keep the pilots informed of its actions.
Recognizing thatautomation now performs a greatnumber of discretefunctionsas well
as the continuous task of flightpath control,itisincreasinglynecessary thatthe automation
inform the human operators of what itisdoing. This guidelineisintended to suggest that
pilotsmust remain involved with, by being informed of,the actionsof the automation that
conducts theflightsthatthey manage, as wellas of failuresinthatautomation. In theNagoya
accident (1994), autotrim was being applied,but there was no audible or other signalto
indicatethisactivity.When thepilotregained control,the pitchtrimwas inan extreme nose-
up condition.
4. Automation failures or malfunctions must be clearly annunciated to the pilots.
Because automation performs discrete as well as continuous functions, its failure to
continue performing these functions may not be obvious. This guideline is intended to
suggest that such failures must be positively annunciated to the crew.
5. Automation must behave predictably under all circumstances.
•
Much of this book deals with the importance of predictability in the behavior of
automated systems, so that pilots can form a"correct" mental model of their functions. Very
complex functions are especially likely to be misunderstood by pilots. It is important that they
be able to follow, whether by dedicated displays or by the behavior of the airplane and its
systems, the behavior of the automation. Means must be made available by which they can
accomplish this critical monitoring task without undue attention. Equally important, the
automation must behave predictably, in a manner that facilitates monitoring by its human
operators.
Automation should monitor the actions of pilots and should warn them when
their actions pose a potential threat to safe continuation of the flight•
We know that humans err with some frequency, and a great deal is known from
operational experience about serious and potentially dangerous mistakes in the operation of
highly automated aircraft. .Automation should monitor human behavior with respect to known
or likely sources of error, and should alert pilots when their behavior does not comport with
appropriate operating procedures. A deliberate attempt should be made during certification
trials to make such errors and to insure that automation either proscribes them without specific
consent, or warns against them. Humans are not very good monitors; computers are excellent
monitors, but they have not been given this task to nearly the extent that they should have
been. Increased error resistance and error tolerance should be primary aims of advanced
automation in new aircraft
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7. Automation should inform pilots of its intentions and should request consent
for actions that may critically affect the conduct of the flight.
An essential ingredient of what Endsley (1994) calls "deep" situation awareness is an
understanding of the near-term future situation. Just as I believe that humans must be given
the means by which to indicate their intent to the automation assisting them, I believe it is
essential that automation indicate its near-term intent to the humans on the team, especially
when mode changes, major changes in state or changes that could compromise the ability of
the airplane to complete its mission are contemplated. This occurs today under some
circumstances (the "flare" annunciation during coupled approaches, the green arc on the
navigation display), but it should be applied as a general rule in complex systems.
Guidelines for the certification of control automation
• Automation involving modes of control known to be
should contain safeguards to guard against its use
conditions.
potentially hazardous
under inappropriate
Experience has shown that under certain circumstances, the "open descent" mode of
operation can present predictable hazards. If such a mode is provided, should it be allowed to
operate without restrictions to prevent it being used below a safe altitude? Similarly, it is
known that the "vertical speed" mode can result in a critical decrease in airspeed during climbs
at higher altitudes. The possibility of this misuse of the VS mode should be guarded against
when the mode is implemented.
Other automated modes may have to be used under circumstances which could present
potential hazards. They should be identified and appropriate cautionary information should bc
provided to pilots under those circumstances, as occurs when alpha floor protection is
removed during landing (see accident at Muthouse-Habsheim, 1989). Design features that
experience has shown to be hazardous should not be utilized without such safeguards against
misuse or inadvertent use in the stress of line operations.
9. Automation design must permit its use at some lower level of authority if
stability augmentation systems have failed.
Fly-by-wire technology has made direct manual control of aircraft impossible under most
circumstances. Even "manual" flying is accomplished through computer assistance in these
aircraft, and the normal mode of operation is the fully assisted mode. In the A320/330/340
series, a "direct" mode of control is available ff the normal mode fails. In this mode, many of
the protections built into the flight control system are bypassed, and the airplane flies as
though directly controlled by the pilot through the proportional sidestick controller. The
automation has less authority, but the pilot's authority is unchanged.
An analogous reversion mode should be available in any aircraft having highly
augmented controls, but it must be capable of being used under normal conditions as well so
that pilots may remain proficient in its use through regular practice. Ideally, it should "feel" as
much like the normal control modes as possible, so that the pilot is able to accomplish the
control task without significant diversion of attention from other tasks.
10. Marginally stable aircraft should be required to have full-time automation
assistance, even in reversion control modes.
Some newer aircrafthave deliberatelybeen designed tobe neutrallystableor marginally
unstable in the pitch axis. Any tendency to instabilityis compensated for by automated
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stability augmentation systems. Such aircraft can be difficult to fly ff the augmentation fails.
(The Space Shuttle is an extreme example of this problem.) Such aircraft should incorporate
back-up augmentation to alleviate pilot workload in event of a failure of the primary systems.
Again, the less difference in control feel between the primary and backup systems, the less
will be the added workload for the pilots following such a failure.
This may also be a problem in aircraft (such as a future high-speed civil transport,
HSCT) that incorporate automatic center of gravity trimming for high-speed flight. Either a
means to return the center of gravity to an appropriate range automatically, or assistance in
flying the airplane following an automation failure, should be incorporated in such aircraft, to
keep pilot workload within reasonable limits. With regard to the HSCT, the same can be said
regarding flight on the "back side of the power curve", which will be required during low-
speed flying during the approach to landing. To quote from Part 25, "The trim, stability, and
stall characteristics are not impaired below a level needed to permit continued safe flight and
landing"; this should also be true in any reversion mode.
Guidelines for the certification of information automation
11. Primary flight displays have become extremely complex.
must decide how much information is too much.
Certification pilots
Though navigation displays in newer aircraft have been integrated and, in the process,
have become easier to read, primary flight displays have become more cluttered through the
addition of a considerable amount of additional information. Mandatory TCAS and wind
shear advisory systems have added still more information to this display. Certification
personnel should give consideration to whether this much information on the primary flight
display is likely to distract, rather than inform, pilots when they are heavily task-loaded.
The PFD is critical for situation awareness, but the amount of information presented on
this screen may be reaching limits using the conventional format. An increasing amount of
data on this display is presented as alphanumerics, which must be read serially to be
comprehended. This is also true of the mode annunciation panel which appears on this
screen. Certification authorities should consider whether pilot duties can be performed
"without unreasonable concenwation or fatigue" using these displays.
Woods (1994a) has pointed out that how information is represented is absolutely critical.
The combination of discrete and continuous data into a more integrated display (such as the
symbolic combination of velocity and acceleration data on some tape airspeed displays) can
enable considerably easier and more precise speed control, particularly during turbulence. The
use of flight path vector symbols is another example long advocated by Bray and others as an
information management and integration tool.
12. Do the most important information elements stand out in complex displays?
Has proper use been made of order, form, thickness of line segments, size
and font of type and use of empty space, as well as color, to highlight
particularly salient information?
Appendix D of Part 25 also emphasizes "the...conspicuity of...failure warning devices"
as a workload factor. Though the number of discrete warning and alerting devices has been
decreased considerably in glass cockpit aircraft, the number of discrete messages that can
occur is still large and these alerts are almost invariably alphanumeric: they must be read to be
comprehended. All are usually in the same size print; more important items may be boxed and
shown in a different color.
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13.
On busy displays, however, this may not be sufficient to draw attention to the most
important items in what can sometimes be a lengthy list (see incident retxm that begins chapter
13). Is the most critical information always obvious? Is the busy pilot's attention drawn to
the items requiringaction?
The status of flight-critical automation should be obvious at all times, not
only when some element has failet£
This isa corollaryof the firstprinciples.Itisan appropriateguidelineinview of Part25,
Appendix D, which statesthat "the degree and duration of concentrated mental...effort
involved in normal operation" is to be considered as a workload factor. AffLrmative
informationconcerning automation activity,modes and especiallymode changes ismuch more
easilymonitored than the lackof such information. Itispossiblethatan automation synoptic
could be of help in view of the complexity and depth of the automated systems in advanced
airplanes.
Guidelines for the certification of management automation
Management automation was in its infancy when Part 25 was rewritten in 1965. It is not
surprising that it was not considered in the regulation. Nonetheless, Appendix D cited "the degree
of automation provided in the aircraft systems" as a workload factor, and coupled navigation
systems were discussed. The certification staff over time has developed precedents and an
Advisory. Circular which deals with flight management systems and there is little question that they
are of great value in today's system.
Bearing in mind that these management aids do relatively little that pilots cannot do without
them aside from over-water navigation (though at the cost of much higher workload), what
guidelines are appropriate in this area? Those which I offer here have more to do with present
systems than with those that may be implemented in the future, for the reasons stated elsewhere in
the document about the direct and indirect costs of moving to a radically redesigned flight
management system in a future aircraft.
14. Flight management systems and their associated control-display units should
assist pilots in programming, particularly for seldom-performed functions.
As pilots gain experience with the FMS, they become facile in performing those tasks that
they are required to perform frequently. Errors in programming these functions are usually
slips or lapses rather than mistakes. Where possible, the CDU should indicate the error when
it rejects an entry.
Rarely-performed programming tasks are less likely to be recalled when needed. Cueing
should be available in the software to assist pilots to perform such tasks rapidly and correctly.
Contemporary CDUs rarely provide such assistance, which means that pilots must sometimes
spend much longer than should be necessary in performing even relatively simple, but
unfamiliar, tasks using the CDU. This can be an important worldoad factor.
15. Reprogramming tasks which must be performed at busy
be simplified wherever possible to minimize the amount
during flight at low altitudes.
times in flight should
of "head-down" time
In the newest flight management systems, avionics manufacturers have gone to
considerable effort to simplify reprogramming in and approaching terminal areas.
Certification staff should be on the alert for functions that are still cumbersome if they must be
performed at the expense of other monitoring functions important to safe flight at low
altitudes. Pilots still "turn it off" rather than permit themselves to be distracted during the
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busiest periods of a flight, and thereby deprive themselves of the protective features in the
systems.
16. Flight management systems should incorporate the maximum practicable
amount of internal error-checking to improve the error resistance of the entire
system.
17.
As has been noted elsewhere, computers are tireless and patient monitors. More use can
and should be made of automation to monitor human performance. As the aviation system
becomes more tightly coupled, the costs of even minor human errors will rise and system
tolerance of such errors will decrease. The flight management system "knows" a great deal
about the aircraft and about navigation. It should be used to the maximum extent possible to
increase error resistance and error tolerance. I have mentioned that "reasonableness checks"
could catch some programming errors; non-sequential altitudes programmed into climb and
descent proftles could also be questioned. A study of machine monitoring of human entry
procedures and common errors would be useful as a basis for incorporating more systematic
error trapping within the FMS.
Management automation should be standardized across fleets to the extent
possible, to minimize the likelihood of errors by pilots transitioning from
other aircraft.
While flight management systems tend to operate in a somewhat standard fashion (though
much more could be done by air carriers to improve such standardization across fleets), mode
control panels may look and operate quite differently in different aircraft (see chapter 10,
guideline 29). Error tolerance and safety would be improved ff more effort were devoted to
making the tools themselves, and the tasks performed using these tools, more standard across
fleets. Certification staff, who work with many aircraft, are uniquely positioned to advocate
such standardization, as they have done with respect to primary flight and other displays in the
past, using both persuasion and FAR Part 25, though it is air carriers that will be most
effective in enforcing standardization across their fleets, by requiring it when they purchase
new aircraft.
Summary
To summarize these guidelines briefly, I have restated them as questions to be considered
during the certification process. I recognize the lack of specificity and the tradeoffs that are always
necessary during design, but it seems to me that these questions still need to be near the forefront
of the certification pilot's mind as he or she examines a particular automation suite in a new
airplane.
1. Is the pilot truly in command under all circumstances?
2. Is the pilot actively involved at all times?
3. Does the automation always keep pilots informed of its actions?
4. Axe failures or malfunctions clearly announced?.
5. Is the automation always understandable and predictable?
6. Does automation search for pilot errors and warn pilots about them?
7. Does automation inform pilots of its intentions? Is it easy for pilots to inform automation
about their intentions?
8. Axe there potentially hazardous modes? If so, axe there safeguards against inappropriate use
of such mod_s?
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9. Are all backup control modes usab/e without undue effort?
10. Do such control modes provide adequate assistance to pilots underr all conditions?
11. Are flight and systems displays easy to understand, or clu_red?
12. Is the most important information always obvious?
13. Is the status of control automation, and its mode changes, always obvious?
14. Does the FMS and its CDU assist pilots in programming?
15. Are tasks which must be performed at busy times simple to execute?
16. Does the FMS incorporate checks to guard against input errors?
17. Is this FMS unique? W'tll it require extensive rele, aming to be used effectively?
Comment
It is worth stating again that safety is relative rather than absolute. Accidents are usually a
conjunction of many factors operating together. Most of the latent factors (Reason's "resident
pathogens") are beyond the control of the manufacturers and those who certify their airplanes. All
that builders and certification authorities can do is to produce (and authorize the use of) an airplane
thatisas resistantto,and tolerantof,both human errorsand machine failuresas isfeasiblegiven
the stateof the art.Nonetheless,attentiontofn'stprinciplescan be of helpin theseprocesses.
I believe the cenu'al problems for the human operators who work with today's aircraft
automation arc the complexity and opacityof thesetools.Put interms of the "firstprinciples",the
human operator must be able to understand the automation, and must be informed about its
activities.To simplifythe toolswillrequiretime and a betterunderstanding of the facetsof the
machine thataredifficulto understand;inthe rncantime,more and betteru'alningin how and why
they operateas they do offersthe bestlikelihoodofamelioratingmany of theproblems outlinedin
thisbook. The opacity issueisalsodifficultand willultimatelyrequiredefinitivesolutions,but
thisisan area inwhich certificationexpertscan be of realhelp by demanding thatnew automation
keep the pilotinformed of itsactivitiesand intentions.
Saner and Woods have had littledifficultyin demonstrating deficientmode awareness and
understanding in pilotsinsimulation studiesin the Boeing 737-300 and Airbus A320, simply by
using probes thatrequire more than superficialunderstanding of how the flightmanagement
system and mode controlpanel actuallyfunction(Sarterand Woods, 1992b, Sarter,1994). Their
work shows thateven pilotsexperienced in these aircraftcan get intotroubleduring non-routine
operations because of shallow knowledge of thesesystems. Certificationpilotscan do much to
improve these automation deficienciesby utilizingsuch probes in theircertificationscenarios,and
almost as much by simply being aware of the sortsof problems thatlilacpilotsarclikelyto have in
handling theirautomation duringromine operations.
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Part 4: Issues for Future Aviation Automation
The last part of the document deals with some issues facing system designers and operators.
Chapter 13 contains a brief overview of newer computational concepts and techniques, including
artificial intelligence (AI) and expert systems (ES, RBES), which have been proposed for use in
future system automation. Chapter 14 contains some general comments and a brief conclusion.
13. Advanced and novel automation concepts in the future system
Charles E. Billingsand Sidney W. A. Dekker
Introduction
As has been noted, today's tightly-coupled automation systems have become extremely
complex and in many cases, relatively opaque to their operators. At the same time, these systems
have limits which may or may not be clear to their operators. An example of the problems that can
be createdisseenin thisinformation,extractedfrom a 1991 incidentreport:
"FlightXXX departed on schedule;heavy rainand gusty winds were experienced on
takeoffand during the departure. The climbout was normal untilapproximately FL 240
when numerous caution/warning messages began to appear, indicatinga deteriorating
mechanical condition. The first...wasOVHT ENG 1 NAC, closelyfollowed by BLEED
DUCT LEAK L, ENG I OIL PRESSURE, FLAPS PRIMARY, FMC L, STARTER
CUTOUT 1,and others.No. I generatortrippedofflineand the#1 engine amber "REV"
indicationappeared. However, no yaw controlproblems wcre noted. The maximum and
minimum speed referenceson the airspeed(tape)came together,followed by stickshaker
activation.
At approximately FL 260, the cabin was climbing rapidly and could not be controlled.
The Captain initiated an emergency descent and turned back to the departure airport. The
crew began to perform emergency procedures and declared an emergency. During the
descent, the stick shaker activated several times but ceased below FL 200. Due to the
abnormal flap indication and the #1 engine reverse, airspeed during the descent was limited
to 260-270 knots.
The Captain called upon the two augmented crew pilots to assist during the remainder
of the flight. While maintaining control of the aircraft, he directed the first officer to handle
ATC communications and to accomplish multiple abnormal procedures with the help of the
additional first officer. The additional captain maintained communications with the lead
flight attendant and company operations as the emergency progressed and later assisted in
the passenger evacuation.
Fuel dumping began on descent below 10,000 feet. The fuel jettison procedure was
complicated as the left dump nozzle appeared inoperative. The crew dumped 160,000 lb of
fuel; this action took about 40 minutes. When the fuel dumping was completed, the captain
requested vectors for a 20 mile final for runway XX.
The crew extended flaps early using alternate procedm_s due to an abnormal leading
edge indication and the FLAPS PRIMARY message...a final approach speed of Vref + 20
and 25 ° of trailing edge flaps was planned. They selected auto brakes number 4. The
weather was still bad with strong, gusty winds and heavy rain causing moderate turbulence
during the approach.
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The ILS approach and landing were normal. At touchdown, maximum reverse was
selected on #2 and#3 engines and about half reverse on #4 engine... As the a_raft passed
a taxiway turnoff, the tower advised that they saw fire on the left fide of the a_craft...this
was the first time crew members were aware of any fire...a runway turnoff was used, and
the aircraft stopped on a taxiway...(a difficult but successful evacuation followed).
This incident is an example of an electronic system "nightmare". The crew received
and had to sort out 42 EICAS messages, 12 caution/warning indications, repeated stick
shaker activation andabnom3al speed reference information on the primary flight display.
Many of these indications were conflicting, leading the crew to suspect number one engine
problems when that engine was actually functioning normally. There was no indication of
fire presented to the crew when a fire actually existed...
Aviation automation to this time has been accomplished with conventional numerical
computational methods and conventional software architectures. These have yielded remarkable
capabilities, but numerical methods have inherent limits. It has been difficult to provide decision
support using numerical techniques, and many human factors researchers have argued that in cases
like this, decision support technology is needed by pilots to avoid serious overload. Note,
incidentally, in the above occurrence, that four pilots were fully occupied in dealing with this
emergency; one can only ponder how the outcome might have been affected had only the normal
crew complement of two persons been in the cockpit.
Such concerns have motivated the application of a number of novel computational concepts
and techniques to aircraft automation. These approaches, generally speaking, are designed to
enable machines to carry out reasoning tasks we normally ascribe to human intelligence. During
the past 30 years, newer classes of computational technology have been developed, using symbolic
rather than numerical manipulation of the behavior of objects. Their purpose is to free computation
from the narrow, inflexible bounds of numerical and arithmatic deduction and permit a broader,
inferential approach to computer reasoning.
Cognitive assistance(theabilitytomason, plan and allocateresources)has been accepted in
severaldomains; thesecomputational methods have been successfulin a varietyof applications.
They are often resource-intensive;complex programs may run slowly because of the large
knowledge bases thatmust be searched. They are imperfect and limited,but many have believed
them to bc the wave of thefuture.Theirmore enthusiasticadvocateshave suggestedthatthey have
clearadvantages forcertainaviationapplications,and forthatreason they areconsideredhere.
Diagnosis of aircraft system faults
The management of disturbances,and the presentationto pilotsof information concerning
them, isa function thatappears to be well-suitedtoartificialintelligence(AI) approaches. Ithas
bccn examined in depth by severalresearchers,stimulatedin largepartby leadershipatNASA's
Langley Research Center. Before considering thiswork, a word should be said about the
constraintsthata dynamic problem-solvingenvironment imposes on any diagnosticprocess.
The diagnosisof faultson a flightdeck differsfundamentally from staticsystems in which a
malfunctioningdevice can be taken off-linefortrouble-shooting.In a dynamic system,the process
must go on while the fault is handled; an aircraft cannot be "parked at a waypoint" while the trouble
is dealt with. Fault scenarios are event-driven; symptoms emerge over time in a fluid, sometimes
cascading fashion (Woods, 1993c). In some cases, "disturbance management" requires that faults
be ignored temporarily while the process is kept under control. In others, the true nature of the
fault is not known and cannot be discerned until some outcome has ensued (as in the case cited
above).
156
The challenges associated with the nature of dynamic faults are legion, as indicated above. I
shall review various AI proposals set forth to address some of these challenges. It should be
remarked that an evaluation much longer than the one that follows would not do justice to the
complexity of the work that has been done in this area of AI. Further, it must always be kept in
mind that in the cockpit or an ATC facility, the issue is not just a single human working with a
computer, but rather multiple humans and often multiple tools working cooperatively to supervise
and maintain the operation of a complex system. In such settings, each human must evaluate what
others are doing, as well as what the total system is doing.
Rule-based diagnostic systems
The first general AI proposal for aiding diagnosis in real-time systems was the use of rule-
based expert systems (R.BES). Machine expert systems are designed to support trouble-shooting
by human problem solvers (Clancey, 1983). Their strength is a large knowledge base, built up
from domain information and experience provided to it by many domain experts. All the known
faults in the domain, and all their associated symptoms and root causes, are enumerated and
encoded in a knowledge database. The reasoning performed on the knowledge base during
diagnosis by an "inference engine" is typically rule-based. This means, in simple terms, that rules
guide the machine problem solver from symptom to symptom until a root cause for the observed
fault has been found. The human may have to function as a data-gatherer for the machine, and is
the critic of its results.
The locus of control in this type of diagnostic reasoning resides with the machine, not with the
human. Such a constellation has been called the paradigm of the "intelligent system as prosthesis"
(Roth, Bennett, & Woods, 1987), where the RBES functions as a replacement or remedy for a
presumed deficiency in the human reasoner. Experience with such systems has indicated that, as
might be expected, the human and the expert system typically proceed in parallel to try to diagnose
and solve the problem using whatever data is available. Intelligent agents do not typically work as
"team players" with humans.
The degradation of joint human-machine performance in such a system has been well-
documented (e.g. Roth et al., 1987). However, this is not the only reason why an ES as aid in the
diagnosis of in-flight faults is ineffective. The time needed to accumulate experience and gather
knowledge on all of the subsystems that make up a commercial aircraft is prohibitive. Pre-
enumeration of all possible faults and all of their symptoms is simply not possible for any but the
most simple or longest-serving airframes still flying. ESs cannot deal with novel faults at all. The
models that motivate the machine's decisions are implicit rather than explicit, which renders the
machine's results both brittle and difficult for the human to understand.
In dynamic situations, the computer's progression through many low-level symptoms, and the
conversation-style interface with most ESs, is unsuitable for time-pressttred situations in which
symptoms can emerge in a cascading and seemingly unconnected fashion. Although various
expert systems have been and are being developed for aerospace applications (see for instance
Pilot's Associate below), none is in use today nor is likely to be in the near future (see Maiin et al.
(1991) for an extensive evaluation of fault management systems in primarily space applications).
Model-based diagnostic systems
Contrasting sharply with rule-based diagnosis is model-based diagnosis. This AI approach
has also been called "reasoning from first principles", or "deep reasoning" as it relies on only a
limited number of basic assumptions or principles about causality in the underlying system.
Central to model-based diagnosis is the ability to view malfunctioning as anything other than what
the system is supposed to do (Davis & Hamscher, 1988). The behavior of the system is observed
(with appropriate sensors) on the one hand, while it is predicted on the basis of a model of the
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systemon theother. Discrepanciesbetweenobservationsand predictions arc called symptoms.
The fundamental assumption is that ffthe model of the system is indeed correct, then all symptoms
arise f_om actual malfunctions in the system.
Model-based diagnosis is much more robust than rule-based reasoning. Among the aviation
studies done in this domain (see for instance: Rogers, 1990; Ovenden, 1991 and also Malin et al.,
1991), Kathy Abbott (1990) has studied and described a model-based diagnostician for aircraft
systems: DRAPHYS (Diagnostic Reasoning About Physical Systems). DRAPHYS is pan of a
larger fault management research program supported by NASA Langley Research Center. Some of
the modules developed under the NASA Faultfinder program have been taken up by others and
resu'ucturedand enhanced (e.g.,the Boeing efforton the Flight Deck Engine Advisor using
elaborationsof DRAPHYS and itsmonitoring cousin MONITAUR). The goal isto develop a
system which advises the crew of inconsistencies, adverse performance trends or non-normal
situations before the conditions become critical and then to assist the crew in system diagnosis
while recommending applicable procedures in response to the situation(Shontz, Records, &
Antonelli,1992). DRAPHYS isdiscussed below in more detailin order to contrastthe model-
based approach (includingitspromises and problems) with rule-basedexpertsystems.
DRAPHYS generates candidate hypotheses about the root causes of faults in an incremental,
constructive approach, foUowing the cascading emergence of symptoms. In that respect,
DRAPHYS has the capability of degrading gracefully, just as human problem solvers would. If it
decides it can no longer generate useful hypotheses at a more detailed level of system description, it
confines its troubleshooting to a higher level of system description.
DRAPHYS knows thatnot allfaultsshould be approached using the same underlying model
as itscriterionof "rightbehavior". Faults can propagate through a system functionally(due to
functionalconnections) as well as physically(due tophysical proximity of affectedcomponents,
for example a fractured fan blade severing a hydraulic line),and DRAPHYS has different
underlying models toaid in the succesfuldiagnosisof both classesof problems.
More exoticsymptom scenariosare presentedby faultsthatpropagate and interactphysically
as well as functionally.DRAPHYS isable to utilizetheseclassesof models in such a way that
(hybrid)interactionsbetween the various types of progressions(i.e.functionaland physical)can
be captured and reasoned upon. Another proposal forhow todeal with this('Bylander,1988) goes
back to the use of knowledge bases:though model-based diagnosisissuitableto determine which
hypotheses explain which symptoms, many model-based systems carmot reason with uncertainty.
That is,they cannot order or rank theirhypotheses according to theirplausibilityrelativeto each
other. The interactionwith a knowledge base may be able tosuggest which of severalhypotheses
ismore likelythan othersrelativetowhat isknown about thedomain.
Another problem with model-based diagnosis is the grain of analysis of the reasoning.
Information about an underlyingfaultmay very well residein therateatwhich a symptom changes
itsbehavior. In DRAPHYS, thereis no differencebetween a slowly decreasing and a rapidly
oscillatingfan speed; both are called"abnormal". Yet diagnosis of an underlying faultcan bc
differenton the basisof the behavior of the symptom at a finergrain of analysis.The tradeoff
here,of course,isthe increasingcomplexity of the model with the incorporationof more detailed
system behavior. This can have negative consequences in terms of longer search times and thc
nccd todealwith more failurehypotheses.
Ultimately, the need for a freer grain of reasoning depends entirely on the context in which
diagnosis takes place. It may matter for diagnosis of an engine malfunction, while it may not
matter in case of a malfunctioning air conditioning pack. Indeed, the need for deep assessment of
symptoms may vary as a function of context: in cases where full, consistent engine performance is
absolutely critical (such as takeoff), the difference between rapidly fluctuating and steadily
decreasing N1 speed does not matter. These issues, together with intermittent faults and faulty
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sensors (a serious problem in these systems), are further challenges to and future research targets
for model-based diagnosis methods.
Finally, AI systems of these types need a monitoring "front end" which can decide which of
the system's findings are to be pursued further, and which are trivial or redundant. The
introduction of faults into a complex, tightly-coupled system such as an aircraft can lead to
symptoms in many parts of the system, and thus to an "explosion" of hypotheses regarding the
root causes of the disturbance. Such a "front end" is extremely sensitive to how the system's
hypotheses are represented. For example, under acute time pressure, pilots typically read the first
line of computer output and begin looking for a prescribed procedure with which to solve the
problem represented. If the AI system presents no procedural solution, it cannot work
cooperatively with the humans to solve the problem.
Autonomous intelligence
Whether such systems simply perform their assigned functions autonomously or are able to
work as "team players" is often less related to their inherent capabilities than to the design of the
interface between the systems and the humans responsible for management of the overall process.
A conversational representation of AI behavior is a grossly inadequate communications tool for a
pilot or controller under time pressure. Human operators cannot sort out the multiple symptoms in
tightly-coupled systems and are unlikely to have time to decide which of ten or more possible faults
is the culprit in a particular anomaly. Here, as elsewhere, "representations are never neutral"
(Woods, 1994a); if they do not help solve the problem, they are perceived as part of the problem.
"The electronic crew member"
In the early 1970s, investigators became interested in the interaction process between humans
and AI systems. Rouse (1988, p. 432) describes the criteria for what are now called "adaptive
aiding" systems: "...the level of aiding, as well as the ways in which human and aid interact,
should change as task demands vary. More specifically, the level of aiding should increase as task
demands become such that human performance will unacceptably degrade without aiding. Further,
the ways in which human and aid interact should become increasingly streamlined as task demands
increase. Finally, it is quite likely that variations in level of aiding and modes of interaction will
have to be initiated by the aid rather than by the human whose excess task demands have created a
situation requiring aiding. The term adaptive aith'ng is used to denote aiding concepts that meet
(these) requirements." (Author's note: It is implied here that the pilot who needs such assistance
will usually be too busy to ask for it, a premise that needs careful examination.)
Following development of the concept and modeling studies of human performance (Rouse,
1980), several empirical studies were performed to evaluate and expand the concept and its
potential applications. These led to the elaboration of a comprehensive "framework for adaptive
aiding" (Rouse and Rouse, 1983). This work, in turn, was embodied in the Pilot's Associate
program, carried out by the Lockheed-Georgia Company under sponsorship of the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency.
In this application, adaptive aiding "is an element of an overall intelligent interface, which
includes AI modules for display management, error monitoring, and adaptive aiding...One
particularly interesting aspect of this effort is the nature of the expertise embedded in the many
expert systems that make up the Pilot's Associate. There are suites of expert systems for mission
planning, tactics planning, situation assessment, and systems status monitoring that include
expertise on aircraft, flying, military doctrine, and so on. In contrast, the primary expertise within
the six expert systems that make up the pilot-vehicle interface is expertise on human information
processing and performance, with special emphasis on how situational characteristics and
information presentation affect the formulation of intentions and subsequent plans. Thus, to an
extent, the pilot-vehicle interface is a highly specialized human factors expert." (p. 433)
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Rouse (1988, p. 441) concludes that, "In retrospect, the notion of adaptive aiding is much
more evolutionary than revolutionary. User-initiated adaptation has long been the norm in
aerospace system (e.g., autopilots). The are also many everyday examples of humans adapting
their automobiles and appliances. Thus the primary innovation of adaptive aiding is not adaptation
per se but the possibility of aid-initiated adaptation." (Author's note: There is a fundamental
difference, however, between user-iniftated adaptation and roach/he-initiated adaptation. The user
almost always has more knowledge of the world state and its implications than the machine.)
Building on its Pilot Associate program, Lockheed has continued its interest in this class of
computer aids. Work is in process on new "associate" technologies for dispatchers, air traffic
controllers and others. The Air Force's Armstrong Laboratory has continued to study adaptive
aiding systems for pilots, and there is a "surface movements advisor" element in NASA's Terminal
Area Productivity research program.
Issues raised by advanced computational concepts
Human and machine roles
Let me first return to the paradigm of the human or machine as prostheses of one another. In
chapter 2, and repeated in chapter 9 and implicitly elsewhere in this document, the prosthesis
paradigm is contrasted with what could be called the paradigm of"the cognitive instnanent" froth
et al., 1987). In the cognitive instrument paradigm, automation is not in place to supplant human
functions. Rather, automation consists of tools to assist human beings in their problem solving
tasks. Machines should be considered as complementary, instead of competitive. We should ask
ourselves again: is the effort of AI in diagnosis directed towards supplanting the human
diagnostician? Or is it aimed at aiding the human problem solver?
In most relevant AI research, great emphasis is placed on how to conduct automated diagnosis
and less attention is paid to how the information from such automated diagnostic processes could
benefit flight crew in various contexts. Such issues as the flight crew information requirements for
fault management on the commercial flight deck are addressed within the NASA Faultfinder
program (Rogers, 1990; Abbott & Rogers, 1992). The study of information presentation in this
program is focused on understanding the cognitive activities associated with fanlt management, so
that needed support of human information processing and decision-making can be offered.
Note that such issues are embedded in the question in chapter 2 about whether crews in newer
aircraft are sufficiently "drawn in" to their operations. Following the cognitive instrument
paradigm, the aim of automated fault diagnosis should not be to interpose more automated
processes between pilot and aircraft. Instead, diagnostic systems should bring pilots closer to
what is going on within a subsystem, rather than alienating them from the process.
Adaptability vs. adaptation
Adaptability (the ability to adapt autonomously given certain input conditions) is a
characteristic of some of these computational concepts. (An example was the mode annunciator
panel decluttering in the A330 accident at Toulouse in 1994.) It is this characteristic that gives rise
tocertainconcernsabouttheiruseina high-risk,dynamic environmentsuchasaviation.
Many machine systems are designed to adapt autonomously: In the A330, autospoiler
extension occurs slowly upon landing until reverse thrust is selected, and rapidly thereafter. In
many aircraft, trailing-edge wing flaps will not extend (or will retract) above a certain airspeed to
avoid excessive airloads. Warning systems are inhibited in most newer aircraft during takeoff;
some function only during cruise flight. The brightness of newer cockpit displays is controlled as
a function of ambient light in the cockpit. These systems, however, adapt in known ways to
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known stimuli; they remain predictable, and if they do not behave in the expected way, the pilot is
alerted to the presence of a malfunction and can compensate for it.
I have suggested throughout that the machine component of this human-machine system must
be predictable, so that the human can understand and form a clear mental model of the machine's
present and expected behavior. There is a good deal of difference between a machine system that
can be adapted--that is adaptable--and a system that can adapt autonomously in perhaps
unpredictable ways. In the former case, the human operator is at the locus of control; in the latter
case, the machine is at the locus of control. With regard to maintaining command of the process,
the difference is crucial. Note that machines that behave in unexpected ways produce surprises for
their operators. In the systems under discussion, surprises can also occur because it is not
possible to fully characterize the ways in which complex AI systems may behave when confronted
with novel circumstances.
Roth et al. (1987) discussed this in the context of intelligent decision systems: "Psychologists
are fond of discovering biases in human decision making. One judgmental bias is the
overconfidence bias where people at all levels of expertise overestimate how much they know.
However, we sometimes forget that these biases can apply to the designers of machines as well as
to the users of machines. This means that the designer of an intelligent decision support system is
likely to overestimate his/her ability to capture all relevant aspects of the actual problem solving
situation in the behavior of the machine expert." (p. 502) Aid-initiated adaptation was a factor in
the Charlotte wind shear accident (1994); it also posed problems in the Tarom Airlines A310
incident at Orly Airport (Paris, 1994).
Comment
These factors have led me over the past decade to a position of possibly extreme conservatism
with regard to the potential of AI systems as autonomous agents, and particularly self-adapting
systems, for flight-critical applications. I recognize that these newer computational architectures
have considerable promise for defined tasks that can be bounded (such as some of the diagnostic
tasks discussed above). I also realize that object-oriented programming may significantly decrease
the enormous software development cost involved in the development of some of today's very
complex, integrated systems. To the extent that these software technologies can ease the large and
growing development burden without making verification of software even more difficult than it is
today, they should be adopted.
But at its present state of development, "In high-risk, dynamic environments, we believe that
technology-centered automation has tended to decrease human involvement in system tasks, and
has thus impaired human situation awareness; both are unwanted consequences of today's system
designs, but both are dangerous in high-risk systems. Adaptive ("self-adapting") automation
represents a potentially serious threat...to the authority that the human pilot must have to fulfill his
or her responsibility for flight safety" (Billings and Woods, 1994).
In civil aviation, at least, it is unlikely that AI concepts will find their way into flight-critical
automation systems until they have been thoroughly proven in less critical applications. One that
has been looked at is the use of an AI system to assist pilots to navigate through the large volume
of data in an electronic library system. Another is the use of AI to assist airline systems operation
centers and dispatchers in resolving flight replanning problems (Smith, McCoy, Layton, & Bihari,
1993; Layton, Smith, & McCoy, 1994). A third, and possibly the one most likely to be adopted in
the near future, is the use of AI to create more adaptive and individualized computer-assisted
training modules. This application would also give airlines and manufacturers the opportunity to
evaluate these technologies and to gain confidence regarding their usefulness and limitations.
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14. Comments and conclusion
Introduction
In this chapter, I have appended some topics that need to be mentioned but do not fit well
elsewhere. The comments am personal and represent my concerns regarding some issues that face
us now, or are likely to in the near future. They are followed by a brief conclusion.
Is cockpit commonality an opportunity, or an issue?
An anonymous Associated Press report dated August 22, 1994, discusses fleet cockpit
commonality and its economic implications for air carriers. It describes an Air Canada decision to
order 25 new Airbus aircraft rather than refurbish its DC-9s despite an increased cost of $20
million per aircraft, which Air Canada estimates will save $3.5M per year due to decreases in
spares inventory and the ease with which pilots can be exchanged with its 34 A320s already in
service. Julius Maldutis, of Salomon Brothers, is quoted as saying that "Increasingly, you'll see
airlines being supplied by a single manufacturer...the battle between manufacturers is increasingly
not for the next 20 airplane deals, but for the next 200 airplane deals to convert airlines entirely to
your product."
The AP report continues, "Some analysts say the common features among different models
give a strong selling advantage to Airbus, (which) intentionally designed five models (the A319,
A320, A321, A330 and A340) to have similar cockpits, handling characteristics and common spare
parts. Airbus says the airlines can get about 20% more flying out of a pilot because less training is
required...Airbus estimates that the similarities between its A319/A320/A321 aircraft can save an
airline $1.3M per year for each jet. The common features of the A330/A340 are worth $1.8M per
year per jet."
(The report might also have noted that Lufthansa has developed a carefully-structured program
of dual qualification in which its Airbus pilots fly both the very long-range A340 and the A320 so
that they can keep their proficiency high on shorter trips. Given that other international air carriers
have felt it necessary to provide additional simulator flying to maintain the skills of pilots who fly
only extremely long routes, this approach has considerable appeal. Of course, the report might
also have mentioned that in the same week, Northwest Airlines, another A320 operator, announced
its intention to refurbish, modernize and add "hush kits" to its sizeable DC-9 fleet, from which it
estimated it could get perhaps two decades of additional service at much lower cost!)
The report continues, "Boeing has not been left out...by flying only Boeing 737s, Southwest
(Airlines) has been able to keep costs low by stocking only one type of (everything). Southwest
pilots only need to know their ways around one cockpit layout" (because Southwest has also
limited the authority of the flight management systems installed in its -300 aircraft and has specified
electromechanical rather than CRT displays in its newer aircraft).
"When Boeing set out to update the 737, a major customer told Boeing to change whatever it
wants, 'but put a padlock on the cockpit door' to keep the designers out. The different models of
the 737 have identical cockpits and pilots can move between the longer-range 757 and 767 with
only an additional hour of training."
While these statements are not entirely correct, the article makes an important point which has
major implications both for operators and for the human factors community. I have tried to
indicate in this document that current automation suites are not free of human-machine interface
problems, some of which have become more serious as more and more cap.able automation has
been implemented. Are we, for economic reasons, at the point where air careers would rather live
with "the devil they know" than move toward correction of some of the acknowledged human
factors problems on their flight decks?
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I believe that at this point in time the answer to this question is probably "Yes". United
Airlines many years ago estimated that each pilot retiretmnt forced the movement (either upgrading
or transition to another airplane), training and qualification of some 13 other pilots. The expense
was enormous, even at a time when air carriers were making money. Air carriers have spent years
trying to minimize training costs; comnxmality among cockpits will certainly be of assistance.
Is this truly a "no-cost" benefit? Possibly, though that has not been our experience in the past.
As indicated above, Southwest has chosen to limit sharply the utility of its newer aircraft
automation by limiting theft flight management systems' functionality. The systems have to be
initialized to set their inertial reference systems, but they are not used for direct navigation. The
carrier has also stayed with electromechanical instruments to insure commonality between its 737-
200s and the -300 series aircraft, which has precluded it from installing the more integrated
navigation displays normally available in the later 737s.
While Airbus cockpits do have a very high degree of commonality, the computer architecture
and FMS functionality across types ate not really identical (though the differences are normally
transparent to pilots). I am concerned, however, about the behavior of the different software in
these types at the margins, and the potential for surprises under difficult circumstances. In the
initial report of the investigation of the A330 accident at Toulouse (1994), it was stated by Airbus
that the combination of problems that occurred during that flight was unlikely or impossible in
other Airbus models, for a variety of aerodynamic and other reasons. Further, the software
involved inimplementation of the altitudeacquisitionmode differedacrosstypes.
Idoubt thatlinepilotsare made aware of such differencesduring training,and many may not
be of concern to them. On the other hand, this mishap need not have happened, and I am impelled
to wonder what other occult problems may be lurking at the margins of operating envelopes,
waiting to snare pilots who have operated successfully in another type and who may therefore have
been led tobelievethat they can operateinthe same ways in thisaircraft.
The liability issue in aviation operations
In recentyears,we have seen an increasingnumber of criminalprosecutions of flightcrew,
and even aircarriermanagers, afteraircraftaccidentsand even incidentsinwhich they were alleged
to have been negligentin the performance of theirexpress or implied duties. The manager was
charged afterthe A320 Strasbourg accident (1992) for his failureto require ground proximity
warning systems in Air Interaircraft.
This trendhas begun to appear intheUnited Statesas well,with the successfulprosecutionof
three pilotsfor having detectable levelsof blood alcohol in theirbodies while engaged inflight
duties. In the United States,the Federal Aviation Regulations (with one exception,interference
with a flightmember in the l:_formance ofduty) are not criminallaw, and theirviolationisalmost
always a civilrather than a criminal maucr. The pilotsmentioned were triedunder a law
prohibitingoperationof a commercial motor vehicleunder the influenceof alcohol. Obviously,
such issuesare a matter of seriousconcern to pilotsand can affecttheirbehavior and decision-
making processes.
In nations which govern under the Napoleonic code, and even in some common law
jurisdictions,violationof Air Navigation Orders ispotentiallya criminal offense. "Two Korean
pilotswere jailedin Libya in 1990 afterlandingshortatTripoli,killing72 passengers and atleast
fiveothers.In 1983, a Swissaircrew was convictedand finedin Greece afterskidding offtheend
of a wet runway inAthens; 14 passengers died."(Wilkinson, 1994).
In a celebrated case in the United Kingdom in 1989, the pilot in command of a Boeing 747
was convicted of negligent endangerment of his passengers after an unstable autocoupled approach
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at London's Heathrow Airport daring which the aircraft came within 70 feet of the ground outside
the airport boundary. The airplane was landed safely from a second approach. The pilot in
command was demoted to first officer by his company. After revoking his pilot in command
license, the UK Civil Aviation Authority brought criminal charges, one of which was sustained in
a split jury decision. The pilot was fined; his appeal was rejected. He subsequently committed
suicide (Wilkinson, 1994). The two pilots involved in a recent A-300 accident in Korea are under
criminal investigation concerning their conduct of the flight and landing.
Air traffic controllers have not been immune. A Yugoslav controller was jailed following a
midair collision over that nation, and others have also been prosecuted, though I do not have
details concerning specific cases.
I have indicated elsewhere my concern that holding pilots or air traffic controllers criminally
liable for negligence is likely to inhibit seriously our ability to investigate air accidents. Rega_ess
of what may be said about the duty of a professional person to disclose information that may
compromise him or her but may save others, the fact is that many otherwise honest and upright
people find it difficult or impossible to do so. When aviation professionals know that their
statements following an accident may cause them lasting harm, they are unlikely in many cases to
be forthright with accident investigators. Today's legal climate insists that blame be apportioned,
but the only way we are likely to continue to be able to learn lessons from accidents is to insure that
the principals in such accidents can talk freely about what happened and why.
How do you punish a computer?
Who is liable for the behavior of a highly automated system? If automation continues to
become more pervasive and authoritative, who will be responsible for its actions? At this time, we
simply say that the pilot and controller remain responsible, but if a more autonomous air traffic
control system is put in place, can this a priori assignment of responsibility continue?
The Eurocontrol Experimental Center is France is pursuing long-term research into future air
traffic management systems. One approach being explored is "complete air-ground automation of
the separation assurance function"; the other is aircraft autonomy in an "open sky", using
"electronic visual flight rules" (Maignan, in Cooper, 1994a). Our present concepts of
responsibility and authority am silent on the implications of such automation, but I cannot imagine
how a controller could be held responsible for a loss of separation in a fully autonomous air traffic
management system, nor even in a system such as I posited in scenario 3 in chapter 6 (page 79).
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that those inclined toward the assignment of blame will take much
pleasure in suspending or fining a computer after an aviation incident. Given that our tort system
requires the apportionment of liability, how will this be done? Is anyone in our legal establishment
considering these implications of increased automation of the air traffic management system?
Conclusion
that are strong, silent, clumsy, and difficult to direct are not team players."
"Automated systems are
David Woods (1994b) has described automation problems succinctly: "'Automated systems
He goes on,
strong when they act autonomously;,
silent when they provide poor feedback about their activities and intentions;
clumsy when they interrupt their human partners during high workload, high criticality
periods or add new mental burdens during these high tempo periods;
difficult to direct when it is difficult and costly for the human supervisor to instruct the
automation about how to change as circumstances change."
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I believe the central problems for the human operators who work with today's aircraft
automation are the complexity and opacity of these tools. Put in terms of the "first principles", the
human operator must be able to understand the automation, and must be informed about its
activities. As indicated in chapters ? and 10, this understanding by human operators of the
capabilities, limitations, and possible problems with their tools is the conceptual problem that must
be attacked if humans and machines are to be able to work more cooperatively, as a team, in
pursuit of system goals.
This document is by no means a complete chronology of automation. It suggests
requirements for new automation designs, but it does not specify how to implement those
requirements in a particular setting. What I have tried to do is to suggest characteristics of
automation that cause problems for at least some of its operators, the types of problems that these
characteristics cause, and means of bypassing some of the problems without compromising the
effectiveness of automated tools.
In a future system in which the human does not play such a central and critical role, these
human-automation interactions might be less of a problem. On the other hand, any such system is
likely to remain under the control of humans at some level, and the problems posed by clumsy,
brittle or uninformative automation will still need to be solved at that level
Though aviation is a remarkably safe way to move people and goods, preventable accidents
continue to occur. To an increasing extent, these accidents involve both human operators and their
machines. They represent system failures, and they will only be prevented by a systematic
approach to a/l components of the aviation system. Automation is now a central element in that
system. It has been extremely successful in improving the reliability and productivity of the
system. Like all technology, its successes have brought with them new problems to solve.
I hope that this document will improve the quality and depth of the dialogue about these
problems and their solutions between system architects and the manufacturers who must realize
their designs, between manufacturers and the customers who purchase their products, between the
customers and the operators who manage and direct the systems, and between all of them and the
government officers who must certify the system and maintain oversight of its safety and
effectiveness. That was the primary purpose of the predecessor document, and that remains the
purpose of this revision. All these people, and many others in the aviation community, are critical
to the continued success of the aviation system, upon which so many millions of our citizens rely
for safe transportation.
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Appendix 1: Aircraft accidents and incidents
This appendix contains brief descriptions of some salient aspects of aircraft mishaps cited in
the text. The occurrences are listed chronologically; each summary is followed by a reference.
6/3011956: TWA L1049A and United Air Lines DC-7, Grand Canyon, AZ
At approximately 1031 hrs PST, a TWA L-1049A and a United Air Lines DC-7 collided at
about 21000 ft over Grand Canyon, AZ. Both aircraft fell into the Canyon; there were no
survivors among the 128 persons aboard the two flights. There were no wimesses to the disaster.
The Civil Aeronautics Board determined that the flights were properly dispatched. In flight,
the TWA crew requested 21000 ft, or 1000 ft on top (above cloud tops). 21000 ft was denied by
ATC because of UAL 718. TW then climbed to and flew at 21000 ft above clouds. The last
position report from each aircraft indicated that both were at 21000 ft, estimating their next fix at
1031. The aircraft were in uncontrolled airspace and were not receiving traffic control services at
the time of the collision.
The Board determined that the probable cause of the collision was that the pilots did not see
each other in time to avoid the collision. The Board could not determine why the pilots did not see
each other but suggested the following factors: intervening clouds, visual limitations due to cockpit
visibility, preoccupation with matters unrelated to cockpit duties such as attempting to provide the
passengers with a more scenic view of the Grand Canyon, physiological limits to human vision, or
insufficiency of enroute air traffic advisory information due to inadequacy of facilities and lack of
personnel. (CAB, 1957)
21311959 Pan American World Airways B-707 over the Atlantic Ocean
Pan American flight 115 was enroute from London, England to New York when it entered an
uncontrolled descent of approximately 29000 feet. Following recovery from the manuever, the
airplane was flown to Gander, Newfoundland, where a safe landing was made. A few of the 129
persons on board suffered minor injuries; the aircraft inctm'ed extensive structural damage.
The aircraft was at 35000 ft in smooth air with the autopilot engaged when the captain left the
cockpit and entered the main cabin During his absence the autopilot disengaged and the aircraft
smoothly and slowly entered a steep descending spiral. The copilot was not properly monitoring
the aircraft instruments and was unaware of the airplane's attitude until considerable speed had
been gained and altitude lost. During the rapid descent the copilot was unable to affect recovery.
When the captain became aware of the unusual attitude he returned to the cockpit with considerable
difficulty. With the aid of the other crew members, he was finally able to regain control of the
aircraft at an altitud_ of about 6000 feet.
The Civil Aeronautics Board determined that the accident resulted from the inattention of the
copilot to the flight instruments during the captain's absence from the cockpit, and the involuntary
disengagement of the autopilot. Contributing factors were the autopilot disengage warning light in
the dim position and the Much trim switch in the "off" position. During analysis, which was
hindered by the flight data recorder having exhausted its supply of metal recording foil, it was
indicated that the airplane had reached Much 0.95 in its abrupt descent. Very high G forces were
indicated by the recorder and had been reported by the pilots during their attempts to recover from
the spiral dive. After landing at Gander, the lower surface skin of the horizontal stabilizers was
found to be buckled; both wing panels and both outboard ailerons were damaged; the wing-to-
fuselage fairings were damaged and a three-foot section of the right fairing had separated in flight.
Both wing panels suffered a small amount of permanent set. All four wing-to-strut fairing sections
of the engine nacelle struts were buckled and other damage was also evident. (CAB, 1959)
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6/1811972: British European Airways Trident, Heathrow Airport, London,
England
This aircraft commenced its operation under the command of a very senior BEA captain. The
first officer was relatively inexperienced and the second officer was a recent graduate of the
airline's training schooL The airline was undergoing a difficult labor-management conflict, and the
captain had been involved in a heated altercation in the crew room before departure.
Shortly after takeoff, when the first reduction of flaps occurred, it is thought that the first
officer inadvertently actuated the wing leading edge slat handle as well, raising the slats at a speed
too low to sustain flight. Based on post-mortem evidence, it is believed that the captain had a
severe cardiac event at about the same time. Many warning lights and areal signals were actuated
by the premanne retraction of the slats. The inexperienced first officer was unable to diagnose the
problem or to regain control of the airplane, which crashed into a reservoir just west of the airport.
There were no survivors. (Department of Trade and Industry, 1973)
12/29/1972: Eastern Air Lines L-lOll, Miami, FL
The airplane crashed in the Everglades at night after an undetected autopflot disconnect. The
airplane was flying at 2000 ft after declaring and executing a missed approach at Miami because of
a suspected landing gear malfunction. Three flight erewmembers and a jumpseat occupant became
immersed in diagnosing the malfunction. The accident caused 99 fatalities among the 176 persons
on board.
The NTSB believed that the airplane was being flown on manual throttle with the autopilot in
control wheel steering mode, and that the altitude hold function was disengaged by light force on
the yoke. The crew did not hear the altitude alert departing 2000 ft and did not monitor the flight
instruments until the final seconds before impact. The Board found the probable cause to be the
crew's failure to monitor the flight insmmaents for the final 4 minutes of the flight and to detect an
unexpected descent soon enough w prevent impact with the ground. The Captain failed to assure
that a pilot was monitoring the progress of the aircraft at all times. The Board discussed
overreliance on automatic equipment in its report and pointed out the need for procedures to offset
the effect of distractions such as the malfunction during this flight (p. 21). (NTSB, 1974a)
7/31/1973: Delta Air Lines DC9-31, Boston, ilia
This airplane struck a seawall bounding Boston's Logan Airport during an approach for
landing after a flight from Burlington, VT to Boston, killing all 89 persons on board. The point of
impact was 165 ft right of the runway 4R centerline and 3000 ft short of the displaced runway
threshold. The weather was sky obscured, 400 ft ceiling, visibility 1 1/2 miles in fog.
The CVR showed that 25 see before impact, a crewmember had stated, "You better go to raw
data; I don't trust that thing." The next airplane on the approach, 4 minutes later, made a missed
approach due to visibility below minimums. The accident airplane had been converted from a
Northeast Airlines to a Delta Air Lines configuration in April, 1973, at which time the Collins flight
directorhad been replaced with a Sperry device;therehad been numerous writcups formechanical
deficienciessincethattime. The flightdirectorcommand barswere different(seefig.11,page 20
for the two presentations),as were the rotaryswitches controllingthe flightdirector.The crew
were former Northeast Airlines pilots. If the crew had been operating in the go-around mode,
which required only a slight extra motion of the replacement rotary switch, the crew would have
received steering and wing-leveling guidance only, instead of ILS guidance. Required altitude
callouts were not made during the approach.
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The NTSB found the probable cause to be the failure of the crew to monitor altitude and their
passage through decision height during an unstabilized approach in rapidly changing
meteorological conditions. The unstabflized approach was due to passage of the outer marker
above the glide slope, fast, in part due to nonstandard ATC procedures. This was compounded by
the flight crew's preoccupation with questionable information presented by the flight director
system.
The Board commented that, "An accumulation of discrepancies, none critical (in themselves),
can rapidly deteriorate, without positive flight management, into a high-risk simation...the fh'st
officer, who was flying, was preoccupied with the information presented by his flight director
system, to the detriment of his attention to altitude, heading and airspeed control..." (NTSB,
I974b)
4/12/77: Delta Air Lines L-lOll, Los Angeles, CA
This airplane landed safely at Los Angeles after its left elevator jammed in the full up position
shortly after takeoff from San Diego. The flight crew found themselves unable to control the
airplane by any normal or standard procedural means. They were able, after considerable
difficulty, to restore a limited degree of pitch and roll control by using differential power on the
three engines. Using power from the tail-mounted center engine to adjust pitch and wing engines
differentially to maintain directional control, and verifying airplane performance at each successive
configuration change during an emergency approach to Los Angeles, the crew succeeded in
landing the airplane safely and without damage to the aircraft or injury to its occupants.
(McMahon, 1978)
12/181977: United Airlines DC-8, near Kaysville, UT
A cargo aircraft encountered electrical problems during its approach to the Salt Lake City
Airport. The flight requested and accepted a holding clearance from the approach controller. The
flight then requested and received clearance to leave the approach control frequency in order to
communicate with Company maintenance (one of the two communications radios had failed due to
the electrical problem). Flight 2860 was absent from the approach control frequency for over 7
minutes, during which time the flight entered an area near hazardous terrain. The approach
controller recognized the crew's predicament but was unable to contact the flight.
When the crew returned to his frequency, the controller told the flight that it was too close to
terrain on its right and to make an immediate left turn. After the controller repeated the
instructions, the flight began a left turn. About 15 seconds later, the controller told the flight to
climb immediately to 8000 ft. Eleven seconds later, the flight reported that it was climbing from
6000 to 8000 ft. The airplane crashed into a 7665 ft mountain near the 7200 ft level.
The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the approach controller's
issuance and the flight crew's acceptance of an incomplete and ambiguous holding clearance, in
combination with the flight crew's failure to adhere to prescribed impairment-of-communications
procedures and prescribed holding procedures. The controller's and flight crew's actions were
attributed to probable habits of imprecise communication and of imprecise adherence to
procedures, developed through years of exposure to operations in a radar environment. A
contributing factor was failure of the airplane's no. 1 electrical system for unknown reasons. The
Board noted that the GPWS would not have provided a warning until 7.7 to 10.2 sec before
impact, which was too late because of the rapidly rising terrain. (NTSB, 1978a)
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5/8/1978: National Airlines B727-235, Escambia Bay, Pensacola, FL
Flight 193 crashed into Escambia Bay about 3 miles short of the runway while executing a
surveillance radar approach to Pensacola Airport runway 25 at night in limited visibility. The
aircraft came to rest in about 12 ft of water. Of 58 persons on board, 3 passengers drowned.
The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the flight crew's
unprofessionally conducted nonprecision insu'ument approach, in that the captain and crew failed
to monitor the descent rate and altitude and the first officer failed to provide the captain with
required altitude and approach performance callouts. The crew failed to check and utilize all
instruments available for altitude awareness, turned off the ground proximity warning system, and
failed to configure the aircraft properly and in a timely manner for the approach. Contributing. to
the accident were the radar controller's failure m provide advance notice of the start-descent point,
which accelerated the pace of the crew's cockpit activities after the passage of the final approach
fix.
The Board noted that the approach was rushed, that final flaps were never extended and that
the captain was unable to establish a stable descent rate after descending below 1300 ft. The
captain either misread or did not read his altimeters during the latter stages of the approach; the first
officer did not make any of the required altitude callouts. The flight engineer's inhibition of the
GPWS coincided with the captain's raising the nose and decreasing the descent rate. The pilots
were misled into believing the problem was solved. (NTSB, 1978b)
1212811978: United Airlines DC-8-61, Portland, OR
This airplane crashed into a wooded area during an approach to Portland International Airport.
The airplane had delayed southeast of the airport for about an hour while the flight crew coped with
a landing gear malfunction and prepared its passengers for a possible emergency landing. After
failure of all four engines due to fuel exhaustion, the airplane crashed about 6 miles southeast of
the airport, with a loss of 10 persons and injuries to 23.
The NTSB found the probable cause to be the failure of the Captain to monitor the fuel state
and to respond properly to a low fuel state and to crewmember advisories regarding the fuel state.
His inattention resulted from preoccupation with the landing gear malfunction and preparations for
the possible emergency landing. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the other two crew
members to fully comprehend the criticality of the fuel state or to successfully communicate their
concern to the Captain. The Board discussed crew coordination, management and teamwork in its
report. (NTSB, 1979a)
3/1011979: Swift Aire Aerospatiale Nord 262, Marina Del Rey, CA
This commuter aircraft was taking off at dusk from Los Angeles enroute to Santa Maria, CA,
when a crewmember transmitted "Emergency, going down" on tower frequency. Wimesses stated
that the right propellor was slowing as the airplane passed the far end of the runway; popping
sounds were heard as it passed the shoreline. The airplane turned north parallel to the shoreline,
descended, ditched smoothly in shallow water, and sank immediately. The cockpit partially
separated from the fuselage at impact. The accident was fatal to the two crewrnembers and one
passenger.
The flaps were set at 35", the right propellor was fully feathered and the left propellor was in
flight fine position. It was found that the right propellor pitot pressure line had failed; the line was
deteriorated and would have been susceptible to spontaneous rupture or a leak. The left engine fuel
valve was closed (it is throttle-actuated). Once the fuel valve has been closed, the engine's
propellor must be feathered and a normal engine start initiated to reopen the valve. The aircraft
operating manual did not state this and the pilots did not know it.
170
The NTSB found that the right engine had autofeathered when the pitot pressure line had
failed; the pilots shut down the left engine shortly thereafter, probably due to improper
identification of the engine that had failed. Their attempts to restart the good engine were
unsuccessful because of their unawareness of the proper starting sequence after a fuel valve has
been closed. Engine failure procedures were revised following this accident. (NTSB, 1979b)
11/1111979: Aeromexico DC-10.30 over Luxembourg
During an evening climb in good weather to 31,000 ft enroute to Miami from Frankfurt, flight
945 entered pre-staU buffet and a sustained stall at 29,800 ft. Stall recovery was affected at 18,900
ft. The crew performed a functional check of the airplane and after finding that it operated properly
they continued to its intended destination. After arrival, it was discovered that parts of both
outboard elevators and the lower fuselage tail maintenance access door were missing.
The flight data recorder showed that the airplane slowed to 226 kt during a climb on autopilot,
quite possibly in vertical speed mode rather than indicated airspeed mode. Buffet speed was
calculated to be 241 kt. After initial buffet, the #3 engine was shut down and the airplane slowed
to below stall speed.
The NTSB found the probable cause to be failure of the flight crew to follow standard climb
procedures and to adequately monitor the airplane's flight instruments. This resulted in the aircraft
entering into prolonged stall buffet which placed it outside the design envelope. (NTSB, 1980)
10/7/1970: Aircraft Separation Incidents at Hartsfield Airport, Atlanta, GA
This episode involved several conflicts among aircraft operating under the direction of air
traffic control in the Atlanta terminal area. In at least two cases, evasive action was required to
avoid coUisions. The conflicts were caused by multiple failures of coordination and execution by
several controllers during a very busy period.
The NTSB found that the near collisions were the result of inept traffic handling by control
personnel. This inepmess was due in part to inadequacies in training, procedural deficiencies, and
some difficulties imposed by the physical layout of the control room. The Board also found that
the design of the low altitude/conflict alert system contributed to the controller's not recognizing the
conflicts. The report stated that, "The flashing visual conflict alert is not conspicuous when the
data tag is also flashing in the handoff status. The low altitude warning and conflict alerts utilize
the same audio signal which is audible to all control room personnel rather than being restricted to
only those immediately concerned with the aircraft. This results in a 'cry wolf syndrome in which
controllers are psychologically conditioned to disregard the alarms." (NTSB, 1981)
1113/1982: Air Florida B-737, Washington National Airport, DC
This airplane crashed into the 14th Street bridge over the Potomac River shortly after takeoff
from Washington National Airport in snow conditions, killing 74 of 79 persons on board. The
airplane had been de-iced 1 hour before depama_, but a substantial period of time had elapsed
since that operation before it reached takeoff position. The engines developed substantially less
than takeoff power during the takeoff and thereafter due to incorrect setting of takeoff power by the
pilots. It was believed that the differential pressure probes in both engines were iced over,
prodding incorrect (too high) EGT indications in the cockpit. This should have been detected by
examination of the other engine instruments, but was not.
The NTSB found that the probable cause of the accident was the flight crew's failure to use
engine anti-ice during ground operation and takeoff, their decision to take off with snow/ice on the
airfoils, and the captain's failure to reject the takeoff at an early stage when his attention was called
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to anomalous engine instrument readings. Contributing factors included the prolonged ground
delay afterdeicing,the known inherentpitchingcharacteristicsof the B-737 when the wing leading
edges are contaminated, and the limited experience of the flightcrew in jet transport winter
operations.(NTSB, 1982)
91311983: Korean Air Lines B.747 over Sakhalin Island, USSR
The airplanewas destroyed in cruiseflightby air-to-airmissilesfiredfrom a Soviet fighter
afteritstrayedintoa forbidden area enroute fi'omAnchorage, AK to Socul,Korea. The airplane
had twice violatedSoviet airspace during itsflight.The flightdata and cockpit voice recorders
were not recovered from the sea. Afterextensiveinvestigationby the InternationalCivilAviation
Organization, itwas believed thatitsaberrant flightpath had been the resultof one or more
incorrectsetsof waypoints loaded intotheINS systems priorto departurefrom Anchorage.
Many years later,the Russian government made availablefurtherinformation on the flight
which supported a findingthatthe crew had inadvertentlyleftthe airplane'sautopilotin heading
mode ratherthan INS mode for an extended period of time. As a result, the flightpath took the
airplaneover Soviet territory,where itwas destroyed by a Soviet fighter.(Stein,1985; see also
incidentof 2/13/90.)
212811984: Scandinavian Airlines DC-10-30, J. F. Kennedy Airport, NY
After crossing the runway threshold atproper height but 50 kt above reference speed, the
airplane touched down 4700 ftbeyond the threshold of an 8400 ftrunway and could not be
stopped on the runway. Itwas steeredto the rightand came to restin water 600 ftfrom the
runway end. A few passengers sustainedminor injuriesduring evacuation. The weather was very
poor and the runway was wet.
The airplane'sautothrottlesystem had been unreliablefor approximately one month and had
not reduced speed when commanded during the first(Stockholm-Oslo) leg of thisflight.The
Captain had deliberatelyselected168 kt tocompensate for a dLreatenedwind shear. The throttles
did not retardpassing 50 ftand did notrespond to the autothzottlespeed controlsystem commands
(theflightcrew was not requiredto use theautothrottlespeed controlsystem forthisapproach).
The NTSB citedas the probable cause the flightcrew's disregardfor prescribed procedures
for monitoring and controllingairspeed during the finalstagesof the approach, itsdecision to
continue the landingratherthan toexecute a missed approach, and overrelianceon the autothrottlc
specd controlsystem which had a historyof recentmalfunctions. Itnoted that"performance was
eitheraberrantor representsa tendency for the crew to be complacent and over-relyon automated
systems". Italso noted thattherewere threespeed indicationsavailableto the crew: itsairspeed
indications,the fast-slowindicatorson the attitudedirector,and an indicatedverticalspeed of 1840
ftper minute on glide slope. In itsreport,the Board discussed the issue of overreliance on
automated systems at length (report pp. 37-39) and cited several other examples of the
phenomenon. (NTSB, 1984)
2/1911985: China Airlines B747-SP, 300 miles northwest of San Francisco
The airplane,flyingat41,000 ftem'outetoLos Angeles from Taipei,sufferedan inflightupset
afteran uneventful flight.The airplanewas on autopilotwhen the#4 engine lostpower. During
attempts to relight the engine, the airplane rolled to the right,nosed over and began an
uncontrollabledescent. The Captain was unable torestorethe airplanetostableflightuntilithad
descended to 9500 ft.
The autopilotwas operating in the performance management system (PMS) mode for pitch
guidance and altitudehold. Roll commands were provided by the INS; in thismode, the autopilot
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uses only the ailerons and spoilers for lateral control; rudder and rudder trim arc not used. In light
turbulence, that airspeed began to fluctuate; the PMS followed the fluctuations and retarded the
throttles when airspeed increased. As the airplane slowed, the PMS moved the throttles forward;
engines 1, 2 and 3 accelerated but #4 did not. The fright engineer moved the #4 throttle forward
but without effect The INS caused the autopilot to hold the left wing down since it could not
correct with rudder. The airplane decelerated due to the lack of power. After attempting to correct
the situation with autopilot, the Captain disengaged the autopilot at which time the airplane rolled to
the right, yawed, then entered a steep descent in cloud, during which it exceeded maximum
operating speed. It was extensively damaged during the descent and recovery; the landing gear
deployed, 10-11 ft of the left horizontal stabilizer was tom off and the no. 1 hydraulic system lines
were severed. The right stabilizer and 3/4 of the right outboard elevator were missing when the
airplane landed; the wings were also bent upward.
The NTSB determined that the probable cause was the Captain's preoccupation with an
inflight malfunction and his failure to monitor properly the airplane's flight instruments which
resulted in his losing control of the airplane. Contributing to the accident was the Captain's
overreliance on the autopilot after a loss of thrust on #4 engine. The Board noted that the autopilot
effectively masked the approaching onset of loss of control of the airplane. (NTSB, 1986)
313111986: United Airlines B-767, San Francisco, CA
This airplanewas passingthrough 3100 fton itsclimb from San Francisco when both engines
lost power abruptly. The engines were restartedand the airplanereturnedto San Francisco,where
it landed without incident. The crew reported that engine power was lost when the flight crew
attempted to switch from manual operation to the engine electronic control system, a procedure
which prior to that time was normally carded out at 3000 R during the climb. The EEC switches
are guarded. It is believed that the crew may have inadvertently shut off fuel to the engines when
they intended to engage the EEC, as in the incident cited immediately below. (AWST, 1986)
613011987: Delta Air Lines B-767, Los Angeles, CA
Over water, shortly after takeoff from Los Angeles, this twin-engine airplane suffered a
double-engine failure when the captain, attempting to deactivate an electronic engine controller in
response to an EEC caution light, shut off the fuel valves instead. The crew was able to restart the
engines within one minute after an altitude loss of several hundred feet. The fuel valves were
located immediately above the electronic engine control switches on the airplane center console,
though the switches were dissimilar in shape.
The FAA thereafter issued an emergency airworthiness directive requiring installation of a
guard device between the cockpit fuel control switches. (AWST, 1987)
718/1987: Delta Air Lines L-lOI1/Continental Airlines B-747 over Atlantic Ocean
These two airplanes experienced a near midair collision over the north Atlantic ocean after the
Delta airplane strayed 60 miles off its assigned oceanic route. The incident, which was observed
by other aircraft in the area but not, apparently, by the Delta crew, was believed to have been
caused by an incorrectly inserted waypoint in the Delta airplane's INS prior to departure. (Preble,
1987)
8/1611987: Northwest Airlines DC9-82, Detroit Metro Airport, Romulus, MI
The airplane crashed almost immediately after takeoff from runway 3C I enroute to Phoenix.
The airplane began its rotation about 1200-1500 feet from the end of the 8500 ft runway and lifted
i Runways are numbered to indicate their magnetic heading to the nearest 10"; 3=30" (actually
from 26-34"). Parallel runways also have letter designators: L=left, C=center, R--right.
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off near the end. After liftoff, the wings rolled to the left and right; it then collided with a light pole
located 1/2 mile beyond the end of the nmway. 154 persons were killed; one survived.
During the investigation, it was found that the trailing edge flaps and leading edge slats were
fully retracted. Cockpit voice recorder (CVR) readout indicated that the takeoff warning system
did not function and thus did not warn the flight crew that the airplane was improperly configured
for takeoff.
The NTSB attributed the accident to the flight crew's failure to use the taxi checklist to insure
that the flaps and slats were extended. The failure of the takeoff warning system was a
contributing factor. This airplane has a stall protection system which announces a stall and
incorporates a stick pusher, but autos]at extension and post-stall recovery is disabled ff the slats are
retracted. Its caution and warning system also provides tone and voice warning of a staB, but this
is disabled in flight by nose gear extension. (NTSB, 1988b)
6/26/1988: Air France Airbus A320, Mulhouse-Habsheim, France
This airplane crashed into tall trees following a very slow, very low altitude flyover at a
general aviation airfield during an air show. Three of 136 persons aboard the aircraft were killed;
36 were injured. The Captain, an experienced A320 check pilot, was demonstrating the slow-
speed maneuverability of the then-new airplane.
The French Commission of Inquiry found that the flyover was conducted at an altitude lower
than the minimum of 170 ft specified by regulations and considerably lower than the intended 100
ft altitude level pass briefed to the crew by the captain prior to flight. It stated that, "The training
given to the pilots emphasized all the protections from which the A320 benefits with respect to Rs
lift which could have given them the feeling, which indeed is justified, of increased
safety...However, emphasis was perhaps not sufficiently placed on the fact that, if the (angle of
attack) limit cannot be exceeded, it nevertheless exists and still affects the performance." (emphasis
supplied) The Commission noted that automatic go-around protection had been inhibited and that
this decision was compatible with the Captain's objective of maintaining 100 ft. In effect, below
100 ft, this protection was not active.
The Commission attributed the cause of the accident to the very low flyover height, very slow
and reducing speed, engine power at flight idle, and a late application of go-around power. It
commented on insufficient flight preparation, inadequate task sharing in the cockpit, and possible
overconfidence because of the envelope protection features of the A320. (Ministry of Planning,
Housing, Transport and Maritime Affairs, 1989)
8/3111988: Delta Airlines B727-232, Dallas-Fort Worth Airport, TX
The airplane, flight 1141, crashed shortly after takeoff from runway 18L enroute to Salt Lake
City. The takeoff roll was normal but as the main gear left the ground the crew heard two
explosions and the airplane began to roll violently; it struck an ILS antenna 1000 ft past the runway
end after being airborne for about 22 see. 14 persons were killed, 26 injured, 68 uninjured.
The investigation showed that the flaps and slats were fully retracted. Evidence suggested that
there was an intermittent fault in the takeoff warning system that was not detected and corrected
during the last maintenance action. This problem could have manifested itself during the takeoff.
The NTSB found the probable cause to be the Captain's and f'_st officer's inadequate cockpit
discipline and failure of the takeoff configuration warning system to alert the crew that the airplane
was not properly configured for takeoff. It found as contributing factors certain management and
procedural deficiencies and lack of sufficiently aggressive action by FAA to correct known
deficiencies in the air carrier. The Board took note of extensive non-duty related conversations and
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the lengthypresencein thecockpitof a flight attendant which reduced the flight crew's vigilance in
insuring that the airplane was properly prepared for flight, oVrSB, 1988a)
3/1011989: Air Ontario Fokker F-28, Dryden, Ontario, Canada
This airplane was dispatched from Winnipeg, Man. to Thunder Bay, Ont., thence via Dryden,
Ont. back to Winnipeg, with an inoperative auxiliary power unit. While preparing for the return
trip at Thunder Bay, the crew found more passengers than had been planned for or could be
accommodated if enough fuel for the entire flight to Winnipeg was boarded, as it had been. The
captain preferred to offload passengers rather than fuel; he was overruled by the company. This
action required a delay for defueling at Thunder Bay and a landing at Dryden to take on additional
fuel. The company's system operations center did not inform the captain of freezing rain forecast
for Dryden.
Upon arriving at Dryden, which had no ground power units with which to start the airplane's
engines, the captain was required to take on fuel with one engine running. This was a permitted
action, though it was performed with passengers on board, which was not permitm& The airplane
could not be de-iced with engines running, however, and freezing rain was falling prior to his
takeoff, which was also delayed by a lost aircraft trying to land. The airplane crashed immediately
after takeoff; ice was noted on the wings by surviving passengers and cabin crew.
The captain in this accident was placed in a "triple bind". He could not uplift sufficient fuel to
fly to Winnipeg with the full passenger load. If he landed at Dryden, he could refuel but could not
de-ice if requixe_ The defueling at Thunder Bay had already made his flight over one hour late.
He received inadequate information and no guidance from his company.
The subsequent Commission of Inquiry found a large number of latent factors at many levels
within the company, its parent, Air Canada, and Transport Canada, the regulatory authority.
(Moshansky, 1992)
11/2111989 British Airways B747, Heathrow Airport, London, England
The aircraft approached London in very bad weather after a flight from Bahrain. Fuel was
low due to headwinds; the copilot had been incapacitated for part of the flight due to gastroenteritis
and diarrhea. The copilot was not certified for category II or I11 landings. BA flight operations
authorized the approach despite the copilot's lack of qualifications. The approach, to runway 27
instead of 9 as briefed, was hurried. When the aircraft captured the localizer and glide slope, the
autopilots failed to stabilize the aircraft, possibly due to late capture of the radio beams. 125 feet
above ground, the runway was not in sight and the captain gently began a missed approach. The
aircraft sank to 75 feet above ground before gaining altitude. After a second, successful approach,
the aircraft landed safely.
An investigation by British Airways disclosed that during the first approach, the aircraft had
been seriously to the right of the localizer course and had overflown a hotel to the north of the
airport only a few feet above the highest obstacle on its course. The pilot and crew were
suspended; legal action was later taken against the captain for endangering the passengers and
persons on the ground. (Wilkinson, 1994)
1/25/1990: Avianea B-707-321, Cove Neck, New York
Avianca flight 052 crashed in a wooded residential area during an approach to Kennedy
International Airport after all engines failed due to fuel exhaustion. The flight from Medellin,
Colombia had been placed in holding patterns three times for a total of about 1.3 hours. During the
third period of holding, the crew reported that the airplane could not hold longer than 5 minutes,
that it was running out of fuel, and that it could not reach its alternate airport in Boston.
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Subsequently, the flight executed a missed approach at Kennedy. While trying to return to the
airport, the airplane lost power in all four engines and crashed 16 miles from the runway.
The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the flightcrew
to adequately manage the airplane's fuel load, and their failure to communicate an emergency fuel
situation to air traffic control before fuel exhaustion occurred. Contributing to the accident was the
flightcrew's failure to use an airline operational control dispatch system to assist them during the
international flight into a high-density airport in poor weather. Also contributing was inadequate
traffic flow management by the FAA and the lark of standardized understandable terminology for
pilots and controllers for minimum and emergency fuel states. Windshear, crew fatigue and stress
were other factors that led to the unsuccessful completion of the first approach and thus conmbuted
to the accident. (NTSB, 1991a)
211311990 E1 AI B747 and British Airways B747 over the Atlantic Ocean
An E1 A1 B-747 enroute from Tel Aviv to New York almost collided with a British Airways
747 in the Reykjavik Flight Information Region after its crew failed to switch back from heading
mode to INS mode after being cleared by Shanwick control to a new oceanic track. The crew
deviated 110 um north of the new track before realizing their error. Upon recognizing the error,
the flightcrew notified ATC but provided no infccmation on the magnitude of their deviation. ATC
cleared them to turn left to reintercept their cleared track, which they did.
The near collision occurred while the crew were navigating bark to the correct track without
descending 1000 ft below the prevailing traffic flow, as prescribed by North Atlantic Special
Procedures for In-fright Contingencies. The E1 Al 747 passed right-to-left ahead of a westbound
British Airways 747 which took evasive action, missing E1 Al by approximately 600 ft. (Pan
American World Airways, 1990)
211.411990: Indian Airlines Airbus A320, Bangalore, India
(Official report not available) This airplane crashed short of the runway during an approach to
land in good weather, killing 94 of 146 persons aboard including the pilots. The best available
data indicates that the airplane had descended at idle power in the "idle open descent" mode until
shortly before the accident, when an attempt was made to recover by adding power but too late to
permit engine spool-up prior to impact. The airplane was being flown by a Captain undergoing a
route check by a check airman.
The crew allowed the speed to decrease to 25 kt below the nominal approach speed late in the
descent. The recovery from this condition was started at an altitude of only 140 ft, while flying at
minimum speed and maximum angle of attack. The check captain noted that the flight director
should be off, and the trainee responded that it was off. The check captain corrected him by
stating, "But you did not put off mine". If either flight director is engaged, the selected autothrust
mode will remain operative, in this case, the idle open descent mode. The alpha floor mode was
automatically activated by the declining speed and increasing angle of attack; it caused the
autothrust system to advance the power, but this occurred too late for recovery to be affected
before the airplane impacted the ground. (Lenorovitz, 1990)
121311990: Northwest Airlines B-727 and DC-9, Detroit Metro Airport, MI
These two aircu'aftcollidedwhile the727 was takingoffand the DC-9 had justinadvertently
taxiiedonto the activerunway. The DC-9 was loston the airportin severelyrestrictedvisibility.
Both aircraftwere on the ground. The accident sitewas not visiblefrom the tower due to fog;
ASDE was not available.
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The Board determined that the probable cause of the accident was a lack of proper crew
coordination, including a reversal of roles, on the part of the DC-9 pilots. This led to their failure
to stop taxiing and alert the ground controller of their positional uncertainty in a timely manner
before and after intruding onto the active runway. A number of contributing factors were also
cited. (NTSB, 1991b)
2/111991: US Air B-737 and Skywest Fairchild Metro, Los Angeles, CA
This accident occurred after the US Air airplane was cleared to land on runway 24L at Los
Angeles while the Skywest Metro was positioned on the runway at an intersection awaiting takeoff
clearance. There were 34 fatalities and 67 survivors. The Metro may not have been easily visible
from the control tower;, airport surface detection radar equipment (ASDE) was available but was
being used for surveillance of the south side of the airport. The controller was very busy just prior
to the time of the accident.
The NTSB investigation indicated that the controller cleared the Metro into position at an
intersection on runway 24L, 2400 ft from the threshold, two minutes before the accident. One
minute later, the 737 was given a clearance to land on runway 24L. The Board determined that the
probable cause of the accident was the failure of Los Angeles Air Traffic Facility management to
implement procedures that provided adequate redundancy and the failure of FAA's Air Traffic
Management to provide adequate policy direction and oversight. These failures ultimately led to
the failure of the local controller to maintain awareness of the traffic situation. (NTSB, 1991c)
512611991 Lauda Air (Austria) B767-300ER over Thailand
This airplane was climbing to altitude on a flight between Bangkok and Vienna when its fight
engine reverser actuated because of a mechanical failure. The flight crew was unable to control the
airplane due to the high level of reverse thrust coming from the right engine. The airplane crashed
after an uncontrolled descent. Simulation studies indicated that recovery from such an event was
not possible for pilots without advance knowledge of the event. (Ministry of Transport and
Communications, Thailand, 1993)
8/12/1991: Ansett Australia A320 and Thai Airways DC-IO: Sydney, Australia
During simultaneous crossing runway operations at Kingsford Smith Airport, a Thai DC-10
was landing on runway 34 and an Ansett A320 was on short final approach for intersecting
runway 25. Landing instructions for the DC-10 included a requirement for the aircraft to hold
short of the runway 25 intersection. While observing the DC-10's landing roll during his landing,
the A320 captain judged that the DC-10 might not stop before the runway intersection. He elected
to initiate a missed approach from a low height above the runway. The go-around was successful;
the A320 passed the centerline of runway 34 at a radio altitude of 52 ft. Under heavy braking, the
DC-10 slowed to about 2 kts ground speed when it reached the edge of nmway 25.
During the A320 go-around, differing attitude command inputs were recorded from the left
and fight sidesticks for a period of 12 seconds. Neither the captain, who had taken over control,
or the copilot, was aware of control stick inputs from the copilot during this period. Activation of
the "takeover button" on the control stick was not a part of Ansett's standard operating procedures.
The incident analysis noted that "Although the A320 successfully avoided the DC-10, under
different circumstances the cross controlling between the pilots could have jeopardized a safe go-
around...This simultaneous input situation would almost certainly have been immediately apparent,
and corrected rapidly had there been a sense of movement between the two sidesticks." (Bureau of
Air Safety Investigation, 1993)
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12/12/1991: Evergreen International Airways B.747, Nakina, Ontario, Canada
While in cruiseflightat31000 ft,a cargo aircraftentereda steeprightbank (greaterthan 90°)
and descended more than 10000 feetat speeds approaching Mach 1. During the recovery, with
verticalaccelerationsgreaterthan 3g, therightwing was damaged. About 20 feetof honeycomb
structurefrom the underside of the wing was missing;,a small honeycomb panel on the upper
portionof the wing was damaged and some structurewas protruding intothe airstream. Upon
recovery from the dive,the aircraftwas experiencing controldifficulties;the crew successfully
divertedtoDuluth, MN. During the approach and landing,the leftand right.flaps,as well as the
righthorizontalstabilizer,were damaged by debrisfrom the damaged rightwang. There were no
injuries.
The TransportationSafetyBoard of Canada determined thatthe flightupset was caused by an
uncommanded, insidious rollinput by the channel A autopilotrollcomputer, the rollwent
undetected by the crew untilthe aircrafthad reached an excessive bank angle and consequential
high rateof descent. The recovery actionwas delayed slightlybecause of the time requiredby the
crew to determine the aircraftattitude.(NTSB, 1992a)
1/??11992: Air Inter Airbus A320 on approach to Strasbourg, France
The airplanewas being given radar vectorsto a non-precision (VOR-DME) approach to the
airportatSwasbourg. Itwas given vectorsthatlefttittletime for cockpitsetup priorto intercepting
the finalapproach course. Itisbelieved thatthe pilotsintended to make an automatic approach
using a flightpath angle of -3.3° from the finalapproach fix;thismaneuver would have placed
them atapproximately the correctpoint for visualdescent when they reached minimum descent
altitude.
The pilots,however, appear to have executed the approach in beading/verticalspeed mode
insteadof track/flightpath angle mode. The FlightControl Unit settingof"-33" yieldsa vertical
descent rateof -3300 ft/min in thismode, and thisisalmost preciselythe rate of descent the
airplanerealizeduntilitcrashed intomountainous terrainseveralmiles shortof the airport.A push
buttonon the FCU panel cyclestheautomation between H/VSI and T/FPA mode.
Modifications to A320 verticalspced/flightpathangle displays(inverticalspeed mode, four
digitsare shown; in flightpath angle mode, only two digitsare visible)were subsequently madc
availableby the manufacturer to avoid thiserror.New production A320s have been modified in
thismanner sinceNovember, 1993 (Aerospace, 1994a).
12/8/1992: United Airlines B737-291, Colorado Springs, CO
United Airlines flight 585 was on final approach course following a flight from Denver, CO to
Colorado Springs, CO under visual meteorological conditions when it was observed by numerous
eyewimesses to roll steadily to the right and pitch nose down, reaching a nearly vertical attitude
when it impacted the ground, killing all 25 occupants.
Despite an exhaustiveinvestigationwhich iscontinuing,the NTSB has thus farbeen unable to
identifyconclusive evidence to explain the lossof thisaircraft.Itis surmised by the Board that
eithera rudder control anomaly, or a "rotor",a horizontalaxiswind vortex,may have precipitated
the lossof control,but thisisnot certain.(NTSB, 1992b)
911411993: Lufthansa A320, Warsaw, Poland
The aircraft,carrying 70 persons,landed atWarsaw in a downpour with strong,gusty winds.
The pilotcarriedextra airspeedbecause of the wind conditions;a probable wind shear latein the
approach made itsground speed stillfasterattouchdown. The airplanelanded gentlydespitethe
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gusts. It continuedfor approximately 8 see after touchdown before being able to activate ground
spoilers and reverse thrust. The airplane overran the runway end, traversed an embankment
beyond the departure end and caught fire. Two persons, including the copilot, were killed; 55
were injured.
"Preliminary f'mdings of the Polish inquiry...suggest that the crew, having been advised of
wind shear and a wet runway, correctly added 20 kt to the approach speed. When the forecast
crosswind unexpectedly became a tailwind, making ground speed about 170 kt, the wheel spinup
and oleo squat switches did not (activate). For a critical 9 see (during which the aircraft may have
been aquaplaning) thrust reverse, wheelbraking and lift dumping (full spoiler deployment)
remained disarmed...Although the A320 was...still to have the softer landing double-oleo
modification, which might have 'made' the switches, the priority question raised by the accident is
whether pilots should have manual override of safety locks..." (Aerospace, 1994b; AWST, 1994a)
4/26/1994: China Airlines A-300-600R, Nagoya, Japan
During a normal approach to landing at Nagoya runway 34 in visual meteorological
conditions, the captain indicated he was going around but did not indicate why. Within the next 30
seconds, wimesses saw the aircraft in a nose-up attitude, rolling to its right before crashing tail-
first 300 ft to the right of the approach end of the runway.
During the approach, the copilot flying apparently triggered the autopilot TOGA (takeoff-go-
around) switch, whereupon the automation added power and commanded a pitch-up. The captain
warned the copilot of the mode change, but the copilot continued to attempt to guide the aircraft
down the glide slope while the automation countered his inputs with nose-up elevator trim.
Ultimately, with stabilizer trim in an extreme nose-up position, the copilot was unable to counteract
the trim with nose-down elevator. The aircraft nosed up to an attitude in excess of 50 ° , stalled, and
slid backwards to the ground. 264 people were killed in the crash.
This accident is still under civil and criminal investigation. It is presently thought that the pilots
failed "to realize that their decision (to continue the approach) contradicted the logic of the
airplane's automated safety systems. In February, 1991, an Interflug A310 at Moscow
experienced a sudden, steep pitch-up similar to the one observed in this accident." (Aviation Week
& Space Technology, 5/2/94, p. 26; 5/9/94, pp. 31-32; 12/5/94, p. 29)
On 8/31/94, The NTSB issued Safety Recommendations A-94-164 through -166 to the FAA.
Its Recommendation stated, "the Safety Board is concerned that the possibility still exists for a
pilot-induced 'runaway trim' situation at low altitude and that...such a situation could result in a
stall or the airplane landing in a nose-down attitude..." Referring to other transport category
aircraft autopilot systems, the Board said, "It is noted that the (autopilot) disconnect and warning
systems axe fully functional, regardless of altitude, and with or without the autopilot in the land or
go-around modes. The Safety Board believes that the autopilot disconnect systems in the Airbus
A-300 and A-310 are significantly different...additionally, the lack of a stabilizer-in-motion
warning appears to be unique to (these aircraft). The accident in Nagoya and the incident in
Moscow indicate that pilots may not be aware that under some circumstances the autopilot will
work against them if they try to manually control the airplane."
The Board recommended thatthese autopilot systems be modified to ensure that the autopilot
would disconnect if the pilot applies a specified input to the flight controls or trim system,
regardless of the altitude or operating mode of the autopilot, and also to provide a sufficient
perceptual alert when the trimmable horizontal stabilizer is in motion, irrespective of the source of
the trim command. (NTSB, 1994)
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6/6/1994: Dragonair A-320, Kai Tak Airport, Hong Kong
The airplane was attempting a landing at Kai Tak Airport during a severe storm. As the
aircraft banked at about I000 feet, it encountered a wind shear that registered -l.6g. It lost 12 kt of
airspeed in 1 second. The buffeting triggered its automatic flap locking safety mechanism, which
is set ff there is more than a 40 mm difference between the positions of the flaps to prevent them
from becoming asymmewical. The flaps locked at a full setting of 400, or "flaps 4" (the landing
position). The airplane's (leading edge) slats were in the no. 3 position of 22 °. Sensing an
anomaly, the electronic centralized aircraft monitoring system (ECAM) flashed a warning message
for the pilot to correct it by moving the flaps lever to Flaps 3.
Unable to do so, the pilot aborted the lauding. On the fourth try, he landed on runway 3 I,
which allowed an approach without a banking maneuver. Two passengers were slightly injured
after the aircraft ran off the runway. The incident is still under investigation. The article notes that
a similar incident apparently occurred to an Indian Airlines A320 in November, 1993. Airbus
Induswie has recommended since this incident that pilots disregard the ECAM warning message.
The software is being rewritten to eliminate the message; changes are also to be made in the flight
control computers to prevent discrepancies between the flap lever position and the position of the
flaps. (AWST, 1994)
6/2111994: Brittania Airways B757-200, Manchester, United Kingdom
The aircraft was at fight weight and was conducting a full-power takeoff. An altitude of 5000
ft had been selected. The autopilot went to altitude acquisition mode passing 2200 ft because of the
rapid climb speed. Power was reduced by the autothrust system and the airplane's speed began to
drop rapidly toward takeoff safety speed because of the high pitch angle. Flight director bars
continued to command pitch up, then disappeared fi'om view. The pilot reduced the pitch attitude
to 10 ° nose-up and normal acceleration resumed. This incident resembles in many respects the
more serious occurrence of the A330 at Toulouse (6/30/94, below), which also involved a rapid
switch to altitude acquisition mode after takeoff. (Civil Aviation Authority, UK, 1994)
6130/1994: Airbus A330-322 test flight, Toulouse Blagnac Airport, France:
This airplane was on a Category [] certification test flight to study various pitch transition
control laws in the autopilot Speed Reference System mode during engine failure at low altitude,
rearward center of gravity and light aircraft weight. The flight crew included an experienced test
pilot flying as captain, a copilot from a customer company, a flight test engineer, and three
passengers. The copilot was handling the aircraft.
During the takeoff, the copilot rotated the airplane slightly rapidly; the landing gear was
retracted. The autopilot was engaged 6 see after takeoff at a speed of 150 kt and a pitch angle of
almost 25 ° nose up. Immediately thereafter, the left engine was brought to idle power and one
hydraulic system was shut down, as planned for the test.
When the airplanereached 25° pitch angle,autopilotand flightdix_tor mode informationwere
automaticallyremoved from the PFD. A maximum pitch angle of 29 ° was reached 8 sec after
takeoff;the airplanewas decelerating.The angle of attackreached 14°,which activatedthealpha
protectionmode of the flightcontrols.The captaindisconnected the autopilot19 sec aftertakeoff.
Subsequent controlactionsby the captain,which included reducing power on the rightengine to
regaincontrol,deactivatedalpha floorprotectionon the leftengine. The airplaneslowed to 100 kt,
appreciablybelow minimum single-enginecontrolspeed of 118 k't,and yawed to the left.The left
wing then stalled;speed reached 77 kt with an increasingleftbank. Pitch angle reached 43 ° nose
down and the airplanecrashed 36 scc aftertakeoff.
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During investigation, it was found that the aircraft autopilot had gone into altitude acquisition
(ALT*) mode. In this mode, there was no maximum pitch limitation in the autoflight system
software. As a consequence, at low speed, ff a major thrust .change occurs (as.it did here.)., .the
autopilot can induce irrelevant pitch attitudes since it is still trying to follow an altatuae acqmsmon
path which it cannot achieve.
The investigating committee believed that the accident was caused by the conjunction of
several factors, none of which taken separately would have produced the accident. The committee
cited the planned and inadvertent conditions under which the flight test was undertaken (high
thrust, very aft center of gravity, trim within limits but nose-up, a selected altitucl_ of 2000 feet,
late and imprecise definition of respective tasks between the pilot and copilot regarding the test to
be performed, firm and quick rotation by the copilot, captain busy with the test actions, taking him
out of the piloting loop). They also noted that the lack of pitch protection in the ALT* mode of the
autopilot played a key role. Contributing factors included the inability of the/light crew to identify
the active autopilot mode (due to the FMA declutter action at 25 ° nose-up), crew confidence in the
anticipated aircraft reactions, late reaction of the flight test engineer to the rapid evolution of flight
paramemrs (particularly the airspeed), and a late captain reaction to an abnormal situation.
A subsequent published article noted that "Contradictory autopilot requirements appear as a
key factor that contributed to the loss of control: the 2,000 ft altitude was selected while the
autopilot also had to simultaneously .manage the combination of very low speed, an extremely high
angle of attack, and asymmetrical engane thrust." (Director General of Armaments (France), 1994)
7/211994: US Air DC-9-31, Charlotte, NC
The airplane was returning from Columbia, SC to Charlotte, NC, when it encountered a wind
shear during a very heavy rainstorm while on final approach to the Charlotte-Douglas Airport. A
wind shear alert had been received and the crew had briefed a missed approach ff necessary. The
captain flying ordered a missed approach at 200 feet because of poor visibility and strong, gusty
winds. The first officer initiated the missed approach; the landing gear was retracted and flaps
reduced from 40 ° (landing position) to 15 °. At 350 ft the crew felt a severe sink developing; full
throttles were applied, but full thrust occurred only about 3 see before impact, too late to arrest the
descent and impact about 0.2 nm to the right of runway 18R. 37 occupants were killed.
The crewmembers were unable to recall whether they had heard an aural warning, from the
wind shear detection system; investigation later revealed that the system's sensitivity _s sharply
reduced while wing flaps are in transit, to minimize the likelihood of false or nuisance warnings
when airflow over the wing is disturbed during the change of configuration. Data provided to the
NTSB by the system's manufacturer indicated that an alert would have been furnished 12 see after
a wind shear was detected if flaps were in transit, whereas an alert would have been generated in
the presence of a severe shear within 5 sec under other circumstances. As a result, the time lag
"rendered the system useless" because the warning "would have occurred too late" for the pilots to
perform a successful escape maneuver, according to the NTSB. It is not known whether the pilots
were aware of this automatic reduction in sensitivity during flap transit.
The NTSB recommended that the FAA issue a flight standards bulletin informing pilots that
wind shear warnings will be unavailable when flaps are in transit, and require modifications in the
standard wind shear alert system to delete the delay feature, thereby ensuring "prompt warning
activation" when flaps are transitioning between settings. The Board did not speak to the fact that
this delay was incorporated in the system's software specifically to avoid nuisance warnings
caused by temporary airflow disturbances. Honeywell had stated that such false alarms could
cause pilots to "overreact or lost confidence" in the system's detection capabilities. (Phillips,
1994c)
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91811994: US Air B737-300, Pittsburgh, PA
During a routine approach m Great Piusburgh International Airport, US Air flight 427 was
cleared to turn left to a heading of 100 °, reduce speed to 190 1_ and descend to 6000 ft in
preparation for a right downwind on a visual approach to runway 28R. The pilots extended their
slats and flaps to the "Flaps 1" position. As the airplane began its turn, it rolled left, then
decreased its bank angle, then increased it again to at least 100 ° as the nose pitched downward.
The airplane snuck the ground 23 sec later at an angle of about 80 ° and an airspeed in excess of
260 kt. The accident was not survivable.
The NTSB has undertaken extensive investigations of this accident, which thus far remains
unexplained. Dam collection is continuing. The similarity between certain aspects of rids accident
and a B737-291 accident at Colorado Springs, CO on 12/8/92, also unexplained, has prompted
intensive studies of rudder control and other aircraft mechanisms by the Board, the Boeing
Company and component manufacturers. In both cases, the Board has been hampered by the
availability of only limited dam from the flight dam recorders, which were older models with
limited paxameter recording capability. (Phillips, 1994b; see also page 69)
9/24/1994: Tarom (Romanian) Airlines A310-300, Orly Airport, Paris, France
The airplane, _g 182 persons on a flight fi'om Bucharest to Paris, was on final approach
to Orly Airport under visual meteorological conditions when it suddenly assumed a steep, nose-
high auimde, then rolled into a dive before the pilots regained control at 800 feet above ground.
No one was seriously injured and the airplane landed safely. A videotape taken by a wimess
showed the airplane in a steep nose-up attitude, then roiling off on one wing and descending in a
nose-down attitude for several seconds before recovery. The digital flight data re.corder was
apparently inoperative during the incident, but data were obtained from the cockpit voice recorder
and a direct access re,cord_ used for maintenance purposes.
It is believed that the autopilot"suddenly went into the 'level change' mode" because flap limit
speed was exceeded by 2 knots during the approach; this resulted in the pitch-up. "According to
one report, the electric trim countered the pilot's action" during the attempt to recover from the
pitch-up. (AWST, 1994b; Aerospace, 1994c; see also AWST, 1995b)
10/3111994: American Eagle Airlines ATR72, Roselawn, IN
The airplane went out of control and crashed after flying at 10,000 ft at relatively low airspeed
in a holding pattern for an extended period under icing conditions. The airplane carried a highly
capable digital flight data recorder, whose data indicated that severe lateral control instability
occurred, due, k is presently thought, to an accretion of ice ahead of the ailerons but aft of the wing
leading edge de-icer boots. The airplane was being flown on autopilot when control was first lost.
The accident is still under investigation, but the NTSB has issued urgent safety
recommendations. The FAA has warned ATR42/72 pilots to avoid prolonged flight under icing
conditions and to avoid high angles of attack if lateral instability occurs. Autopilot use under such
conditions is proscribed, because autopilot corrective actions can mask the onset of the
controllability problem. NTSB was aware of "similar, uncommandcd autopilot disengagements
and uncommanded lateral excursions" that have occurred on ATR42 aircraft in the past six years.
(Phillips, 1994a)
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Appendix 2: Wiener and Curry guidelines for aircraft automation
In a landmark paper in 1980, Earl Wiener and Renwick Curry discussed "Flight-Deck
Automation: Promises and Problems". Their contribution has been the stimulus for a great deal of
research during the 15 years since it was published. This chapter begins with a discussion of these
authors' thoughtson this subject.
Wiener and Curry pointed out that even in 1980, the question was "no longer whether one or
another function can be automated, but, rather, whether it should be" (p. 2). They questioned the
assumption that automation can eliminate human error. They pointed out failures in the interaction
of humans with automation and in automation itself.
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Fig. A2-1: Monitoring and control functions
(redrawn from Wiener and Curry, 1980).
They discussed control and
monitoring automation and
emphasize.A the independence of these
two forms of automation (figure A2-
1); "it is possible to have various
levels of automation in one dimension
independent of the other".
The authors then discussed
system goals and design philos-
ophies for control and monitoring
automation. They offered some
generalizations about advantages and
disadvantages of automating human-
machine systems and went on to
propose some guidelines for the
design and use of automated systems
in aircraft.
It is worth reviewing Wiener and Curry's guidelines because they foresaw many of the
advantages and disadvantages of automation as it is used today. The following are abstracted from
their guideline statements.
Control tasks
1. System operation should be easily interpretable by the operator to facilitate the detection of
improper operation and to facilitate the diagnosis of malfunctions.
. Design the automatic system to perform the task the way the user wants it done...this may
require user control of certain parameters, such as system gains (see guideline 7). Many
users of automated systems find that the systems do not perform the function in the
manner desired by the operator. For example, autopilots, especially older designs,.have
too much "wing waggle" for passenger comfort when tracking ground-based navigation
stations...Thus, many airline pilots do not use this feature...
. Design the automation to prevent peak levels of task demand from becoming
excessive...keeping task demand at reasonable levels will insure available time for
monitoring.
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4.... Theoperatormustbe trainedand motivated to use automation as an additional resource
(i.e., as a helper).
.
6.
Operators should be u_ained, motivated and evaluated to monitor effectively.
If automation reduces task demands to low levels, provide meaningful duties to maintain
operator involvement and resistance to distraction...it is extremely important that any
additional duties be meaningful (not "make-work")...
7. Allow for different operator "styles" (choice of automation) when feasible.
8. Insure that overatl system performance will be insensitive to different options, or styles of
operation...
. Provide a means for checking the setup and infonmtion input to automatic systems. Many
automatic system failures have been and will continue to be due to setup error, rather than
hardware failures. The automatic system itself can check some of the setup, but
independent error-checking equipment and procedures should be provided when
appropriate.
10. Extensive trainingisxvquired foroperatorsworking with automated equipment, not only
to insureproper operation and setup,but toimpart a knowledge of correctoperation (for
anomaly detection) and malfunction procedures (for diagnosis and treatment).
Monitoring tasks
1i. Keep falsealarm rateswithinacceptablelimits(recognizethe behavioraleffectof excessive
falsealarms).
12. Alarms with more than one mode, or more than one condition that can trigger the alarm for
a mode, must clearly in_catc which condition is responsible for the alarm display.
13. When response time is not critical, most operators will attempt to check the validity of the
alarm. Provide information in the proper format so thatthisvalidity check can be made
quickly and accurately...Also,provide the operator with information and controls to
diagnose the automatic system and warning system operation.
14. The format of the alarm should indicatethe degree of emergency. Multiple levelsof
urgency of the same conditionmay bc beneficial.
15. Devise training techniques and possibly training hardware...to insure that flightcrews axe
exposed to all forms of alerts and to many of the possible combinations of alerts, and that
they understand how to deal with them.
The authors concluded that "the rapid pace of automation is outstripping one's ability m
comprehend allthe implicationsfor crew performance. Itisun_alisticto callfor a haltto cockpit
automation untilthe manifestationsarc completely understood. We do, however, callfor those
designing, analyzing, and installingautomatic systems in the cockpit to do so carefully;to
recognize the behavioral effects of automation; to avail themselves of present and future guidelines;
and to be watchful for symptoms that might appear in training and operational settings..."
(emphasis supplied) Their comments arc as appropriate as when they were written.
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